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Abstract 
 
The emergence of bilateral regulatory cooperation between large states and jurisdictions is one of 
the most notable trends in global governance. Advocates underline its contribution to the protection 
of consumer safety, public health and the environment. It would further liberalise trade flows in a 
world of economic interdependence and support administrative efficiency in adopting and 
implementing regulations. Critics argue that regulatory cooperation would exert downward 
pressure on the stringency of regulations, provide asymmetric benefits for firms and business 
associations relative to civil society organisations and undermine the democratic accountability of 
law-makers. The relevance of these arguments depends on the extent to which states and 
jurisdictions engage in bilateral regulatory cooperation. The extent of regulatory cooperation 
usually corresponds to their choice of a bilateral regulatory cooperation strategy.   
This book aims to explain which factors constrain the choice of a bilateral regulatory cooperation 
strategy by large states and jurisdictions. It addresses an important puzzle. The existing literature 
uses factors, such as a large internal market, high regulatory capacity and high regulatory 
stringency, to explain the ability of states to externalise regulations and market-related measures. 
These factors, however, only partly, if at all, account for variation in their choice among different 
bilateral regulatory cooperation strategies. This puzzle also applies to the European Union, arguably 
the most prominent actor in bilateral regulatory cooperation at the time of writing. The research 
question that this book addresses is thus the following: What constrains the formation and choice 
of a bilateral regulatory cooperation strategy of a state or jurisdiction with high regulatory capacity? 
The answer that this book develops results from the deduction of a new integrative theoretical 
framework, the Inter-relational Institutionalism. It combines the two most prominent approaches in 
governance and interdependence research, the actor-centred institutionalism and the New 
Interdependence Approach. Moreover, this book integrates the different conceptualisations of 
bilateral regulatory cooperation strategies in the existing literature into a new typology. This 
typology differentiates strategies according to their ‘dimension’, i.e. their reference to regulatory 
policies or implementation procedures, and ‘depth’. It thus distinguishes between ‘regulatory 
alignment’, ‘equivalence’, ‘alignment of implementation procedures’ and ‘information exchange’.  
The Inter-relational Institutionalism developed in this book argues that the formation and choice of 
a bilateral regulatory cooperation strategy is constrained by three factors: the presence of 
bureaucratic pressure, the compatibility of regulatory institutions and the mobilisation of societal 
actors in support of regulatory cooperation. These factors become relevant at different steps in the 
process. First, bureaucratic pressure within regulatory bodies by the politically appointed or 
administrative leadership reduces uncertainty and the reluctance of technical regulatory officials to 
pursue regulatory cooperation. It initiates the formation of a regulatory cooperation strategy. 
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Second, the subsequent choice among the regulatory cooperation strategies is constrained by the 
compatibility of regulatory institutions between the domestic and the foreign jurisdiction. 
Regulatory institutions comprise regulatory competence allocations, called ‘regulatory authority 
structures’, and regulatory approaches, called ‘regulatory principles’. They are compatible if they 
do not allocate regulatory responsibilities to different authority levels and do not establish 
conflicting objectives and ideas. Regulators can choose ‘regulatory alignment’ if both regulatory 
authority structures and regulatory principles are compatible. They are, however, constrained to 
choose ‘equivalence’ if regulatory principles differ even if regulatory authority structures are 
compatible. Regulators can only opt for an ‘alignment of implementation procedures’ if regulatory 
principles are compatible but regulatory authority structures are not. Moreover, they can choose 
‘information exchange’ even if both regulatory authority structures and regulatory principles 
between the domestic and foreign jurisdiction are incompatible. Finally, the mobilisation of societal 
actors in support of regulatory cooperation pushes technical officials and bureaucratic leaders to 
adopt a regulatory cooperation strategy in accordance with the distribution of regulatory 
compatibilities.  
The ability of the Inter-relational Institutionalism to explain the choice of a regulator with high 
regulatory capacity is tested in four industry-sectoral regime case studies: chemicals, engineering, 
food safety as well as information and communication technology (ICT). This study investigates 
regulatory cooperation activities of the European Commission. The European Union is arguably 
the most active jurisdiction in bilateral regulatory cooperation. The analysis focuses on cooperation 
with the United States of America, a ‘least likely’ case for European Union regulators to require 
bureaucratic pressure for the initiation of regulatory cooperation. The case selection combines a 
‘least-likely’ logic for the explanatory capacity of the Inter-relational Institutionalism with a 
‘method of difference’ logic for variation on the independent variable ‘regulatory compatibilities’. 
The study selects the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA), the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC) 
and the negotiations over a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) from the history 
of transatlantic regulatory cooperation initiatives. It uses process-tracing to establish the causal 
mechanism and the role of societal actor mobilisation therein. The empirical analysis builds on an 
analysis of public and non-public documents as well as 26 expert interviews conducted between 
2015 and 2017.  
The theoretical contribution of this book is twofold: It refines the conceptualization of domestic 
constraints in international cooperation by linking previously separated literatures. The integration 
of actor-centred institutionalism and the New Interdependence Approach re-specifies the ‘domestic 
constraints’ argument by focussing on structural constraints on state and sub-state actors. Second, 
it specifies an alternative, complementary theoretical micro-foundation for the engagement of state 
and sub-state actors in international cooperation. It assumes a certain degree of autonomy for state 
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and sub-state actors in international cooperation and considers their own preference for using 
interdependence as an opportunity structure.  
Empirically, the findings of this book imply that the points of criticism towards regulatory 
cooperation can be soothed. The constraints imposed by regulatory compatibilities on regulators’ 
choice of a strategy makes it highly unlikely that bilateral regulatory cooperation lowers the level 
of protection for consumer safety, public health and the environment. At the same time, the results 
offer arguments why bilateral regulatory cooperation is likely to enhance administrative efficiency 
without undermining the democratic accountability of legislators and regulators. The concluding 
section of this book derives suggestions how bilateral regulatory cooperation may be designed 
effectively.   
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1. Introduction 
 
Regulatory cooperation is arguably the most important trend in global governance. It often takes place 
in international organisations such as committees of the United Nations (UN) and the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Since the late 1990s and in particular since the late 
2000s, regulatory cooperation also takes place between states and jurisdictions bilaterally. Institutional 
reforms in many jurisdictions have led to the creation of regulatory agencies and networks of regulators.  
Regulatory cooperation as a form of international cooperation follows the rise and continuation of 
globalisation and economic internationalisation. The advent and expansion of regulatory cooperation is 
especially accompanied by hopes to solve three important challenges in a globalised and interdependent 
world: First, regulatory cooperation is an instrument for regulators to shape and control international 
markets and ensure a high level of consumer safety and environmental protection even as markets grow 
and the boundaries of jurisdictions become blurred. Regulatory cooperation follows the establishment 
of ‘regulatory states’ (Majone, 1996) and the creation of regulatory capacity in many jurisdictions. Issues 
of consumer protection, health and environmental protection have been delegated to regulators and 
regulatory agencies from the United States (subsequently: US) to the European Union (subsequently: 
EU) to Japan. The coordination of regulations and their implementation among regulators from different 
jurisdictions shapes possibilities for regulators to ensure a high level of consumer safety and 
environmental protection in their own jurisdiction. Besides, it creates possibilities for regulators to 
extend their influence beyond the boundaries of their jurisdiction and raise the level of protection of 
consumers and the environment in states and jurisdictions outside their control. As markets 
internationalise, regulatory cooperation arguably helps to rein in frequently feared downward pressure 
on safety and environmental protection. The underlying argument runs as follows: As regulatory 
cooperation establishes a ‘level playing field’ for domestic and foreign firms, it protects firms from 
being undercut by competitors from other jurisdictions which are subject to less stringent regulation. It 
therefore reduces the pressure on regulators to lower the stringency of regulations to maintain the 
competitiveness of domestic firms. Standards can be safeguarded, if not raised as a result of regulatory 
cooperation.   
Second, regulatory cooperation promotes new ways of international trade liberalisation. As multilateral 
trade liberalisation and additional bilateral trade liberalisation have reduced or abolished most tariffs 
between countries, the main impediment to international trade flows are divergent rules and standards. 
Although they individually pursue legitimate objectives with regard to the protection of consumer safety, 
health and the environment, divergent regulations and administrative procedures between states 
constitute impediments to further international market integration. Regulatory cooperation that entails a 
coordination of regulations and administrative procedures between regulators thus helps create ‘a level 
playing field’ for domestic and foreign firms and reduces adjustment costs for firms that seek to enter a 
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new market. Regulatory cooperation is thus an important instrument of trade liberalisation especially 
for smaller firms that do not have the resources to adapt products and production processes to divergent 
regulatory requirements of different markets. The export or uploading of domestic standards and 
procedures particularly benefits domestic firms because it creates ‘first-mover advantages’ for firms 
which already comply with these standards and procedures (Zeitlin, 2015: 10). The economic benefits 
attributed to regulatory cooperation reflect arguments among economists that trade liberalisation 
enhances economic growth by increasing productivity through specialisation, enabling the use of 
economies of scale, fostering technology transfer, facilitating access to high-quality and low-cost 
imports, and increasing competition.  
Third, regulatory cooperation is an instrument for regulators to maintain their ability to regulate products 
and ensure consumer, health and environmental protection even as their budgets and administrative 
resources are being cut.  With the entry into office of the Trump Administration, the US Administration 
has announced budget cuts for regulatory agencies to counteract what it perceives as a growing over-
regulation of products and processes in the US. Similarly, in the EU, the prospect of Brexit will most 
probably reduce financial resources available to Commission regulators to elaborate new proposals for 
laws on consumer, health and environmental protection, adopt technical regulations and monitor their 
implementation. Cooperation and coordination among regulators from these and other jurisdictions 
therefore create possibilities for regulators to ensure their ability to act effectively despite the prospect 
of budget cuts. Cooperation and coordination can be envisioned in different forms: It may entail a 
division of tasks between regulators for the identification of regulatory challenges, the collection of data 
and the development of potential solutions as well as an exchange of ideas and best practices how 
effective regulation can be organised most efficiently. Regulatory cooperation thus protects regulatory 
effectiveness even if executives and legislatures implement budget cuts on regulators.  
Regulatory cooperation is, however, not only a technical exercise (Pollack, 2005: 912). It encompasses 
a redistributive dimension not only between firms of different jurisdictions, but according to critics of 
regulatory cooperation also between different actors within a jurisdiction. The criticism of regulatory 
cooperation addresses primarily three concerns: First, regulatory cooperation seeks to liberalise trade at 
the expense of the protection of consumers, public health and the environment. Regulatory cooperation 
often takes place within trade negotiations and is consequently promoted by trade negotiators. Critics 
argue that trade negotiators pay closer attention to liberalising trade flows through strategies such as 
mutual recognition and equivalence rather than ensuring that regulations and standards for which 
equivalence is recognised indeed achieve equivalent levels of protection (Siles-Brügge & de Ville, 
2015). This may trigger downward pressure on the level of consumer, health and environmental 
protection in the jurisdiction with the higher level of protection. Second, regulatory cooperation transfers 
issues relating to the safety and health of consumers into the technical competences of regulators and 
therefore contributes to disempower parliaments. Even if regulators are not able to change overarching 
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framework legislation through regulatory cooperation, information exchange between regulators and the 
recognition of regulations as equivalent in effect may constrain the scope for parliamentary decisions in 
the future. Critics call this effect the ‘regulatory chill’ (Bode, 2015). For this reason, Corporate Europe 
Observatory, together with other NGOs, has called regulatory cooperation a “threat to democracy” 
(Corporate Europe Observatory, 2016). Third, opponents of regulatory cooperation argue that it 
enhances the influence of firms and business associations in a jurisdiction at the expense of citizens and 
civil society organisations (Beuc, 2016; Greenpeace, 2016; Siles-Brügge & de Ville, 2015). Corporate 
Europe Observatory (2017) puts forward that regulatory cooperation gives disproportionate access to 
standard-setting and regulatory policy-making to firms. Firms and business associations often have more 
organisational and financial resources to monitor and participate in regulatory cooperation dialogues 
than non-governmental organisations and thus asymmetrically benefit from these processes.  
The objective of this book is not to analyse the validity of the arguments regarding the benefits and costs 
of regulatory cooperation or to take sides in this debate. It acknowledges that advocates of regulatory 
cooperation offer powerful arguments why cooperation between regulators from different jurisdictions 
in an interdependent environment is an advantageous instrument that warrants a closer examination. 
Yet, this book neither considers arguments proposed by critics and opponents of regulatory cooperation 
as less relevant nor argues that they lack a strong empirical basis. Its motivation to study regulatory 
cooperation lies in the increasing level of attention that regulatory cooperation attracts among both 
academic and practitioners.  
This chapter begins with a specification of the research interest that underlies this book (chapter 1.1.). 
Subsequently, it formulates the puzzle that has motivated the research for this book and presents the 
research questions (chapter 1.2). A next section summarises the main argument of this book (chapter 
1.3). A concluding section presents its outline (chapter 1.4).   
 
1.1. Relevance of bilateral regulatory cooperation strategies  
 
The observation that regulatory cooperation is a highly important trend in global governance constitutes 
the point of departure that helps explain the research interest of this book. This section begins with a 
brief overview of the regulatory cooperation activities by the EU, arguably the jurisdiction which has 
globally engaged the most in regulatory cooperation. It shows how regulatory cooperation that initially 
mostly took place within international organisations and at the multilateral level has additionally entered 
bilateral relations. It then addresses the response of academic literature to the emergence of regulatory 
cooperation as a prominent trade in global governance and identifies an important gap in this literature. 
Lastly, it outlines the relevance of the research interest that was the motivation for this book.      
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Regulatory cooperation shall be defined as coordination activities between regulators from different 
jurisdictions with a view to the promote the exchange of information and joint policy-making of 
regulatory policies and market-related measures. Regulatory cooperation reflects and reinforces the 
development of the ‘regulatory state’ (Majone, 1996) as well as the incidence of economic 
internationalisation. The development of the regulatory state describes the delegation of discretionary 
authority to independent regulators, regulatory agencies and commissions (Majone, 1996). Within the 
logic of the regulatory state, regulators and regulatory agencies set up transnational regulatory networks 
both within a jurisdiction (Groenleer, 2011) and with regulators and regulatory agencies from third 
countries (Zeitlin, 2015). Through these networks, regulators and regulatory agencies within their 
discretionary authority exchange information and promote joint regulatory policy-making.   
Two different levels of regulatory cooperation should be differentiated. On the one hand, governments 
and regulators engage in regulatory cooperation within international organisations and through 
multilateral agreements. International organisations in which governments and regulators seek 
regulatory cooperation include the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC) for the development of food 
safety standards, the International Standardisation Organisation (ISO) for the development of technical 
product standards, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) for the vehicle 
standards and the OECD for standards and procedures across numerous industry sectors and policy 
areas. Multilateral agreements in which regulatory cooperation has been anchored include the Technical 
Barriers to Trade (TBT) and Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPS) Agreements concluded within 
the WTO. Therein, mostly large states and jurisdictions attempt to vertically upload their standards and 
procedures and shape the decisions taken within international organisations and through multilateral 
agreements. For the purpose of this book, regulatory cooperation which takes place within international 
organisations and as a result of multilateral agreements shall be called ‘international regulatory 
cooperation’.  
On the other hand, governments and regulators also promote regulatory cooperation in bilateral 
relations. In the latter case, regulatory cooperation takes place through regulatory dialogues, interactions 
within transnational regulatory networks, and increasingly through the conclusion of bilateral free trade 
and economic partnership agreements. In doing so, regulators seek to horizontally expand the influence 
of domestic rules and procedures to third countries. This shift in the level of regulatory cooperation 
reflects a multitude of reasons, including the difficulty to reach common decisions in a growingly 
multipolar international environment and the perceived usefulness of individual bilateral coordination 
in advance of multilateral discussions (Peterson & Young, 2014; Young, 2010). Regulatory cooperation 
that occurs through regulatory dialogues and bilateral free trade and economic partnership agreements 
shall be referred to as ‘bilateral regulatory cooperation’.         
The spread of regulatory cooperation is a result and at the same time a driver of economic 
internationalisation and globalisation. Economic internationalisation shall be understood as “the 
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expansion of markets from the domestic level to the international level” (Damro, 2006: 175). It follows 
processes of trade liberalisation, the deregulation of domestic economies and technological 
development. Economic internationalisation and globalisation imply that decisions taken in one 
jurisdiction do not only affect the domestic jurisdiction, but also interact with decisions taken in other 
jurisdictions. 
The development of the regulatory state with numerous independent regulatory agencies has initially 
been a characteristic of the US (for a brief history of the development of regulatory agencies in the US 
see e.g. Pérez & Dudley, 2016). Yet, with the establishment of the Single European Market since the 
1990s, this development has become more pronounced in the EU and has subsequently put the EU ahead 
of all other jurisdictions in this regard (e.g. Levi-Faur, 2011; Thatcher, 2011; Majone, 1996). With the 
emergence of the EU as a ‘regulatory state’, the European Commission (subsequently ‘Commission’) 
has become particularly open to the engagement in regulatory cooperation. Correspondingly, the 
perception of US hegemony in international regulation (Simmons, 2001; Braithwaite & Drahos, 2000) 
has since the mid-2000s given way to the view that the EU has gained a decisive impact on international 
regulation, across a range of issues and sectors, often also in opposition to the US (Peterson & Young, 
2014; Bradford, 2012; Vogel, 2012; Lütz, 2011; Jacoby & Meunier, 2010; Newman & Posner, 2010; 
Sapir, 2007; Drezner, 2007; Bach & Newman, 2007).    
Regulatory cooperation received a first mention as a policy objective of the EU in its Market Access 
strategy from 1996:  
“The Community’s trade objectives can be summarised simply. First, to reduce technical 
barriers in overseas markets and prevent the emergence of new ones. Secondly, to encourage 
our trading partners to adopt standards and regulatory approaches based on, or compatible with 
international and European practice. […] The regulatory solutions developed by Europe, 
particularly under the Single Market programme, offer, by virtue of their flexibility, trade-
friendliness and consistency with international practice, an appropriate reference point for other 
countries or regions as they establish or reform their own regulatory systems” (European 
Commission, 1996: 4-5) 
Since then, the external projection of EU policies has been described as one of the core objectives and 
characteristics of the EU (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006; Orbie, 2009). The Commission reiterated the 
importance it attaches to exporting its regulatory approaches in the context of the Global Europe strategy 
2006. The Global Europe strategy states that the EU “must play a leading role in sharing best practice 
and developing global rules and standards” (European Commission, 2006: 7). The Commission revealed 
that it aimed at “making European norms the reference for global standards”. In its 2007 Single Market 
Review, the Commission concluded that “the EU must also be able to learn: examining global standards 
when devising Europe’s own policy solutions and taking inspiration from best practices of foreign 
regulators should serve to improve EU regulations and facilitate their acceptance abroad” (European 
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Commission, 2007: 8).1 Likewise, in the Staff Working Document accompanying the Global Europe 
strategy, the Commission underlined that an externalisation of EU rules and standards would not only 
offer benefits to European firms and citizens, but also their foreign counterparts, because of the high 
quality, innovative character, and broad applicability of EU regulation (Zeitlin, 2015: 7).   
The Commission has mostly sought to extend the impact of EU rules and standards through trans-
governmental regulatory dialogues and networks (Zeitlin, 2015; Bradford, 2012; Lavenex & 
Schimmelfennig, 2010). It has established regulatory dialogues with other large economies in the global 
political economy, including the US, Japan and Canada. Regulatory cooperation has been pursued 
through numerous forums, including the G20 and the G7/8. Besides, regulatory cooperation has been a 
key component of networks established in the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy, including 
Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Israel, the 
Palestinian Territories, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria (Lavenex, 2014; Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2010). 
Since the late 2000s, the Commission has also sought to promote regulatory cooperation through the 
negotiation of ‘deep and comprehensive free trade agreements (FTAs)’, notably with South Korea, 
Canada, Japan and the US (Zeitlin, 2015; Peterson & Young, 2014; Siles-Brügge, 2014; Siles-Brügge, 
2011). 
Reflecting the expansion of international regulatory cooperation as “one of the most notable trends” in 
global governance (Abbott, 2014: 1; Keohane & Victor, 2011: 5), regulatory cooperation has also 
attracted the attention of researchers in economics, law and political science (Shaffer, 2016; Abbott, 
2014; OECD, 2013b; Keohane & Victor, 2011; Evenett, 2011; Pollack & Shaffer, 2005)2. Researchers 
have particularly focused on regulatory cooperation in international organisations, i.e. the form of 
regulatory cooperation which this book refers to as ‘international regulatory cooperation’. Moreover, 
they have concentrated on outcomes of regulatory cooperation and sought to examine to what extent 
regulatory cooperation achieves or leads to regulatory convergence across jurisdictions (Heichel et al., 
2005; Knill, 2005). Authors examine sources of power in regulatory cooperation (Newman & Posner, 
2015), look at facilitators and obstacles to regulatory cooperation (Shaffer, 2016; OECD, 2013b) and 
identify ‘success factors’ (OECD, 2013b; Evenett, 2011). With regard to regulatory convergence, in 
turn, scholars have hypothesised that regulatory convergence between the EU and other large countries, 
notably the US, is limited if regulatory approaches differ (e.g. Pollack & Shaffer, 2006; Vogel, 2003). 
However, at the time of writing, a large body of academic work on this issue remains descriptive (e.g. 
Josling & Tangermann, 2015; Maier, 2008; Poli, 2004).  
                                                     
1 In the same document, the Commission argues that such openness of EU regulation to external influences could 
be expected to become progressively more important. On the one hand, the international environment was 
changing rapidly. On the other hand, challenges growingly needed coordinated global action, e.g. climate change 
or counterfeiting and piracy (Commission, 2007: 7).  
2 Global governance shall be defined as the “institutional arrangements to monitor, enforce and amend 
transnational rules and regulations” (Drezner, 2007: 11). 
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Nonetheless, with the “slow killing of the WTO” (Elsig & Pollack, 2017) and other international 
organisations, bilateral interactions between third countries will rise in importance. At the time of 
writing, the EU’s bilateral regulatory cooperation efforts already cover the US, Japan, Canada and South 
Korea. They may expand to Russia, China and India in the future as these economies develop regulatory 
capacity and interdependence between the EU and these countries increases. Yet, despite its growing 
empirical relevance, bilateral regulatory cooperation remains heavily understudied. Bilateral regulatory 
cooperation is especially a research desideratum as insights gained from the study of international 
regulatory cooperation are only partly transferable.  
Insights from international regulatory cooperation are only partly transferable because the strategies 
pursued by governments and regulators in bilateral cooperation differ from those in international 
cooperation. At this point it should additionally be noted that both international and bilateral regulatory 
cooperation assume increasingly differentiated forms. The identification and delineation of these forms 
has driven work both by practitioners and scholars. In a comprehensive study on international regulatory 
cooperation, the OECD (2013b) identifies and delineates eleven different mechanisms. Academics in 
EU studies (Newman & Posner, 2015; Peterson & Young, 2014; Falkner & Müller, 2013; Lavenex, 
2014) also distinguish different forms of interaction between the EU, third countries and international 
organisations. Moreover, these authors agree that governments or regulators, including the Commission, 
do not necessarily always export domestic standards and rules, but often limit regulatory cooperation to 
less deep or comprehensive strategies. 
This differentiation of the forms and strategies through which governments and regulators seek to 
promote regulatory cooperation gives rise to a new set of questions. Recent empirical investigations of 
the EU’s international policy strategies (Young, 2015b; Falkner & Müller, 2013) observe that the EU, 
represented by the Commission, does not only not succeed in achieving regulatory convergence, in many 
cases it does not even try to do so. On the contrary, they find that the EU is reluctant to attempt exporting 
domestic standards and norms and instead chooses to pursue regulatory cooperation to a ‘less ambitious’ 
extent. This implies that there must be factors in addition to power resources that restrict the ability or 
the willingness of regulators to engage in regulatory cooperation and export domestic standards and 
rules. To reveal these factors, research needs to concentrate on exploring and understanding the choices 
of governments and regulators. Little benefit can in this regard be gained from looking at outcomes 
alone.    
Identifying factors that constrain regulators in the pursuit of bilateral regulatory cooperation is crucial 
to move the understanding of political science of regulatory cooperation beyond the status quo. 
Understanding the constraints that a regulator faces in its choice of a bilateral regulatory cooperation 
strategy has relevance from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective. Theoretically, two-level 
games (Putnam, 1988) and theories of domestic politics (Lake, 2009; Drezner, 2007; Raustiala, 2002; 
Milner, 1997) certainly offer a useful point of departure to understand constraints on international 
Introduction 
8 
 
cooperation that does not rely on treaty ratification. Yet, as especially bilateral regulatory cooperation 
often takes place through non-treaty cooperation within the discretion of regulators (Pollack & Shaffer, 
2006; Damro, 2006; Pollack, 2005), existing domestic politics theories risk falling short of providing a 
comprehensive answer to explaining the constraints and determinants of international cooperation. 
Going beyond existing studies is therefore necessary to understand the factors which shape and constrain 
the behaviour of state and regulatory actors from large jurisdictions in an environment shaped by 
political and economic interdependence. 
Empirically, the extent to which governments and regulators pursue regulatory cooperation has 
immediate implications for the presence of costs and benefits of regulatory cooperation described in the 
introduction to this chapter. The size of economic benefits from regulatory cooperation accruing to firms 
with transnational activities arguably grows with the extent of regulatory cooperation. Likewise, the 
contributions of bilateral regulatory cooperation to administrative efficiency and effectiveness vary 
between different ‘forms’ of bilateral regulatory cooperation. At the same time, potential risks to 
environmental, labour or health standards are higher under certain ‘forms’ of bilateral regulatory 
cooperation. To assess the potential costs and benefits to bilateral regulatory cooperation thus 
presupposes that researchers and practitioners can anticipate the extent of regulatory cooperation that is 
likely to occur.   
Yet, until the time of writing, the choices of governments and regulators among different bilateral 
regulatory cooperation strategies remain a research desideratum. An important reason why this research 
desideratum persists reflects the lack of studies which engage in a systematic comparative analysis on 
regulatory cooperation (Newman & Posner, 2015 and Falkner & Müller, 2013 are an exception). 
Previous research has been constrained by the focus on one or at best two industry sectoral regulatory 
regimes or policy areas, which makes it difficult to generalise findings beyond the specific case 
analysed. To move towards an understanding of the constraints on regulatory cooperation, especially on 
bilateral regulatory cooperation that is growing in importance, it is indispensable to go beyond the 
specific case and seek to analytically uncover potential structural factors which constrain the choices of 
governments and regulators across cases.  
This book is the first to conduct a systematic analysis of bilateral regulatory cooperation strategies across 
several (sectoral) case studies. The comparative perspective adopted in this book thus allows a deduction 
and identification of the (structural) constraints that shape the behaviour of the Commission not only in 
one policy field in one specific contexts, but across a wider range of policy issues and interaction 
contexts. The EU and the Commission in particular are a relevant actor to study in this context as the 
EU holds the relevant power resources identified by existing regulatory cooperation literature (e.g. 
Newman & Posner, 2015; Damro, 2012) and has since the establishment of the Single Market expressed 
a keen interest in regulatory market integration with third countries beyond its borders. For this reason, 
this book concentrates on the engagement of the Commission in bilateral regulatory cooperation.       
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The research interest of this book can thus be summarised as follows:  Rather than concentrating on 
regulatory cooperation among states and jurisdictions in international organisations, it emphasises 
regulatory cooperation between states and jurisdictions in bilateral interactions. Besides, and even more 
importantly, it does not aim at identifying success or facilitating factors to regulatory cooperation, but 
seeks to examine the behaviour of states and jurisdictions in regulatory cooperation that take a 
particularly active role in this process. This book seeks to understand how, under which conditions and 
to which extent regulators use bilateral regulatory cooperation in practice. What are the constraints that 
regulators see on the use and engagement in bilateral regulatory cooperation? Under which conditions 
do regulators use regulatory cooperation? The research interest of this book thus lies in understanding 
the strategies that regulators choose in bilateral regulatory cooperation and in shedding light on the 
factors that drive and explain the choice of regulators for a particular strategy.  
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1.2. Puzzle and research question  
 
The previous section has indicated that governments and regulators rely on increasingly differentiated 
forms and strategies as they engage in regulatory cooperation. While strategies differ for international 
and bilateral regulatory cooperation, both levels of regulatory cooperation have in common that they 
occur through various, differentiated strategies. This differentiation of the strategies that regulators 
choose as they pursue regulatory cooperation is puzzling. This section elaborates on the nature of this 
puzzle and subsequently presents the research question that this book seeks to address.  
A growing body of literature presents arguments why the export of domestic rules and standards is 
beneficial to governments and regulators (e.g. Zeitlin, 2015; Farrell & Newman, 2014, Lavenex, 2014; 
Damro, 2012; Schimmelfennig & Lavenex, 2009). Governments and regulators from jurisdictions with 
a large internal market, high regulatory capacity and a set of regulations are in a privileged position to 
export their rules and standards. Nonetheless, externalisation, i.e. an export of domestic rules and 
standards, is not always chosen by regulators. Indeed, it seems to be chosen far less frequently than 
suggested by the corresponding literature (see Newman & Posner, 2015: 862 for this argument). This 
puzzle especially applies to bilateral regulatory cooperation (Josling & Tangermann, 2015: 185). 
The puzzle that regulators rarely choose externalisation as a strategy in bilateral regulatory cooperation 
has both a theoretical and an empirical dimension. From a theoretical perspective, the reluctance to 
engage in regulatory cooperation through rule export poses a puzzle to institutionalist literature which 
dominates political science research on the emergence of international cooperation (Keohane, 2017; 
Zürn, 2016; Damro, 2012; Drezner, 2007). This institutionalist literature has often studied the emergence 
of international cooperation, including regulatory cooperation, through the lens of the ‘two-level game’ 
concept (Milner, 1997; Putnam, 1988). The latter describes international negotiations as a strategic 
interaction between two different levels of decision-making and focuses on these two levels of analysis 
– the international level (level I) and the domestic level (level II) - to explain international outcomes. 
According to this concept, negotiators act as the domestic-international interface. They are constrained 
by the need for an agreement with foreign negotiators at the international level and the need to ensure 
ratification of the agreement by domestic legislatures at the domestic level (Peterson & Young, 2014; 
Moravcsik, 1993; Putnam, 1988).      
Authors examining regulatory cooperation have noted, however, that rather than through international 
treaty agreements, regulatory cooperation often takes place through non-treaty agreements (Damro, 
2006). These are not subject to domestic ratification by legislatures. Even in cases where regulatory 
cooperation is promoted in the context of free trade agreements which are subject to domestic 
ratification, regulatory cooperation provisions are often kept out of the final agreement and instead are 
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included in a separate text3. The pursuit of regulatory cooperation through non-treaty agreements thus 
softens the domestic constraint that regulators face.  
If they are not constrained by the need to secure domestic ratification, it should be expected that actors 
use their discretionary authority to realise their preferences. The observation that in practice, regulators 
pursue regulatory cooperation through numerous, diverse strategies contradicts theoretical expectations. 
These predict that regulators should use their discretion to pursue their preferences if domestic veto 
players have limited institutional possibility to oppose strategy choices of regulator. Indeed, the decision 
that a regulatory actor with discretionary authority does not necessarily seek to externalise own 
regulatory policies and processes thus challenges existing accounts from the rational-choice and 
historical institutionalist literatures.  
Empirically, the observation that also the Commission, arguably the ‘most likely’ promoter of regulatory 
cooperation and externalisation of its domestic regulatory measures, does not necessarily choose to do 
so is equally puzzling. Reasons why the Commission is a ‘most likely’ candidate for the engagement in 
regulatory cooperation will be examined in greater depth in chapter 5.1. At this point it shall suffice to 
refer to the large size of the Single Market, the high regulatory capacity of the Commission and the high 
stringency of its regulatory measures that according to international regulatory cooperation literature 
constitute crucial power resources for the ability to externalise domestic regulatory measures (see 
chapter 2.4 for an in-depth discussion). Yet, despite its alleged power resources empirical studies show 
that the Commission only partially seeks to externalises its domestic regulatory measures (Falkner & 
Müller, 2013). Moreover, stark differences exist for its externalisation attempts across different policy 
issues (Young, 2015b). The observation that even the Commission is reluctant to externalise its 
regulatory measures through regulatory cooperation although it supposedly has the power resources to 
do so is puzzling. Authors acknowledge that some of these power resources lose influence as factors 
such as geographical proximity and trade interdependence change. Damro (2015b) e.g. states that the 
power and attractiveness of the EU internal market decrease with lower geographical proximity between 
the EU and a third country. Yet, this argument raises the question why the Commission for certain policy 
issues does pursue regulatory export even if the geographical distance with a third country is high 
(Young, 2015b). Indeed, while regulatory export appears to be much more seldom than discussed by the 
external governance literature (Lavenex, 2014), it appears to be only weakly correlated with the 
proximity between a third country and the EU (Young, 2015b).     
Existing political science research lacks a theoretical framework that explains which factors constrain a 
regulator in its choice among different potential regulatory cooperation strategies. To clarify the puzzle 
                                                     
3 The separation of regulatory cooperation provisions negotiated in the context of free trade agreements (FTAs) 
from market access provisions ensures that regulatory cooperation commitments are not subject to dispute 
settlement in the implementation and enforcement phase of the FTA. One interview partner noted that the 
subjection of regulatory cooperation to dispute settlement would reduce the willingness of regulators to make 
cooperation commitments (Interview 18).   
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that this book seeks to address, it shall be assumed that bilateral regulatory cooperation strategies can 
be ‘ranked’ on a scale according to their effect on existing regulations, trade flows or other factors 
(chapter 3.3.1 will propose criteria how bilateral regulatory cooperation strategies can be grouped). 
Given also the observed reluctance of the Commission to pursue regulatory export, this book proposes 
that, for certain policy issues, structural constraints exist which deter a regulator from pursuing a strategy 
which has a deeper effect on domestic regulations or trade flows. These constraints do not imply that 
the regulator will pursue this strategy on the issue in question across all contexts. Factors including those 
proposed by existing literature (Evenett, 2011; Quick, 2011, Young, 2010; Damro, 2006; Vogel, 2003) 
may support or undermine the pursuit of regulatory cooperation. However, this book suggests that 
structural constraints exist which prevent a regulator from even attempting a strategy such as rule export 
and policy externalisation across all contexts. 
In abstract terms, the puzzle that this book seeks to address can thus be re-phrased as follows: Why does 
a regulator with high regulatory capacity only seek to export and externalise on certain policy issues? 
And why does it not choose to do so on other policy issues? It therefore aims at resolving the puzzle that 
a regulator with high regulatory capacity exports its rules to a specific third country only on some issues 
although prominent explanations propose similar strategies for all issues towards a given third country. 
To develop an answer, it is necessary to understand the formation and choice of a regulatory cooperation 
strategy other than externalisation or rule export. The development of an explanation should exclude 
cases in which a regulator does not seek externalisation or rule export because it is not ‘powerful’ enough 
to do so. This restriction can be controlled by assuming that the regulator is in principle powerful enough 
to export its rules. This can be assumed if it has high ‘regulatory capacity’ (Bach & Newman; 2007; see 
chapter 2.4 for a closer discussion). The research question that this book seeks to address is thus the 
following:  
What constrains the formation and choice of a bilateral regulatory cooperation strategy of a state 
or jurisdiction with high regulatory capacity? 
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This puzzle can in particular be applied to the Commission. The Commission is often argued to have 
high regulatory capacity (e.g. Bach & Newman, 2010). Yet, despite its claimed high regulatory capacity 
and although existing explanations would expect similar strategies (for empirical data showing this 
differentiation see Young, 2015b), the Commission in practice pursues highly differentiated strategies 
of bilateral regulatory cooperation although. Applied to the Commission, the research question reads as 
follows:  
 
This research question entails a number of sub-questions: 
 
To sum up, this section has presented the puzzle that motivates this book. This puzzle consists in the 
reluctance of the Commission, as observed by previous studies, to export its rules to third countries on 
certain issues although rule export should create benefits for both the Commission and societal actors 
and, according to previous literature, should be an expected choice of the Commission. This section has 
sketched out both the theoretical and empirical dimension of this puzzle. From this puzzle it has derived 
the main research question that this book seeks to address: What constrains the formation and choice of 
a bilateral regulatory cooperation strategy of a regulator with high regulatory capacity? 
 
  
Who decides on the pursuit of bilateral regulatory cooperation within the Commission? 
Among which bilateral regulatory cooperation strategies does the Commission choose?   
How does the context in which regulatory cooperation takes place influence the behaviour of the 
Commission?  
How do societal actors influence and alter the Commission’s choice of a regulatory cooperation 
strategy? 
 
What constrains the formation and choice of a bilateral regulatory cooperation strategy of the 
Commission? 
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1.3. Summary of the main argument 
 
After the research question has been developed, this section presents the main argument that will be 
subsequently elaborated in this book.  
Regulators’ choice of a regulatory cooperation strategy depends on bureaucratic pressure to engage in 
regulatory cooperation, the distribution of regulatory compatibilities between the domestic and the 
foreign jurisdiction as well as on the presence of societal mobilisation in support of regulatory 
cooperation. 
Bureaucratic pressure within regulatory bodies by the politically appointed or administrative leadership 
initiates the formation of a regulatory cooperation strategy. Due to their limited resources, burden 
overload and uncertainty towards the success of regulatory cooperation, regulatory officials, i.e.. 
technical officials from the Commission Directorates General (DGs), usually concentrate their efforts 
on ensuring an adequate level of consumer health, safety and environmental protection at the domestic 
level. In the absence of bureaucratic pressure, regulatory divergences and differences across jurisdictions 
thus remain frequently unaddressed. Yet, the relative prioritisation between domestic regulation and 
international engagement of politically appointed top-level officials and non-technical DGs differs from 
the prioritisation of technical officials. Politically appointed officials and administrative leaders have 
discretion to pursue non-technical objectives; non-technical bureaucrats have different mandates than 
technical regulatory officials. Both therefore see regulatory cooperation as an opportunity structure 
under interdependence to prevent political intervention and enhance the autonomy and legitimacy of the 
Commission. As politically appointed officials, administrative leaders and non-technical bureaucrats 
become involved in the formation of regulatory cooperation strategy Commission strategy, they reduce 
uncertainty for technical regulatory officials. Hence, the priorities of technical regulatory officials 
change. Under bureaucratic pressure, they seek to protect their discretion vis-à-vis politically appointed 
officials, top-level bureaucrats and non-technical DGs and demonstrate that their regulatory efforts 
ensure a high level of consumer and environmental protection while enabling a competitive business 
environment. As a result, they shift organisational resources from domestic regulation to international 
cooperation and explore if regulatory cooperation is an opportunity structure to achieve regulatory 
objectives and enhance their discretion. 
The compatibility of regulatory institutions between the domestic and the foreign jurisdiction constrains 
the subsequent choice of regulatory officials among different bilateral regulatory cooperation strategies. 
Regulatory institutions comprise regulatory competence allocations which this book calls ‘regulatory 
authority structures’, and regulatory approaches, called ‘regulatory principles’. They are compatible if 
they do not allocate regulatory responsibilities to different authority levels and do not establish 
conflicting objectives and approaches. In bilateral regulatory cooperation, a regulator is unlikely to 
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achieve cooperation with a third country if it demands significant changes to foreign institutions. It can 
thus only cooperate with third-country regulators by accepting or recognising their regulatory 
institutions. At the same time, domestic regulatory officials seek to prevent losing domestic autonomy 
and legitimacy. Regulatory officials thus seek to prevent a loss of their authority to regulate their 
domestic market and avoid additional power claims from sub-central regulators. Moreover, they seek to 
prevent a loss of their legitimacy towards legislators and societal actors by recognising regulations and 
procedures which conflict with the principles institutionalised in domestic legislation.  
The ability of officials to use bilateral regulatory cooperation with regulators from a third-country as an 
opportunity structure is thus constrained by the presence of non-centralised regulatory authority and 
conflicting regulatory principles in the foreign jurisdiction. Regulatory officials can choose ‘regulatory 
alignment’ if both regulatory authority structures and regulatory principles are compatible. They are, 
however, constrained to choose ‘equivalence’ if regulatory principles differ even if regulatory authority 
structures are compatible. Regulators can only opt for an ‘alignment of implementation procedures’ if 
regulatory principles are compatible but regulatory authority structures are not. Moreover, they can 
choose ‘information exchange’ even if both regulatory authority structures and regulatory principles 
between the domestic and foreign jurisdiction are incompatible.  
The mobilisation of societal actors in support of regulatory cooperation pushes technical officials and 
bureaucratic leaders, i.e. politically appointed officials and administrative leaders, to adopt a regulatory 
cooperation strategy in accordance with the distribution of regulatory compatibilities. Societal 
mobilisation offers technical expertise and guidance to regulatory officials on which issues within a 
regulatory regime they can cooperate with a third country or jurisdiction. It assures them that societal 
actors consider their pursuit of regulatory cooperation as legitimate. If societal mobilisation takes place 
across jurisdictional boundaries, it raises expectations among regulatory officials that their counterparts 
from the third country may respond to their chosen regulatory cooperation strategies. Societal 
mobilisation can, however, not push regulatory officials to pursue bilateral regulatory cooperation 
beyond the constraints imposed by regulatory compatibilities.  
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1.4. Approach and outline of the book 
 
This section summarises the approach and offers an outline of this book. It thus sheds light on the 
structure that this study uses to theoretically deduce and empirically test the proposed argument. 
This book begins with a discussion of the existing literature that offers theoretical approaches to the 
study of strategy formation in external governance (chapter 2). It distinguishes approaches that identify 
explanatory factors at the domestic and international level and that follow a rational-choice and 
constructivist logic. This study places itself in the field of research which sees explanatory factors at the 
domestic level and follows a rational-choice logic. The discussion defines a theoretical gap in the 
shortcoming of domestic-level rational-choice approaches to account for the variation and 
differentiation of bilateral regulatory cooperation strategies. At the same time, it points out a theoretical 
incoherence regarding the influence of ‘state’ actors in external governance. While theoretical studies 
emphasise the relevance of state actors, they lack a micro-theory that focuses on ‘state’ actors and can 
account for the decision-making process underlying the choice for a strategy.  
To develop a theory on the constraints under which bilateral regulatory cooperation strategies are formed 
and chosen, this book first develops a typology of the various, differentiated bilateral regulatory 
cooperation strategies. This allows the operationalisation of the dependent variable for the following 
analysis (chapter 3). Bilateral regulatory cooperation strategies are placed within prior categories of 
governance mechanisms. Subsequently, a stock-taking of all bilateral regulatory cooperation strategies 
as understood by different approaches is conducted. Identified strategies are then synthesised and 
organised into a 2x2 typology. This typology aims at reducing analytical complexity while maximising 
the difference between types. It clusters bilateral regulatory cooperation strategies based on the 
‘dimension’ and ‘depth’ of cooperation.  
The next chapter (chapter 4) deduces the independent variables of this book. To address the theoretical 
gap identified in chapter 2, it integrates the emerging interdependence research paradigm, the New 
Interdependence Approach, into the most widely used approach in governance studies, actor-centred 
institutionalism. From this incorporation, it derives a new integrative framework, the Inter-relational 
Institutionalism. The first independent variable of Inter-relational Institutionalism, ‘bureaucratic 
pressure’, is derived from the ‘actor characteristics’ building block of actor-centred institutionalism. It 
reflects the key conclusion of the New Interdependence Approach that interdependence creates 
endogenous incentives for actors to seek transnational engagement. The second independent variable 
are the ‘regulatory compatibilities’ constraining the choice of regulators of a regulatory cooperation 
strategy. It is derived from the conclusion of the New Interdependence Approach that institutional 
conditions determine the access and ability of actors to engage transnationally under interdependence. 
From the actor-centred institutionalism, two elements of this independent variable are deduced: the 
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compatibility of regulatory authority structures and the compatibility of regulatory principles. 
Constraints on the choice of a bilateral regulatory cooperation strategy are linked to the pursuit of a 
strategy through the introduction of a third independent variable, the ‘mobilisation of societal actors’ by 
bureaucratic actors. This mobilisation completes the causal mechanism which links variation in 
regulatory compatibilities to the choice of different bilateral regulatory cooperation strategies.    
The subsequent chapter (chapter 5) introduces the methodology that is used by this book to empirically 
test the refined theoretical framework deduced in chapter 4. It presents the reasons for the choice to 
adopt a qualitative approach and pursue a comparative case study of the Commission’s pursuit of 
regulatory cooperation in transatlantic regulatory cooperation across three different phases in four 
different sectors. Different regulatory cooperation initiatives are delineated to ensure variation on the 
independent variable ‘bureaucratic pressure’. Moreover, different industry sectoral regimes are chosen 
as least likely case studies for the explanatory strength of the Inter-relational Institutionalism. While the 
chosen sectoral regimes agree on almost all rival explanatory factors, they disagree on their outcomes 
on the second independent variable, the ‘constellation of regulatory compatibilities’ between the EU and 
the US. Within-case process-tracing is used to identify the causal mechanism that accounts for the 
Commission’s formation of a regulatory cooperation strategy on a particular issue within a sector. 
Chapter 6 then presents the four sectoral empirical case studies which link variation in internal 
Commission constellations to variation in the distribution of regulatory compatibilities between the EU 
and the US. The chemicals case study (chapter 6.1.) shows that demands of Commissioners and DG 
Trade for regulatory cooperation on chemicals led to the pursuit of ‘information exchange’ due to the 
constraints of incompatible regulatory authority structures and incompatible regulatory principles. The 
engineering case study (chapter 6.2.) shows that demands of Commissioners and top-level bureaucrats 
led officials pursue an ‘alignment of implementation procedures’ due to the compatibility of principles, 
but incompatibility of authority structures. In the food safety case study (chapter 6.3.), it is laid down 
that demands of Commissioners and the DG Trade for cooperation led to the choice of ‘equivalence’ 
due to the compatibility of regulatory authority structures, but incompatibility of regulatory principles. 
Finally, in the ICT case study (chapter 6.4) it is demonstrated that demands of Commissioners and top-
level bureaucrats for cooperation allowed the pursuit of ‘regulatory alignment’ because of the 
compatibility of both regulatory authority structures and principles.  
Chapter 7 discusses the findings of the empirical case studies in light of their reliability, validity and 
objectivity and draws out limitations of the generalisability of these findings beyond the case studies 
examined. Moreover, it lays down the theoretical and empirical contribution of the findings of this book 
and sketches out avenues for future research.              
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2. Literature review: Strategy formation in external governance  
 
While research on strategy formation on regulatory cooperation and policy coordination is an 
underdeveloped field of research, theoretical approaches can be identified if related streams of literature 
are taken into consideration. Indeed, a comprehensive body of literature can be found if regulatory 
cooperation is considered more broadly as a form of global governance. This is particularly the case if 
regulatory cooperation is approached as a form of external governance which includes institutional 
arrangements and processes to monitor and enforce rules and regulations in external relations. Much of 
the literature on external governance concentrates on the behaviour of the EU in external governance4. 
This chapter discusses the external governance literature with a view to the puzzle and research question 
on strategy formation underlying this book. It structures the discussion around the objective to delineate 
the theoretical gap that this book seeks to address.    
Existing theories and approaches can be largely distinguished along three dimensions: their level of 
analysis, their identification of actors, and their conception of actor behaviour. With regard to the level 
of analysis, approaches identify causal factors both at the domestic and international level. Moreover, 
while some approaches conceive of a relatively great autonomy of state actors from societal actors, 
others see the behaviour of state actors as largely determined and shaped by societal pressures. Besides, 
approaches can be distinguished based on whether they model the behaviour of actors in either rationalist 
or idealist terms. With a view to the theoretical ambition of this book to the literature, this review 
organises existing studies along two dimensions. The first dimension distinguishes if approaches 
identify explanatory factors at the domestic or international level. The second one divides contributions 
into those that employ rational-choice frameworks and those that see ideational factors as drivers of the 
behaviour of actors. The typology in figure 1 illustrates the division of the literature on external 
governance with a focus on the EU into four categories. 
Behaviour of actors 
Level of analysis 
Domestic International 
Rational-Choice Domestic politics International political economy 
Constructivist Domestic regulatory culture Global regulatory capitalism 
Figure 1: Typology of external governance literature 
                                                     
4 ‘Governance’ has become associated with a form of governing which puts emphasis on effective and efficient 
problem-solving and an orientation of state and non-state actors towards problem-solving for the ‘public good’ 
(Kohler-Koch & Rittberger, 2006: 28). 
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This chapter first discusses constructivist approaches that identify explanatory factors for the behaviour 
of actors at the international level (chapter 2.1.). Contributions to this literature emphasise the emergence 
of a global regulatory capitalism. It then discusses rational-choice literatures that see explanatory factors 
at the international level (chapter 2.2.). This literature has mostly dominated research in “the first wave 
of scholarship” (Drezner, 2007: 12) in the 1980s and early 1990s and has more recently enjoyed a 
renewed interest on the role of international organisations in mediating and orchestrating the behaviour 
of states and sub-state actors. Contributions to this field often identify themselves as part of the 
‘international political economy’ literature. Subsequently, it discusses domestic-level constructivist 
approaches that propose the existence of distinct domestic regulatory cultures which reflect underlying 
ideas and normative orientations (chapter 2.3). In a fourth step, it examines domestic-level rational-
choice explanations to which also this book seeks to contribute (chapter 2.4). These contributions 
underlining the influence of ‘domestic politics’ have arguably become mainstream with the emergence 
of the ‘Open Economy Politics’ paradigm in international political economy. More recently, the New 
Interdependence Approach has sought to build a bridge between domestic- and international-level 
approaches. Lastly, the shortcomings of each approach are summarised and the theoretical gap is 
specified that this book seeks to address.  
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2.1. Global regulatory capitalism  
 
This section begins with a discussion of approaches that identify explanatory factors for the behaviour 
of actors at the international level. Many studies within the “first wave of scholarship” (Drezner, 2007: 
12) have adopted a constructivist stance. Constructivist approaches put forward that the behaviour of 
actors is shaped by the beliefs and values that they hold (Siles-Brügge, 2014). Actors are driven by 
internalised norms and rules of appropriate behaviour (Checkel, 2005). From this perspective, the ideas, 
values and priorities that actors hold regarding the meaning and objective of a policy are thus responsible 
for the strategies that they pursue (Beland, 2009). 
This review groups contributions that see factors determining the behaviour of actors at the international 
level and which follow a constructivist logic under the heading of a ‘global regulatory capitalism’ 
literature. Two different streams within this literature can be delineated. A first stream borrows from 
sociological institutionalism and underlines the influence of a ‘World Society’ of NGOs, epistemic 
communities and scientific networks. It underlines the role of trans-governmental networks as place for 
socialisation among regulators. This literature is summarised in the sub-section ‘transnational regulatory 
networks’. The second stream is more strongly grounded in conventional constructivist thinking and 
emphasises the emergence of a global ideational framework that encapsulates a ‘regulatory capitalism’. 
This ideational framework underlines the role of experts and epistemic communities. Both streams of 
the ‘global regulatory capitalism’ literature imply that regulators should seek to engage in deep 
regulatory cooperation.   
 
Transnational regulatory networks 
 
Sociological institutionalists propose that the socialisation of governments and regulators from different 
jurisdictions in transnational regulatory networks leads to the development of common norms and 
identities (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004; Ruggie, 1993). They thus imply that socialisation promotes the 
engagement of regulators in regulatory cooperation.  
Sociological institutionalists put forward that through their socialisation in international organisations 
and trans-governmental networks, governments and regulators establish common norms. International 
organisations and trans-governmental networks define meanings and norms of good behaviour and in 
particular establish which choices can be considered as appropriate or legitimate behaviour (Barnett & 
Finnemore, 2004; Ruggie, 1993). As international organisations networks encourage and support 
socialisation and learning among government actors, they promote the spread of ideas, norms and 
understandings of appropriate behaviour and good governance (Djelic & Sahlin-Anderson, 2006; 
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Finnemore, 1996). Authors argue that as a consequence of these learning processes, actors internalise 
shared norms and develop common identities. Regulators exchange best practices, learn from each other 
and develop an interest in maintaining their reputation vis-à-vis other officials from other entities 
(Eberlein & Grande, 2005; Sabel & Zeitlin, 2008; Slaughter, 2004: 59; Trondal, 2010: 22). As a result, 
the socialisation and embeddedness of government officials in international organisations and trans-
governmental networks are argued to drive governments to mutually harmonise their policies 
(Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Checkel, 1999). Likewise, socialisation in trans-governmental networks 
acts as an ‘external reflexive discipline’, causing officials to take greater account of the impact of internal 
decisions on other states (Zeitlin, 2015b: 346). The OECD (2013b) has claimed that trans-governmental 
networks not only contribute to the development of a common language and identities, but socialisation 
also promotes trust in the ability of foreign government to implement shared commitments. Moreover, 
trust-building among governments helps overcome reluctance among governments to pursue regulatory 
cooperation. 
Scholars in EU studies have underlined the influence of internationally shared norms and socialisation 
on the engagement of the Commission in regulatory cooperation and externalisation. Schwellnus (2013) 
argues that convergence on common ideas of human rights in the ILO support the EU’s promotion of 
labour standards. At the same time, Niemann and Bretherton (2013) explain the difficulty of the EU to 
incorporate international competition policy commitments into WTO Agreements with absence of 
shared norm establishment in international institutions. Bretherton and Vogler (2006) add that shared 
common understandings between the Commission and foreign government officials developed in trans-
governmental networks has supported EU efforts for cooperation through global governance. 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005) put forward that socialisation in trans-governmental networks 
promotes perceptions among foreign government officials that policy solutions of the EU are legitimate 
and that EU policy actors have technical expertise. They claim this reinforces intentional strategies of 
the Commission to export its ‘normative capabilities’. Niemann (2004) notes that a high degree of 
institutionalisation and dense socialisation of Commission officials with representatives of other states 
in transnational networks support the reliance of the Commission on communicative action and 
normative discourses. Slaughter (2004) adds that this engagement in deliberative and problem-solving 
discourses paves the way for regulatory harmonisation through exchanges of best practices. 
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Regulatory capitalism 
 
The second constructivist approach that locates explanatory factors for the formation of regulatory 
cooperation strategies at the international level are agency-centred explanations. These draw attention 
to the influence of global epistemic communities of scientists and experts on the behaviour of regulators. 
They note that the spread of ‘global regulatory capitalism’ (Braithwaite, 2008; Levi-Faur, 2005) has 
strengthened the role of scientific knowledge in policy-making. According to the ‘regulatory capitalism’ 
argument, the rise of epistemic communities connected by shared scientific knowledge facilitates 
cooperation efforts among regulators and promotes regulatory convergence.  
Contributions adopting the argument of ‘regulatory capitalism’ propose that the spread of regulatory 
capitalism has strengthened transnational epistemic communities made up of transnational NGOs and 
global communities of researchers and scientists (Haas, 1992). They can act as ‘norm entrepreneurs’ 
across borders. Epistemic communities and scientific experts guide the choices of policy-makers and 
government officials across jurisdictions, define policy problems and shape government officials’ 
perceptions which solutions to policy problems are legitimate. As transnational NGOs and researchers 
organise in advocacy or issue networks, connected by shared beliefs and values, they provide scientific 
knowledge about cause-and-effect relationships to governments and regulators (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). 
Consequently, the global spread of scientific discourses by epistemic communities is thus argued to 
promote a convergence in meaning structures among government officials. Authors argue that this 
encourages efforts of government officials and regulators to achieve institutional isomorphism 
(Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Checkel, 1999; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  
Scholars in EU studies offer confirming evidence for this argument. Holzinger and Sommerer (2013) 
argue that the rationalisation and globalisation of scientific discourse on climate change has driven the 
EU’s promotion of adopting international environmental regulation. Schwellnus (2013) underlines the 
influence of global NGOs and human rights movements on pushing and encouraging Commission 
officials to promote human rights internationally. The OECD (2013b: 111) outlines that epistemic 
communities support e.g. the alignment of testing methods and laboratory practices and thus support the 
development of a common language and definitions among government officials, which it sees as a 
driver of efforts for regulatory approximation.  
Yet, both sociological institutionalist approaches and contributions to the ‘regulatory capitalism’ 
literature cannot offer a strong explanation for the observation that in practice, governments or regulators 
choose regulatory cooperation strategies which differ from harmonisation or policy imitation. This is 
not to call into question that socialisation in international institutions, learning through trans-
governmental networks and norm entrepreneurship by global epistemic communities and advocacy 
networks does not influence strategy formation of government officials or policy-makers at all. 
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However, these approaches first overemphasise the influence of ideas and scientific discourse on the 
behaviour of actors. Even if actors share common understandings and norms, they may fail to act upon 
them (Falkner & Müller, 2013: 219). Moreover, where scientific evidence is ambiguous, regulators and 
governments may instrumentally employ scientific studies that conform to their preferences derived 
otherwise5 to justify their behaviour. At the same time, they cannot account for strategies other than 
regulatory approximation or the persistence of regulatory competition. Second, their empirical 
applicability remains limited. Sociological institutionalism and approaches emphasising the role of 
epistemic communities approaches often employ biased case selection as they concentrate on empirical 
cases supportive of their theory. Checkel (2005) thus argues that epistemic communities and trans-
governmental networks are most likely to influence the strategy formation of policy-makers in 
depoliticised settings if the latter face complex or uncertain issues (Checkel, 2005). Moreover, Garrett 
and Weingast (1993: 168) state that epistemic communities can influence the behaviour of state actors 
if distributional differences between different solutions are small and power asymmetries between 
involved actors are small. However, they neglect ‘hard cases’ in which regulators and governments 
refuse to pursue approximation despite the availability of global scientific discourse and the existence 
of transnational advocacy groups. Third, they do not specify or examine a causal mechanism that links 
the behaviour of regulators and governments to trans-governmental networks and expert communities. 
They thus infer the development of shared values and internalised norms from the observation of similar 
policy responses across jurisdictions rather than tracing specific actors or decisions (Tarrow, 2001).   
In sum, this section has presented two main constructivist approaches that can be joined into a ‘global 
regulatory capitalism’ literature. They see explanatory factors for (regulatory) cooperation at the 
international level. Sociological institutionalists argue that international organisations and trans-
governmental networks lead to the development of common norms and identities, promote trust and 
mutual learning and thus drive regulators and governments to promote regulatory approximation. 
‘Global regulatory capitalism’ approaches argue that the rising importance of scientific experts promotes 
an alignment of discourses across jurisdictions and thus implies that epistemic communities influence 
regulators to pursue regulatory cooperation. Empirical evidence confirming these approaches remains 
selective, however. Consequently, these approaches overestimate the extent to which governments and 
regulators pursue harmonisation. Indeed, they are unable to explain the pursuit of differentiated 
regulatory cooperation strategies other than approximation. Besides, authors insufficiently demonstrate 
a causal mechanism that leads regulators to internalise norms and scientific discourse and struggle to 
explain regulatory cooperation outside depoliticised settings with little distributive implications.  
  
                                                     
5 The employment by various governments from EU member states of different scientific studies with divergent 
findings on the public health impact of glyphosate in the debate on the re-authorisation of the pesticide in the EU 
in autumn 2017 is arguably a good example for this.    
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2.2. International political economy 
 
This section looks at rational-choice approaches which see explanatory factors at the international level. 
Rational-choice approaches assume that actors build their choices on instrumental maximisations of 
utility, expressed and measured in terms of welfare and power (March & Olsen, 2008; Shepsle, 2005; 
March & Olsen, 1989). This section distinguishes between two streams of rational-choice approaches 
within the ‘international political economy’ literature that see explanatory factors for the cooperation 
behaviour of state actors, i.e. governments and regulators, at the international level. A first stream 
underlines the creation of international institutions, notably the role of international organisations and 
trans-governmental networks, on altering the behaviour of actors at the international level. A second one 
emphasises the effect of economic internationalisation and the influence it has exerted on the influence 
of transnational firms on decisions of state actors at the domestic level. This section first reviews 
contributions to the international institutions literature and then looks at contributions to literature 
emphasising economic internationalisation.  
 
International institutionalisation  
 
Authors that propose a causal role of international organisations on the behaviour of actors at the 
domestic level distinguish two functions and influences of international organisations. They view 
international organisations as a) coordination mechanisms to resolve coordination problems and b) 
independent orchestrators.  
The role of international organisations in influencing the behaviour of governments is treated both as an 
intervening and independent variable. Liberal institutionalists (e.g. Keohane & Nye, 1977; Moravcsik, 
1993) mainly treat international institutions, comprising international organisations and dense 
transnational regulatory networks, as an intervening variable. They argue that international organisations 
or dense transnational regulatory networks influence the behaviour strategies of governments because 
they help solve coordination problems at the international level and encourage governments to seek 
cooperative outcomes rather than relative gains (Keohane & Nye, 1977). International institutions can 
thus push governments to act upon something that they would not have responded to in the absence of 
international organisations (Dai, 2007; Checkel, 1997; Risse-Kappen, 1995). Moreover, international 
institutions create focal points and thus push government officials to concentrate regulatory cooperation 
strategies on selected, focused initiatives (Zeitlin, 2015). They therefore help resolve transnational 
externalities of regulations or regulatory differences across jurisdictions. Authors note, however, that 
the ability of international organisations to push states to cooperate is linked to their monitoring and 
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enforcement capacities (Slaughter, 2004; Mattli & Büthe, 2003; Koremenos, Lipson & Snidal, 2001; 
Keohane, 1984).  
More recently, liberal institutionalists borrowing from historical institutionalism have come to view 
international organisations not only as a coordination facilitator, but as institutions with an independent 
causal influence (Abbott, Snidal, Genschel, & Zangl, 2015; Farrell & Newman, 2014; Fioretos, 2011; 
Börzel, 2005; Dai, 2005). According to this argument, international institutions can constrain the 
discretion and autonomy of domestic government officials through hierarchical intervention and thus 
condition the scope of possible strategies (Börzel, 2005; Dai, 2005). As ‘endogenous actors’, 
international institutions are argued to create feedback effects, trigger distributional implications for 
political and societal actors and thereby bias policy in a particular direction. International institutions 
thus initiate processes of ‘institutional drift’ and push states to pursue cooperation with each other 
(Farrell & Newman, 2014; Fioretos, 2011). Besides, liberal institutionalists have suggested that 
international institutions may act as ‘orchestrators’ rather than through hierarchical intervention and 
enlist and support intermediary actors in pursuit of their goals (Abbott, Snidal, Genschel, & Zangl, 
2015). International organisations empower societal actors and ‘policy entrepreneurs’ by allowing them 
to build alliances with other transnational or supranational actors or increase the political leverage and 
improve the informational status of domestic actors (Farrell & Newman, 2014). This empowerment of 
societal actors by international organisations is argued to push governments to cooperate internationally 
(Abbott et al., 2015; Zeitlin, 2015).  
Numerous studies discuss the effect of international institutions on the strategies pursued by the EU. 
Falkner and Müller (2013) argue that international institutions with monitoring and enforcement 
capacities induce the EU to engage in policy export and policy promotion. De Bièvre, Poletti and 
Thomann (2014) have proposed that the enforcement capacities of the WTO and judicialisation through 
the Dispute Settlement Mechanism has allowed hierarchical intervention and pushed the EU to adapt its 
regulatory policies. Zeitlin (2015) argues that the SPS Agreement under the WTO has pushed the EU 
and US to initiate cooperation in managing the risks of unauthorised contamination with genetically 
modified organisms (GMO). Newman and Posner (2015) add that the density of international institutions 
determine the policy strategies used by the EU at the international level. More specifically, dense 
international institutions are argued to encourage the EU to use ‘deeper’ forms of cooperation. Costa 
and Jorgensen (2012: 4), however, put this finding into perspective, arguing that international 
organisations have influence on decisions in the EU if they are legalised and have strong organisational 
backing.  
Authors also examine why international organisations shape the behaviour of the EU. Dai (2007: 138) 
puts forward that international organisations have a particularly high influence on the EU because of its 
multiple access points and potential ‘policy entrepreneurs’. Abbott et al. (2015) underline that 
international organisations as orchestrators are likely to influence the behaviour of the EU through the 
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provision of technical expertise. As the Commission frequently seeks scientific and technical expertise 
for its decision-making, including to assess the impact of proposed legislation, international 
organisations can influence decision-making in the EU through the provision of this expertise (Costa & 
Jorgensen, 2012: 6). Other studies note that international organisations encourage the EU to conduct 
regulatory cooperation. Conceicao-Heldt and Meunier (2014) argue that the structure of the international 
trade regime pushes the EU to negotiate cooperation multilaterally. Similarly, de Bièvre et al. (2014) 
suggest that the high degree of judicialisation and the scope for issue linkage make the WTO a preferred 
venue for the EU to address and negotiate regulatory issues at the international level.  
However, the ability of these approaches to explain strategy formation on regulatory cooperation is 
limited. First, regulatory cooperation is not only a coordination problem as suggested by liberal 
institutionalists relying on game theory. Even if international organisations may facilitate coordination 
among governments, they may not push governments to pursue regulatory cooperation. Regulatory 
cooperation may entail such high adjustment costs for one side that cooperation may not be in the mutual 
interest of both sides (Büthe & Mattli, 2011). Second, despite individual counter-examples the influence 
of international organisations on the formation of regulatory cooperation strategies of governments or 
regulators remains limited. On the one hand, multiple or overlapping regimes among international 
organisations offer both the EU and other parties opportunities to shift among alternative international 
solutions and engage in forum-shopping (Alter & Meunier, 2009). Moreover, they can use alternative 
venues to create conflicting solutions to existing rules and thus widen their discretion against the 
influence of international institutions and organisations (Alter & Meunier, 2009: 17). On the other hand, 
international organisations have limited capacities to force states and governments to cooperate. They 
usually have restrictive treaty mandates, are subject to close oversight by member states and have limited 
financial and administrative resources (Abbott et al., 2015: 3). Even if international organisations have 
succeeded to promote the adoption of an international standard or decision, states retain considerable 
discretion in the adoption and implementation of international rules. Policy evidence proves that the EU 
too builds selectively on international standards and multilateral objectives in its internal regulations 
(Zeitlin, 2015b: 344). Third, international organisations have limited possibilities to resolve major 
conflicts of interest especially among large states (Drezner, 2007). Orchestration is mainly supported by 
states if they share common governance goals with international organisations, but lack the capabilities 
to achieve them (Abbott et al., 2015: 30). Possibilities of international organisations for entrepreneurship 
thus remain restricted to issues on which states have capability gaps. These are commonly limited to 
issues of low salience. This is not to argue that international organisations do not influence strategy 
formation of governments at all. Yet, their influence is likely to prevail in the case of issues on which 
governments are willing to maintain capability gaps because issues are not salient to them. Influence 
may also be indirect as international organisations rely on the support and engagement of actors at the 
domestic level.  
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Economic internationalisation 
 
The second rational-choice approach that proposes explanatory factors for the formation of regulatory 
cooperation strategies at the international level underline the influence of economic internationalisation 
and the trans-nationalisation of firms on the behaviour of governments and regulators. Many of these 
contributions build on the assumption that economic internationalisation and globalisation have led to 
an ‘erosion’ of the state (e.g. Strange, 1996). They put forward that economic internationalisation leads 
to regulatory convergence, including through regulatory cooperation. Moreover, they argue that 
transnational firms, whose emergence has been facilitated by trade liberalisation and growing economic 
interdependence, influence strategy formation of government officials at the domestic level, including 
by undermining governments’ scope for action. They disagree, however, on the direction of this 
regulatory convergence, i.e. its implication for the protection of health, consumer and environmental 
standards.   
According to the ‘race-to-the-bottom’ hypothesis (e.g. Siles-Brügge & de Ville, 2015; Frieden, 2006; 
Prakash & Potoski, 2004; Long & Quek, 2002; Klein, 2000; for a discussion see Drezner, 2007; Vogel 
& Kagan, 2004), transnational firms put pressure on governments to lower regulatory standards that 
otherwise raise production costs (for a discussion see: 14; Vogel & Kagan, 2004: 2). Moreover, they 
threaten governments to shift production or investments to jurisdictions with lower regulatory standards. 
In order to maintain employment and tax revenues and to attract additional investment, governments 
will bow to firm pressure and lower regulatory standards, thus raising profit rates for multinational firms. 
As governments compete for highly mobile investments of multinational firms, they set in motion a 
downward spiral of lower regulatory standards towards a lowest common denominator and trigger a 
‘Delaware effect’ (see also Kahler & Lake, 2003). 
According to the ‘race-to-the-top’ or ‘trading up’ hypothesis (Vogel, 2012; 1995), the liberalisation of 
trade and capital flows facilitates a raise in regulatory standards across jurisdictions. This argument puts 
forward that firms advocate a restriction of competition through stringent domestic regulatory standards 
that are similar to their current production methods to raise their profitability. In doing so, they find 
support from NGOs. Within ‘Baptist-bootlegger’ coalitions (Vogel, 1995: 260), firms advocate more 
stringent regulatory standards that make market access conditional upon compliance with these stringent 
standards. The latter benefit domestic producers and reflect the interest of domestic NGOs, but 
disadvantage foreign producers. Yet, transnational firms which operate in several markets have an 
interest in uniform regulations across jurisdictions to reduce their production costs and lower regulatory 
certainty. If the jurisdiction that imposes more stringent regulatory standards has a large domestic 
market, the argument runs that foreign producers will lobby their own governments to raise regulatory 
standards and align them with those of the more stringent jurisdiction. In response to pressure from 
export-oriented producers, foreign governments will adjust their national regulations to the more 
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stringent regulatory standard to retain market access for their producers (Princen, 2004; Vogel, 1997). 
In this view, liberalisation of trade and the growing importance of export-oriented producers increases 
support for the export and spread of stringent regulatory standards, thus triggering a ‘California effect’. 
The ‘experimentalist governance’ literature (Zeitlin, 2015: 17) adds that transnational firms not only 
lobby their domestic government to align its regulatory standards with the more stringent ones required 
by large foreign markets, but also lobby the foreign government to consider practices elsewhere in 
revising their own regulation. They thus suggest that ‘trading up’ sets off mutual influences and promote 
cross-national learning. 
While both the ‘race-to-the-bottom’ and the ‘race-to-the-top’ hypotheses have received significant 
attention in the academic literature, their applicability to explain regulatory cooperation strategies is 
limited. On the one hand, empirical evidence for both remains limited. With regard to the ‘race-to-the-
bottom’ hypothesis, Newland (1999) puts forward that trade liberalisation has exerted downward 
pressure on labour standards. Vogel (1995: 250) acknowledges that the construction of the Single 
Market has weakened national regulations of some member states on food additives and packaging 
directives. Nonetheless, cross-sectoral analyses fail to find empirical support for a systematic downward 
pressure exerted by multinational firms on domestic regulatory standards (for a discussion and review 
see Drezner, 2007: 16; Garrett & Lange, 1995). The establishment of private regimes by transnational 
firms has not undermined domestic regulatory frameworks, but mostly been a response to government 
inaction (Zeitlin, 2015) or have been restricted to emerging policy issues. As policy debates have 
developed, private regimes have been complemented or replaced with government regulation. 
Likewise, empirical evidence remains limited for the broad applicability of the influence of transnational 
firms in promoting a ‘race-to-the-top’ or engaging in ‘trading up’. Even if Vogel (1995) identifies 
examples of trading up in environmental and consumer safety regulation, the mutual strengthening of 
regulatory standards across jurisdictions as a result of transnational firm influence is limited. The 
mobilisation of foreign firms in favour of more stringent regulatory standards rather depends on the size 
and attractiveness of the market that imposes stricter regulatory standards in the first place (Vogel, 1995: 
261). Only if the market is sufficiently attractive for foreign exporters, may they support a strengthening 
of standards to maintain market access. If, in turn, the market is too small, exporters may rather forego 
export opportunities than support a strengthening of regulatory standards in their own market. Besides, 
foreign producers may not mobilise in favour of more stringent regulatory standards if they perceive 
these more stringent regulatory standards as only motivated by protectionist interests (Princen, 2004). 
Likewise, if the strengthening of regulatory standards is perceived to reflect protectionist interests, the 
existence of Baptist-bootlegger coalitions may prevent a California effect in the country affected by 
trade restrictions (Princen, 2004: 141). In this case, foreign producers will seek to challenge them in 
front of international dispute settlement mechanisms or will seek to set rival regulatory standards rather 
than mobilise in favour of an adoption of the more stringent regulatory standards.      
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At the same time, international political economy approaches provide limited insight into the particular 
process of regulatory cooperation. They merely assume a regulatory dynamic without coordination 
among governments and regulators (see chapter 3.1). As a result, they do not specify which preferences 
a ‘state’ pursues that is transformed (even if it not eroded) by globalisation (Kahler & Lake, 2003). 
Functional pressures, i.e. regulatory divergences against a context of increasing interdependence, may 
well be considered a necessary condition for the pursuit of regulatory cooperation by the ‘government’ 
of a large economy. Certain authors, however, even call into question that it is necessary at all (Falkner 
& Müller, 2013: 280). In any case, these approaches leave unclear why high functional adaptation 
pressure should encourage governments to align or approximate their regulatory policies with those of 
other countries. High adaptational pressure may also reinforce government strategies to protect domestic 
policies under the status quo, e.g. making them more stringent, to maintain and protect their own 
regulatory scope.   
In sum, this section has presented two main rational-choice approaches that see explanatory factors for 
regulatory cooperation at the international level. Liberal institutionalists argue that international 
organisations are coordination facilitators, act as focal points and orchestrators and thereby encourage 
states to engage in cooperation. International political economy scholars propose that transnational firms 
push governments to cooperate, either in a downward direction of regulatory stringency according to 
the ‘race-to-the-bottom’ hypothesis or an upward direction based on the ‘race-to-the-top’ argument. 
Empirical evidence for both arguments remains limited, though. Besides, they propose explanations that 
mostly reject an active role of the state in regulatory dynamics and thus fail to offer a mechanism that 
could explain the engagement of regulators in cooperation.     
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2.3. Domestic regulatory culture 
  
Constructivist contributions that identify explanatory factors for the strategy formation of actors at the 
domestic level commonly share references to a ‘domestic regulatory culture’. Within the literature that 
is relevant to understand constraints on strategy formation and choice in bilateral regulatory cooperation, 
this field of research is arguably the smallest. Constructivist approaches that see explanatory factors for 
the behaviour of regulators at the domestic level again share the assumption that the behaviour of an 
actor is shaped by its beliefs, values and identities. The embedding of actors within institutions shapes 
their identity and thereby constitutes meaning for them. According to approaches in this field, ideas and 
institutions thus influence what actors consider as legitimate behaviour.   
Domestic-level constructivist approaches on international governance and regulatory cooperation 
identify two main explanations for the behaviour choice: the identity of a government and the presence 
of distinct regulatory approaches that constitute for a government what can be regarded as legitimate 
behaviour. These two explanations have been particularly influential in research that examines the 
influence of the EU’s and the Commission’s identity on its behaviour choices. 
Approaches that follow identity-based explanations are rooted in both actor-centred and structural 
constructivism as well as sociological institutionalism. Actor-centred constructivism assumes that actors 
use ideas they hold strategically to advance what they consider as legitimate and appropriate behaviour 
(Saurugger, 2013). Sociological institutionalism, in turn, assumes that institutions shape the identities 
of actors and therefore constitute actors’ behaviour (Eising & Jabko, 2001). Institutions thus define 
which claims and demands can be considered legitimate (Goldstein, 1988; Goldstein & Keohane, 1993). 
If ideas, values, and norms are embedded in an institutional setting, they can affect the strategic choices 
of policy-makers. Societal actors can exert influence on policy-makers as ‘norm entrepreneurs’ because 
they carry new ideas, values, or principles (Risse, 2000). To advance their norms at the international 
level, state actors thus seek to persuade other states about the legitimacy of their proposals (March & 
Olsen, 1989).  
Within EU studies, approaches that may be placed into actor-centred constructivism have noted the 
Commission’s pursuit of governance strategies that correspond to ideas that it holds. The latter support 
hypotheses for an engagement in deep regulatory cooperation and rule externalisation. To protect and 
extend the ‘European model’, authors note that the Commission seeks to combine deep economic 
integration with high social, environmental, health, and safety standards (Laïdi 2008; Zielonka 2008). 
Siles-Brügge (2011) puts forward that the internalisation and strategic use of neoliberal economic ideas 
explain the Commission’s strategy to reduce non-tariff barriers to trade. Van den Hoven (2006) suggests 
that the Commission’s decision to pursue rules-based multilateralism aiming at a fair redistribution of 
economic gains reflects its belief in justice and its belief in the inability of markets to deliver fair 
distributions of economic gains. 
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At the same time, authors have emphasised the influence of the EU’s own multilateral identity and its 
experience of integration within the Single Market as an explanation for the pursuit of external 
governance (Jorgensen, 2006; Lucarelli & Manners, 2006). These studies have, however, not explicitly 
addressed the EU’s or the Commission’s pursuit of regulatory cooperation. Still, they have analysed 
related questions such as the role of the EU in promoting regionalism (Grugel, 2007), the relationship 
between the EU and state-centric international organisations (Laatikainen & Smith, 2006) and the 
potential of the EU to shape norms and rules of the international system (Smith, 2010; Chaban, Elgström 
& Holland, 2006). Falke (2005) argues that the Commission’s pursuit of a rules-based trade policy and 
global governance architecture reflects its own post-modern identity.  
An important contribution in this field are characterisations of the EU as a “civilian power” (Hill, 1990; 
Orbie & Tortell, 2009) and a “normative power” (Manners, 2002). The ‘civilian power’ perspective 
argues that the strength of the EU as a foreign policy actor relies primarily on the application of its own 
model of regional integration. Manners (2002) emphasises that the external behaviour of the EU is 
rooted in its particular and unique identity based on universal values such as freedom, human rights and 
democracy. He has coined the term ‘Normative Power Europe’ for the EU’s distinctive identity 
(Manners, 2008). Empirical discussions focus on the EU’s approach to promote human rights, 
democracy, and the rule of law through economic means (Orbie & Tortell, 2009; for a discussion see 
Schimmelfennig, 2010). 
Authors further draw attention to the distinct regulatory cultures in jurisdictions that are rooted in 
regulatory ideas and public values. Regulatory cultures link ideas to institutions of regulatory 
convergence. In EU studies, Pollack and Shaffer (2005) and Vogel (2003) have drawn attention to the 
EU’s distinct regulatory culture in assessing and managing risks and meeting consumer expectations for 
safety. Vogel (2003) argues that the prevalence of the EU’s distinct regulatory culture and public value 
explain the persistence of regulatory divergence over time despite high levels of economic and political 
interdependence. The existence of distinct regulatory cultures reflecting specific public values hinders 
the engagement in regulatory cooperation if the regulatory cultures differ across jurisdictions.  
The influence of distinct regulatory cultures especially on regulatory cooperation between large 
jurisdictions is admittedly difficult to disregard. Existing studies on transatlantic regulatory cooperation 
convincingly argue that distinct regulatory approaches in the EU and the US on many issues explain the 
persistence of divergences in regulations and standards (Vogel, 2012; Pollack & Shaffer, 2005; 
Steffenson, 2005). The distinction according to domestic regulatory cultures can, however, only support 
a dichotomous explanation between cooperation and non-cooperation. It cannot explain the multiple 
variation and the differentiated outcomes related to regulatory cooperation strategies that are observed 
empirically. Moreover, contributions to this field lack the specification of a causal mechanism that 
connects distinct regulatory cultures to the choice for different strategies of regulatory cooperation. This 
point will be resumed in greater depth in chapter 2.5.     
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2.4. Domestic politics  
 
This section discusses rational-choice approaches that see explanatory factors for the governance 
behaviour of regulators at the domestic level. Drawing from an earlier characterisation by Drezner 
(2007), contributions to this field are summarised under the title ‘domestic politics’. Rational-choice 
explanations that identify explanatory factors at the domestic level have become mainstream in both 
wider studies of international political economy and specific studies on the EU during what may be 
called a “second wave of scholarship”. They maintain that ‘great power’ states with large internal 
markets remain the key actors and determine the extent of regulatory cooperation and convergence 
(Drezner, 2007). This literature argues that despite globalisation and economic internationalisation, the 
state has not disappeared, but rather changed its shape (Raustiala, 2002; Abbott & Snidal, 2009). Majone 
(1996) specifies this, observing the emergence of the ‘regulatory state’. Slaughter (1997: 183) argues 
that “the state is not disappearing, but disaggregating into its separate, functionally distinct parts with 
these parts networking with their counterparts abroad”. Abbott and Snidal (2009) put forward that multi-
actor models of regulation can be better described as ‘governance triangle’ consisting of states, firms 
and NGOs, where decentralised regulatory powers are shared by state agencies and private actors. 
Within this governance triangle, the state retains a central role in transnational regulation and regulatory 
cooperation due to its competencies, its legitimacy and its credibility to act in the public interest (Abbott 
& Snidal, 2009). Many studies examining strategies, but also patterns of international governance fall 
into this field of research. It is also the field in which the theoretical contribution of this book shall be 
placed. 
The ‘domestic politics’ literature can be broadly divided into four different streams: A first stream 
derives explanations for the behaviour of state actors from neo-realist theory. A second stream, the 
‘Open Economy Politics’ literature builds on Liberal Institutionalism and explains the behaviour of 
actors with domestic societal preferences and domestic institutions which shape their aggregation. A 
third stream, the ‘experimentalist governance’ literature relaxes the strict assumptions of rational-choice 
theory for the behaviour of actors and proposes a behavioural framework which incorporates uncertainty 
and learning. Lastly, the ‘New Interdependence Approach’, relies on historical institutionalism and puts 
forward arguments for patterns of cross-jurisdictional institutional change in a context of high 
interdependence. This section will review each of these streams, examining whether and how they can 
be applied  to the puzzle that this book seeks to address. 
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Neo-realism  
 
Neo-realists (e.g. Gilpin, 1987; Krasner, 1976) emphasise that the states and jurisdictions with large 
internal markets are able to shape international regulatory outcomes. Relatively more powerful countries 
are assumed to have leverage over other countries and can therefore shape outcomes in line with their 
interests. States and jurisdictions with large internal markets will use their power strategically to shape 
global policy regimes in view of their own domestic policies and thus achieve relative gains over other 
powers. At the same time, they seek to protect their domestic policy choices by coercing others into 
compliance when necessary. Regulatory cooperation is thus also driven by geopolitical considerations. 
According to this argument, states will pursue regulatory coordination if adjustment costs that actors 
face in altering their pre-existing rules and regulations are not too high (Drezner, 2007).  
States and jurisdictions will thus pursue regulatory cooperation where they have hegemonic or at least 
relative power. Simmons (2001) thus explains harmonisation in international capital regulation in the 
1990s with the reliance of the US on its hegemonic power. Drezner (2007) also stresses the market 
power of the EU as a determinant of its willingness and ability to shape global regulatory outcomes 
alongside the US.  
Many authors emphasise that the size of the Single Market is an essential power resource of the EU 
(Bach & Newman, 2007; Damro, 2012; Bretherton & Vogler, 2006; Meunier & Nicolaidis, 2006). Yet, 
a large market is increasingly considered a necessary, but not sufficient power resource. At the same 
time, few studies have found evidence for geopolitical considerations as a determinant of the motivation 
for the EU’s interactions at the international level (Zimmermann, 2007; Aggarwal & Fogarty, 2004). 
Conceicao-Heldt and Meunier (2014) on the contrary argue that the EU mostly uses its material power 
where it negotiates with symmetrical power whereas it is more likely to act as a normative power when 
it negotiates with smaller or less powerful actors.  
Correspondingly, the scope for power-based bargaining especially in bilateral regulatory cooperation is 
small. Bilateral regulatory cooperation usually involves the contestation among rival solutions with one 
tending to prevail in the end (Peterson & Young, 2014: 160). Under an equivalence decision, each side 
maintains its rules. Compromise is only possible if one side accepts the other side as equivalent in effect. 
Even where the EU found itself in an unfavourable bargaining situation in the past, it did not change its 
regulations due to external pressure (Alons, 2014). Moreover, regulatory externalisation has been 
stronger with states similar in market size to the EU than with smaller states (Young, 2016). Power-
based bargaining has been particularly constrained where the positions of the EU have been “isolated” 
(Falkner & Müller, 2013: 219) or the preference differential between the EU and third countries has 
been very high (Young, 2014).    
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Open Economy Politics  
 
The arguably most widely applied rational-choice institutionalist model to understand strategy formation 
in international political economy is the so-called ‘Open Economy Politics’ framework (Lake, 2009). It 
conceptualises strategy formation of governments in a two-step process: preferences of economic actors, 
i.e. firms, trade unions and NGOs, are aggregated into a strategy whereby the aggregation of these 
preferences is conditioned by the domestic institutions of a country, i.e. its decision rules. The 
subsequent application of the framework to understand a state or jurisdiction’s behaviour in international 
negotiations employs the metaphor of the ‘two-level game’. One ‘game’ is the domestic game in which 
the range of outcomes is determined for which the government can ensure ratification, i.e. the ‘win-set’. 
The other ‘game’ represents the bargaining of the government negotiators as the interface between the 
domestic and the international level at the international level with other governments6.  
Within the domestic ‘game’, the constraints on strategy formation by government negotiators are 
influenced by the constellation of societal preferences and the pattern of political institutions (Lake, 
2009). The constellation of societal preferences constrains the negotiating room for government 
negotiators at the international level. The preference of a societal actor with regard to a specific outcome 
reflects the anticipated gains or losses from that potential outcome (Dür & De Bièvre, 2005; Bouwen, 
2002; Grossman & Helpman, 1994; Frieden, 1991; Rogowski, 1989; Milner, 1988). Subsequently, the 
aggregation of the preferences of societal actors into state preferences is determined by the domestic 
institutional framework. The domestic institutional framework thus determines how many actors can 
influence the formulation of a strategy and their relative power on its adoption or eventual ratification.  
With regard to regulatory cooperation, the preferences of societal actors are argued to reflect the pattern 
of ‘regulatory politics’ or ‘new trade politics’, i.e. societal contestation among economic and non-
economic interest groups (Kelemen 2010; Kelemen & Vogel 2010; Peterson & Young, 2014; Young & 
Peterson, 2007). Import-competing firms are expected to prefer protection through non-cooperation 
while export-oriented firms are expected to prefer liberalisation. Authors argue that a shift in the balance 
of power among economic interests as a result of trade integration, trade diversion effects, the emergence 
of global value chains and the growing importance of import-dependent firms has recently led to an 
increasing pursuit of trade liberalisation and regulatory cooperation (Kim, 2017; Eckhardt & Poletti, 
2016; Siles-Brügge, 2011; Dür, 2010;; Manger, 2009; Woll, 2008; McGuire, 2006 ). 
                                                     
6 There has been a debate if regulatory cooperation can be modelled with the help of the two-level game. Studies 
(Peterson & Young, 2014: 162; Damro, 2006) have put forward that regulatory cooperation does not entail the 
participation or involvement by government leaders, but government officials or regulators. However, these are 
argued to represent domestically agreed positions and behave in ways grasped by the two-level game metaphor. 
(Peterson & Young, 2014: 162). 
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At the same time, authors put forward that the growing importance of NGOs and the emerging 
politicisation of regulatory cooperation constrains the ability of state actors to engage in trade politics 
or regulatory cooperation (Dür & De Bièvre, 2007; Young & Peterson, 2006). The literature suggests 
that NGOs and trade unions prefer a strengthening of regulations which protect their constituency 
(Young & Peterson, 2006). NGOs thus tend to support an export or uploading of domestic consumer, 
labour, environmental and public health regulations (Peterson & Young, 2014). Yet, most environmental 
and consumer organisations are assumed to oppose regulatory cooperation because they fear downward 
pressure on domestic regulations (Vogel, 2003, 2012; Evans, 2003: 155). In these constellations, high 
issue salience and the mobilisation of societal actors are argued to constrain the space for government 
negotiators to act upon their own preferences (Peterson & Young, 2014; Klüver, 2012; Mahoney, 2007).  
From these considerations, Open Economy Politics deduces the preferences of societal actors in 
‘regulatory politics’. Regulatory approximation through changes to national regulations is argued to be 
opposed by NGOs that support the substantive objective of a policy as well as firms that would face 
increasing competition (Peterson & Young, 2014: 161; Nicolaidis, 2000: 159). Actors that may favour 
a foreign regulation to the domestic one are argued to be in the minority as they likely lost the 
corresponding political debate previously. Negotiated mutual recognition is argued to reflect the patterns 
of traditional trade politics, i.e. the confrontation between export-oriented and import-competing firms. 
NGOs may question if a foreign regulation is equivalent in effect to the domestic one. Import-competing 
firms are argued to question ‘equivalence’ to avoid higher competition. Societal actors should favour 
negotiated mutual recognition where export-oriented interests prevail (Peterson & Young, 2014: 162; 
Eckhardt & Poletti, 2016). 
In EU studies, Eberle and Lauter (2011) argue that the increase in powers for the European Parliament 
with the Lisbon Treaty increased the importance of veto points for the Commission. Newman (2011) 
puts forward that the multi-level structure of the EU allowed national data privacy authorities and NGOs 
in the dispute on the sharing of airline passenger records to leverage their access to opportunity structures 
at the EU level. This prevented an agreement on the exchange of airline passenger records against the 
support for data sharing among the interior ministries of the EU member states. Authors further point 
out that NGOs in the EU oppose regulatory cooperation as the stringency of EU regulations often tends 
to exceed that of other countries (Young, 2016; Eliasson, 2014; Peterson & Young, 2014: 27). Ziegler 
(2011) argues that the politicised regulatory process of risk management in the EU with its openness to 
the participation of NGOs give rise to a prevention-focused approach. The mobilisation of NGOs has 
been connected to a ‘politicisation’ of trade and regulatory politics (Eliasson, 2014; Zürn, 2015). Pollack 
argues that this domestic politicisation “has constrained the ability of regulators to engage in substantive 
compromises with their counterparts” (Pollack, 2005: 911; see also Pollack, 2003). Besides, Vogel 
(2012: 32) draws attention to the public, arguing that the public in the EU displays a pronounced concern 
for the protection from risks that could be challenged through regulatory cooperation (Vogel, 2012: 32). 
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Yet, ‘regulatory politics’ struggles to explain the Commission’s choice of regulatory cooperation 
strategies in practice. First, in many cases, societal mobilisation is muted or reactive. The Commission’s 
struggle to raise civil society participants for all regulatory cooperation dialogues except those with the 
US shows this. Societal mobilisation is at best reactive as it mainly occurs when regulators have 
provided incentives to mobilise. Second, authors also call into question if regulatory cooperation can be 
explained with the deduction of preferences according to the ‘Open Economy Politics’ framework. On 
the one hand, anticipated costs and benefits are harder to predict for regulatory cooperation (Peterson & 
Young, 2014: 27; Jacoby & Meunier, 2010: 311; Woll, 2008: 18). On the other hand, negotiations on 
regulatory cooperation do not (only) revolve around the question whether to liberalise, but rather how 
to liberalise economic relations. Existing studies have mostly proposed that the preferences of firms 
reflect the expected adjustment costs of regulatory adjustments or approximations (Büthe & Mattli, 
2011). Firms are thus expected to prefer regulatory outcomes with which they are familiar to avoid 
adjustment costs. If expected adjustment costs outweigh the anticipated benefits of a reduction in 
regulatory barriers, even export-oriented firms prefer a maintenance of the regulatory status quo. 
Third, in the presence of the NGOs and after the adoption of rules and standards on risk regulation firms 
advocate an externalisation of domestic rules and standards and demand that they are also applied to 
imported products. As domestic firms adapt their products to domestic regulatory requirements, they 
have a competitive advantage in applying these rules and standards relative to their foreign competitors. 
Yet, frequently EU regulatory cooperation does not entail changes to domestic rules. Fourth, the public 
salience of regulatory cooperation has been low for the most part of the discussions, leaving aside 
perhaps the dispute over the authorisation of chlorine washes for chicken in 2008. Until the launch of 
the TTIP negotiations transatlantic regulatory cooperation has taken place in a technical environment7 
without much scrutiny by the wider public (Pollack & Shaffer, 2005). Fifth, public opinion lacked a 
transmission mechanism to influence the choice of regulatory cooperation strategies. Newman (2011) 
suggests that public opinion can play an important role on decision-making when the European 
Parliament has participation rights and acts as an opportunity structure for the wider public. Regulatory 
cooperation discussions outside the TTIP negotiations, however, took place in face-to-face interactions 
among officials and politically appointed officials without continuous consultation requirements of the 
European Parliament (Pollack & Shaffer, 2005; Green Cowles, 2001). Sixth, public opinion is often 
politically constructed at a specific point in time and thus subject to change (Vogel, 2012). This makes 
it difficult to argue that public opinion defends socially or historically rooted risk cultures and forces the 
Commission not to pursue regulatory externalisation where this could be reciprocated with demands to 
introduce changes to EU risk regulation. On the contrary, the Commission is itself argued to construct 
public opinion in order to pursue its own interests and preferences (e.g. Siles-Brügge & de Ville, 2015).
                                                     
7 Majone (1996) argues that regulatory politics is per se a technical exercise and does not attract the attention of 
the public.  
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Experimentalist governance  
 
The ‘experimentalist governance’ literature (Zeitlin, 2015; de Burca, Keohane & Sabel, 2014; Sabel & 
Zeitlin, 2010) relaxes the rational-choice assumption of full information to understand the emergence of 
less hierarchical forms of governance. Rather than assuming full information of government officials 
and their ability to engage in informed cost-benefit analyses, authors have put forward that actors have 
limited foresight and act in an environment of strategic uncertainty and a polyarchic distribution of 
power. Strategic uncertainty implies that actors need to learn what their goals should be and to learn 
how they can achieve these goals, for both of which they rely on cooperation with other actors (Sabel & 
Zeitlin, 2010: 9). Government officials are supported by civil society actors who can act either or both 
as agenda-setters and problem-solvers (de Burca, Keohane & Sabel, 2014: 13). Zeitlin (2015) as well as 
Sabel and Zeitlin (2010) find that ‘experimentalist governance’ can explain the Commission’s 
regulatory approach both within domestic regulatory networks and transnational regulatory networks. 
They argue that within these networks, the Commission relies on policy experimentation and 
cooperation with both state and non-state actors. Moreover, rather than hierarchical forms of 
governance, it employs ‘information exchange’ and leaves scope to sub-state or private actors for the 
implementation of initial commitments. 
Experimentalist governance has proven valuable to understand the Commission’s pursuit of information 
exchange and its wide involvement of both member state authorities and societal actors in the 
implementation of policy commitments. Yet, despite an arguable rise in importance of these forms of 
governance, ‘hierarchical forms of governance’ through negotiated mutual recognition or regulatory 
approximation remain important in the Commission’s approach to third countries. Experimentalist 
governance thus at best partly explain the Commission’s choice of regulatory cooperation strategies.  
 
New Interdependence Approach 
 
The New Interdependence Approach implies that regulatory cooperation strategies of government 
officials reflect the institutional power resources of a jurisdiction. Rooted in historical institutionalism, 
it puts forward that the preferences of actor are not exogenously given, but constituted by institutions in 
which they are embedded. Institutions created in the past thus structure decision-making in path-
dependent ways with often unintended constraints and consequences (Ikenberry, 2001). The New 
Interdependence Approach will be reviewed in greater depth in chapter 4.1.2.  
Studies within this approach agree that institutional power resources in international regulatory 
cooperation, enabling a jurisdiction to externalise policies and regulations, derive not only from its 
market size, but also from its regulatory capacity and the stringency of its regulations (Damro, 2012; 
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Bach & Newman, 2010, 2007). ‘Regulatory capacity’ describes the ability of a state to enforce its rules 
based on its personnel, knowledge and expertise (Bach & Newman, 2007). It determines the ability to 
generate and present information and maintain engagement in highly technical discussions (Büthe & 
Mattli, 2011). Moreover, it is considered an important source of power in bilateral regulatory 
cooperation, “in both negotiated mutual recognition and regulatory approximation” (Peterson & Young, 
2014: 162). Stringent regulations and the existence of ‘regulatory peaks’ push policy-makers to engage 
in policy export or promote the adoption of international standards which resemble the stringency of 
domestic rules to avoid a race-to-the-bottom (Young & Peterson, 2006). According to this approach, 
both regulatory stringency and regulatory capacity structure the behaviour of government actors. At the 
same time, interdependence triggers a functionalist dynamic and pushes domestic regulators, i.e. 
government officials, to coordinate with government officials from other jurisdictions with whom they 
would not have coordinated in the absence of interdependence.   
 
Mixed approaches  
 
Insights from Open Economy Politics and the New Interdependence Approach have been combined in 
the ‘Market Power Europe’ conceptual framework (Damro, 2015b, 2012). Damro proposes that market 
size, regulatory capacity and societal contestation should be taken as analytical dimensions to understand 
the ability of a large economy such as the EU to externalise its domestic policies and regulatory 
measures. Damro (2012: 683) argues that “the single market provides the material existence of the EU 
as a market power Europe that externalizes its economic and social market-related policies and 
regulatory measures”. Damro delineates market power as “intentional behaviour” which can be 
displayed through both persuasive and coercive means (Damro, 2012: 690). Persuasive means reflect 
the channels of Normative Power while coercion implies strategic leverage through conditionality 
(Damro, 2012: 690).  
EU studies note that the EU has developed considerable regulatory capacity across many policy areas, 
notably because of institutional and legislative reforms linked to the creation of the Single Market 
(Peterson & Young, 2014: 155; Bach & Newman, 2010; Bach & Newman, 2007). Moreover, they note 
that some EU regulations, e.g. on risk regulation, data privacy, and some financial service, are among 
the most stringent in the world (Vogel, 1995). At the same time, Lavenex (2014) implies that EU’s the 
reliance on functionalist extensions increases with geographical proximity where interdependence 
between the EU and third countries is high. Functionalist extensions are argued to exist in the 
interactions of the EU with its neighbourhood and the frameworks of accession, partnership, and 
association agreements. Newman and Posner (2015) add the density of international institutions as an 
explanatory variable for the policy strategies of the Commission in international regulatory cooperation. 
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Yet, institutional power resources and an environment of interdependence are not sufficient to push the 
Commission to engage in regulatory cooperation across all policy areas. Empirical studies have found 
that the Commission’s choice of policy strategies (including regulatory cooperation strategies in the 
terminology of this book) differs substantially across different sectors and issues.  Falkner and Müller 
(2013) conclude that the Commission is both a policy exporter, policy shaper, policy importer and policy 
defender. Young finds that in bilateral FTAs, the Commission only pursues limited regulatory export in 
specific sectors, e.g. food safety and car safety, while it does not pursue regulatory export in many others 
(2015b). Zeitlin (2015) also argues that the Commission does not necessarily promote an externalisation 
of EU rules even where it has regulatory capacity, but has adopted a ‘dual strategy’ to promote an 
externalisation of EU rules, standards and norms and to develop mechanisms for establishing 
‘equivalence’ of EU and foreign rules and standards. The Commission, however, has considerable 
autonomy towards member states where their preferences are heterogeneous or where member states’ 
preferences do not substantially differ from the Commission’s preferences on regulatory cooperation 
(Peterson & Young, 2014: 161). A focus on member states alone can therefore not explain the 
Commission’s behaviour in cases in which the Commission has discretionary authority or would 
externalise common EU regulations to which member states would not raise opposition. Explanations 
resorting to international-level variables (Newman & Posner, 2015) to solve the empirical puzzle of 
strategy differentiation lack the specification of a causal mechanism that would explain why 
international regulatory cooperation explanations may be transferred to bilateral interactions between 
states and jurisdictions.      
In sum, domestic level rational-choice institutionalist arguments propose that the patterns of societal 
contestation and domestic decision-making rules shape the possibility of ‘government officials’, i.e. 
Commission officials, to engage in regulatory cooperation and an externalisation of regulatory measures 
and policies. The increasing integration of firms into global value chains and the opportunity to use 
economies of scale create support among businesses for regulatory cooperation according to ‘open 
economy politics’. Yet, anticipated effects of such regulatory cooperation on domestic regulations give 
rise to opposition among NGOs, leading to a politicisation of regulatory cooperation and reducing the 
size of domestic ‘win-sets’ for government officials.  
Agenda-setting possibilities, delegated authority and the unwillingness or inability of member states to 
organise opposition are argued to increase the autonomy and discretion of the Commission. At the same 
time, a large internal market, regulatory stringency and regulatory capacity are considered as 
institutional power resources allowing the EU to engage in policy externalisation. An additional 
explanation is thus necessary to show how the Commission sets its behaviour in cases in which it has 
discretionary authority.  
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2.5. Summary 
 
The previous sections have demonstrated that existing empirical studies identify numerous strategies 
that large jurisdictions pursue in international governance. In contrast, the theoretical literature proposes 
variables which mostly derive a dichotomous understanding of international governance strategies. 
Based on this contrast, this section thus specifies the theoretical gaps that this book seeks to address. It 
will first reiterate why neither domestic-level and international-level theoretical approaches can offer a 
full explanation with regard to the constraints that governments face in choosing a strategy for regulatory 
cooperation. The first step thus makes clear why existing studies are unable to fully resolve the puzzle 
with a focus on the dependent variable of this book. Second, it will show why bilateral-level theoretical 
approaches, to which this dissertation will contribute, require a further refinement of independent 
variables that studies have considered in the past. Third, it will demonstrate that existing approaches do 
not specify a causal mechanism that connects outcomes on the independent variables with those on the 
dependent variable.  
The literature discussed in the previous sections suggests various explanatory variables for the 
constraints on the choice of governments and regulators on international governance strategies. Yet, 
taken individually, each of these approaches displays important shortcomings in relation to the puzzle 
raised by this book. International-level rational-choice approaches overestimate the influence of 
international institutions and the constraints that interdependence and globalisation exert on the 
autonomy of domestic state actors. Correspondingly, they also overestimate the extent of regulatory 
cooperation that a large jurisdiction will seek to promote. International-level constructivist approaches 
overestimate the influence that ideas and norm entrepreneurs have on transnational policy convergence. 
They imply that socialisation should lead to ‘institutional isomorphism’. However, they cannot explain 
why domestic state actors do not necessarily promote transnational regulatory approximation even 
where socialisation and shared values are present. Besides, neither approach can explain why 
governments may choose not to pursue regulatory cooperation. 
Likewise, domestic-level constructivist literature taken alone lack a causal mechanism that connects the 
influence of ideas to the behaviour of actors. This limitation mostly also holds for studies that seek to 
integrate constructivist and rational-choice approaches, especially for contexts in which the level of 
uncertainty is low. Respective studies insufficiently clarify how ideas shape behaviour patterns when 
the level of uncertainty is low. Instead, explanations proposed for the behaviour patterns of actors in 
contexts of relatively high certainty reflect conventional rational-choice accounts.  
Lastly, domestic-level rational-choice approaches suggest explanatory factors which are arguably 
necessary for a jurisdiction to pursue regulatory cooperation, i.e. market size, regulatory capacity and 
internal unity. At the same time, they propose factors that may account for the reluctance of state actors 
to pursue regulatory cooperation, e.g. societal contestation and contestation. However, they struggle to 
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explain the empirically observed variation in governance and interaction strategies. Moreover, they lack 
a causal mechanism when societal contestation is muted or societal mobilisation is contested. In these 
cases, state actors should have discretion to strategically mobilise societal actors with preferences close 
to their own ones, making it necessary to identify a causal mechanism that relates strategy choice to the 
decision-making problem of state actors.  
In this regard, existing domestic-level rational-choice approaches display a certain theoretical 
incoherence. Although recent contributions increasingly stress the influence that state and sub-state 
actors exert on the behaviour of a state or jurisdiction in international governance, the majority of 
explanations continue to rely on the aggregation of societal preferences as the principal determinant of 
state or jurisdictional preferences. The acknowledgement of an autonomy of state actors on the one hand 
appears to contradict with the search for a theoretical micro-foundation of state behaviour in the 
constellation of societal preferences. Indeed, this apparent contradiction raises the question if a 
theoretical micro-foundation of state or jurisdictional behaviour cannot be deduced from the preferences 
of state or sub-state actors themselves.   
From this discussion of the shortcomings of existing literature it can be concluded that the political 
science literature lacks a theoretical foundation for the variation in international governance strategies 
observed in empirical studies. To clarify, this is not to argue that existing literature does not put forward 
relevant explanatory factors. The domestic rational-choice literature to which also this book seeks to 
contribute identifies several independent variables that describe the ability of a jurisdiction to engage in 
regulatory cooperation and policy externalisation. The book does not call the relevance of these factors 
into question. Rather, it seeks to specify additional variables that explain the actual behaviour of a state 
or jurisdiction in international governance, especially in bilateral interactions. 
To specify these variables, this book thus seeks to address the gap if and how domestic-level 
constructivist approaches can be incorporated into the domestic rational-choice literature to derive a 
more refined and concise framework. Rather than integrating domestic-level constructivist approaches 
into the ‘Open Economy Politics’ framework, this book aims at combining domestic-level constructivist 
approaches into the rational-choice approaches that themselves have incorporated international-level 
literature elements. Through an integrative combination of existing theoretical approaches, this book 
should obtain a more nuanced theoretical framework. The latter should help to provide a theoretical 
explanation for the variation in governance strategies, including regulatory cooperation strategies, that 
previous empirical studies have observed.   
Moreover, in specifying variables for the constraints and the choice of regulatory cooperation strategies, 
this book also seeks to address the theoretical gap resulting from the lack of a theoretical micro-
foundation that foresees a decisive role for state and sub-state actors. In deducing variables, this study 
thus seeks to specify them with a view to formulate the decision problem and explain constraints on the 
choice of a strategy from the perspective of state and sub-state actors. To clarify this point further, the 
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theoretical gap to be addressed does not consist in the lack of an explanation that assumes full autonomy 
of state actors. Rather, it consists in the lack of a micro-founded explanation that gives state and sub-
state actors autonomy in moderating opposing positions expressed by societal actors. This includes the 
possibility that state and sub-state actors take autonomous decisions because societal contestation is 
muted.  
This entails that this book needs to develop a causal mechanism that links the decision problem of state 
actors, the independent variables deduced from a combination of constructivist and rational-choice 
approaches and the variation in international governance, i.e. bilateral regulatory cooperation, strategies. 
This causal mechanism should specify a) how outcomes on independent variables constrain the decision 
of state actors and b) how state actors form a strategy based on different outcomes of the independent 
variables.   
To conclude, this book identifies three main theoretical gaps that it aims to address. First, it seeks to 
overcome the fragmentation of prior theoretical approaches and thereby address the under-theorising of 
the variation of governance strategies. Contributing to domestic-level rational-choice approaches, it 
seeks to deduce how constructivist approaches can be integrated into and combined with domestic-level 
rational-choice approaches that themselves have incorporated international-level explanatory elements. 
This gap thus addresses the contradiction between the manifold variation in forms and strategies of 
regulatory cooperation observed empirically and the mostly dichotomous distinction of governance 
forms derived theoretically. Second, in doing so, it seeks to derive the constraints on the choice and 
formation of a regulatory cooperation strategy with state and sub-state actors as the main object of 
analysis. This gap thus addresses the theoretical incoherence between a broad acknowledgement of the 
centrality of state and sub-state actors in international governance and the derivation of behaviour from 
the constellation and societal actor preferences. Third, and related to the former, it derives and specifies 
a causal mechanism that links the variation in state actor-centred explanatory factors to constraints on 
the choice and the formation of international governance, i.e. bilateral regulatory cooperation, strategies.     
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3. Developing a typology of bilateral regulatory cooperation strategies  
 
This book seeks to explain the constraints under which the regulator of a large jurisdiction forms and 
chooses different strategies for regulatory cooperation. In a comprehensive stock-taking exercise, the 
OECD (2013b) differentiates eleven different ‘mechanisms’ of regulatory cooperation. Yet, delineations 
and operationalisations of regulatory cooperation strategies in other literature differ starkly. Regulatory 
cooperation strategies differ along dimensions including their scope, depth, enforceability and policy 
dimension. Frequently discussed strategies in bilateral regulatory cooperation include harmonisation, 
mutual recognition, equivalence and mutual recognition of conformity assessment (Peterson & Young, 
2014, Veggeland, 2011).  
This chapter elaborates a new analytical specification for the dependent variable of this book, i.e. 
bilateral regulatory cooperation strategies. Its objective is to aggregate the considerable number of 
alternative operationalisations into one analytical model that captures the breadth of empirically relevant 
bilateral regulatory cooperation strategies, but is applicable to empirical investigation. The ensuing 
typology of bilateral regulatory cooperation strategies deduces the possible outcomes on the dependent 
variable of this book.  
First, for analytical clarity, the chapter introduces and defines bilateral regulatory cooperation strategies 
(chapter 3.1). Second, it maps regulatory cooperation strategies as identified by existing alternative 
studies and analyses the overlap of existing delineations (chapter 3.2.). Third, it synthesises bilateral 
regulatory cooperation strategies and develops a typology (chapter 3.3.). This typology will be used in 
chapter 4 to deduce how variation in the independent variables leads to differences in outcomes on the 
dependent variable.  
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3.1. Strategies of bilateral regulatory cooperation 
 
Within this section, this book defines the term ‘strategies’ and delineates it from the related concepts 
‘preferences’ and ‘interests’ that are frequently used in studies of international political economy 
(chapter 3.1.1). Besides, it places bilateral regulatory cooperation within the related concepts of active 
and passive external governance and horizontal and vertical governance (chapter 3.1.2.). This clarifies 
the scope of the argument presented in this book in relation to these concepts that characterise a large 
body of the literature on external governance. Furthermore, it provides an overview of different 
regulatory instruments to delineate the ‘dimensions’ to which regulatory cooperation can apply (chapter 
3.1.3.).  
 
3.1.1. Strategies as a concept 
 
Strategies are a frequently used concept in international political economy (e.g. Newman & Posner, 
2015; Woll, 2008; Frieden, 1999). They must be delineated from outcomes, preferences and interests.  
‘Strategies’ are defined by Frieden (1999) as the pursuit of an actor of its most preferred outcome. A 
strategy is thus the attempt of an actor “to come as close as possible to the outcome it prefers the most.” 
(Frieden, 1999: 41). Strategies are thus different from outcomes, which are frequently the dependent 
variable in political science research. Frieden (1999: 45) argues that strategies reflect “the anticipated 
actions of others, differential capabilities, knowledge and information”. They therefore take into 
consideration important contextual factors and information. Actors may, however, miscalculate the 
actions of others or have insufficient information or knowledge of contextual factors that determine the 
‘success’ of a strategy and their ability to realise an ‘outcome’ that is as close as possible to the outcome 
it prefers the most. This book concentrates on strategies rather than outcomes for two distinct reasons: 
First, bilateral regulatory cooperation is a recently emerging phenomenon and has featured on the agenda 
even of the EU only for some years. The population of regulatory cooperation outcomes is thus still 
relatively small. Second, bilateral regulatory cooperation is subject to numerous ‘technical’ challenges, 
e.g. methods how to assess the ‘equivalence’ of two regulations and regulatory approaches (Peterson & 
Young, 2014: 163). These challenges are still not entirely understood and continue to raise the interest 
of legal science scholars (e.g. Chase & Pelkmans, 2015). An analysis of outcomes is thus likely 
obstructed by what quantitative researchers call ‘omitted variable bias’. At the same time, strategies as 
the outcome that an actor aims to achieve has relevance in itself for both political science scholars and 
practitioners, including societal actors, that expect benefits or losses from regulatory cooperation 
(chapter 1.3).  
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On the other hand, strategies must be delineated from preferences. Preferences are prior to strategies 
and reflect the costs and benefits resulting from an outcome. Scholars of international political economy 
understand preferences to derive from stable, underlying interests of actors (Frieden, 1999). Preferences 
translate this interest into a policy- or outcome-specific evaluation of costs and benefits. Strategies, in 
turn, denote behaviour that an actor chooses to realise its preference. They consider how the preferences 
of an actor relate to the structural constraints of an interaction context and the preferences of other actors. 
The formation of a strategy is thus dependent on the “possibilities presented by the environment” and 
the “constraints of circumstance” (Frieden, 1999: 45). Figure 2 shows the relationship between interest, 
preferences, strategies and outcomes (adapted from Woll, 2008: 44).  
 
 
Figure 2: Strategies as a concept 
 
 
3.1.2. Bilateral regulatory cooperation in external governance 
 
This section places bilateral regulatory cooperation within the concepts used in studies of external and 
international governance. This will help to clarify the scope of the argument subsequently proposed in 
this book. This section first delineates bilateral regulatory cooperation as an ‘active’ mechanism of 
external governance from ‘passive’ ones such as diffusion and trading up. Second, it delineates bilateral 
regulatory cooperation as a ‘horizontal’ mechanism from vertical ones that apply to international 
regulatory cooperation.  
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Active versus passive mechanisms of external governance 
 
This first sub-section delineates regulatory cooperation from ‘trading up’ and ‘emulation’ as passive 
mechanisms of external governance and places it within ‘coordination’ as an active mechanism.     
Regulatory cooperation is an active mechanism of external governance. Active mechanisms, also 
referred to as political-administrative extensions or intentional mechanisms, must be delineated from 
passive mechanisms, also called indirect socio-economic or unintentional mechanisms (Falkner & 
Müller, 2013; Lavenex, 2014: 891). Active mechanisms describe that the ‘government’ of a country 
intentionally engages in the projection of policies or the coordination of policies with the government 
of another country. Passive mechanisms of external governance, in contrast, entail that policy export 
occurs without the deliberate action of a country’s governance, but only relies on its presence (Falkner 
& Müller 2013: 8; Bradford, 2012).  
As an active mechanism, regulatory cooperation must be delineated from the two most common 
mechanisms of passive policy transfer, ‘trading up’ and ‘emulation’. Both can be subsumed under 
processes of ‘diffusion’ that may lead to regulatory policy convergence (Elkins and Simmons, 2005).   
‘Trading up’ (Vogel, 1995) is a passive mechanism of policy export and transfer discussed by the 
rational-choice literature. It refers to the strengthening of regulations of a foreign country reflecting 
domestic regulations as a response to pressure on the foreign government by transnational firms. 
According to the ‘trading up’ logic, foreign exporters lobby their government to approximate the rules 
of the domestic market which has more stringent regulations than the foreign jurisdiction in order not to 
forego market access. They thus advocate the adoption of similar rules in fields such as environment, 
health, and product safety as the jurisdiction with more stringent regulations. The transfer of stringent 
regulations to other jurisdictions thus follows the advocacy of transnational firms and foreign exporters 
that have an interest in uniform or similar regulations across jurisdictions to maintain market access, use 
economies of scale and establish regulatory certainty (Vogel 2012; Bradford 2012). ‘Trading up’ thus 
describes behaviour of societal actors and governments from mostly smaller jurisdictions that change 
their behaviour in order to correct the negative externalities of the policies of larger jurisdictions 
(Zielonka, 2008; Dobbin et al., 2007; Raustiala, 2002). Due to the size of its internal market that is 
attractive to exporters from other countries and the stringency of EU regulations, ‘trading up’ has been 
described as an important mechanism through which EU regulations are transferred across jurisdictions. 
The prior strengthening of domestic EU regulations may be an intentional choice of the ‘domestic 
government’, i.e. the Commission, to protect domestic producers from competitive pressures and 
respond to demands of NGOs. Yet, ‘trading up’ does not arise as a result of deliberate strategies of the 
Commission to externalise EU policies or procedures but is initiated by advocacy activities of 
transnational or non-EU firms. It therefore falls outside the scope of regulatory cooperation strategies. 
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‘Emulation’ describes passive rule transfer and indirect rule approximation from a constructivist 
perspective (Gilardi, 2012; Braun & Gilardi, 2006). Under emulation or learning, regulators and 
government officials approximate or align their regulations with those of another country because they 
perceive them as legitimate or normatively superior. They learn about the regulations of other countries 
as they socialise with government officials and regulators from other countries within transnational 
networks or international institutions. Regulations are thus argued to diffuse across jurisdictions and to 
be emulated by other jurisdictions if underlying domestic norms resonate with norms held or shared by 
foreign governments. The logic of emulation lies at the core of Manners’ argument about the role of the 
EU in norm diffusion (Manners, 2002: 251). Yet, similar to the mechanism underlying ‘trading up’, 
‘emulation’ does not require the proactive promotion of regulations by the government of the jurisdiction 
whose regulations are emulated.  
Within active mechanisms of external governance, regulatory cooperation must be placed within the 
realm of ‘coordination’ rather than ‘coercion’.  
Under ‘coercion’, the government of a state enjoying an asymmetric power advantage urges another 
government to adopt or adapt to its norms and standards. The domestic government offers rewards to 
the foreign government for the adoption of its norms and standards or threatens the use of sanctions if a 
foreign government refuses to adopt them. Coercion builds on power-based bargaining and the use of 
conditionality. It also implies that the domestic government enjoying an asymmetric power advantage 
will seek to ‘export’8 or ‘transfer’9 its existing policies rather than adjusting its behaviour, i.e. strategy, 
to the preferences of the foreign government. Yet, the use of coercion presupposes a power asymmetry, 
resulting e.g. from differences in market size. Yet, bilateral regulatory cooperation often takes place 
between ‘states’ of comparable market size10.  
Under ‘coordination’, governments “adjust their behaviour to the actual or anticipated preferences of 
others” (Keohane, 1984: 51). This implies that government actors exchange ideas, coordinate efforts 
and negotiate common standards with officials from governments of other countries (Kudrna & Müller, 
2016; Lavenex, 2014; Gilardi, 2012; Holzinger et al., 2007; Lütz, 2007; Braun & Gilardi, 2006).11 Under 
                                                     
8 ‘Policy export’ is understood as “process through an actor actively and passively projects beyond its borders 
formal and informal norms or policy paradigms” (Müller & Falkner, 2014: 6). 
9 ‘Policy transfer’ is defined as “processes by which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, 
institutions and ideas in one political system (past or present) is used in the development of policies, administrative 
arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political system” (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000: 5). 
10 Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2009) note that coercion has e.g. been important in interactions between the EU 
and its neighbourhood.  
11 Coordination may not only involve top-level government representatives and government officials, but often 
also administrators and private sector regulators. These organise in trans-governmental networks (Slaughter, 2000; 
Raustiala, 2002).   
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coordination, governments and regulators thus work towards a harmonisation or alignment of standards, 
regulations and procedures. Regulatory cooperation can thus placed within the realm of ‘coordination’12.  
 
Horizontal versus vertical governance 
 
In a next step, bilateral regulatory cooperation shall be placed within horizontal mechanisms of 
governance in contrast to vertical ones.  
Vertical mechanisms take place within international organisations and global trans-governmental 
networks. They are thus mostly multilateral. Outcomes of vertical pathways are multilaterally negotiated 
policies and rules (Jorgensen et al, 2011; Jorgensen 2009, Laatikainen & Smith, 2006; see also 
Wunderlich & Bailey, 2011; Tèlo, 2009; Bretherton & Vogler, 2006). Horizontal pathways, in turn, take 
place between individual or a group of ‘states’ as well as between regions. They can be both unilateral, 
bilateral and plurilateral. Examples for horizontal pathways of transfer and coordination are bilateral 
and regional free trade agreements as well as bi- and plurilateral regulatory and trans-governmental 
networks13.   
A government may pursue horizontal and vertical mechanisms in parallel, engaging in venue-shopping 
to pursue decisions in several settings and environments simultaneously (Damro, 2005). Nonetheless, it 
is likely to select a venue strategically in which it can most effectively advance its preference (Alter & 
Meunier, 2009; Drezner, 2009). Vertical and horizontal pathways should therefore be distinguished for 
analytical purposes. The pursuit of regulatory cooperation in a horizontal or vertical setting imposes 
different constraints on the discretion of a government to pursue its most preferred outcome. Horizontal 
mechanisms are argued to give governments more discretion in pursuing their most preferred outcome 
than vertical mechanisms (Young, 2016). Vertical settings impose high constraints on governments due 
to potential independent effects of agenda-setting by international organisations as well as voting and 
decision rules (Young, 2015a; Jorgensen, 2011; Jorgensen 2009, Laatikainen & Smith, 2006). 
Moreover, the large number of other actors, i.e. states, involved and the heterogeneity of their 
preferences reduce the likelihood of a successful pursuit of vertical strategies in contrast to horizontal 
strategies (Newman & Posner, 2015). The lower likelihood of ‘success’ in vertical relative to horizontal 
cooperation should not influence the choice of a specific strategy, but may impact the decision to engage 
in regulatory cooperation at all.  
                                                     
12 Lavenex (2014: 891) argues that active and passive mechanisms often mutually support each other. 
Harmonisation of regulations may thus e.g. result from the simultaneous occurrence of ‘trading up’ demands of 
transnational firms and coercion efforts of the Commission in an international organisation. Yet, for analytical 
purposes, they shall be delineated to allow statements about the causal mechanism producing an observed outcome.   
13 Zeitlin (2015b: 335) argues that although trans-governmental networks are not coercive in nature, the EU often 
uses them for ‘disguised policy transfer’ rather than mutual learning (see also Lavenex, 2015).    
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At the same time, horizontal mechanisms entail a lower geographical scope of possible transfer and 
coordination. Societal actors may therefore be reluctant to mobilise resources in favour of horizontal 
mechanisms (Peterson & Young, 2014). At the same time, government officials may be reluctant to 
mobilise administrative resources in support of ‘complex’ strategies such as harmonisation for vertical 
coordination (Egan & Pelkmans, 2015). Only some international regulatory cooperation strategies may 
thus be applicable to bilateral regulatory cooperation, which is the object of this book. 
To clarify the analytical scope of the argument developed in this book, this section has placed bilateral 
regulatory cooperation into wider distinctions of the external governance literature. It has delineated 
bilateral regulatory cooperation as an active mechanism from ‘trading up’ and ‘emulation’ as passive 
mechanisms and contrasted its reliance on ‘coordination’ with ‘coercion’. Besides, this section has 
determined bilateral regulatory cooperation as a vertical rather than horizontal mechanism. The 
discretion of the government and the impact of a potentially low willingness of societal actors and 
regulators and governments to mobilise resources in bilateral regulatory cooperation will be re-
considered in the delineation of strategies in chapter 3.2.   
  
3.1.3. Regulatory instruments  
 
This section sketches an overview of regulatory instruments used in domestic regulatory policy-making 
with a view to delineate the dimensions of bilateral regulatory cooperation. This will help to clarify to 
which regulatory instruments bilateral regulatory cooperation can apply. This section will distinguish 
legislation, regulatory policies and implementation procedures.   
Legislation covers all legislative acts that transpose constitutional objectives and put policies into 
practice. Legislative acts are adopted by the legislative bodies within a political system. They can 
regulate, authorise or restrict. In the EU, legislative acts come from the principles and objectives laid 
down in the EU Treaties. Their adoption follows the legislative procedures set out in the EU Treaties, 
i.e. the Ordinary Legislative Procedure or special legislative procedures. In the Ordinary Legislative 
Procedure, legislative acts are adopted by the Council or the European Parliament. The most relevant 
types of legislative acts in the EU are Regulations and Directives. While Regulations apply directly and 
automatically to all EU member states, Directives need to be transposed by member states into national 
law. Directives specify a result that member states need to achieve, but allow them to choose how to 
achieve that result (for an overview of EU legislative acts see Wessels, 2008: 342-347). In the US, 
Federal Laws are introduced as bills into Congress and debated and adopted by both chambers of 
Congress, i.e. the House of Representatives and the Senate. The President signs and approves the bill 
and thus enacts it as law (Burnham, 2011).    
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Regulatory policies include technical regulations and standards. Technical regulations specify elements 
of legislation and include technical specifications and requirements (European Parliament & Council, 
2015). In goods regulation, technical regulations specify terminology, symbols, packaging or labelling 
requirements (World Trade Organisation, 1995a; art. 2 WTO TBT Agreement). Technical regulations 
are adopted by executives as non-legislative acts. Compliance with technical regulations is mandatory 
to enter a product onto the market in a jurisdiction. In the EU, technical regulations are mostly adopted 
as delegated acts and implementing acts by the Commission (Parker & Alemanno, 2014: 21). In the US, 
regulations are issued mostly by federal regulatory agencies, boards or commissions and specify the 
implementation of objectives laid down in Congress legislation (Parker & Alemanno, 2014: 25).  
Standards are technical specifications which define requirements for products, production processes and 
services in support of legislation or regulation (World Trade Organisation, 1995a; art. 4 WTO TBT 
Agreement). They differ from technical regulations as compliance with standards is usually voluntary. 
Standards are mostly developed by private and market actors following basic principles of 
standardisation such as consensus, openness, transparency and non-discrimination (European 
Parliament & Council, 2012; Büthe & Mattli, 2011: 28). In the EU, standards are developed by the 
European Standardisation Organisations CEN, CENELEC and ETSI (European Commission, 2003). In 
the US, standards are also developed by market and private actors under the coordination of the 
American National Standards Institute (ANSI; Büthe & Mattli, 2011: 35-38).  
In addition to technical regulations and standards, the ‘regulatory state’ relies on a number of conformity 
assessment procedures and administrative procedures to effectively implement regulatory policies 
(Parker & Alemanno, 2014: 30; Mattli & Woods, 2009). For the remainder of this book, these procedures 
shall be referred to as ‘implementation procedures’. Implementation procedures summarise the 
processes executing and implementing the rules and specifications of legislation and technical 
regulations. They include conformity assessments and ‘administrative procedures’ that ensure that 
regulatory requirements laid down in legislation and technical regulations14 are met. Conformity 
assessments include testing and inspection and certification (European Commission, 2016; World Trade 
Organisation, 1995a; art. 5 WTO TBT Agreement). Conformity assessment procedures are defined and 
described in the corresponding legislation and regulation (European Commission, 2016j: 64-86). 
Administrative procedures verify the application of regulatory requirements and enforce the 
implementation of requirements. They include market surveillance procedures and redress procedures 
(European Commission, 2016j: 97-101). In goods regulation, market surveillance procedures include 
product controls, including import controls, product withdrawals, recalls and sanctions against non-
compliant products (European Commission, 2016j: 107-109). In the EU, Regulation 765/2008 lays 
down the requirements for market surveillance for the marketing of products (European Parliament & 
                                                     
14 As standards are voluntary for procedures, compliance with standards is usually not subject to specific 
implementation procedures.  
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Council, 2008). Under market surveillance, competent authorities can require documentation from 
producers on the conformity of products with regulatory requirements, enter the premises of producers 
and take samples for testing (European Commission, 2016j: 105-109). For the pharmaceutical and food 
sectors, often additional procedures apply, i.e. import authorisations for specific establishments, 
countries or products (European Commission, 2016j: 114-117).  
In sum, this chapter has introduced the distinction between different regulatory instruments, 
differentiating between legislation, technical regulations, standards and implementation procedures. 
While legislation, technical regulations and standards define rules and regulatory requirements, 
implementation procedures include the applicable processes to carry out and verify the adherence to the 
rules and regulatory requirements defined in legislation, technical regulations (and standards). 
Legislation defines objectives and results with regard to a product or process. It is mandatory and 
adopted by the legislative bodies of a political system, i.e. the Parliament. Technical regulation specifies 
elements of legislation and includes technical specification and requirements. Compliance of market 
participants with technical regulation is mandatory, but unlike legislation, technical regulations are 
adopted by executive bodies. Standards also specify technical requirements in support of legislation and 
technical regulation, but are voluntary and adopted by private and market actors.   
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3.2. Mapping bilateral regulatory cooperation strategies  
 
This section aggregates the numerous existing delineations of regulatory cooperation strategies and 
demonstrates their respective overlap. The contrast of existing operationalisations of regulatory 
cooperation strategies with alternative approaches helps to verify the comprehensiveness of the range 
of strategies covered by an operationalisation to be developed in this chapter and its compatibility with 
alternative theoretical approaches. It thus prepares the incorporation of these delineations into one 
analytical model to be presented in chapter 3.3. This section first presents the strategies most frequently 
discussed in the literature looking at the engagement of the EU in bilateral regulatory cooperation. 
Second, it will contrast this delineation with a growing recent literature on regulatory cooperation 
strategies by both political science scholars, the OECD as well as the delineation of policy strategies of 
the EU’s interactions with international ‘policy regimes’. Third, it will aggregate these delineations into 
one comparison and demonstrate their respective overlap.  
 
Political science literature on bilateral regulatory cooperation  
 
The existing literature on bilateral regulatory cooperation often concentrates on the following strategies 
of regulatory cooperation: harmonisation or approximation, negotiated mutual recognition or 
‘equivalence’, Mutual Recognition Agreements, guidelines of good regulatory practices and 
commitments to ‘information exchange’ (e.g. Peterson & Young, 2014; Pollack & Shaffer, 2009; 
Nicolaidis, 2000).  
‘Approximation’ or ‘harmonisation’ entails the alignment of national rules. Peterson and Young (2014: 
159) understand ‘approximation’ as standard-setting in international standard-setting organisations, e.g. 
the International Standardisation Organisation (ISO), the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe (UNECE) or the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC)15. They note that approximation is the 
“most intense and demanding form of regulatory cooperation” (Peterson & Young, 2014: 159). It 
requires that jurisdictions agree on what the approximated rule should be. The requirement to agree on 
a specific rule also limits the scope for compromise (Büthe & Mattli, 2011: 11; Drezner, 2007: 34; 
Pollack & Shaffer, 2009: 126; Krasner, 1991: 336)16. 
‘Negotiated mutual recognition’ or ‘equivalence’ implies that two jurisdictions “agree that specific 
regulations are equivalent in effect” (Peterson & Young, 2014: 160; Nicolaidis, 2000: 595). It only takes 
                                                     
15 International standards exist mostly with regard to the regulation of goods, less with regard to services.  
16 Nonetheless, international standards remain mostly voluntary. International standards only become binding if 
they are cited as a mandatory requirement in domestic regulations (i.e. they are ‘referenced’) or if they are cited in 
international agreements whose provisions can be enforced through forms of dispute settlement.   
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place in bilateral interactions. In order to establish ‘equivalence’, regulators from different jurisdictions 
agree that regulatory objectives are equivalent and that different domestic means are conducive to 
realising these objectives (see e.g. Council, 2005). While under ‘negotiated mutual recognition’ or 
‘equivalence’ a policy change may be necessary, it is usually not the main objective (Peterson & Young, 
2014: 161; Nicolaidis, 2000: 595). Besides, ‘negotiated mutual recognition’ leaves scope to choose 
among several alternatives.  
‘Mutual Recognition Agreements’ establish “that specified bodies in each jurisdiction can certify that 
products produced on its territory conform to the standards of the other territory” (Peterson & Young, 
2014: 159). They thus neither aim at nor lead to a change of domestic policies. On the contrary, they 
accept the divergence of domestic standards and rules and only align procedures that have been 
established to implement domestic policies. 
Contributions to the regulatory cooperation literature also note that cooperation occurs through the 
establishment of ‘guidelines on good regulatory practice’ and ‘commitments to information exchange’. 
The latter entail provisions to notify other countries of new regulatory measures (Peterson & Young, 
2014: 159). Table 1 summarises the delineation of regulatory cooperation strategies based on Peterson 
and Young (2014) and Pollack and Shaffer (2009):  
Harmonisation / Approximation 
Negotiated mutual recognition / ‘equivalence’ 
Mutual Recognition Agreements 
Guidelines of good regulatory practices 
Commitments to ‘information exchange’  
Table 1: Delineation of regulatory cooperation based on political science literature 
 
New Interdependence Approach literature on international regulatory cooperation  
 
Within a contribution of the New Interdependence Approach literature on international regulatory 
cooperation, Newman and Posner (2015) distinguish four strategies: regulatory export, first-mover 
agenda-setting, mutual recognition and coalition-building. ‘Regulatory export’ implies the 
externalisation of domestic policy solutions (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2009; Newman, 2008; 
Falkner & Müller, 2013; Hartlapp & Treib, 2007; Kelemen & Vogel, 2010). ‘First-mover agenda-
setting’ describes the early setting of policy and negotiation agendas in international organisations and 
trans-governmental networks to shape the design of future international standards and rules (Mattli & 
Büthe, 2003). ‘Mutual recognition’ is understood as the concession of market access to exporting firms 
from other countries, given that the domestic government accepts that the “other’s regime meets a 
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negotiated minimum of standards, said by each to be equivalent of their own” (Newman & Posner, 2015: 
1328; Nicolaidis & Shaffer, 2005; Farrell, 2003). ‘Coalition-building’ refers to the formation of alliances 
in support of preferred rules and against rules promoted by other coalitions in order to influence global 
standards (Alter, 2014; Kissack, 2015; Risse-Kappen, 1995; Sabel & Zeitlin, 2010; Tarrow, 2001). Table 
2 illustrates these strategies:  
Regulatory export 
First-mover agenda-setting 
Mutual recognition  
Coalition-building 
Table 2: Delineation of regulatory cooperation strategies based on the NIA 
  
OECD survey of international regulatory cooperation  
The OECD (2013b) has derived a comprehensive list of regulatory cooperation mechanisms in a 
comprehensive stock-taking exercise. Authors have called the OECD list “the most comprehensive 
survey of regulatory cooperation forms and mechanisms up-to-date” (e.g. Egan & Pelkmans, 2015: 5). 
Apart from policy strategies this list, however, also covers mechanisms which do not involve policy or 
procedure interactions, but forms of institutional creation. Table 3 presents the forms and mechanisms 
compiled by the OECD (2013b): 
Economic integration and harmonisation through supra-national 
law-making and institutions 
Mutual recognition  
Specific conventions and treaties 
Joint regulatory partnerships 
Mutual recognition of conformity assessment  
International regulatory cooperation through international 
organisations  
Trans-governmental networks  
Formal requirements to consider all relevant frameworks for 
cooperation in other jurisdictions 
Recognition of international standards 
Soft law 
Regulatory dialogues 
Table 3: Delineation of regulatory cooperation strategies based on the OECD survey  
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‘Economic integration and harmonisation through supra-national law-making and institutions’ refers to 
the creation of supranational institutions and the establishment of supranational law-making. The 
empirical frequency of this form is low and the OECD notes that “harmonisation as a broader principle 
of economic regionalism is difficult to conceive at least for the time being” (OECD, 2013b: 44). ‘Mutual 
recognition’ establishes the functional ‘equivalence’ in effect of the rules of two countries or 
jurisdictions regarding safety, health, environment, and consumer protection (SHEC) objectives and 
their enforcement. Mutual recognition refers to policy objectives governing an entire sector or a set of 
sectors and not a case-by-case examination of specific regulations. Empirical examples are equally rare, 
including mostly the mutual recognition negotiated under the Single European Act and the Australia-
New Zealand ‘Trans-Tasman’ Mutual Recognition Agreement.   
‘Specific conventions and treaties’ establish binding international policies in a specific area or sector, 
but leave regulatory authority with domestic governments. Examples are cooperation treaties on tax 
matters or the Montreal convention on protecting the ozone layer as well as the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change. ‘Joint regulatory partnerships’ establish commitments and 
cooperation agreements for a greater coordination of regulatory practices, processes, and activities 
between countries (OECD, 2013b: 48). Resulting agreements are not treaty-based and therefore not 
enforceable under international law. ‘Joint regulatory partnerships’, however, cover a broad range of 
strategies that can be pursued within them. The OECD (2013b: 48) acknowledges that their content 
depends “on the regulatory principles, disciplines and obligations for cooperation that are set in such a 
partnership”. They may thus cover harmonisation of rules just as ‘equivalence’ agreements demanding 
a case-by-case examination of product regulations. Examples cited for joint regulatory partnerships are 
the Transatlantic Economic Partnership or the US-Canada Regulatory Cooperation Council.  
‘Mutual recognition of conformity assessment’, established through Mutual Recognition Agreements, 
allows conformity assessment bodies from the cooperation partner to certify that products from a 
specifically covered sector meet the regulatory requirements of the other partner. Examples are the 
Mutual Recognition Agreements concluded between the EU and the US in 1998. ‘International 
regulatory cooperation through international organisations’’ covers a wide range of interactions among 
regulators and technical experts. Policy outcomes envisaged through these interactions range from 
common standards to common procedures for the implementation of domestic rules. Cited examples are 
interactions in the ILO, WTO and the OECD.  
‘Trans-governmental networks’ bring together experts and regulators in informal networks and rely on 
peer-to-peer collaboration, memoranda of understanding and other informal agreements. They develop 
rules that members of the network are expected to implement into national law. The OECD notes that 
trans-governmental networks exist in the field of competition policy (the International Competition 
Network), financial regulation (the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision) and pharmaceuticals 
regulation (ILAC), but also in environmental policy. ‘Formal requirements to consider all relevant 
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frameworks for cooperation in other jurisdictions’ implies that domestic regulators take into account the 
relevant international regulatory environment when formulating regulatory proposals. ‘Recognition of 
international standards’ promote the harmonisation of the technical specifications of products, but 
remain non-binding for domestic regulators. ‘Soft law’ refers to cooperation based on legally non-
binding instruments such as codes of conduct, roadmaps or peer reviews. ‘Regulatory dialogues’ 
establish informal dialogues among regulators.  
 
Political science literature on policy strategies in international regime interaction  
 
Strategies for regulatory cooperation can also be approached from the perspective of international 
regime interaction. Falkner and Müller (2013) distinguish four strategies for the EU’s interactions with 
‘international policy regimes’: policy export, policy promotion, policy import, and policy protection. 
Crucially and in contrast to many previous contributions, they argue that the EU does not only export 
its domestic policy-making, but also promotes policy-making internationally. ‘Policy export’ is 
understood as the projection or externalisation of domestic policies to the international environment 
(Young, 2016; Damro, 2012; Börzel & Risse, 2012; Lavenex et al., 2009; Young & Peterson, 2006; 
Bretherton & Vogler, 2006; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005; Manners, 2002). ‘Policy promotion’ 
describes the shaping and promotion of global policy outcomes, often universal international rules which 
reflect domestic solutions (Falkner & Müller, 2013: 214).’Policy import’ refers to the adoption and 
translation of international rules into domestic policy solutions. The EU seeks to adopt domestic policy 
solutions according to international rules to make these rules more binding or to achieve greater internal 
convergence, policy integration and/or to reform domestic policies. International negotiations or rules 
serve as an opportunity structure to change the domestic status quo. ‘Policy protection’ implies that the 
EU shields domestic policies from external pressure. It delays or blocks the adoption of decisions which 
are not in line with its own policies and/or seeks to exclude decisions which oppose its preferences from 
the agenda of negotiations. Moreover, the EU may promote international policy solutions which protect 
its domestic policies. Table 4 summarises these strategies:         
Policy export 
Policy promotion 
Policy import 
Policy protection  
Table 4: Policy strategies in international regime interaction 
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The survey above demonstrates that delineations of strategies and mechanisms differ based on the scope 
of their analysis, their unit of analysis and the explanatory objectives of their study. The contrast of 
existing definitions of the regulatory cooperation strategies with alternative approaches nonetheless 
helps to verify the comprehensiveness of the range of strategies covered by an operationalisation and its 
compatibility with alternative theoretical approaches.   
Not all regulatory cooperation strategies and mechanisms identified by the literatures above are, 
however, relevant to bilateral regulatory cooperation strategies. Some strategies can only be pursued in 
international organisations as they presuppose participation of multiple actors. Others are only pursued 
in multilateral regulatory cooperation because they entail the mobilisation of large resources that neither 
the EU nor another large political actor is willing to mobilise in the interaction with only a single other 
entity. Still others require the presence of institutional architectures for their effective enforcement and 
implementation which have, at least until present, not been established for bilateral relations.  
Theoretically, the EU may adjust its own policies to those of other actors. While adjustment of domestic 
policies to global standards has occurred in multilateral settings (e.g. Kudrna & Falkner, 2016), there is 
no single empirical case up-to-date in which the EU has either adjusted its domestic policies or policy-
making processes to those of another country. This option shall therefore not be taken into account for 
the further analysis in this book.   
Table 5 contrasts the strategies discussed by the existing literature on regulatory cooperation, policy 
interactions, international regulation and the international regulatory cooperation mechanisms by the 
OECD, illustrates their degree of overlap and indicates their relevance regarding bilateral regulatory 
cooperation strategies. The relevance of the strategies and mechanisms identified by the different 
literatures and authors with regard to bilateral regulatory cooperation is assessed on the basis of the 
following criteria:  
• Do decisions made within a mechanism or strategy require / presuppose an institutional 
architecture which only exists within a specific region or at the global level? 
• Does a mechanism or strategy require the participation of more than two countries/actors?  
• Does a mechanism or strategy require the creation of new institutions?17  
      
                                                     
17 This criterion builds on an insight from previous literature that the EU does not create new formal institutions 
with only one country (Lavenex, 2014).    
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IRC mechanisms 
OECD 
Bilateral regulatory 
cooperation 
literature  
Policy strategies in 
international regime 
interaction 
New 
Interdependence 
Approach  
Relevance for 
bilateral regulatory 
cooperation  
Economic integration 
and harmonisation 
through supra-
national law-making 
and institutions 
- - - - 
Mutual recognition - - - - 
Specific conventions 
and treaties 
(Approximation) 
 
Policy export/ policy 
promotion  
Regulatory export/ 
First-mover agenda-
setting/ Coalition-
building / 
- 
Joint regulatory 
partnerships 
Approximation/ 
‘equivalence’ 
Policy export  Regulatory export/ 
Mutual recognition 
✓ 
Mutual recognition of 
conformity 
assessment 
Mutual recognition of 
conformity 
assessment 
(policy protection) - ✓ 
International 
regulatory 
cooperation through 
international 
organisations 
Approximation / 
‘equivalence’ 
Policy export / policy 
import/ policy 
promotion  
Coalition-building/ 
First-mover agenda-
setting 
- 
Trans-governmental 
networks 
 Policy export / policy 
promotion   
Regulatory export - 
Formal requirements 
to consider all 
relevant frameworks 
for cooperation in 
other jurisdictions 
   - - ✓ 
Recognition of 
international 
standards 
- - (Policy protection)  - ✓ 
Soft law Guidelines  - - ✓ 
Regulatory dialogues Information exchange - - ✓ 
Table 5: Contrast of different operationalisations of regulatory cooperation strategies 
 
A number of lessons can be drawn from the table 5: First, not all forms or mechanisms of international 
regulatory cooperation are relevant for bilateral regulatory cooperation. At least until present, neither 
economic integration nor comprehensive mutual recognition are conceivable for bilateral regulatory 
cooperation. The signature of new specific conventions or treaties is equally unlikely given that bilateral 
cooperation only foresees two signatories and thus has limited capacity to solve the global problems 
usually addressed by these conventions. International organisations as a forum for the promotion of 
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cooperation are equally irrelevant although some New Interdependence Approach authors argue that 
international organisations as a coordination mechanism influence regulatory cooperation between two 
jurisdictions (Newman & Posner, 2015). The emergence of trans-governmental networks may in 
principle also occur bilaterally, but actors commonly see the limited reach of bilateral networks as an 
impediment or as insufficient to address wider international problems (for an in-depth discussion of this 
question see Parker & Alemanno, 2014). For this reason, the reliance on trans-governmental networks 
is likely to be limited to regional, if not global regulatory cooperation. Likewise, at least until the time 
of writing, entities have not yet established a bilateral transnational agency.  
Second, with regard to the explanatory objective of this dissertation, existing political science literature 
on regulatory cooperation continues to offer the arguably most relevant classification of strategies. Yet, 
the incorporation of certain mechanisms from the OECD compilation complements this classification 
and enhances its comprehensiveness. Third, for the strategies among which the Commission can choose, 
based on the derivation from political science literature and the OECD list, it follows mostly policy 
export or policy protection. While policy import shall not be excluded as a motivation for bilateral 
regulatory cooperation, according to the literature its empirical relevance until present is low (Young, 
2015a; Falkner & Müller, 2013). Policy promotion does not apply as there are empirically no bilateral 
institutions or organisations in which decisions are taken jointly. Yet, single strategies identified by the 
regulatory cooperation literature often involve combinations of policy export and policy protection. 
Fourth, and similarly, while regulatory cooperation strategies used in bilateral relations include mutual 
recognition or regulatory export, the strategies differentiated by the New Interdependence Approach 
literature do not offer significant variation with regard to the strategies relevant to bilateral relations. 
Importantly, due to the interactions between only two entities, first-mover agenda-setting and coalition-
building do not play a role.   
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In view of these lessons, the different approaches contrasted above can be synthesised to deduce that the 
universe of possible outcomes consists of the following strategies: harmonisation, approximation, 
negotiated mutual recognition/equivalence, mutual recognition of conformity assessment, guidelines for 
good regulatory practices, recognition of international standards, requirements to consider relevant 
frameworks, soft law, regulatory dialogues and information exchange. Table 6 summarises these 
strategies:  
 
harmonisation 
approximation 
negotiated mutual recognition/equivalence 
mutual recognition of conformity assessment 
guidelines for good regulatory practices 
recognition of international standards 
requirements to consider relevant frameworks 
soft law 
regulatory dialogues 
information exchange 
Table 6: Synthesis of different regulatory cooperation strategies 
 
This universe of outcomes goes beyond the strategies defined by previous regulatory cooperation 
literature. The delineation of regulatory cooperation strategies needs to be refined accordingly. The 
criteria for this refinement are developed in the next section. 
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3.3. Synthesis of bilateral regulatory cooperation strategies 
 
This section synthesises the findings from the previous section and deduces two analytical criteria for 
the differentiation of bilateral regulatory cooperation strategies in this book, i.e. ‘dimension’ and ‘depth’ 
(chapter 3.3.1). It then integrates the regulatory cooperation strategies presented in chapter 3.2 into a 
typology (chapter 3.3.2.).  
 
3.3.1. Criteria for a typology  
 
This section defines the categories according to which regulatory cooperation strategies shall be 
delineated in this book. The objective of this definition of categories is to reduce analytical complexity 
to the greatest extent possible. Categories shall thus be defined which help to clearly differentiate 
between strategies while at the same time allowing grouping similar strategies. The objective of the 
definition of categories is to facilitate the construction of a dependent variable whose outcomes can be 
explained with a theoretical framework that can itself be reductionist and avoid excessive analytical 
complexity. It is put forward that the greatest reduction of analytical complexity can be achieved with a 
delineation of bilateral regulatory cooperation strategies based on their ‘dimension’ of reference and 
their ‘depth’. This section first discusses existing categories of delineation drawn from both previous 
policy literature and related literatures such as convergence and governance literatures. A first step 
reviews the policy literature and shows why among previous approaches only ‘depth’ is conducive to 
delineate bilateral regulatory cooperation strategies. A second step then shows why a distinction 
according to the ‘dimension’ of cooperation helps capture observed strategies that are not captured by a 
distinction based on ‘depth’ alone.  
Existing regulatory cooperation research mostly borrows from policy research to deduce criteria for the 
delineation and categorisation of strategies (Niemann & Bretherton, 2013; van Schaik, 2013; Elsig, 
2013; Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2009; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005; Schimmelfennig & 
Wagner, 2004; Lavenex, 2004). Within policy research, measuring the ‘intensity’ of policies and rules 
has been a long-standing issue (Alesina et al., 2005; Hooghe & Marks, 2001; Schmitter, 1996).  Authors 
distinguish the ‘intensity’ of international policy cooperation and domestic adoption based on the 
functional scope of rules, the depth of rules, their binding effect and the direction of policy change 
(Falkner & Müller, 2013: 5; Breitmeier et al., 2006).   
The ‘functional scope’ measures the degree to which a sector or a set of sectors is governed by 
international rules and international ‘regimes’. The ‘depth’ measures the specificity and density of the 
rules that are applied or adopted domestically. The ‘binding effect’ has been operationalised to specify 
if the application or adoption of internationally or bilaterally agreed rules can be enforced through 
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mechanisms such as dispute settlement (see Breitmeier et al., 2006). The following paragraphs discuss 
if and to what extent these criteria are relevant for bilateral regulatory cooperation.  
Delineating strategies based on their ‘functional scope’ is the basis for the ranking of international 
regulatory cooperation mechanisms by the OECD. The differentiation on the functional scope helps 
delineate mechanisms which trigger comprehensive supranational polity-making from cooperation in 
specific sectors and on specific issues. Yet, delineations based on functional scope deliver little 
analytical benefit with regard to regulatory cooperation strategies, in particular bilateral ones. Previous 
contributions have emphasised that cooperation rarely covers all policies that govern a particular policy 
area (Zeitlin, 2015). On the contrary, strategies such as regulatory export, mutual recognition or 
harmonisation are applied to specific policies that cover only a marginal functional scope (Young, 
2015b; Egan & Pelkmans, 2015). A delineation based on functional scope thus does not help to 
differentiate the use of approximation or mutual recognition.  
The ‘binding effect’ of regulatory cooperation is the second criterion according to which the OECD has 
ranked regulatory cooperation mechanisms. It is also used by Young (2015b) to measure the ‘intensity’ 
of regulatory export through EU free trade agreements. A delineation based on the ‘binding effect’ of 
the regulatory cooperation mechanism is conducive to delineating a) cooperation through conventions, 
treaties and regulatory partnerships from b) cooperation in international organisations, trans-
governmental networks and the establishment of soft law. Previous studies including Damro (2006), 
however, note that bilateral regulatory cooperation often occurs outside formal treaty agreements. The 
non-treaty agreements through which regulatory cooperation is initiated or concluded often do not 
include provisions that subject the enforcement of the informal agreement to any form of dispute 
settlement. The ‘binding effect’ of cooperation rather depends on the negotiation or coordination 
context, but does not help to delineate strategies such as regulatory export, harmonisation or mutual 
recognition which are pursued through both treaty and non-treaty agreements. While the ‘binding effect’ 
of regulatory cooperation is a relevant a criterion especially for multilateral regulatory cooperation, its 
application to bilateral regulatory cooperation is not useful to significantly reduce analytical complexity 
either.   
The ‘direction of policy change’ is used by Falkner & Müller (2013) to delineate strategies of the EU’s 
interaction with international policy regimes. This criterion is useful to identify if the EU (or possibly 
any other large political actor) engages in ‘regulatory export’ as stipulated by a large body of previous 
contributions, protects its domestic status quo policies or contributes to international policy-making. 
Still, its conduciveness to delineating bilateral regulatory cooperation strategies is limited because policy 
change is rarely the objective or outcome of bilateral regulatory cooperation. A distinction based on the 
‘direction of policy change’ arguably helps to differentiate approximation and mutual recognition. It is, 
however, not able to delineate approximation from any of the other strategies pursued in bilateral 
regulatory cooperation.   
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The ‘depth’ of cooperation, measured as the specificity and density of cooperation (Alesina et al., 2005), 
in turn, suggests a possible way to delineate both approximation and mutual recognition and mutual 
recognition of conformity assessment and other forms of exchange. Approximation entails the 
development of provisions which specify what and how regulations are approximated whereas mutual 
recognition only stipulates the functional equivalence of standards and rules. It thus entails a higher 
specificity and density of provisions than equivalence. Moreover, mutual recognition of conformity 
assessments entails more specific and dense rules than ‘information exchange’ which often only 
specifies the modalities of the interaction.  
A consideration of the ‘depth’ of cooperation can also explain the differences in ranking notably between 
previous regulatory cooperation literature and the ranking of mechanisms of the OECD. Insights from 
research on the design of free trade agreements on the ‘depth-flexibility nexus’ (Dür & Mateo, 2014) 
imply that deeper forms of cooperation are often complemented with more flexible forms as decision-
makers want to maintain a certain degree of discretion in particular if they choose to agree on ‘deeper’ 
forms of cooperation.  
Yet, ‘depth’ alone cannot delineate approximation or equivalence from mutual recognition of 
conformity assessment or other forms of interaction which do not change or affect the substance of 
policies. Existing contributions note the importance of distinguishing notably ‘equivalence’, or 
‘negotiated mutual recognition’, from ‘mutual recognition of conformity assessment’ (Josling & 
Tangermann, 2015b; Nicolaidis, 2000), but do not offer a criterion by which these strategies could be 
delineated.     
Further criteria to delineate strategies can be deduced from literatures related to policy research, notably 
the literatures on convergence (Heichel et al., 2005; Knill, 2005), Europeanisation (Radaelli, 2003; 
Börzel & Risse, 2003) and, increasingly, experimentalist governance (Zeitlin, 2015; Sabel & Zeitlin, 
2010). These literatures distinguish between different ‘dimensions’ of convergence or Europeanisation 
respectively. The convergence and Europeanisation literatures share an analytical differentiation 
between substance and process (Heichel et al., 2005; Radaelli, 2003). Damro (2006: 870) defines 
procedural convergence as the “development of common procedures among authorities from different 
jurisdictions”, including measures for collecting, evaluating and sharing information. He understands 
substantive convergence, in turn, as “the adoption of common rules and understandings” (Damro, 2006: 
870).  
The distinction between substance and process is taken up by experimentalist governance authors who 
differentiate the adoption and transfer of policies specifying ‘framework goals’ from administrative 
decisions and procedures (Sabel & Zeitlin, 2010; Zeitlin, 2015). Moreover, the definition of framework 
goals is analytically separated from their implementation, which is often guided by administrative 
procedures. Administrative procedures are thus understood as the processes which execute and 
implement the rules and understandings conceived in policies. Yet, while drawing attention to this 
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distinction, the experimentalist governance literature does not offer a clear definition of administrative 
decisions and procedures. An instrumental definition of administrative procedures can, however, be 
approximated. The Commission (2017) describes administrative procedures as those procedures “to 
ensure that applicable regulatory requirements are met”. Administrative procedures verify the 
application of regulatory requirements, correct inadequate application and enforce the implementation 
of requirements. They involve procedures of conformity assessment, market surveillance, infringement 
complaints and redress as well as communication between authorities (Commission, 2017). Delineating 
strategies based on the ‘dimension’ of regulation thus offers an additional factor along which 
approximation, ‘equivalence’ and mutual recognition of conformity assessment can be differentiated.   
To conclude, this section argues that the complexity of bilateral regulatory cooperation strategies can be 
reduced to two key aspects: the dimension of regulation to which they refer, i.e. procedure or substance, 
and the depth of cooperation. This is not to argue that the range of criteria discussed in related literatures, 
e.g. the functional scope, binding nature and direction of cooperation, is not useful to delineate 
regulatory cooperation strategies. However, the benefits of delineating bilateral regulatory cooperation 
strategies based on the dimension and depth of cooperation are higher analytical clarity and the reduction 
of analytical complexity. This makes an operationalisation of the dependent variable based on the 
dimension and depth of cooperation easier to apply in the empirical analysis that follows in the second 
half of this book.      
 
3.3.2. Typology of bilateral regulatory cooperation strategies  
 
This section draws together the conclusions of the previous sections and develops a typology of 
regulatory cooperation strategies that will be used as the operationalisation of the dependent variable of 
this book.  
The discussion in section 3.3.1 has indicated that depth and dimension are complementary criteria. For 
the purpose of this dissertation, the depth of a cooperation strategy shall be operationalised on a 
dichotomous scale, distinguishing ‘low depth’ and ‘high depth’, or ‘deep’ and ‘low’ respectively. In line 
with the definition of ‘depth’ by previous studies, ‘high depth’ is assigned to strategies that entail 
specific and dense prescriptions or changes to existing policies or procedures (Falkner & Müller, 2013: 
20). ‘Low depth’, in turn, is assigned to strategies that have vague prescriptions to existing policies and 
procedures or leave these unchanged.  
‘Dimension’ is also understood dichotomously, with strategies either addressing substance, i.e. policies, 
or procedures. Strategies are categorised as addressing policies if they concern the substance of 
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regulations, i.e. the goals, content, structure and concepts of policies18. They shall be considered as 
addressing procedures if they entail prescriptions on the formulation, execution and implementation of 
rules, including administrative structures and techniques19. To reduce analytical complexity to the 
greatest extent possible and enable an empirical application of the theoretical , the strategies mapped in 
section 3.2. are grouped into four categories. These categories are defined along the two complementary 
criteria of dimension and depth.  
Only the strategies of harmonisation, approximation, negotiated mutual recognition and equivalence 
refer to policy substance, i.e. goals, content, structure and concepts. They are therefore placed under the 
dimension ‘policy’. Among them, only harmonisation and approximation are deep strategies of policy 
cooperation. Harmonisation entails highly specific prescriptions with regard to both the goals, content 
and structure of a policy, eliminating regulatory diversity between entities (Radaelli, 2003). 
Approximation equally entails specific prescriptions with regard to the alignment of goals, content and 
structure of a policy, but does not require identity of policies as a result. Empirically, however, the 
pursuit of harmonisation is rare. While approximation also entails a shared specific understanding of 
goals, concepts, and structures of policies, it is suggested to be more common than harmonisation as it 
leaves both the domestic and the foreign side room for own deviating content. Deep and policy 
cooperation shall thus be subsumed under the label ‘regulatory alignment’. As laid down, it contains the 
pursuit of harmonisation as well as the pursuit of an approximation of regulations. ‘Equivalence’ is 
understood as a ‘low’ cooperation strategy as it only establishes functional ‘equivalence’ of the goals 
and content of a policy without, however, changing its structure or underlying concepts. The specificity 
of the agreed policies is thus relatively low. Low and policy cooperation shall be labelled ‘equivalence’. 
All other strategies refer to the formulation, execution and implementation of rules and are therefore 
placed under the dimension ‘procedures’: mutual recognition of conformity assessment, guidelines for 
good regulatory practices, recognition of international standards, requirements to consider relevant 
frameworks. ‘Mutual recognition of conformity assessment’ entails detailed rules according to which 
conformity assessment bodies in other jurisdictions need to assess the conformity of a product. Due to 
the specificity of these rules ‘mutual recognition of conformity assessment’ shall therefore be considered 
as a deep strategy of cooperation. ‘Guidelines for good regulatory practices’ shall also be classified as a 
deep strategy if the guidelines specify clear rules. A strategy promoting the ‘recognition of international 
standards’ shall be considered a deep strategy as it entails a clear specification as to how regulators and 
government officials should align decisions and procedures. The same applies to requirements to 
consider relevant frameworks if these requirements specify individual frameworks. Deep and procedure 
cooperation shall be called ‘alignment of implementation procedures’. It shall include mutual 
                                                     
18 This borrows from Dolowitz and Marsh (1996: 350) who define elements of policy transfer as “policy goals, 
content, instruments, structure and policy concepts, attitudes, ideas”.   
19 The latter specification is also adopted from Dolowitz and Marsh (1996: 350).  
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recognition of conformity assessment as well as commitments to consider mutual standards and rules 
how to adopt and implement administrative decisions. 
Unspecific ‘requirements to consider relevant frameworks’, ‘soft law’, ‘regulatory dialogues’ and 
‘information exchange’, in turn, shall all be classified as low strategies because they do not contain any 
(specific) prescriptions as to how regulators and governments should formulate, execute or implement 
rules, but only set up exchanges and interactions among officials. Low and procedure cooperation shall 
be called ‘information exchange’ and include the establishment of regulatory dialogues, exchanges of 
data and other information as well as the conduct of benchmarking, peer reviews and the exchange of 
best practices. Although dialogues and exchanges risk being perceived and used as ‘talk-shops’, they 
encourage exchanges among regulators and therefore contribute to mutual trust in each other, promote 
confidence in the rules of cooperation partners and their ability to enforce rules. They can facilitate 
cooperation notably if otherwise there “is little common ground between jurisdictions” (Chase & 
Pelkmans, 2015: 3). 
It should hereby be underlined that ‘depth’ is treated as a relative concept. Across the two dimensions 
‘policy’ and ‘procedures’, ‘depth’ cannot be operationalised analogously as policies usually have a much 
higher specificity and density than ‘procedures’. As a relative concept, the two operationalisations of 
‘depth’ shall rather be understood as an indicator to which degree a strategy affects and constrains the 
behaviour of government officials relative to the absence of cooperation.  
Figure 3 shows the classification of strategies of this book in the form of a typology:  
Depth 
Dimension 
Implementation procedure Regulatory policy 
Low Information exchange Equivalence 
High 
Alignment of implementation 
procedures 
Regulatory alignment 
Figure 3: Typology of regulatory cooperation strategies 
 
Beside the engagement in one of these strategies, regulators and government officials may also choose 
to maintain regulatory competition. Again, this does not preclude that third countries adjust their own 
regulatory policies or implementation procedures according to the regulatory policies or implementation 
procedures of the jurisdiction with larger market size or higher regulatory stringency. If some form of 
regulatory adjustment occurs, however, it is the result of diffusion or emulation processes across 
jurisdictions. It is not the result of ‘deliberate’ or ‘active’ regulatory cooperation. Furthermore, 
Developing a typology of bilateral regulatory cooperation strategies 
67 
 
regulators and government officials of a jurisdiction with large market size or high regulatory stringency 
may choose not to engage in regulatory cooperation in order to create pressure on other jurisdictions to 
modify their own regulatory policies and thus respond to potential demands of firms or citizens. If such 
‘trading up’ occurs, however, it is again not the result of deliberate coordination and regulatory 
cooperation between jurisdictions. As the decision to maintain regulatory competition implies the 
absence of cooperation, the corresponding strategy shall be called ‘no cooperation’. 
Aggregating the potential regulatory cooperation strategies delineated in the typology and the possibility 
of ‘non-cooperation’, the outcomes on the dependent variable of this study, ‘bilateral regulatory 
cooperation strategies’, can be operationalised with five possible outcomes as follows in figure 4:  
Non-cooperation 
Information 
exchange 
Alignment of 
implementation 
procedures 
Equivalence 
Regulatory 
alignment 
Figure 4: Outcomes on the dependent variable 
 
The operationalisation of the dependent variable that has been made in this section inevitably represents 
a simplification. Here, it should be re-iterated that the motivation for the operationalisation of the 
dependent variable has been a reduction of analytical complexity. Nuances among strategies that have 
been grouped into a single outcome for the purpose of the subsequent empirical analysis persist either 
with regard to criteria that have been omitted or with regard to the precise level of depth that they foresee. 
Two examples shall illustrate this point. Indeed, ‘requirements to consider relevant frameworks’ have a 
different functional scope from ‘regulatory dialogues’ or the enactment of ‘soft law’. As argued above, 
summarising them under a single category is nonetheless justified if the specificity of the envisioned 
cooperation is taken into account. Likewise, as already noted, the outcome ‘regulatory alignment’ 
aggregates strategies which differ with regard to the extent of policy change. Here again, the reason to 
group them has been a practical one: Adding a separate category would have made the analytical 
framework much less reductionist without offering a major empirical benefit. The examples that would 
be covered with a more extensive framework are few, given that harmonisation is regulatory cooperation 
is empirically rare. Nonetheless, limits to the typology developed in this section certainly merit greater 
scrutiny in light of their empirical validity. This point will be addressed in greater depth in the discussion 
following the empirical analysis of this book (chapter 6).         
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3.4. Summary 
 
This chapter has elaborated a new analytical specification for the dependent variable of this book, 
bilateral regulatory cooperation strategies. It was guided by the objective to aggregate the growing 
number of definitions and delineations of regulatory cooperation in the academic and practitioners’ 
literature into one analytical model that captures the breadth of empirically relevant bilateral regulatory 
cooperation strategies, but is applicable to empirical investigation. It has placed bilateral regulatory 
cooperation within the broader literature on external governance and identified it as an active, horizontal 
governance mechanism that relies on coordination rather than coercion. Regulatory cooperation can 
cover both regulations, standards as well as administrative procedures such as conformity assessments, 
import authorisation procedures and market surveillance measures while cooperation applying to 
legislation is highly unlikely.  
The chapter has laid down the definitions of regulatory cooperation strategies by the different streams 
of academic and practitioners’ literature, contrasted them and derived a comprehensive universe of 
potential regulatory cooperation strategies. It has argued that a categorisation of these strategies based 
on the complementary criteria of depth and dimension (substance or procedure) achieves the highest 
reduction of analytical complexity and makes an operationalisation of the dependent variable based on 
these values applicable to empirical examination. Subsequently, it has attributed the possible bilateral 
regulatory cooperation strategies to one of the four categories that result from the combination of the 
complementary depth and dimension. The ensuing typology of bilateral regulatory cooperation 
strategies has led to the operationalisation of the dependent variable of this book. Incorporating the 
possibility of non-cooperation, the dependent variable, bilateral regulatory cooperation strategies, is 
operationalised with five possible outcomes: regulatory competition, information exchange, ‘alignment 
of implementation procedures’, ‘equivalence’, ‘regulatory alignment’.  
The next chapter (chapter 4) links these outcomes on the dependent variable to variation in the 
independent variables. It thus deduces the explanatory factors of the Inter-relational Institutionalism.    
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4. Explaining bilateral regulatory cooperation strategies    
 
The theoretical objective of this book is to refine existing theoretical frameworks and thus contribute to 
the research lacunae in explaining under which conditions the EU chooses which strategy of regulatory 
cooperation in bilateral regulatory cooperation. Put differently, it seeks to understand why the EU does 
not necessarily pursue harmonisation and regulatory approximation in its interactions with countries 
outside its neighbourhood although its jurisdiction overlaps with these countries and creates regulatory 
conflicts. 
The motivation for refining existing theoretical frameworks builds on gaps in existing research and the 
shortcomings of previous literature identified in the literature review in chapter 2. This refined 
theoretical framework to explain the puzzle of this book needs to draw on three main theoretical 
literatures: First, it requires an actor-centred framework to be able to explain the creation of rules and 
institutional structures with the decisions of (bureaucratic) actors rather than with structural or 
functionalist accounts. Second, it needs to combine and integrate rational-choice and constructivist 
approaches in line with recent literature to overcome the shortcomings of both accounts individually 
with regard to the deduction of actor preferences. Third, it needs to adopt a domestic-level approach to 
identify the constraints that restrict the behaviour of actors in an interdependent environment.  
The refined theoretical framework is based on six main assumptions: (1) Rules, structures and rule 
regimes are intentionally created by actors. The creation of rules, structures and rule regimes cannot be 
understood without attention to the preferences and interests of actors who are able to shape them. (2) 
Institutions in which actors are embedded shape and constitute the preferences of actors. The preferences 
of actors cannot be deduced from material interests alone. (3) Institutions shape and constrain the 
behaviour of actors, determining which behavioural choices are feasible within an institutional context. 
(4) Trade liberalisation and the emergence of interdependence among jurisdictions is endogenous to the 
behaviour of actors. Interdependence constitutes and constrains the behaviour of actors and the choices 
they can pursue. (5) A large internal market and a high degree of regulatory capacity are important for 
the ability of a jurisdiction to influence rules and norms at the international level. (6) Through regulatory 
cooperation, regulators and governments do not seek to significantly change the institutions of another 
jurisdiction, but accept them as constraints on their behaviour.        
This chapter proceeds as follows: A first section (chapter 4.1.) presents the ‘building blocks’ of the 
refined theoretical framework which respond to the theoretical gaps identified in chapter 2, i.e. actor-
centred institutionalism and the New Interdependence Approach, and reiterates the shortcomings of each 
approach taken individually. A second section (chapter 4.2.) shows how the New Interdependence 
Approach can be integrated into actor-centred institutionalism to derive a new theoretical framework, 
the Inter-relational Institutionalism. The third section (chapter 4.3.) specifies and applies the Inter-
relational Institutionalism to decision-making of regulators in bilateral regulatory cooperation along two 
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analytical elements: actor characteristics and actor constellations. It thus deduces the three independent 
variables of the Inter-relational Institutionalism: bureaucratic pressure, regulatory compatibilities and 
societal mobilisation.  
Chapter 4.3.1. first specifies the formation of preferences of regulators on regulatory cooperation for an 
individual technical regulatory body without bureaucratic pressure and subsequently aggregate 
regulatory preferences under bureaucratic pressure. Chapter 4.3.2. deduces that ‘regulatory institutions’ 
which shape and constrain the preferences of regulators can be distinguished into ‘regulatory authority 
structures and ‘regulatory principles’. It then specifies the other independent variables which constrain 
the formation of strategies that actors form based on their preferences, i.e. ‘regulatory compatibilities’ 
between the domestic and the foreign jurisdiction. Following the deduction of preference-constituting 
‘regulatory institutions’ as ‘regulatory authority structures’ and ‘regulatory principles’, it distinguishes 
the independent variable ‘regulatory compatibilities’ into ‘compatible regulatory authority structures’ 
and ‘compatible regulatory principles’. Based on the presence of bureaucratic pressure and the 
constellations of ‘regulatory compatibilities’ between the domestic and the foreign jurisdiction on an 
issue, it deduces the hypotheses that link variation in the independent variables to the outcomes on the 
dependent variable delineated in chapter 3.3. Chapter 4.3.3. lays down the causal mechanism that leads 
to the formation of a regulatory cooperation strategy and clarifies the relationship between the 
independent variables and the dependent variable.  
Chapter 4.4. operationalises the independent variables ‘bureaucratic pressure’ and ‘compatible 
regulatory authority structures for the formation of regulatory cooperation strategies of the Commission. 
The independent variable ‘compatible regulatory principle’ will be operationalised at the beginning of 
each of the empirical case studies in chapter 6. Chapter 4.5. summarises the hypotheses specified and 
deduced in this chapter.  
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4.1. Building blocks for an integrated theory 
 
This section introduces the building blocks of the theoretical framework that is developed in the next 
sub-section. The choice for these buildings blocks reflects their respective dominance in political science 
research on policy choice and strategy formation as well as institutional developments under 
interdependence. This section first presents the contours of actor-centred institutionalism and then 
sketches out the main components of the New Interdependence Approach. The shortcomings of each 
approach taken individually are raised at the end of each discussion.  
 
4.1.1. Actor-centred institutionalism  
 
A first step introduces the actor-centred institutionalism. Actor-centred institutionalism corresponds to 
two out of three demands for a refined theoretical framework derived in the literature review: First, it is 
an actor-centred framework and explains the design of rules, policies and institutional structures with 
the intentional behaviour of actors. Second, it is theoretically neutral to rational-choice and constructivist 
assumptions and instead seeks to incorporate elements of both. Actor-centred institutionalism explains 
the adoption and choice of a policy within a three-step analytical process: actor characteristics, actor 
constellations and modes of interaction. The following paragraphs will present each of these three steps. 
Actor-centred institutionalism has become a crucial framework in public policy analysis to explain the 
development of public policies. Its main achievement has been to overcome the debate between agency- 
and structure-based explanations in policy development. Rather, it seeks to analytically distinguish the 
interaction dynamics between actors and institutional factors. Actor-centred research has moved beyond 
the rational-choice, game-theoretic framework within which it was originally developed by Scharpf 
(1997) and opened itself up to historical and sociological institutionalist approaches.  
Actor-centred institutionalism shares the assumption of all streams of institutionalist literature, i.e. 
rational-choice, historical and sociological institutionalism, that institutions shape and constrain the 
behaviour of actors and influence processes of institutional change (Hall & Taylor, 1996). It defines 
institutions as “a collection of formal rules which structure the cooperation between actors” (Scharpf, 
1997: 21). Actor-centred institutionalism establishes the notion of intentional, actor-centred steering 
(Mayntz, 1987; Mayntz & Scharpf, 1995). Analytically, it relies on three core building blocks: First, it 
puts forward a crucial role of ‘actors’ as determinants of policy outputs, acknowledging that policy 
developments are above all the “outcome of interactions among purposeful actors” (Scharpf, 1997: 1). 
It emphasises the causal role of actors and agency in policy development. Analytical attention is shifted 
to the preferences of actors as explanatory variables for policy development and policy output. 
Orientations and capabilities thus shape what Scharpf calls ‘actor characteristics’. Actors are argued to 
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have distinct preferences which are shaped by both (subjectively defined) material interests and 
normative and cognitive dimensions (Scharpf, 1997: 19-22). Material interests include the 
considerations by actors of costs and benefits resulting from different policy alternatives. Norm-induced 
preferences relate to the role and identify and interaction orientations of an actor (Scharpf, 1997: 21). 
This proposes that human action is culturally shaped and reflects socially constructed beliefs about the 
world (Scharpf, 1997: 21). Whether actors can realise their preferences is argued to depend on their 
capabilities, i.e. their resources, access and political power. The adoption and reflection of a 
methodological individualism thus pushes back institutions as the sole explanatory factors of policy 
development and instead concentrates on actors as immediate causal factors. The focus on actors and 
the strategic use of opportunity structures has been underlined by contributions to implementation and 
Europeanisation research (Graziano et al., 2011; Jacquot & Woll, 2003; Treib, 2003).    
Second, actor-centred institutionalism distinguishes not only material from cognitive and ideational 
dimensions of agency, but also preferences from processes of strategy formation. Most actors studied 
by actor-centred institutionalism are not individuals, but organisations. They coordinate their behaviour 
through the adoption of aggregate and collectively binding decisions. Actor-centred institutionalism 
draws attention to interaction dynamics and processes of strategy formation with complex collective 
actors and looks at the interactions among different collective actor members in the development of a 
collective actor strategy.  
Third, actor-centred institutionalism incorporates that actors are embedded within a set of institutions 
that influence their perception of reality, structure the interactions of actors at the domestic level and 
thus shape processes of policy development. Mayntz and Scharpf (1995: 43) formulate that institutions 
stimulate, facilitate and restrict the action context. Scharpf (2000: 775) puts forward that institutions 
affect the preferences and behaviour as (a) formal rules restrict the choice of feasible policy alternatives, 
(b) formal rules create ‘constellations of actors’ and (c) social norms shape normative and cognitive 
orientations. The embedding of actors in an institutional structure creates what Scharpf calls ‘actor 
constellations’. Institutions therefore shape and determine the constellations of actors that a specific 
actor faces in the pursuit of her preferences. They determine which veto players can vote on a policy 
and fix the threshold of agreement which is necessary to adopt a policy change. Authors examining the 
impact of institutions on the aggregation of interests derive hypotheses in particular from the literature 
on comparative political institutions (Tsebelis, 2002). Institutions are found to vary according e.g. to the 
size of constituencies, the number of veto points, and the domestic electoral system, as well as between 
democracies and non-democracies. Formal rules discourage actors from pursuing goals which conflict 
with the content of rules. Moreover, they are argued to create incentive structures and to shape expected 
payoffs resulting from certain strategies, thus influencing the likelihood that certain strategies are 
adopted by rational actors. Formal rules also equally determine veto positions or constitute certain 
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actors. The interdependence of jurisdictions is, however, treated as an independent phenomenon 
exogenous to the formation of actor strategies.  
As social norms, institutions define and shape value orientations and preferences of actors (Lewis, 
2005). Institutions thus also determine the “mode of interaction” (Scharpf, 1997: 44), i.e. the choice of 
an actor how to resolve a conflict and interact with other actors. Figure 5 shows the decision-making 
problem of actors according to actor-centred institutionalism (based on Scharpf, 1997: 44).  
  
Figure 5: Decision-making problem of actors according to actor-centred institutionalism 
 
Actor-centred institutionalism, however, mostly assumes processes of strategy formation within 
independent individual units. Although it acknowledges influences of “wider policy developments” on 
the preferences and behaviour of actors, it offers little theoretical clarification as to how wider policy 
developments exert influence on actor characteristics, actor constellations and modes of interaction. 
Domestic strategy formation is analytically separated from the behaviour of actor in ‘international’ 
interactions. Actors develop ‘domestically’ individually optimal strategies, but do not consider if their 
strategies allow cooperation with actors from other jurisdictions. Instead, actor-centred institutionalism 
assumes that cooperation is enabled and facilitated through communication mechanisms, side payments 
and commitment mechanisms for repeated interactions. Interdependence is thus treated as a factor 
exogenous to the strategy formation. As discussed in chapter 2.1, the assumption of domestic 
jurisdictions as independent units of analysis leads to empirically false conclusions (cf. Oatley, 2011).  
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4.1.2. New Interdependence Approach 
 
This section introduces the New Interdependence Approach as an emerging theoretical literature that 
addresses the main shortcoming of the ‘independent unit of analysis’ assumption of actor-centred 
institutionalism (Newman & Farrell, 2016; Farrell & Newman, 2014; Büthe & Mattli, 2011; Krasner, 
2011; Posner, 2009).  
The New Interdependence Approach is a structural argument, examining the sequential cross-national 
diffusion of institutional patterns in a context created by trade liberalisation and economic and political 
interdependence.  It makes the following assumptions and statements: First, interdependence is not only 
an intervening variable, but a causal factor of domestic institutional change. Interdependence creates 
rule overlap and conflicting rules across jurisdictions as well as an opportunity structure for actors to 
change domestic institutions. The New Interdependence Approach thus acknowledges that jurisdictional 
boundaries are often no longer bound to the nation state (Putnam, 2009). “Interdependence” is 
understood as the “interpenetration of national polities and markets, so that decisions made in one 
jurisdiction have consequences in another” (Farrell & Newman, 2014:2). Consequently, states are not 
assumed to be independent units of domestic preference aggregation.  
Second, institutions are viewed as constitutive and thus endogenous to the preferences and power of 
domestic actors in interdependent relations. Domestic institutions influence the ability of domestic 
actors to shape transnational and international rules. Third, processes of institutional change across 
borders are not only initiated by government negotiators through intergovernmental agreements, but by 
multiple sub-state actors that seek to respond to rule overlap. These sub-state actors are notably 
regulators, trans-national interest groups or the secretariats of international organisations. They are 
assumed to engage in contestation across boundaries and use both foreign jurisdictions and the global 
level as opportunity structure to advance their preferences. Fourth, outcomes of cross-national 
interactions are not stable policy equilibria such as intergovernmental agreements, but reiterated 
sequences of institutional changes across borders and new institutions ‘layered’ above existing 
institutions.   
The argument proposed by the New Interdependence Approach runs as follows: Interdependence gives 
rise to rule overlap across jurisdictions and clashes between the rules of different markets. As actors are 
subjected to conflicting rules, they seek to resolve these disputes and establish certainty. At the same 
time, however, interdependence and overlapping jurisdictions create new opportunities and opportunity 
structures for actors subjected to diverging rules as they can shift their activities across jurisdictions to 
take advantage of overlapping and conflicting rules. Actors, notably regulators, trans-national interest 
groups or the secretariats of international organisations, seek to resolve regulatory disputes, establish 
certainty and facilitate cross-national coordination. For this purpose, they use interdependent relations 
as an opportunity structure to advocate domestic institutional change across jurisdictions.  
Explaining bilateral regulatory cooperation strategies 
75 
 
According to the New Interdependence Approach, domestic policy choices of interdependent 
jurisdictions are therefore not only determined by previous domestic institutional choices, but also by 
institutional asymmetries with other states and their institutional choices (Farrell & Newman, 2014: 12; 
Farrell & Newman, 2010: 623; Krasner, 2011; Simmons & Elkins, 2004). More specifically, 
institutional asymmetries across states at the international level trigger processes of domestic 
institutional change. Importantly, rule overlap changes domestic reversion points. A domestic 
institutional change subsequently reshapes institutional asymmetries at the international level and 
triggers endogenous change in another jurisdiction. This leads to a dynamic of “an iterated sequence of 
domestic institutional moves across national borders” (Farrell & Newman, 2014: 13). Interdependence 
destabilises the domestic and global regulatory status quo, making globalisation an endogenous process.     
Theoretically, the New Interdependence Approach mostly adopts a historical institutionalist framework. 
In doing so, it concentrates on examining processes of institutional change across jurisdictions. 
Dependent variables of its research are processes of diffusion across jurisdictions and trans-
governmental coordination rather than policy outcome equilibria. To describe this dynamic, the New 
Interdependence Approach borrows the historical institutionalist terminology of ‘layering’ and 
‘sequencing’, emphasising the importance of temporality. Layering describes the creation of a new and 
additional layering of cross-national institutions which overlay domestic institutions and over time 
subsumes or replaces them (Farrell & Newman, 2014: 26; Thelen, 2004). Sequencing within the New 
Interdependence Approach denotes a dynamic “in which particular institutional change in one country 
can produce endogenous effects in another, spurring reactions that lead to further institutional change.” 
(Farrell & Newman, 2014: 17) 
The New Interdependence Approach also identifies power resources to shape the direction of 
institutional change across borders, the causal mechanism underlying institutional change across borders 
and the role of international institutions. Authors note that power is constituted through institutions that 
determine the access of actors to opportunity structures created by interdependence. Institutions offering 
access are a high relative domestic regulatory capacity (Raustiala & Sprigma, 2009; Putnam, 2009; Bach 
& Newman, 2007), first-mover advantages (Newman & Posner, 2015), a hierarchical domestic 
institutional structure and a high degree of institutional fit between domestic and international 
institutions (Büthe & Mattli, 2011) as well as a large internal market (Simmons, 2001; Drezner, 2007). 
Market size essentially shapes the ability to benefit from asymmetric interdependence (Keohane & Nye, 
2001) and to exert adaptational pressure on exporters and other jurisdictions through the exclusion of 
foreign products from the domestic market. Regulatory capacity denotes “the expertise, resources, 
organisation, and authority to develop, implement, and enforce rules” (Bach & Newman, 2007: 831). 
The ability to define, monitor and enforce market rules is argued to put actors in a better position to 
control their markets and demand access to transnational structures. Yet, the New Interdependence 
Approach emphasises relational considerations more than absolute power conditions. Relational 
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considerations put the power of actors in contrast with the power of other actors involved20. Moreover, 
they compare the timing of policies and the development of regulatory capacity in one state to the 
development of policies in other states. New Interdependence Approach authors thus consider high 
relative regulatory capacity and first-mover advantages as more important power resources rather than 
a large internal market and regulatory capacity. They argue that if a market develops regulatory capacity 
before other states, foreign firms and other actors which are exposed to international markets are likely 
to converge on the preferences of the market with early regulatory capacity. Besides, they stress that 
actors who were present at the time when the first-mover state established institutions are more likely 
to influence the trajectory of subsequent institutional development than those whose influence came in 
later. At the same time, actors are likely to be in a situation of disadvantage if regulatory conflict arises 
on an issue in which they have not established regulatory capacity before economic interdependence set 
in (Farrell & Newman, 2010: 622). Yet, authors also stress that first-mover advantages do not deliver 
permanent relative power resources as they are embedded in continuously evolving processes of 
institutional change (Farrell & Newman, 2014: 18). Access to opportunity structures is argued to also 
depend on the degree of fit between domestic institutions and international structures. Büthe and Mattli 
(2011) have described a fit between domestic institutions and international opportunity structures as 
‘regulatory complementarities’. 
Researchers investigating the causal mechanism leading to sequences of institutional change across 
jurisdictions acknowledge that institutional change is triggered by actors that seek to resolve regulatory 
conflicts under rule overlap and to establish certainty. These actors are often sub-state actors, including 
regulators and societal actors. The overlap of jurisdictions creates shifting boundaries of political 
contestation and opportunity structures outside the domestic set of institutions. domestic actors also 
influence foreign institutions and the positions of foreign governments (Krasner, 2011). They use 
interdependence as an opportunity structure to advance their preferences. As they take advantage of 
international opportunity structures and interact with actors in other states, they can change even ‘sticky’ 
domestic institutions (Farrell & Newman, 2014: 19; Cerny, 2010; Slaughter, 2004). The New 
Interdependence Approach argues that the likelihood and ability of actors to use interdependence as an 
opportunity structure is shaped by their preferences and their access to transnational fora and opportunity 
structures. Authors differentiate between actors who seek to maintain the institutional status quo and 
thus who seek to change or overturn it. Actors who prefer to overturn existing domestic institutions and 
who enjoy a high degree of transnational access are assumed to pursue ‘cross-national layering’, i.e. the 
creation of a “new layer of cross-national institutions, whether formal or informal, which overlay 
domestic institutions” which may, but need not over time subsume or replace domestic institutions 
                                                     
20 Relational considerations are, however, neither specific nor original to the New Interdependence Approach. 
They are also a common feature of traditional rational-choice approaches and realist approaches. Yet, the New 
Interdependence Approach applies relational considerations more broadly and uses them to derive explanations 
for outcomes on the dependent variable.    
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(Farrell & Newman, 2014: 24). As a causal mechanism of institutional change, authors propose that 
actors with a preference to change institutions and access to international opportunity structures build 
trans-national coalitions with actors from other jurisdictions and use these coalition to create 
argumentative pressure (Posner, 2009). International institutions and organisations are seen as mediating 
actors, reflecting the characterisation of liberal institutionalism (Keohane & Nye, 2001). They influence 
institutional change as they provide information and monitoring capacities to actors with access to 
international opportunity structures (Farrell & Newman, 2014). 
Although the New Interdependence Approach is designed as a structural approach, it cannot explain 
institutional changes across borders without agency and the deliberate behaviour of actors. The main 
limitation of the New Interdependence Approach is its neglect of actor strategies. Authors agree that the 
power resources identified by the New Interdependence Approach are rather necessary conditions to 
shape cross-national layering rather than sufficient condition to explain the exercise of this power in an 
interdependent context (Farrell & Newman, 2010: 614). Yet, as discussed above, observed actor 
strategies often deviate from their assumed or deduced preferences. This deviation of actor strategies 
from their preferences is not addressed by the New Interdependence Approach. Instead, it implies that 
actors with access to transnational fora and preferences to change the domestic status quo are able and 
willing to pursue their preferences and advance a change of domestic institutions.  
Yet, it offers an important insight that helps to refine and adapt the actor-centred institutionalist 
framework. The New Interdependence Approach addresses the ‘insulated unit of analysis’ problem of 
actor-centred institutionalism. It suggests that interdependence is not only a ‘wider policy development’, 
but constitutive to the ability of actors to pursue their preferences. In this regard, it defines the ‘actor 
constellations’ determining the ability of actors to realise their most preferred outcome. The adapted 
conceptualisation of ‘actor constellations’ based on the assumptions of the New Interdependence 
Approach will be specified in the next section which combines actor-centred institutionalism and the 
New Interdependence Approach into an integrative theoretical framework (chapter 4.2). 
To conclude, this section has reviewed both actor-centred institutionalism and the New Interdependence 
Approach. It has identified the treatment of jurisdiction as an independent unit of analysis as an 
important theoretical shortcoming of actor-centred institutionalism. Moreover, it has shown that the 
emerging New Interdependence Approach framework offers a response to this shortcoming because it 
suggests that institutional asymmetries across jurisdictions are both an opportunity structure and a 
constraint to the behaviour of actors at the international level. It lacks, however, a theoretical micro-
foundation that specifies the translation of theoretically deduced preferences of actors into observable 
strategies. The next section (chapter 4.2.) specifies how both theoretical approaches can be combined.   
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4.2. Inter-relational Institutionalism   
 
This section incorporates the New Interdependence Approach into actor-centred institutionalism and 
derives a new theoretical framework, the Inter-relational Institutionalism. This framework addresses the 
shortcomings of both theoretical frameworks taken individually. Thus, it aims at deriving a theoretical 
model that can better account for the constraints and behaviour of actors in an environment of 
interdependence. This framework will guide the deduction of hypotheses in chapter 4.3. and direct the 
empirical analysis of this book in chapter 6.  
The Inter-relational Institutionalism shares the definition of an institution as “a relatively enduring 
collection of rules and organized practices, embedded in structures of meaning and resources that are 
relatively invariant in the face of turnover of individuals and relatively resilient to the idiosyncratic 
preferences and expectations of individuals and changing external circumstances” (March & Olsen, 
2008: 2). For analytical clarity, the derivation of the Inter-relational Institutionalism follows the structure 
and building blocks of actor-centred institutionalism. In line with the analytical focus of this book, this 
framework, however, only incorporates two out of three building blocks of actor-centred 
institutionalism, i.e. ‘actor characteristics’ and ‘actor constellations’, while leaving aside the ‘mode of 
interaction’. As outlined in the previous section, the ‘mode of interaction’ defines the logic of action 
which existing governance literature differentiates into interaction through bargaining and persuasion 
(Lavenex, 2014; Falkner & Müller, 2013; Börzel & Risse, 2012). While bargaining relies on the use of 
coercion and conditionality, persuasion builds on socialisation, deliberation and learning.  
The decision to leave out the mode of interaction reflects findings from previous studies. On the one 
hand, existing literature has already extensively analysed scope conditions for the prevalence of either 
mode of interaction, e.g. the institutional context (Falkner & Müller, 2013), the complexity of issues 
discussed (Keohane & Goldstein, 1993), politicisation of the setting (Peterson & Young, 2014; Lavenex, 
2014; Checkel, 2001) or the clarity or ambiguity of distributive implications (Poletti, 2011). There is 
little reason to presume that these scope conditions should not hold for regulatory cooperation. On the 
other hand, and more importantly, the literature implies that the mode of interaction and the prevalence 
of bargaining or persuasion is without effect on the research object of this book, i.e. the constraints on 
strategy formation. Falkner & Müller (2013) suggest that frequently bargaining interactions 
complement, but do not replace persuasion mechanisms. Moreover, the complexity of regulatory 
cooperation (Shaffer, 2016; Egan & Pelkmans, 2015) is highly unlikely to replace persuasion 
mechanisms and create room for coercion and conditionality even when regulatory cooperation is 
embedded in a bargaining context. While the ‘mode of interaction’ as a variable may be addressed in 
future research, it is not further theorised in the Inter-relational Institutionalism.    
This section thus proceeds as follows: A first sub-section (chapter 4.2.1.) specifies the ‘actor 
characteristics’, defining the preferences of actors in the context of interdependence. This sub-section 
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addresses the combination of both rational-choice and sociological-constructivist assumptions into one 
coherent theory. The second sub-section (chapter 4.2.2.) derives the ‘actor constellations’ under 
institutional asymmetries in interdependence.      
 
4.2.1. Actor characteristics 
 
This first sub-section deals with the first building block of actor-centred institutionalism and derives the 
preferences of actors. It first shows how the assumption of actor behaviour as intentionally rational 
offers a model to incorporate sociological-constructivist understandings of behaviour into rational-
choice models. Second, it derives differences in preferences of ‘sub-actors’ that are a part of collective 
actors. Third, it specifies the preference of actors under interdependence.  
Due to its foundation in rational-choice theory, Scharpf’s actor-centred institutionalism defines the 
characteristics of actors as their have distinct preferences, orientations and capabilities. The emphasis 
on preferences as an analytical instrument to understand the decision-making problem of an actor is also 
shared by the New Interdependence Approach (Farrell & Newman, 2014: 32). In line with actor-centred 
institutionalism, preferences shall be defined as the most preferred outcome of an actor regarding a 
specific issue, given its fixed underlying interest (Frieden, 1999; see also chapter 3.1.).  
In its original, purely rational-choice form, actor-centred institutionalism derives the preference of an 
actor from its underlying material interest. This material interest is assumed to be fixed and clearly 
discernible. It results from cost-benefit calculations of the consequences of policy alternatives to their 
fixed, underlying interests (Frieden, 1999). From the sociological-constructivist perspective, in turn, the 
constitution of actors’ self-interest and their preferences depend on their identity and the beliefs that 
they hold. Identities shape interests because they offer information about the normative expectations 
which are addressed to an actor. They thus shape the perception of actors of what constitutes an 
opportunity or threat and the pursuit of which goals they can consider as appropriate for their behaviour 
(Ziegler, Campbell, Hall & Pedersen, 2011). Beliefs and ideas influence the ends which actors pursue 
because they offer guidance for action and specify the causal and normative relationships that pertain to 
a particular action.  
More recent contributions to neo-institutionalist (including actor-centred institutionalist) theory offer a 
way to combine this understanding of preferences derived from the material interest of actors with 
sociological-constructivist conceptions of behaviour as driven by normative and cognitive orientations 
They assume that actors are intentionally rational, i.e. that actors seek to behave rationally (e.g. Woll, 
2008). Intentional rationality means that actors are not able to deduce rational behaviour from a clear 
ranking of preferences. Instead, rationality is socially constructed within the structural embeddedness of 
actors in a given social system. Actors do not have full knowledge of the relationship between means 
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and ends in an environment of uncertainty. The institutional context in which actors are embedded 
shapes their beliefs about how means are connected to ends and which ends are politically feasible. 
Uncertainty is a reflection of lack of knowledge about the relationship between means and ends. Actors 
make sense of the connection between means and ends through interacting with their social environment, 
establishing how means and ends are connected and establishing the most appropriate means to pursue 
in a context of constraint. Within this context, institutions reduce uncertainty and establish ideas about 
the mechanisms between means and ends.   
The model of intentional rationality thus incorporates both material interest and normative orientations 
and identities as motifs for intentionally rational behaviour. When conflicts occur within cognitive 
frameworks or perceived means-ends relationships fail, actors perceive that existing beliefs no longer 
serve legitimate behaviour. Following cost-benefit considerations, they look for other ideas that can 
establish relationships between means and ends. A strive for rationality and an efficient use of resources 
in actors, however, induces them to engage with ideas that are proposed by authoritative actors. In 
evaluating the costs and benefits and normative implications of different policy alternatives, actors are 
assumed to prefer a solution which is close to the status quo (Woll, 2008). 
Actors that the New Interdependence Approach and actor-centred institutionalism study are mostly 
organisations, not individuals. Organisations are composite actors of different individual sub-actors. 
Neither actor-centred institutionalism nor the New Interdependence Approach specifically address the 
question how aggregate actors form aggregate preferences. However, proxy rational-choice 
institutionalist theories, especially the principal-agent approach, have been proposed to fill this gap. 
Following the distinction between different sub-actors, their respective preferences and orientations can 
be derived from the assumption of intentionally rational behaviour. The preferences of different sub-
actors differ in line with their structural embeddedness in a specific context and their particular identity. 
Sub-actors thus have different beliefs how means are connected to ends. Based on their degree of 
uncertainty and their evaluation of the relationship between ends and means under the status quo, they 
attribute different roles to new ideas and deviate in their conception of rational behaviour.      
The preferences of sub-actors are translated into the aggregate preference of an actor, i.e. organisation. 
Actor-centred institutionalism puts forward that the formation of a collective preference results from the 
interaction dynamics among different members of a collective actor. These interaction dynamics shape 
the capabilities of sub-actors to shape the aggregate preference of an actor. Actor-centred 
institutionalism suggests that resources, power and access strengthen the capability of a sub-actor to 
shape the aggregate preference of an actor.  
For analytical clarity, the relative capabilities of sub-actors to shape the aggregate preference can be 
modelled using the principal-agent approach, thus following a large body of rational-choice 
institutionalist theoretical literature (Elsig & Dupont, 2012; Dür & Elsig, 2011; Damro, 2007). Although 
typically applied to study the relationship between executives and legislatures, the concept can also 
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grasp the behaviour of sub-actors within an organisation (Elsig & Dupont, 2012). The principal-agent 
approach notes that in delegated relationships, actors, called ‘agents’, have a certain degree of autonomy 
that they obtain e.g. from agenda-setting, information asymmetries and the active use of strategies 
(Pollack, 2003; Kiewiet & McCubbins, 1991). The intervention of other actors, however, decreases their 
autonomy. Variation in the participation of different ‘agents’ or sub-actors in agenda-setting thus shapes 
and constrains the capabilities of sub-actors in the formation of an aggregate preference in a collective 
organisation. This point will be specified in chapter 4.3.2.     
Incorporating the New Interdependence Approach now allows specifying the preference of actors 
(including sub-actors) in an environment of interdependence. The New Interdependence Approach 
proposes that interdependence possibly increases uncertainty to actors because rule overlap increases 
the likelihood that other actors may intervene (Farrell & Newman, 2014; Damro, 2006). The intervention 
by other actors, however, unfavourably affects the material interest to maximise its utility. Rule overlap 
also gives rise to cognitive conflicts. As a consequence, it can be derived that actors in seeking to reduce 
uncertainty prefer avoiding divergent decisions across jurisdictions. The individual cost-benefit analyses 
of sub-actors, the uncertainty that they perceive due to the emergence of cognitive conflict as well as 
their beliefs in the possibility to use interdependence as an opportunity structure to reduce uncertainty, 
however, differ.  
To summarise, this sub-section has addressed the first building block of Inter-relational Institutionalism 
and derived the preferences of actors. It has shown that the conception of actor behaviour as intentionally 
rational allows incorporating sociological-constructivist understandings of behaviour into rational-
choice preference models. Moreover, it has specified variations of intentionally rational behaviour 
among sub-actors within actors as organisations, drawing from the principal-agent concept in rational-
choice institutionalist frameworks. Third, it has incorporated the New Interdependence Approach into 
actor-centred institutionalism and specifies the preference of an actor in the face of interdependence.  
 
4.2.2. Actor constellations 
 
After the first sub-section has derived the preferences of actors under interdependence and specified 
parameters for the capacity of individual sub-sector to influence the collective preference of a collective 
actor, the goal of this second sub-section is to deduce the potential actor constellations that allow an 
actor to use interdependence as an opportunity structure. It is here that the focus of this book and its 
development of the Inter-relational Institutionalism lies. This sub-section shows how the incorporation 
of the New Interdependence Approach specifies potential domestic actor constellations and thus the 
constraints on actors that arise from the overlap of jurisdictions and institutional asymmetries.    
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As explained in chapter 4.1.1., actor-centred institutionalism understands actor-constellations as 
determined by the set of domestic institutions in which an actor is embedded. These institutions 
influence actors’ perception of reality and structure their interactions21. Institutions also determine the 
autonomy of actors vis-à-vis potential veto players. They lay down the rules for decision-making and 
the delegation of authority. Chapter 4.1.2., however, discussed the assumption of the New 
Interdependence Approach that institutions shaping the interactions and constellations of actors are not 
distinct sets or independent units of analysis, but overlapping structures. The incorporation of the New 
Interdependence Approach therefore crucially adds to the actor-centred institutionalism that the use of 
interdependence as an opportunity structure is subject to potential actor constellations at the domestic 
level. Potential domestic actor constellations that an actor expects, in turn, reflect the conflict between 
domestic and foreign incentive structures. They therefore constrain the decision of an actor to use 
interdependence as an opportunity structure.   
For argumentative clarity, some of the assumptions of the Inter-relational Institutionalism that have been 
stated in the introduction to this chapter shall be briefly recalled before the actor constellations resulting 
from institutional asymmetries across jurisdictions are further elaborated. First, power resources in 
regulatory cooperation are shaped by domestic institutions, notably regulatory capacity, regulatory 
stringency as well as a large internal market. These assumptions reflect the deduction of power resources 
according to the New Interdependence Approach. Although this view is not uncontested (Elsig, 2013; 
Falkner & Müller, 2013; Gehring et al., 2013; Jorgensen et al, 2011; Niemann & Bretherton, 2013; 
Oberthür & Rabitz, 2013), the Inter-relational Institutionalism adopts the finding of the New 
Interdependence Approach that centralised regulatory authority is a source of asymmetric power. It thus 
assumes that actors pursue regulatory cooperation in areas that fall under their regulatory authority. At 
the same time, the Inter-relational Institutionalism does not concentrate on the role of domestic 
institutions as rules determining ratification rules. Regulatory cooperation by means of non-treaty and 
formal cooperative agreements often entails that regulators can enter cooperation without requiring 
formal domestic ratification.  
Second, in regulatory cooperation, radical institutional change is rare. The resilience of institutions 
reflects the increasing returns they offer to previously enacted actors and thus makes changes to 
institutions often path-dependent. Even actors seeking to resolve regulatory clashes do not necessarily 
support overturning foreign institutions (Farrell & Newman, 2014: 26). Rather, actors promote policy 
coordination within existing rules and structures and seek adaptations within status quo institutions22,23. 
                                                     
21 This resonates with Frieden’s (1999) argument that the formation of an actor’s strategy is dependent on the 
“possibilities presented by the environment” and the “constraints of circumstance” (Frieden, 1999: 45). 
22 This reflects the conclusion of Thelen (2004) that most forms of policy adaptation take place outside ‘critical 
junctures’ and take an incremental form.  
23 This assumption differs from the focus of the New Interdependence Approach literature on institutional change 
across borders through cross-layering or the use of interdependence as an opportunity structure to change 
international-level institutions (Büthe & Mattli, 2011; Bach & Newman, 2010).  
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The strategy choice of actors is therefore constrained by the need for agreement with foreign actors 
given foreign institutions (Damro, 2006).  
Chapter 4.2.1. has deduced that interdependence creates incentives for actors to use rule overlap as an 
opportunity structure to reduce the uncertainty of intervention against their preferences. Beside the 
availability of the power resources regulatory capacity, regulatory stringency and market size, the ability 
of an actor to use overlap as an opportunity structure depends on the actor constellations that result from 
the institutional conditions. The New Interdependence Approach offers an argument for the ability of 
domestic actors to use international institutions as an opportunity structure (Büthe & Mattli, 2011): the 
complementarity argument. While the argument of the New Interdependence Approach refers to a 
‘vertical mechanism’ (chapter 3.1.2.), the essence of this theoretical argument can be transferred to a 
horizontal mechanism too.  
The complementarity argument states that the ability of an actor to use international institutions as an 
opportunity structure depends on the complementarity between domestic and international incentive 
structures, where complementarity describes the level of fit between institutions (Büthe & Mattli, 2011). 
It posits that domestic institutions yield higher benefits if they are combined with a ‘fitting’ international 
institution (Büthe & Mattli, 2011: 29). Complementarity between domestic and international institution 
is a power resource as it determines the constellations between domestic and foreign actors and among 
different domestic actors. Put differently, the complementarity of domestic and international institutions 
implies that the incentive structures of the different sets of institutions are not in conflict with each other.  
The complementarity argument can easily be adapted to incentive structures and actor constellations 
between a domestic and a foreign jurisdiction horizontally. The argument then takes the assumption of 
actor-centred institutionalism, i.e. that an actor’s ability to pursue a preference depends on the 
constellation of actors, as the point of departure. Under interdependence, however, actor constellations 
are not defined purely ‘domestically’, but transnationally. The incorporation of New Interdependence 
Approach into actor-centred institutionalism hence proposes that not only domestic institutions, but the 
relation between domestic and overlapping foreign institutions determines actor constellations. The 
overlap of jurisdictions potentially creates conflict among the rules and structures of the domestic and 
the foreign jurisdiction. More specifically, if overlapping jurisdictions give rise to conflicting incentive 
structures, the foreign institutions set incentives which conflict with the preferences of the ‘main’ 
domestic actor that are derived from domestic incentive structures24. Thus, if incentive structures 
                                                     
Zdenek and Müller (2016), examining the case of accounting standards, also propose that if domestic institutions 
are ‘weak’ relative to foreign institutions, actors with the necessary capabilities can seek to strengthen domestic 
institutions by changing domestic institutions in line with foreign institutions. The international level may 
constitute a ‘global exit mechanism’ from a ‘joint-decision trap’ at the domestic level reflecting divergent and 
incompatible preferences of member states. The Commission thus leverages ‘international’ institutions by creating 
policy options that were not available at the domestic level and creating previously unavailable side-payments.   
24 This argument reflects the assumption of actor-centred institutionalism that institutions constitute and shape 
preferences. 
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conflict, also the preferences of actors constituted by these incentive structures must conflict. Neglecting 
or ignoring the conflict in incentive structures by assuming the equality of incentive structures must 
violate the preferences of the ‘main’ domestic actor. 
At the same time, if an overlap of jurisdictions and institutions leads to conflicting incentive structures, 
the main domestic actor would either need to change domestic or foreign institutions to resolve the 
conflict. This institutional change may, however, be assumed as unlikely (see assumption (6) in the 
introduction to chapter 4). If the domestic main actor nonetheless sought to use rule overlap as an 
opportunity structure to reduce uncertainty, other domestic actors would mobilise and seek to intervene. 
If domestic and foreign incentive structures then conflict, the potential actor constellation is conflictual. 
The intervention of other domestic actors would increase uncertainty and violate the material interest of 
the actor. Conflicting incentive structures created by conflicting domestic and foreign institutions thus 
give rise to a conflictual actor constellation. The latter then constrains the ability of the main actor to 
use interdependence as an opportunity structure.    
From this reasoning, it follows that interdependence is only an opportunity structure for actors to pursue 
their preferences beyond their domestic institutional embeddedness if overlapping jurisdictions do not 
create conflicting incentive structures. The latter would give rise to a conflictual actor constellation 
against the main actor at the domestic level. Put differently, actors are only able to pursue their 
preferences under overlapping jurisdictions if these overlapping jurisdictions do not create conflicting 
incentive structures. Note that this condition strongly differs from the condition formulated by Scharpf 
(1997) that (only) institutions in which actors are ‘embedded’ shape the actor constellations under which 
a (capable) actor pursues its preferences.  
If, in turn, incentive structures of domestic and foreign institutions do not conflict, the actor constellation 
is non-conflictual. The ability of the main actor to use interdependence as an opportunity structure at the 
domestic level is thus constrained by the conflict or non-conflict between domestic and foreign incentive 
structures. This constraint also relates to the risk perceived by an actor that other domestic actors may 
intervene and impede its autonomy as they seek to avert a negative influence of conflicting foreign 
institutions.  Büthe and Mattli (2011) argue that the vertical absence of conflict in incentive structures 
gives rise to institutional complementarities. This argument can be adapted to the use of interdependence 
horizontally. The absence of a conflict in horizontal incentive structures shall be called ‘compatibility’, 
adopting terminology used earlier by Nicolaidis (2000) and Pollack (2003). Two sets of institutions are 
‘compatible’ with each other if they do not have underlying conflicting incentive structures. From the 
latter it follows that compatibilities determine the access and ability of actors to use opportunity 
structures resulting from overlapping jurisdictions. More specifically, if two sets of overlapping 
institutions are compatible, actors can use them as an opportunity structure to pursue their preferences 
beyond the set of institutions in which they are embedded domestically.  
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Compatible institutions present an opportunity structure because they allow actors who prefer to 
cooperate with other actors building alliances in support of cooperation across borders. Theoretically, 
actors with a preference to cooperate will want to choose a strategy that they can pursue without 
conflictual actor constellations. Combining the actor-centred institutionalism with the New 
Interdependence Approach now derives the conclusion that the ability of actors to pursue their 
preferences depends on the constellations of actors in the domestic and the overlapping foreign 
jurisdiction. If incentive structures conflict that shape the behaviour of two actors in interaction, an actor 
seeking cooperation with an actor from the foreign jurisdiction will face the threat of intervention and 
will be unable to build an alliance. If incentive structures do not conflict, though, the actor interested in 
cooperation will not face opposition and will be able to form an alliance that reflects the preferences of 
actors in both the domestic and foreign jurisdiction.      
Lastly, this reasoning now also allows formulating a causal mechanism to describe the use of 
interdependence as an opportunity structure by the domestic ‘main’ actor. To address domestic 
opposition by actors against institutional change or cooperation, actors who seek to use interdependence 
as an opportunity structure form argumentative coalitions. These coalitions consist of actors with similar 
preferences and access to opportunity structures across jurisdictions. They are initiated by the actor with 
power resources, high access to interdependence opportunity structures and low collective action 
problems. The actor who initiates coalition-building uses these coalitions to enhance the legitimacy of 
its demands and build up domestic argumentative pressure.   
To conclude, this section has deduced the analytical dimensions of the Inter-relational Institutionalism 
based on two building blocks of actor-centred institutionalism: actor characteristics and actor 
constellations. Related to actor characteristics, it has shown that the conception of actor behaviour as 
intentionally rational allows incorporating sociological-constructivist understandings of behaviour into 
rational-choice preference models. It has specified that under interdependence, actors develop a 
preference to use rule overlap as an opportunity structure to reduce uncertainty and avoid negative 
intervention by other actors. Moreover, it has argued that intentionally rational behaviour may vary 
among different sub-actors within collective actors, based on their structural embeddedness in different 
contexts and their different identities.  
With regard to actor constellations, this section has deduced that institutional compatibilities between 
the domestic and foreign jurisdictions constrain the ability of actors to use interdependence as an 
opportunity structure. The conflict between the incentive structures created by domestic and foreign 
institutions constrain the ability of the main domestic actor to use interdependence as an opportunity 
structure at the domestic level as it risks an intervention by other domestic actors to avert the influence 
of conflicting foreign institutions. This section has therefore deduced that an actor only uses 
interdependence as an opportunity structure if incentive structures between the domestic and foreign 
jurisdiction are non-conflicting.  
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Moreover, it has deduced the causal mechanism that describes the use of interdependence as an 
opportunity structure by the domestic ‘main’ actor. An actor who comes to prefer using interdependence 
as an opportunity structure mobilises other actors with similar preferences to form argumentative 
coalitions to enhance the legitimacy of its demands and build up domestic argumentative pressure. The 
next section will apply the abstract theoretical framework to bilateral regulatory cooperation.   
 
4.3. Inter-relational Institutionalism and bilateral regulatory cooperation 
 
This section now applies the Inter-relational Institutionalism deduced in section 4.2. to bilateral 
regulatory cooperation and specifies the hypotheses that shall be tested in the empirical part of this book. 
In doing so, it specifies regulators as the main actors in bilateral regulatory cooperation. This 
specification reflects the conclusion of the New Interdependence Approach that “sub-state actors” 
including regulators as well as transnationally organised societal actors are the main players shaping 
global governance as well as cross-national patterns of institutional change (Farrell & Newman, 2014: 
24). Likewise, it reflects the insight of more recent liberal institutionalist literature that with the 
transformation of the state and the emergence of the regulatory state, regulators obtain a major role in 
international governance (Raustiala, 2002; Majone, 1996).  
This section first begins with a specification of regulator preferences as the analytical basis for the 
deduction of regulator strategies. It connects the preferences of regulators to regulatory authority 
structures and regulatory principles which are shaped by different sets of institutions (chapter 4.3.1.). It 
then deduces the independent variables of the analytical framework of this book, in line with the building 
blocks ‘actor characteristics’ and ‘actor constellations’ of the Inter-relational Institutionalism. Second, 
it deduces bureaucratic pressure from the ‘actor characteristics’ building block as the first independent 
variable constraining regulators’ choice of a regulatory cooperation strategy (chapter 4.3.2.). Third, it 
deduces the compatibility of domestic and foreign regulatory authority structures and the compatibility 
of domestic and foreign regulatory principles as the second and third independent variables from the 
‘actor constellations’ building block. Fourth, it lays down the causal mechanism that links regulator 
preferences to the pursuit of a specific regulatory cooperation strategy.  
 
4.3.1. Bureaucratic pressure  
  
This sub-section introduces the first independent variable of this book, based on the ‘actor 
characteristics’ building block of the Inter-relational Institutionalism. Chapter 4.2.1. has noted that most 
actors studied by the New Interdependence Approach and actor-centred institutionalism study are 
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organisations composed of different sub-actors, not individuals. This statement also applies to 
regulators, which are the subject of analysis in this book. Although neither the ‘New Interdependence 
Approach nor actor-centred institutionalism specifically address decision-making within organisations, 
chapter 4.2.1. has explained why the principal-agent approach may be used to study decision-making 
within composite actors. In line with the argument proposed in chapter 4.2.1., this sub-section therefore 
uses a variant of the principal-agent approach to deduce ‘bureaucratic pressure’ as the first independent 
variable that determines the choice of a bilateral regulatory cooperation strategy. 
In order to deduce the intra-organisational patterns that shape the strategy formation of regulators, this 
sub-section in a first step specifies the actor-specific preferences of regulators based on insights from 
previous literature. In line with the approach of this book to follow the integrated rational-choice-
constructivist approach initiated by previous authors, it takes into consideration both the material interest 
of regulators and a deduction of their preferences from the institutional context in which they are 
embedded. Reflecting institutionalist literature, it identifies the institutions which shape and constrain 
the preferences of regulators. For this purpose, it distinguishes the influence of ‘regulatory authority 
structures’ and ‘regulatory principles’ on the preferences of regulators. It shows how the introduction of 
sociological-constructivist elements in accordance with the actor-centred institutionalism and the New 
Interdependence Approach helps refine regulator preferences according to a rational-choice, materialist 
understanding.  
In a second step, it deduces the ‘policy preferences’ of domestic central-level regulators on bilateral 
regulatory cooperation. Policy preferences with regard to regulatory cooperation are differentiated into 
a support for cooperation, called ‘regulatory cooperation’, and a rejection of cooperation, called 
‘regulatory competition’.  
In a third step, it introduces and distinguishes the policy preferences of different sub-actors within a 
regulatory organisation and entity. To this purpose, this sub-section follows previous literature in 
distinguishing different sub-actors within a regulator, i.e. technical regulatory officials, politically 
appointed regulatory leaders and non-technical bureaucratic actors. Based on their different sub-actor-
specific preferences on uncertainty, it deduces different policy preferences of these sub-actors on 
bilateral regulatory cooperation. From the differentiation of the policy preferences of the different sub-
actors within a regulatory entity it deduces the relevance of bureaucratic pressure and its influence on 
the formation of a bilateral regulatory cooperation strategy.   
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Actor-specific preferences 
   
From a rational-choice perspective, authors argue that the fixed, underlying material interest of 
regulators is power (Wilson, 1989; Peters, 1995). To protect and possibly enhance their power, 
regulators seek to protect their autonomy (Wilson, 1989; Peters, 1995; see also Thatcher, 2011; 
Groenleer, 2014; Bach, de Francesco, Maggetti & Ruffing, 2016). Autonomy ensures that no other 
actors can erode the power of the regulator. Intervention of other actors, e.g. political ‘principals’ such 
as legislators or societal actors, curtails the autonomy of actors. The space in which regulators can act 
autonomously, i.e. the “relatively undisputed jurisdiction over specific tasks and ways of doing them”, 
is called their ‘turf’ (Wilson, 1989: 183). To protect or enhance their autonomy, it can be deduced that 
regulators therefore prefer avoiding intervention by other actors. ‘Turf’ and autonomy protection can 
thus be deduced as the preference of a regulator (Heims, 2016: 3; Dunleavy, 1991).  
From a sociological perspective, the normative and cognitive orientations of a regulator are derived from 
its identity and the beliefs they hold. The identity of a regulator is shaped by its mission, also called its 
‘mandate’. Ideas, shared economic and non-economic beliefs and cognitive frameworks guide the choice 
among alternative policy choices (Blyth, 2002: 11). A regulator prefers to behave in a way which does 
not conflict with the cognitive orientations adopted through ideas as well as its mission. Prevailing ideas 
and the identity of a regulator thus influence what it constitutes ‘legitimate’ behaviour. Obtaining 
legitimacy is thus also a preference of a regulator.   
As has been argued in chapter 4.2.1., these sociological elements do not represent an alternative 
specification of individual preferences, but can be incorporated into the rational-choice institutionalist 
specification25. Institutionalist accounts incorporating sociological elements into a rational-choice 
framework emphasise that the actor-specific preference of an actor, i.e. its most preferred outcome 
among alternative choices, is shaped by evaluations which choice reflects rational behaviour. These 
evaluations are shaped by the institutions in which an actor is embedded. domestic institutions are thus 
constitutive to the actor-specific preferences of regulators (Keohane, 2009; Katzenstein, 2009; Farrell 
& Finnemore, 2009). Incorporating these sociological elements into a rational-choice logic, it follows 
that regulators use institutionalised cognitive frameworks to derive and approximate rational behaviour. 
Accordingly, the pursuit of legitimacy and action in accordance with their mandate constitute rational 
behaviour for an actor. If other actors have concerns about the legitimacy of the choices pursued by the 
actor in question, they may choose to intervene and restrict the autonomy of that actor. Autonomy 
restrictions cannot only be one-time measures, but can also be made permanent. Regulators often have 
an understanding they know best how a specific task should be carried out (Heims, 2016). As they 
defend their mandate in their jurisdiction, they ensure political support (Bach et al., 2016: 15). Different 
                                                     
25 For a detailed discussion why and how sociological-constructivist elements can be incorporated into a rational-
choice framework see chapter 4.2.1.   
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regulators, however, have different mandates that shape their identity, implying that e.g. an 
environmental regulator considers different policy choices as ‘legitimate’ than a trade regulator. This 
point will be reconsidered in the discussion of the formation of collective preferences below. Here it can 
be maintained that regulators prefer to pursue ‘legitimate’ policies to protect their autonomy and turf.  
This raises the question which institutions shape and constitute the preferences of regulators. To deduce 
an answer, recall the definition of ‘institutions’ by Hall and Taylor (1996) as “the formal and informal 
rules, norms, precedents, and organizational factors that structure political behaviour” (Hall & Taylor, 
1996: 5). This definition has two elements: organisational factors on the one and norms and precedents 
on the other hand. Existing institutionalist accounts have used this definition to derive the content of 
policy preferences from policy legacies and formal political institutions (Lieberman, 2002).  
To deduce the institutions that shape and constitute the preferences of a regulator, it is necessary to adapt 
the distinction between policy legacies and formal institutions to regulatory policy-making. Essentially, 
this distinction can be translated into a differentiation between ‘regulatory principles’ and ‘regulatory 
authority structures’. ‘Regulatory principles’ reflect what previous accounts have referred to as ‘policy 
legacies’ (Lieberman, 2002) or ‘regulatory approaches’ (Vogel, 2003). These comprise the encoded 
norms which actors are required to follow when they adopt decisions. Regulatory principles reflect prior 
social and economic ideas, but are institutions as they are formally encoded by legislators in a 
jurisdiction’s rules and regulations or informally encoded in regulatory practices across an extended 
period of time. Besides, encoded norms create actors which ensure their implementation and further 
their application. Regulatory principles shape the preferences of regulators because they guide their 
understanding which decisions constitute legitimate behaviour. Regulators therefore seek to maintain 
and protect regulatory principles to pursue legitimate policies and avoid intervention and opposition to 
their decision-making by other actors including legislators or societal actors. Examples of regulatory 
principles in the EU are the precautionary principle or the polluter-pays principle.  
Regulatory principles and policy legacies are shaped by policy paradigms, but should not be confused 
with them. ‘Policy paradigms’ are “a framework of ideas and standards that specifies not only the goals 
of policy and kind of instruments that can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems 
they are meant to be addressing” (Hall, 1993: 279). They legitimise existing institutions or policies or 
challenge them and guide the evaluation of policy legacies. Policy legacies, in turn, are formal rules 
guiding the interaction of actors in response to a policy problem. They reflect policy paradigms, i.e. the 
ideational frameworks, which have shaped the adoption of policies in the past, but in addition enact 
specific actors to support them. Changes to policy paradigms follow an ideational logic, result from 
learning processes or the emergence of cognitive conflicts particularly in periods of uncertainty. 
Changes to policy legacies require a change in rules and norms in accordance with formal decision-
making rules.  
Explaining bilateral regulatory cooperation strategies 
90 
 
‘Regulatory authority structures’ reflect formal political institutions. The latter describe the rules and 
structures determining the role and participation of actors in adopting and implementing a decision 
(Scharpf, 1997). They establish voting and veto rights to certain actors and determine which actors can 
participate to which extent in decision-making. Regulatory authority structures thus describe the 
allocation of competences to and the structures determining the aggregation of interests in a jurisdiction. 
The allocation of competences thereby reflects the delegation of regulatory functions studied by 
principal-agent literature (Zimmermann & Dür, 2007; Damro, 2007; Pollack, 2005).  
Two dimensions of the allocation of competences can be differentiated: the vertical and horizontal 
allocation of competences. The vertical dimension refers to allocation of competences between the 
federal and the sub-federal level26. Not all competences are allocated at the federal level because the 
central level may lack the power, resources and the capacity to adopt or implement decisions. The 
horizontal dimension, in turn, refers to the allocation of competences between different state and private 
actors27.  
Regulatory principles and regulatory authority structures apply to both regulatory policies and 
implementation procedures (for the distinction between regulatory policies and implementation 
procedures see chapter 3.1.3).  For analytical purposes, the regulatory principles and regulatory authority 
structures shaping regulatory policies are arguably more important, though. First, implementation 
procedures are designed in accordance with regulatory policies. Therefore, implementation procedures 
commonly follow similar regulatory principles as regulatory policies (at least they do not follow 
regulatory principles that substantially conflict with overarching regulatory policies). Second, control 
over implementation procedures is less important for the material interest of regulators to protect their 
turf and autonomy than control over regulatory policies. This reflects the argument made above that 
implementation procedures are designed in accordance with regulatory policies. Moreover, regulators 
frequently delegate the conduct of implementation procedures to lower-level authorities which helps 
reinforce the argument that implementation procedures matter less for the definition of the material 
interest of a regulator than regulatory policies (see the empirical chapters of this book for examples of 
this delegation). Third, implementation procedures are likely less intensively monitored by citizens and 
societal actors and thus less relevant for the preference of regulators to safeguard their legitimacy than 
regulatory policies. 
This is not to argue that regulatory authority structures and regulatory principles shaping implementation 
procedures are irrelevant. Due to the lower salience of implementation procedures relative to regulatory 
policies, implementation procedure principles are usually established and institutionalised under the 
                                                     
26 This is tantamount to the distinction of EU governance mechanisms made by Lavenex (2014), distinguishing if 
decisions are made by the EU as a unitary actor or whether EU-level and national administrative representatives 
act cooperatively in network forms of governance.  
27 The division of competences between state and private actors and reasons for the emergence of private regulation 
are discussed by Büthe and Mattli (2011).   
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influence of other societal actors than regulatory policies28. Regulatory principles underlying 
implementation procedures can therefore differ from the regulatory principles underlying regulatory 
policies. Moreover, implementation procedures are relevant to the power and autonomy of regulators if 
changes in the responsibility for implementation threaten the effective conduct of implementation 
procedures. To reduce analytical complexity, however, implementation procedures shall be considered 
less relevant for the autonomy and legitimacy preferences of regulators than regulatory policies.  
To briefly conclude, the actor-specific preference of regulators is specified by this book as the protection 
and enhancement of their turf or autonomy and the protection and enhancement of their legitimacy. The 
‘content’ of regulators’ turf and legitimacy is shaped and constituted by regulatory institutions, which 
can be divided into regulatory authority structures, i.e. formal institutions, and regulatory principles, i.e. 
institutionalised norms and policy legacies. Regulatory authority structures and regulatory principles 
shape regulator preferences with regard to both regulatory policies and implementation procedures 
although for analytical simplicity their influence is assumed to be greater regarding regulatory policies.                
 
Policy preferences 
 
The next paragraphs specify the policy preferences of a domestic central-level regulator with regard to 
(bilateral) regulatory cooperation. Policy preferences with regard to regulatory cooperation can be 
conceptualised as the support for cooperation, which shall be called ‘regulatory cooperation’29, and the 
rejection of cooperation, which shall be referred to as ‘regulatory competition’30. Based on the 
specification above, the policy preference of a regulator on regulatory cooperation can be deduced from 
the anticipated effects of cooperation on its turf and legitimacy and thus on its autonomy. Insights from 
previous literature imply that regulators should see cooperation with other regulators as a potential 
impediment to their turf (Bach et al., 2016: 10; Heims, 2014; Wilson, 1989). Regulatory cooperation 
might lead to “turf battles” (Wilson, 1989: 188). As a domestic regulator cooperates with a foreign 
regulator, the latter may seek to expand its power at the expense of the power of the domestic regulator. 
Moreover, if the domestic regulator allows cooperation through coordination with a foreign regulator, 
rival domestic regulators from sub-central levels might also seek to enhance their power at the expense 
                                                     
28 This reasoning builds on the conclusion of e.g. Klüver (2012) that NGOs are likely to exert a stronger influence 
on decision-making than business actors if issue salience is high.  
29 The policy preference in support of ‘regulatory cooperation’ entails the choice of a strategy among the potential 
strategies delineated in chapter 3.3.2.   
30 For an explanation why the preference for a rejection of cooperation is called ‘regulatory competition’ see the 
delineation of strategies in chapter 3.2.  
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of the domestic regulator. As a result, regulators should not prefer regulatory cooperation as it infringes 
upon their autonomy and reduces their turf31.  
Likewise, if a regulator needs to coordinate and cooperate with a foreign regulator, its ability to pursue 
‘legitimate’ policies may be impeded. Cooperation with a foreign regulator entails ‘coordination costs’ 
and distracts resources from the pursuit of its original mandate. Based on his empirical work, Pollack 
(2005: 911-912) introduces the argument that regulators see cooperation with foreign regulators as a 
distraction from their core regulatory mandate. Regulators have limited resources and often already 
suffer from overload in the absence of regulatory cooperation. As cooperation entails coordination costs, 
they prefer to not engage in cooperation to prevent an increase in their burden. Taking up this argument, 
it follows that a regulator should not prefer regulatory cooperation because it leads to an increase in its 
burden and possibly negatively affects its legitimacy. Therefore, it can be deduced that the domestic 
central-level regulator prefers ‘regulatory competition’.    
At the same time, authors have also proposed and discussed the flip-side of the argument above. This 
states that regulatory cooperation enhances the autonomy of regulators (Peters, 1998; Heims, 2016: 4). 
Regulatory cooperation strengthens the role of domestic regulators in domestic policy-making and 
implementation procedures (Bach et al., 2016). As they face new ‘actor constellations’, regulators such 
as Commission officials enhance their autonomy from actors with potentially conflicting interests and 
preferences (Ruffing, 2015). These can be both societal actors (Maggetti, 2012) and domestic political 
actors (Maggetti, 2014; Bach & Ruffing, 2013; Egeberg & Trondal, 2009). From this perspective, 
regulatory cooperation supports and reinforces the power of the domestic central-level regulator. 
Moreover, as officials of the domestic regulator share resources with foreign regulator officials, they 
can draw on their experiences and enhance the ‘quality’ of their decision, thus enhancing the legitimacy 
of their decisions. Following this argument, the domestic regulator interested in power prefers 
‘regulatory cooperation’ because it enhances its autonomy and legitimacy. 
In sum, actors’ policy preferences reflect their resource constraints. In assessing potential benefits and 
costs of a policy choice, regulators weigh the benefits of this choice against its costs. Costs arise as 
regulators, like all actors, have limited resources, i.e. time, organisational and administrative resources. 
Devoting resources to regulatory cooperation may require regulators to reduce resource input to 
domestic regulatory activities. Benefits to autonomy and legitimacy arising from regulatory cooperation 
thus contrast possible costs in terms of autonomy and legitimacy resulting from the lower availability 
of resources for domestic regulatory activities. The interview evidence cited by Pollack (2005: 912) and 
Shaffer (2003: 325) shows that material constraints, the perceived burden for regulators arising from 
                                                     
31 A largely shared view within the existing literature holds that regulators and government officials are reluctant 
to work with others because they seek to protect their autonomy and bureaucratic practices (Bardach, 1996, 1998; 
Wilson, 1989). The ‘turf protection’ argument has been employed as a crucial factor explaining the preferences of 
government and government agency officials on coordination with other bureaucratic actors (Peters, 1998; for a 
literature review see McGuire & Agranoff, 2011).  
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regulatory cooperation and regulatory overload make regulators reluctant to engage in regulatory 
cooperation substantiates this point. 
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Bureaucratic pressure: Policy preferences of different sub-actors 
   
As a next step, the policy preferences of different ‘sub-actors’ within a collective actor should be 
examined more closely. A variant of the principal-agent approach (importantly Elsig & Dupont, 2012) 
explains variation in decision-making of ‘agents’ within organisations with the relative influence and 
access of different ‘agents’ to decision-making32. It divides ‘agents’ into technical regulatory officials, 
politically appointed regulatory leaders and non-technical bureaucratic actors. The capability of an 
‘agent’ or ‘sub-actor’ to pursue and realise a preference is argued to depend on the degree of access to 
decision-making (Elsig & Dupont, 2012). Pollack (2005) states that technical regulatory officials usually 
have discretion in shaping the strategy of a regulator on regulatory cooperation33. This discretion 
changes, however, if regulatory leaders and non-technical bureaucratic actors seek access to decision-
making and thus constrain the discretion of technical regulatory officials.  In chapter 4.2.1., this book 
has argued that the preferences of different sub-actors are shaped by their structural embeddedness in 
specific contexts and their identities. Their degree of uncertainty and their evaluation of the relationship 
between ends and means under the status quo shapes the influence of (new) ideas on their behaviour and 
their conception of rational behaviour. From this reasoning it follows that the assessment of costs and 
benefits of regulatory cooperation regarding the legitimacy and autonomy of the regulator should vary 
based on the structural embeddedness of a regulatory sub-actor and its identities.  
Likewise, based on these criteria, the policy preferences of different ‘agents’ or sub-actors on regulatory 
cooperation can be deduced. Regulatory leaders are likely to have a weaker preference in favour of 
maintaining the status quo because of their relatively lower structural embeddedness in a regulatory 
organisation relative to technical regulatory officials. Moreover, due to their identity as political actors, 
they are likely to be consider new ideas more frequently than technical regulatory officials. As a result, 
regulatory leaders should be more likely to consider rule overlap as an opportunity structure to enhance 
the autonomy and legitimacy of a regulator than technical regulatory officials. 
Similarly, other non-technical bureaucratic actors are likely to assess the benefits of regulatory 
cooperation as higher than the costs. On the one hand, they are structurally less embedded in a specific 
technical regulatory policy-making process than technical regulatory officials. To some extent, this 
lowers the influence of regulatory principles and regulatory authority structures on their preferences34. 
On the other hand, non-technical bureaucratic actors have a different identity than technical regulatory 
                                                     
32 This explanation is notwithstanding and thus complementary to most principal-agent explanations (e.g. 
Conceicao-Heldt, 2014; Dür & Elsig, 2011) that account for variation in decision-making with differences in the 
discretion of agents relative to oversight and intervention by principals.    
33 Damro (2006) suggests support for this statement in his examination of the Commission’s choice of venues for 
regulatory cooperation on competition policy.  
34 However, even if the influence is marginally smaller, this does not mean that the influence of regulatory 
institutions of a jurisdiction on their preference is zero.   
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officials because they have a different mandate. Regulatory cooperation may facilitate the attainment of 
the objective formulated by the mandate. As a result, non-technical bureaucratic actors are likely to 
assess the benefits of regulatory cooperation as higher than the costs.  
Technical regulatory officials, in turn, are structurally deeply embedded in a regulatory institution. The 
assessment of the legitimacy of their behaviour strongly depends on meeting the regulatory objectives 
defined in their mandate. Given their limited administrative resources to reach these regulatory 
objectives, technical regulatory officials are likely to assess the costs of regulatory cooperation as higher 
than regulatory leaders and non-technical bureaucratic actors. Consequently, they should be more likely 
to prefer a maintenance of the status quo, i.e. regulatory competition, than regulatory leaders and non-
technical bureaucratic actors.  
This reasoning now allows the specification of the first independent variable, ‘bureaucratic pressure’. 
Since technical regulatory officials usually have discretion, bureaucratic pressure is present if regulatory 
leaders and non-technical bureaucratic actors are involved in decision-making. Likewise, if regulatory 
leaders and non-technical bureaucratic actors do not seek access to decision-making, bureaucratic 
pressure is absent. Given the likely different assessment of these sub-actors or ‘agents’ of the costs and 
benefits of regulatory cooperation regarding the autonomy and legitimacy of a regulator, bureaucratic 
pressure should have an influence on the choice of a regulatory cooperation strategy. As regulatory 
leaders and non-technical actors are likely to have a stronger policy preference in favour of regulatory 
cooperation, the presence of bureaucratic pressure should constrain technical regulatory officials to 
choose a cooperation strategy. The absence of bureaucratic pressure, in turn, should allow officials to 
pursue regulatory competition. Hypothesis 1 can therefore be formulated as follows:  
H1a: The presence of bureaucratic pressure leads regulators to choose ‘regulatory alignment’, 
‘equivalence’, ‘alignment of implementation procedures’ or ‘information exchange’. 
H1b: The absence of bureaucratic pressure leads regulators to pursue regulatory competition.  
 
4.3.2. Regulatory compatibilities  
 
This sub-section introduces the second independent variable of this book, based on the ‘actor 
constellations’ building block of the Inter-relational Institutionalism, i.e. the ‘regulatory compatibilities’ 
between the domestic and the foreign jurisdiction. Following the deduction of preference-constituting 
‘regulatory institutions’ as ‘regulatory authority structures’ and ‘regulatory principles’, it divides the 
independent variable ‘regulatory compatibilities’ into ‘compatible regulatory authority structures’ and 
‘compatible regulatory principles’. Based on the constellations of ‘regulatory compatibilities’ between 
the domestic and the foreign jurisdiction on an issue, it deduces four hypotheses that combine variation 
in regulatory compatibilities to the outcomes on the dependent variable delineated in chapter 3.3.  
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It is in this sub-section that the Inter-relational Institutionalism differs substantially from the 
conventional actor-centred institutionalism due to the incorporation of the interdependence assumptions 
from the New Interdependence Approach. To emphasise this distinction, this sub-section first reiterates 
the understanding of actor constellations of the Inter-relational Institutionalism. It then presents possible 
combinations of regulatory authority structures and regulatory principles between the domestic and the 
foreign jurisdiction. Based on these combinations, it then deduces four hypotheses that connect 
combinations of regulatory compatibilities to the constraints on the choice of a regulatory cooperation 
strategy.    
Chapter 4.2.2. has argued that the compatibility of domestic and foreign incentive structures shapes the 
conflictiveness of domestic actor constellations and thus determines the ability of actors to cooperate 
within their discretionary authority. ‘Compatibility’ has been defined as the absence of conflicting 
incentive structures in regulatory institutions. It has argued that cooperation under conflicting incentive 
structures constituted by domestic and foreign institutions would set incentives which conflict with the 
preferences of the ‘main’ domestic actor that are derived from domestic incentive structures. If the 
domestic main actor sought to engage in cooperation, other domestic actors would mobilise and seek to 
intervene, increasing uncertainty. Chapter 4.2.2. has concluded that conflictual potential domestic actor 
constellations due to conflicting incentive structures between the domestic and foreign jurisdiction lead 
the main domestic actor not to pursue cooperation. Compatibility can be conceived with regard to both 
regulatory authority structures and regulatory principles. The following paragraphs will discuss possible 
combinations of regulatory compatibilities.  
To keep analytical complexity manageable, regulatory authority structures shall be conceived as 
compatible and incompatible. As defined above, compatibility denotes the absence of conflicting 
incentive structures. To derive expectations for the influence of the compatibility of regulatory authority 
structures on regulators’ formation of strategies, actor constellations under different constellations of 
domestic and foreign authority structures shall be examined. Chapter 4.3.1. has deduced that the 
preferences of regulators constituted by domestic regulatory authority structures are shaped by the 
horizontal and vertical distribution of regulatory authority, i.e. the division of regulatory authority 
between different levels of government and the division between state and private actors. Moreover, the 
Inter-relational Institutionalism shares the assumption of the New Interdependence Approach (see also 
Young, 2015a) that regulators at the central level are mostly likely to seek regulatory cooperation with 
regulators from other jurisdictions on issue areas in which they have regulatory authority themselves35. 
                                                     
35 This assumption does not exclude that regulators at the central level may intentionally engage in regulatory 
cooperation on issue areas on which they do not have regulatory authority yet in order to change domestic 
institutions. This case is studied by Zdenek and Müller (2016). The authors acknowledge, however, that their 
argument on the ability to use the ‘international’ level as an ‘exit from the domestic institutions’ relies on the 
shared perception of a crisis of domestic institutions among some societal actors and the legitimacy of a solution 
to the crisis of domestic institutions provided by an international organisation. While societal actors can be 
mobilised to advocate the domestic adoption of an international policy solution that subsequently offers them 
global market access, it is difficult to mobilise societal actors for domestic institutional change entailing the 
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It also shares the assumption of both ‘Open Economy Politics’ and the New Interdependence Approach 
that regulators (as well as societal actors) from the domestic central level mostly engage with regulators 
(and societal actors) from the foreign central level.    
If regulatory authority in the domestic jurisdiction is centralised – it shall be assumed to be so by 
definition for the purpose of this analytical framework, this leaves two options for the allocation of 
regulatory authority in the foreign jurisdiction. First, regulatory authority can be allocated to regulators 
(or government actors) at the central level. Second, regulatory authority may be non-centralised. In the 
latter case, it may be shared between government actors at central- and sub-central levels. Besides, it 
may be shared with or entirely allocated to private actors. This is the case if the foreign regulator does 
not consider an issue sufficiently salient to have it regulated by state actors.  
If regulatory authority in the foreign jurisdiction is non-centralised, a foreign regulator with which the 
domestic regulator interacts is likely to be reluctant to adopt or recognise policies because it faces 
opposition from regulators at sub-central levels who act as veto players. If the domestic and foreign 
regulator agreed to cooperate, the foreign regulator would be unable to commit to an implementation of 
the cooperation by both the central and the sub-central regulators. At the same time, the foreign regulator 
would be unwilling to mobilise resource unless ‘its’ institutions are perceived to be in crisis (for this 
argument see Thelen, 2004). Regulatory cooperation with the foreign regulator in this constellation 
would thus asymmetrically expand the geographical scope of domestic and foreign regulations. The 
acceptance of this asymmetry and the acknowledgement of regulatory authority to sub-central foreign 
regulators by the central domestic regulator would then provide sub-central regulators with an incentive 
to demand greater authority over the setting of rules themselves. This would give rise to a conflictual 
domestic actor constellation.  
Likewise, if in the foreign jurisdiction regulatory authority is delegated to private actors, the agreement 
of the domestic regulator to adopt or accept the regulations of the foreign jurisdiction developed by 
private actors would provide an incentive for domestic private actors, which are societal actors, to 
demand a regulation by private actors in the domestic jurisdiction as well. The foreign regulator would 
unlikely change the distribution of authority in its jurisdiction as the concession of authority to private 
actors indicates that it does not consider the issue as sufficiently salient to merit an allocation of limited 
regulatory resources. The mobilisation of domestic societal actors would again give rise to a conflictual 
domestic actor constellation.  
The emergence of a conflictual domestic actor constellation would, however, reduce and undermine the 
‘turf’ of the domestic regulator. In this constellation, the domestic regulator cannot enhance its autonomy 
                                                     
adoption of a foreign solution due to the competitive disadvantage this would create for them with regard to foreign 
competitors (cf. Newman & Farrell, 2014: 27; Büthe & Mattli, 2011). To advocate institutional change, central-
level regulators then rely on the perception of institutional change. Both conditions restrict the applicability of the 
argument of Zdenek and Müller (2016) to bilateral regulatory cooperation.  
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through regulatory cooperation. From the preference function of the domestic regulator outlined in 
chapter 4.3.1. it thus follows that in this constellation it cannot use the overlap of jurisdictions as an 
opportunity structure. A reduction of autonomy opposes the preferences of the domestic regulator, 
making the status quo preferable to an outcome under regulatory cooperation.  
If regulatory authority is allocated at the central level in both the domestic and foreign jurisdiction, in 
turn, both domestic and foreign regulators share a perception of salience and similar veto players on an 
issue.  This makes their incentive structures comparable. From the definition above it follows that 
regulatory authority structures are also compatible. Regulatory cooperation does thus not undermine the 
autonomy of the domestic regulator. Instead, as the domestic regulator cooperates with a foreign 
regulator with whom it shares an overlapping jurisdiction, the resolution of regulatory conflict reduces 
the scope for intervention by other actors. If the domestic and the foreign regulator resolve regulatory 
conflict, they reduce the possibility for other domestic regulators to introduce alternative policies. At 
the same time, they reduce the possibility for societal actors to engage in arbitrage between domestic 
and foreign regulations. Moreover, they reduce the possibility for societal actors to lobby regulators in 
either jurisdiction for a lowering of the regulatory burden in order to increase the competitiveness of 
domestic firms. It follows from the theoretical argument laid down above that if regulatory authority is 
allocated at the central level in both the domestic and the foreign jurisdiction, regulators can use 
regulatory cooperation to enhance their autonomy in line with their preferences.  
The distribution of regulatory authority structures can now be combined with the adherence to regulatory 
principles, reflecting the integration of structure and substance outlined in chapter 4.1.1. To reduce 
analytical complexity, regulatory principles shall also be operationalised dichotomously as ‘compatible’ 
and ‘incompatible’. From the definition of compatibility above it follows that regulatory principles are 
compatible if they do not entail conflicting incentive structures. From the definition of regulatory 
principles, in turn, it follows that incentive structures are not conflicting if they do not produce cognitive 
conflict that leads regulators to approximate rational behaviour differently. Incentive structures are 
conflicting if regulatory principles encoded in past policies establish a guideline for legitimate behaviour 
which rules out the full compliance with an alternative guideline36.  
This now allows making statements about the choices of regulators that seek to behave rationally. If 
regulatory principles are incompatible, regulators in the domestic and foreign jurisdictions approximate 
rational behaviour differently. As a consequence, they have different understandings of legitimate 
regulatory behaviour. If the domestic regulator adopts or accepts a regulation of the foreign regulator, it 
creates a cognitive conflict. The alternative acceptance or the deviation from the domestically 
institutionalised regulatory principles would establish the possibility to regulate an issue or to launch a 
                                                     
36 To illustrate this point through an example, the principle to follow the precautionary principle in the EU and to 
take precautionary measures in case available scientific evidence is inconclusive (e.g. Vogel, 2003) conflicts with 
a principle to only adopt measures if these can be positively supported by scientific evidence.  
 
Explaining bilateral regulatory cooperation strategies 
99 
 
product for firms which is not allowed under domestic regulatory principle. This would undermine the 
subjectively defined legitimacy of the behaviour of the domestic regulator. In line with the preferences 
deduced in 4.3.1., the domestic regulator therefore expects that other actors, government officials or 
societal actors will intervene as a response to the regulator’s choice and thus curtail its autonomy. To 
avoid this political intervention, the domestic regulator should thus not cooperate with the foreign 
regulator if regulatory principles on an issue are incompatible. 
If regulatory principles are compatible, the domestic and foreign regulator share understandings of 
legitimacy and approximate rational behaviour in a similar way. If they adopt or recognise mutual 
decisions, they can therefore confirm to each other that their regulations are legitimate responses to an 
issue. The confirmation of the legitimacy by a regulator with whom the domestic regulator shares 
understandings of legitimacy thus enhances the subjectively defined legitimacy of its choices. As the 
foreign jurisdiction adopts or accepts the regulatory choices of the domestic regulator, it can interpret 
the geographical expansion of its choices as evidence that their choices represent a legitimate response. 
At the same time, this contributes to insulate the domestic regulator against demands from other 
regulators or societal actors and enhances its autonomy. Cooperation under compatible regulatory 
principles thus enhances the legitimacy as well as the autonomy of the domestic regulator and is in line 
with her preferences deduced in chapter 4.3.1.  
In a next step, the actor constellations for different compatibility constellations of regulatory authority 
structures and regulatory principles need to be applied to and connected with the regulatory cooperation 
strategies defined in the typology in chapter 3.3. Four possible constellations are theoretically 
conceivable.  
First, if both regulatory authority structures and regulatory principles between the domestic and the 
foreign jurisdiction are compatible, regulatory cooperation can enhance the autonomy and the legitimacy 
of the domestic regulator. The domestic regulator should therefore seek to make regulatory cooperation 
as deep and comprehensive as possible. This implies that it should seek to cooperate with the foreign 
regulator on policies at high depth. Due to domestic institutional restrictions, notably the binding 
adoption of legislation by the legislator, the domestic regulator cannot adopt legislation without the 
consent of the legislator. However, it can propose to the legislator to harmonise legislations. To avoid 
political intervention, the domestic regulator will concentrate on regulatory approximation through the 
formulation and adoption of technical regulations and standards under its discretionary authority. 
Besides, the domestic regulator can seek to elaborate draft structures for the adoption of future regulation 
together with the foreign regulator with a view to shape the space for political intervention by the 
legislator. For this reason, if both regulatory authority structures and regulatory principles are 
compatible, the domestic regulator should pursue a strategy of ‘regulatory alignment’:  
H2a: If both regulatory authority structures and regulatory principles are compatible between the 
foreign and domestic jurisdiction, the domestic regulator chooses a strategy of ‘regulatory alignment’. 
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Second, if regulatory authority structures are compatible, but regulatory principles are incompatible, the 
compatibility of regulatory authority structures suggests that regulatory cooperation can enhance the 
autonomy of the domestic regulator. As regulatory authority lies with the central-level regulator in both 
the domestic and the foreign jurisdiction, the domestic regulator can strive to cooperate over policies to 
enhance its autonomy. However, as the regulatory principles shaping the behaviour of the domestic and 
the foreign regulator are incompatible, the domestic regulator simultaneously seeks to avoid adopting 
policies of the foreign regulator to protect its legitimacy at the status quo level. This suggests that the 
domestic regulator seeks to avoid changes to domestic regulations.  
Nonetheless, the domestic regulator can enhance its legitimacy by establishing regulatory certainty and 
creating new market access opportunities to certain societal actors, notably firms with transnational 
activities. As regulations shall not be changed through regulatory cooperation, cooperation can only 
consist in recognising the ‘equivalence’ of specific regulations. To ensure that this increase in 
subjectively defined legitimacy towards transnational firms does not come at the expense of other 
societal actors, the domestic regulator will conduct tests and assessments to show that existing domestic 
regulatory principles are not undermined as a consequence of regulatory cooperation. This is likely to 
be possible for only very specific regulations, restricting the depth of regulatory cooperation the 
domestic regulator seeks to pursue. If regulatory authority structures are compatible, but regulatory 
principles are incompatible, the domestic regulator should thus pursue a strategy of ‘equivalence’.  
H2b: If regulatory authority structures are compatible, but regulatory principles are incompatible 
between the foreign and domestic jurisdiction, the domestic regulator chooses a strategy of 
‘equivalence’.  
Third, if regulatory authority structures are compatible, but regulatory principles are incompatible, the 
domestic regulator can seek regulatory cooperation to enhance its legitimacy. The incompatibility of 
regulatory authority structures suggests that the domestic regulator should not seek to cooperate on 
regulations to protect its autonomy. According to the theoretical considerations above, the domestic 
regulator is thus restricted to cooperate on implementation procedures to enhance its legitimacy (for a 
clarification of cooperation on regulations and implementation procedures see chapter 3.1.3). The 
subjectively defined legitimacy of the domestic regulator increases as the implementation procedures 
institutionalised domestically are also recognised in the foreign jurisdiction and considered as an 
adequate method to ascertain the achievement of a regulatory objective. Moreover, the legitimacy of the 
domestic regulator increases as cooperation on implementation procedures resolves conflicts and 
divergences on implementation procedures. Cooperation then facilitates trade flows, with benefits 
accruing in particular to firms with transnational operations. Since regulatory principles underlying 
regulatory principles are compatible, the domestic regulator can expect that the foreign regulator pursues 
similar objectives with regard to implementation procedures to define its own legitimacy. This results 
from the argument made in chapter 4.3.1. that implementation procedures are usually designed in 
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accordance with the principles underlying regulatory policies. In line with the argument laid down in 
chapter 4.3.1., the domestic regulator verifies, however, if foreign implementation procedure principles 
are compatible implementation procedure principles. If implementation procedure principles were to 
conflict, regulatory cooperation would lead to legitimacy losses and regulatory cooperation would be 
against the preference of the regulator.  
Yet, regulatory cooperation in this constellation still requires that the domestic regulator overcomes 
incompatible regulatory authority structures. This is more likely for implementation procedures than for 
regulatory policies. As noted in chapter 3.1.3., implementation procedures are in most jurisdictions 
subject to networks of administrative authorities due to resource constraints of regulators. Besides, 
because of their lower salience they are subject to political intervention only in times of a crisis of 
existing implementation procedures. Even in the case that implementation procedures are allocated to 
sub-central administrative authorities, cooperation on implementation procedures is thus unlikely to lead 
to domestic political intervention and a loss of autonomy. The domestic regulator might, however, 
demand reassurances from the foreign regulator and likewise offer reassurances to the foreign regulator 
that cooperation on implementation procedures does not lead to a loss of autonomy. As a result, if 
regulatory authority structures are incompatible, but regulatory principles are compatible, the domestic 
regulator should pursue a strategy of ‘alignment of implementation procedures’.  
H2c: If regulatory authority structures are compatible, but regulatory principles are incompatible 
between the foreign and domestic jurisdiction, the domestic regulator chooses a strategy of ‘alignment 
of implementation procedures’.  
Fourth, if both regulatory authority structures and regulatory principles are incompatible, the domestic 
regulator can neither expect to enhance its autonomy or legitimacy through regulatory cooperation. 
Regulatory cooperation can only be an opportunity structure for the regulator to save administrative 
resources while protecting its autonomy and legitimacy. The domestic regulator can only seek to protect 
its autonomy and legitimacy through regulatory cooperation by avoiding future regulatory uncertainty, 
conflict or arbitrage. To save administrative resources, it can seek to shift administrative tasks to the 
foreign regulator and thereby concentrate its resources on making legitimate regulations. It follows from 
the categorisation proposed in chapter 3.3. that a strategy to save administrative resources is to exchange 
information and data with the foreign regulator, given that the foreign regulator supplies this information 
and data in the quality demanded by the domestic regulator. At the same time, ‘information exchange’ 
and data exchange also correspond to the policy preference of the domestic regulator to avoid future 
regulatory uncertainty. As a consequence, if both regulatory authority structures and regulatory 
principles are incompatible, the domestic regulator should pursue a strategy of ‘information exchange’. 
H2d: If both regulatory authority structures and regulatory principles are incompatible between the 
foreign and domestic jurisdiction, the domestic regulator chooses a strategy of ‘information exchange’. 
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To summarise, this sub-section has laid down the possible combinations of variation in the distribution 
of regulatory authority structures and the incorporation of regulatory principles in the domestic and 
foreign jurisdictions. Based on the presentation of possible combinations, it has identified the 
compatibilities between domestic and foreign regulatory authority structures and regulatory principles. 
In a last step, it has connected the combination of variation in the compatibility of regulatory authority 
structures and regulatory principles between the domestic and foreign jurisdiction to the bilateral 
regulatory cooperation strategies delineated in chapter 3.3. This has led to the formulation of four 
hypotheses that link variation in the independent variables ‘regulatory compatibilities’ to constraints in 
the choice among outcomes on the dependent variable ‘regulatory cooperation strategy’. Figure 6 
summarises these constraints of the domestic regulator on the choice of a bilateral regulatory cooperation 
strategy:     
Regulatory authority 
structures 
Regulatory principles 
Incompatible Compatible 
Incompatible Information exchange Equivalence 
Compatible 
Alignment of implementation 
procedures 
Regulatory alignment 
Figure 6: Summary of hypotheses 2a-2d 
 
 
4.3.3. Societal mobilisation  
 
Lastly, this sub-section lays down the causal mechanism that connects variation in the independent 
variables to outcomes on the dependent variable. In a first step, it proposes how bureaucratic pressure 
initiates the process of strategy formation. In a second step, it lays down how the regulator mobilises 
societal actors to ensure that the pursuit of regulatory cooperation is considered as legitimate. In a third 
step, it borrows from principal-agent literature to illustrate how the regulator gives preferential access 
to those actors that mobilise in line with maximum constraints on regulatory cooperation given by 
regulatory compatibilities.  
In line with hypothesis 1, strategy formation is initiated by bureaucratic pressure. Bureaucratic pressure 
arises if either a regulatory leader or a non-technical bureaucratic actor proposes to consider the 
engagement in regulatory cooperation. Bureaucratic pressure is thus likely to arise after the politically 
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appointed leadership in a regulatory body or a non-technical bureaucratic organisation changes37. 
Regulatory leaders or non-technical bureaucratic actors task regulatory officials to evaluate 
opportunities for regulatory cooperation with another jurisdiction. 
Recall that to deduce rational behaviour, regulators rely on intersubjective understandings translate their 
actor preferences into policy preferences (e.g. Woll, 2008). Therefore, they interact with other actors 
and gather information about their understandings of empirical phenomena. Upon the task by regulatory 
leaders or leaders of other non-bureaucratic actors, regulatory officials collect information about 
regulatory institutions in the foreign jurisdiction. In doing so, they coordinate their activities within their 
regulatory institution and other bureaucratic institutions. Moreover, they launch consultations with 
societal actors to obtain information about regulatory institutions in the foreign jurisdiction. Besides, 
they seek to obtain information about regulatory conflicts between the domestic and foreign jurisdiction 
that societal actors perceive as particularly disadvantageous. 
Actors then structure the information and intersubjective understandings of phenomena that they have 
gathered. Regulatory officials thus compare information gathered through the public consultations with 
their own information of the regulatory institutions of the foreign jurisdiction. This information is 
evaluated with regard to their objective to avoid a reduction of their turf and a reduction of their 
legitimacy. Regulatory officials then discard cooperation that they expect would trigger a negative actor 
constellation. Instead, they propose a strategy in line with their assessment of the implications of 
regulatory cooperation for their turf and their legitimacy.  
Regulatory officials then coordinate and consult with other domestic bureaucratic actors that can legally 
participate in the adoption of a regulatory cooperation strategy. Moreover, they mobilise societal actors 
that have participated in the public consultation in support of their strategy under the internal 
coordination. The principal-agent literature proposes that actors, i.e. regulatory officials, with a certain 
degree of autonomy can thereby rely on two main mechanisms: ‘managing permeability’ and ‘buffering’ 
(Hawkins & Jacoby, 2006). Regulatory officials have larger autonomy if the public consultation reveals 
that societal actors mobilise both in favour and against regulatory cooperation or only in favour of 
regulatory cooperation. If societal actors mobilise only against regulatory cooperation, the actor 
constellation becomes negative. This implies regulatory officials expect that the pursuit of regulatory 
cooperation reduces their legitimacy. Under contested mobilisation or a muted actor constellation, 
however, regulatory officials in coordination with regulatory leaders and other non-bureaucratic actors 
can be assumed to follow ‘managing permeability’ and ‘buffering’:  
                                                     
37 The decision of the regulatory leader or a non-technical bureaucratic actor to propose the engagement in 
regulatory cooperation reflects personal convictions as well as an openness to consider new ideas for the 
achievement of regulatory objectives. The latter also reflects a lower structural embeddedness of regulatory leaders 
and non-technical bureaucratic actors in a regulatory organisation (for this argument see chapter 4.2.1.).  
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Under ‘managing permeability’, an actor gives preference to some societal actors by “structuring public 
input and information-gathering in such a way as to favour outsiders with similar preferences” (Hawkins 
& Jacoby, 2006: 209). Under ‘buffering’, an actor interacts with societal actors which have similar 
preferences as itself. This allows them to buffer against criticism in the future and create focal points for 
other actors. If opposition to the actor’s preference arises, it can build on the support of ad-hoc coalitions 
of societal actors (Elsig & Dupont, 2012: 891)38. 
The mobilisation of societal resources helps regulatory officials and regulatory leaders to raise the 
domestic salience of regulatory cooperation and create domestic support, notably. among legislators, for 
regulatory cooperation (for the underlying theoretical argument see Elsig & Dupont, 2012; Posner, 
2010). Moreover, if societal actors mobilise in favour of regulatory cooperation that corresponds to the 
strategy already proposed by regulatory officials during the internal coordination, regulatory officials 
can feel ensured that the pursuit of regulatory cooperation enhances their legitimacy towards societal 
actors. For this reason, it can be assumed that under ‘managing permeability’ and ‘buffering’, regulatory 
officials and regulatory leaders give preferential access to societal actors, in particular if these are 
‘embedded’ in the corresponding jurisdiction (see Beyers & Kerremans, 2005).39  
If societal actors fail or refuse to mobilise in support of the strategy in line with regulatory 
compatibilities, regulatory officials become reluctant to insist on adopting this strategy for the pursuit 
of regulatory cooperation. Regulatory officials re-consult internally, with other bureaucratic actors and 
with societal actors to pursue a strategy that they expect will safeguard their legitimacy. Consequently, 
they propose a lower dimension or less deep regulatory cooperation strategy for which they can mobilise 
support by some domestic societal actors.  
In a last step, regulatory officials send the proposed strategy to the regulatory leaders. The latter formally 
adopt the proposed regulatory cooperation strategy. A third hypothesis can thus be formulated:  
H3: If regulatory leaders and regulatory officials succeed to mobilise societal actors in support of the 
strategy that is in line with regulatory compatibilities, regulators will pursue a strategy in line with 
regulatory compatibilities.  
  
                                                     
38 Note that this ‘bureaucratic’ explanation of changes in regulator behaviour differs from the argument of 
functionalist literature that an external ‘penalty default mechanism’ is necessary to change the status quo and push 
officials towards cooperation (Zeitlin, 2015).   
39 Besides, regulatory officials mobilise societal actors to lobby the foreign regulator in favour of agreeing to 
engage in regulatory cooperation. Regulatory officials should thus mobilise societal actors to form alliances, 
coalitions and networks with societal actors in the foreign jurisdiction. The deliberate mobilisation of societal 
actors thus helps to build up argumentative pressure to shape the strategy of the foreign regulator. 
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The specification of the causal mechanism under hypothesis 3 also allows clarifying the relationship 
between the independent variables and the dependent variable ‘choice of a regulatory cooperation 
strategy’. The presence of bureaucratic pressure (IV1) initiates the process of strategy formation. In the 
absence of bureaucratic pressure, regulatory officials prefer to maintain regulatory competition. Once 
bureaucratic pressure has initiated the process of strategy formation, regulatory compatibilities (IV2) 
constrain the extent, i.e. the dimension and depth, to which regulatory officials consider engaging in 
regulatory cooperation. They thus also determine if regulatory officials take into consideration 
suggestions and demands by other actors. The distribution of regulatory compatibilities determines if 
regulatory officials pursue ‘information exchange’, an ‘alignment of implementation procedures’, 
‘equivalence’ or ‘regulatory alignment’. The mobilisation of societal actors, notably through ‘buffering’ 
and ‘managing permeability’ by regulatory officials, influences if suggestions and demands are included 
into a regulatory cooperation strategy and thus pursued or if they are discarded (IV3). Besides, the 
mobilisation of societal actors guides the search of regulatory officials for technical information on 
issues on which regulatory cooperation could be pursued. As ‘information exchange’ does not constrain 
the autonomy of regulators both with regard to regulatory policies and implementation procedures, 
supportive mobilisation of societal actors is not expected to be necessary for the choice and pursuit of 
‘information exchange’. Supportive mobilisation is, however, expected to be necessary for the choice 
of the other three strategies, given the information requirements and legitimacy preferences of regulatory 
officials.   
Figure 7 illustrates the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable 
graphically:  
 
Figure 7: Relationship between the variables 
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To sum up, this sub-section has deduced the independent variables which explain the presence of 
variation on the dependent variable of this study, ‘bilateral regulatory cooperation strategies’. It has 
deduced that the independent variable ‘bureaucratic pressure’ constrains the engagement in regulatory 
cooperation rather than the maintenance of regulatory competition. The independent variable ‘regulatory 
compatibilities’ constrains the ‘extent’ of regulatory cooperation, i.e. the depth and dimension of 
bilateral regulatory cooperation at which cooperation is envisaged. The independent variable ‘societal 
mobilisation’ constrains the adoption of the strategy in line with regulatory compatibilities. In the next 
step, the process shaping the choice of a regulatory cooperation strategy shall be operationalised to 
strategy formation in the European Commission in order to prepare the empirical analysis in chapter 6.   
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4.4. Operationalising the Inter-relational Institutionalism  
 
The Inter-relational Institutionalism proposes a theoretical explanation for the formation and choice of 
a bilateral regulatory cooperation strategy. For issues subject to EU-level regulation, the main regulator 
in the EU is the Commission. At the same time, an increasing number of authors approximate the 
Commission as the ‘executive’ or ‘government’ of the EU and observes a “normalisation of the 
Commission as the EU’s executive” (Wille, 2013; see also Shore, 2011, Egeberg, 2006; Franchino, 
2000)40. This section operationalises the Inter-relational Institutionalism with regard to the authority of 
the Commission in bilateral regulatory cooperation and its processes of strategy formation.  
A first sub-section (chapter 4.4.1.) describes the Commission’s authority in EU regulatory policy-
making relative to other EU institutions. A second sub-section (chapter 4.4.2.) looks at how the 
discretion of technical Commission DGs varies along the different regulatory cooperation strategies 
delineated in chapter 3.4. Both help understand to which extent the Commission can engage in bilateral 
regulatory cooperation without the support of other EU institutions. A third sub-section (chapter 4.4.3.) 
applies the independent variable ‘bureaucratic pressure’ to the Commission. It identifies the different 
regulatory sub-actors described in chapters 4.2.1., 4.3.2. and 4.3.4 and shows how Commissioners and 
other DGs can affect the behaviour of technical officials. A fourth sub-section (chapter 4.4.4.) applies 
the causal mechanism described in chapter 4.3.3 to decision-making within the Commission and lays 
down the process of strategy formation. This section will, however, not operationalise the second 
independent variable, ‘regulatory compatibilities’. This will be done at the start of each empirical chapter 
as regulatory authority structure and the adherence to regulatory principles in the EU and a foreign 
jurisdiction differ across sectoral regimes and policy fields.    
 
4.4.1. Regulatory authority of the European Commission  
 
 
This first sub-section begins with a delineation of the Commission’s regulatory authority in EU 
regulatory policy-making to understand to what extent it has authority to accept or recognise regulations 
or implementation procedures of third countries during regulatory cooperation. In line with the 
distinction between legislation and regulation in chapter 3.1.3., the adoption of legislation, which in 
internal market policies mainly follows the Ordinary Legislative Procedure, must be distinguished from 
the adoption of regulations and rules through implementing and delegated acts. These processes entail 
different scopes of authority for the Commission. Consequently, they also impose different constraints 
                                                     
40 Most authors, however, still underline the sui generis character of the Commission and the difficulty to compare 
it national executives of member states as well as the governments of third countries (e.g. Christiansen, 1997; 
Follesdal & Hix, 2006).   
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on the ability of the Commission to change the content or objectives of these policies through regulatory 
cooperation. 
In the Ordinary Legislative Procedure, the Commission enjoys the exclusive right to initiate legislation 
and to submit a legislative proposal41. Yet, the right to take legislative decisions lies with the EP and the 
Council as co-legislators. The Commission has no authority to vote on the proposal. The Commission 
proposal first goes to the EP, which may approve, reject or amend it. The (amended) proposal then is 
passed on to the Council. If the Council agrees with the EP’s position, the bill is adopted. In practice, 
the Commission can steer the discussions between the EP and the Council through informal tripartite 
meetings between the Commission, the Council and the EP called ‘trilogues’. Moreover, it can change 
the voting rules in the Council if it disagrees with significant amendments introduced into the legislative 
proposal. However, it cannot vote on the legislative proposal or seek to ensure its adoption through other 
means than dialogue or persuasion. Similarly, it cannot amend existing legislation without a new 
legislative proposal which is again subject to approval by the EP and the Council.  
In regulatory policy-making through delegated and implementing acts, the authority of the Commission 
is substantially greater.  Through delegated acts, the Commission has authority to supplement or amend 
primary legislation in its non-essential parts. More precisely, the Commission has authority to adopt 
delegated acts if a Regulation or a Directive delegates to the Commission the power to adopt non-
legislative “acts of general application to supplement or amend non-essential elements of the legislative 
act”. This delegation of authority is frequent in particular in internal market policy that is the subject of 
regulatory cooperation (Parker & Alemanno, 2014: 10). ‘Non-essential elements’ are provisions that do 
not influence the fundamental principles a legislative act, e.g. the choice of a mandatory labelling 
scheme. The decision which amendments are ‘essential’ or ‘non-essential’ are taken by the legislators 
in the adoption of the underlying legislative act. Since the Lisbon Treaty, the Commission has authority 
to prepare and adopt a draft delegated act without being obliged to consult committees of national 
representatives42. The Commission presents the adopted delegated act to the EP and the Council for 
review. If the EP and the Council oppose the delegated act, they must state reasons for their opposition 
(e.g. ultra vires, breach of a procedural requirement, etc.). Opposition of the EP and the Council may 
delay the entry into force of the act, but the Commission can still adopt the act even if both institutions 
oppose it43. 
                                                     
41 The following summary builds on Parker and Alemanno (2014).  
42 Before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Commission was also legally obliged to consult with 
committees of member state representatives in the preparation and adoption of ‘delegated acts’ under the so-called 
‘comitology procedures’.   
43 In such a constellation, member states may, however, choose not to implement a delegated act adopted by the 
Commission in opposition to the Council.  
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Through ‘implementing acts’, the Commission can implement primary legislation where uniform 
conditions of implementation are required44. The adoption of implementing acts requires that the 
Commission consults committees of member states representatives. The committee that is chaired by 
the Commission delivers its opinion by a qualified majority. If the committee is unable to find a qualified 
majority (for or against), it issues a ‘no opinion’ and the Commission is free to adopt or withdraw the 
implementing act in question. 
Technical standards in support of EU-level legislation, so-called ‘harmonised standards’, are developed 
or provided by the European Standards Organisations (ESOs) CEN (European Committee for 
Standardisation) and CENELEC (European Committee for Electrotechnical Standards) and ETSI 
(European Telecommunication Standards Institute). The Commission has authority to designate them 
as the only providers of European standards and maintains a contractual relationship with them. It 
elaborates and publishes annual standardisation requests to the ESOs (Egan & Pelkmans, 2015: 8). The 
Commission has, however, no influence on the voting on the adoption of standards. This is reserved to 
the members of the ESOs, which are the standardisation organisations of each member state.  
In sum, it follows that the Commission has legal authority to engage in regulatory cooperation without 
the consent of other EU institutions where it is limited to the adoption of delegated acts. Moreover, it 
can task the ESOs to change European ‘harmonised standards’ through the inclusion of such requests in 
the annual standardisation work programmes. Yet, it has no authority to pursue strategies which conflict 
with existing EU legislation or aim at changing EU legislation without requiring the approval of the 
Council and the EP through the Ordinary Legislative Procedure. As this makes the ‘success’ of a 
regulatory cooperation strategy uncertain, the Commission should not be expected to pursue regulatory 
cooperation that conflicts with or requires changes in the essential parts of EU legislation45.  
 
Regulatory authority of the European Commission in regulatory cooperation  
 
This section builds on the insights of the previous sub-section to elaborates how the authority of the 
Commission in EU regulatory policy-making affects its discretion in the formation of a bilateral 
regulatory cooperation strategy. 
Previous empirical studies confirm that regulatory preferences of the Commission correspond to the 
regulator preferences theoretically deduced in chapter 4.3.1. On the one hand, they argue that 
Commission seeks to protect its material interest, i.e. its regulatory autonomy (Thatcher, 2011; 
                                                     
44 This process used to be referred to as ‘comitology’, since the exercise of this authority by the Commission 
required the consultation of committees made up of representatives of the Member States. 
45 At the time of writing, the Commission has not pursued regulatory cooperation which conflicted with or required 
changes to EU legislation.  
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Groenleer, 2014; Bach, de Francesco, Maggetti & Ruffing, 2016). Many authors (e.g. Meunier, 2014, 
2005; Laatikainen & Smith, 2006) suggest that ‘internal cohesiveness’ is an important factor for the 
Commission to enjoy power and thus engage in external governance. On the other hand, authors have 
underlined the identity of the Commission and its normative orientations of legitimate behaviour as 
decisive for its behaviour. They propose that the Commission’s identity and own experience in market 
integration leads it to protect the common rules and rule-making procedures of the Single Market against 
international disciplines (Woolcock, 2005; Young, 2004) and use the Single Market as a row model to 
address non-tariff trade barriers (Holmes & Young, 2001).  
To describe the legal authority of the Commission to engage in bilateral regulatory cooperation, a 
distinction must be introduced here with regard to the scope of the intended regulatory cooperation. 
Pelkmans and de Brito (2015) differentiate if regulatory cooperation extends on a single technical 
regulation and regulatory decision or if it sets up an agreement covering a whole range of products. 
Examples of the latter are Mutual Recognition Agreements or Veterinary Equivalence Agreements. If 
the Commission pursues regulatory cooperation on individual regulations or regulatory decisions, it has 
substantial legal discretion in doing so as long as these decisions remain within the ‘non-essential parts’ 
of overarching EU legislation and thus fall under the scope of delegated acts or decisions. If the 
Commission, however, were to pursue regulatory cooperation covering a whole range of products 
through the negotiation of an agreement, its legal discretionary authority is limited. It can be argued, 
though, that the de facto discretion of the Commission in the formation of a strategy is nonetheless 
considerable. Importantly, the dimension and depth of a strategy that the Commission can pursue within 
its discretion is not restricted by the scope. 
Within its discretionary authority in EU regulatory policy-making that the previous sub-section has 
delineated, the Commission has legal authority to pursue regulatory cooperation along all the strategies 
differentiated in chapter 3.3.2. If the technical regulation falls within the non-essential aspects of the 
overarching legislation, the Commission can harmonise or mutually recognise regulatory requirements 
within the non-essential aspects through a delegated act, thus pursuing ‘regulatory alignment’. Likewise, 
it can take ‘equivalence’ decisions through delegated and – in exceptional cases- implementing acts46. 
Moreover, through ‘decisions’ the Commission can authorise production facilities in third countries for 
export to the EU, thus certifying their compliance with the conformity assessment requirements of the 
EU (Weimer & Vos, 2015) and pursuing an ‘alignment of implementation procedures’. ‘Information 
exchange’ does in many cases not even entail a formal non-legislative decision and thus lies within the 
discretionary behaviour of the Commission (Chase & Pelkmans, 2015: 10).  
                                                     
46 To illustrate the applicable EU procedures, see Commission (2017). It lays down the procedures for recognition 
of non-EU regulatory frameworks in the example of financial frameworks, specifying the ‘equivalence’ assessment 
and the ‘equivalence’ decision. The Commission specifies that “an ‘equivalence’ decision may take the form of 
an implementing or delegated act, in accordance with what is envisaged in the corresponding ‘equivalence’ 
provision in the basic act.”  
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Agreements that establish procedures for a range of products and legislative decisions, in turn, only to 
a limited extent fall under the legal authority of the Commission. Agreements promoting ‘equivalence’ 
are ‘Veterinary Equivalence Agreements’ while ‘Mutual Recognition Agreements promote an 
‘alignment of implementation procedures’ (see chapter 3.2.). Harmonisation and mutual recognition, 
both captured by ‘regulatory alignment’, have come to be negotiated in Free Trade Agreements although 
the regulatory decision adoption mostly follows the procedures of delegated and implementing acts 
(Interview 19). These Agreements fall under the Common Commercial Policy and follow the procedure 
for the negotiation of international agreements47. In this procedure, authority is centralised at the EU 
level48, but the legal discretionary authority of the Commission relative to other EU institutions is 
limited. Previous studies have, however, argued that de facto the Commission still enjoys considerable 
discretion (Siles-Brügge, 2014; Siles-Brügge, 2011; Elsig & Dupont, 2012). 
In international negotiations, the Commission has the right to formulate initial negotiating positions and 
to conduct the negotiations49. Under the lead of DG Trade, the Commission initiates the formulation of 
the EU’s strategy in abstract terms, i.e. its negotiating positions. In coordination with other DGs 
concerned, DG Trade elaborates draft negotiating directives50. Yet, the adoption of these negotiating 
directives is in the responsibility of the Council. DG Trade sends the negotiating directives to the Trade 
Policy Committee of the Council. The Council, i.e. EU member states, then adopts these negotiating 
directives, the so-called ‘mandate’, and thus launch international negotiations51. 
Subsequently, the Commission has authority to conduct the negotiations. In coordination with other DGs 
concerned, DG Trade specifies the strategy of the EU and elaborates position papers and then textual 
proposals for individual chapters of an agreement. Lead negotiators are the Trade Commissioner and 
the DG Trade. Agricultural negotiations are conducted by the Commissioner for Agriculture and the 
Directorate General for Agriculture. In the sectoral regulatory cooperation negotiations, lead negotiators 
came from the technical DGs while DG Trade representatives only participated. A special arrangement 
persists with regard to discussions on sanitary and phytosanitary measures. Here, both Commission 
representatives of DG Trade and DG Sanco as well as member state representatives participate in the 
negotiations in the so-called ‘Potsdam Group’ and ‘Roosendaal Group’. This arrangement has been 
                                                     
47 An exception to this are the Memoranda of Understanding that the Commission has concluded with regulators 
from a number of third countries, notably the US and Canada. They establish formalised procedures for 
‘information’ exchange between the Commission and third-country regulators (see chapter 3.3.2.). These 
agreements fall within the discretionary authority (Chase & Pelkmans, 2015; see also Damro, 2005).  
48 The EU holds the exclusive competence on the Common Commercial Policy since the Treaty of Rome (1958). 
The Treaty of Lisbon extended the scope of the Common Commercial Policy. Yet, agreements including 
provisions on sensitive sectors, notably audio-visual services, health, and education services, require unanimous 
ratification in the Council.  
49 The following paragraphs build on Peterson and Young (2014: 80-85) and Woolcock (2010).  
50 The detailed procedure is laid down in the subsequent sub-section.  
51 While the EP has no formal role in this step, it is informed by DG Trade and has sent comments and amendments 
on the negotiating directives to the Commission, e.g. on the EU-US TTIP and the EU-Japan FTA.   
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established prior to the competence transfers under the Amsterdam Treaty and has been kept since 
(Interview 7, Interview 8).  
The legal discretion of the Commission in the formulation of a strategy and the conduct of negotiations 
is constrained by two factors, though. First, on an almost weekly basis the Commission52 reports to the 
Trade Policy Committee of the Council53 and the Special Committee on Agriculture on the progress of 
the negotiations, shares documents and outlines its agenda for the negotiations. The member states can 
thus monitor the state of play and progress of the negotiations as well as the conduct of the Commission 
in line with their preferences. Bilateral links between member states and negotiating partners eliminate 
the scope for informational advantages of the Commission, which could otherwise be a source of 
autonomy and discretion (Pollack, 2003: 278; Woolcock, 2010: 389). Since the Lisbon Treaty the 
Commission also reports to the INTA Committee of the EP. 
Second, the Commission does not have authority to adopt the outcomes of the negotiations. The Trade 
Commissioner signs the agreement and thus decides when negotiations are finished. Yet, the negotiated 
outcome is ratified by the Council in the Trade Policy Committee and since the Lisbon Treaty also by 
the EP. Both therefore have the possibility to refuse the ratification of an agreement negotiated by the 
Commission54.  
Despite these legal institutional constraints on the formation and pursuit of negotiating strategies by the 
Commission, studies on EU trade policy have proposed that the Commission retains considerable 
discretion. First, the Commission can anticipate the preferences of different member states and thus seek 
to reflect specific preferences in the drafting of the negotiating directives. Besides, divisions among 
member states make it difficult for the Council to adopt a ‘tight’ mandate that would significantly 
constrain the Commission’s room for manoeuvre. Disagreements among member states have arguably 
helped the Commission advance its liberalisation agenda (Siles-Brügge, 2014; Conceicao-Heldt, 2010). 
Second, the Commission presents the negotiated outcome as a bundle to the Council that member states 
can either adopt or reject, but not amend. For this reason, a non-ratification of a negotiated outcome is 
usually very unlikely55. Third, and crucially, the Commission can structure the information it presents 
to member states and thus use its argumentative space to persuade member states (Siles-Brügge, 2011). 
On many issues, member states do not have fixed preferences and therefore do not constrain the 
                                                     
52 This is mostly DG Trade or DG Agriculture. Only where sectoral regulatory cooperation negotiations are 
conducted by other DGs, these report to the Council or the EP.  
53 Until the Lisbon Treaty, the Trade Policy Committee was known as the ‘Article 133 Committee’, reflecting the 
article 133 of the Nice Treaty upon which the establishment of this Committee was based.  
54 The EP ratifies agreements with a majority of its component members. This process has become formalised with 
the Lisbon Treaty. Decision rules in the Council depend on whether a specific policy falls within the Common 
Commercial Policy. Decisions under the Common Commercial Policy require a qualified majority in the Council 
of Ministers. Yet, member states de facto seek to achieve a consensus even where decision rules only require a 
qualified majority. Unanimity is still required if policies touch upon areas of mixed competences (‘mixity’). 
55 This is not to say that non-ratification is impossible. The EP has rejected the ratification of the anti-piracy and 
intellectual property rights agreement ACTA in 2012 (Dür & Mateo, 2014). The Council has been very close to a 
non-ratification of the EU-Canada CETA Agreement in 2016.  
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negotiating space of the Commission (Adriaensen, 2016). This is also true for issues in regulatory 
cooperation (Interview 4).   
In conclusion, this sub-section has elaborated the authority of the Commission in the formation of a 
regulatory cooperation strategy towards member states in the Council and the EP. It has deduced that 
the authority of the Commission does not constrain its choice among the regulatory cooperation 
strategies delineated in this book. The Commission’s discretionary authority is high in regulatory 
cooperation that concentrates on individual regulatory measures. Its legal discretionary authority is 
limited towards the Council and the EP in the negotiation of agreements that are larger in scope and 
address a range of products. Yet, the Commission’s de facto discretion is often still considerable, given 
inter alia information asymmetries and collective action problems of the Council and the EP. Crucially, 
however, while the scope of regulatory cooperation may restrict the discretion of the Commission, it 
does not constrain the Commission’s ability to choose among a regulatory cooperation strategy based 
on the analytical categories of this book, i.e. dimension and depth.  
 
4.4.2. Bureaucratic pressure in the European Commission  
 
This sub-section applies the independent variable ‘bureaucratic pressure’ to bureaucratic interaction 
within the Commission. It identifies the different regulatory sub-actors described in chapters 4.2.1., 
4.3.2. and 4.3.4. Based on this, it shows how Commissioners and other DGs can direct the behaviour of 
technical officials.  
The Commission consists of an administrative and a political level. The administrative level is divided 
into several Directorates General (DGs). These, in turn, can be subdivided into ‘technical’ DGs with 
policy responsibilities, DGs with responsibilities for external relations and so-called ‘horizontal’ DGs. 
All DGs have different mandates. Within each DG, responsibilities are divided among different 
departments and units. Each DG is led by a Director General. At political level, the Commission is made 
up of 28 Commissioners whose responsibilities broadly reflect the divisions between the different DGs.  
For the clarity of the terminology and the distinction between the political and administrative levels 
within the Commission, figure 8 offers an overview of the organisation of the Commission. The 
organisational structure depicted and the names of the DGs and the relevant Commissioners correspond 
to the organisation of the Commission at the time of the Juncker Commission56,57.  
                                                     
56 Commission Vice-Presidents were for the first time introduced with the Juncker Commission in 2014.   
57 The names of DGs and the responsibilities of Commissioners slightly change with the appointment of new 
Commissioners. For the DGs and Commissioners which are relevant for the empirical case studies discussed in 
this book, changes to names of DGs and the responsibilities of the relevant Commissioners are introduced in the 
corresponding case studies.  
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Abbrev.  
DG 
DG name Relevant European 
Commissioner 
Abbrev.  
DG 
DG name Relevant Commissioner 
AGRI Agriculture and Rural 
Development  
Agriculture and Rural 
Development 
FISMA Fin. Stability, Fin. 
Services, Capital 
Markets Union 
Fin. Stability, Fin. 
Services, Capital Markets 
Union 
BUDG Budget Financial Programming 
and the Budget   
SANTE Health and Food 
Safety 
Health and Food Safety 
CLIMA Climate Action Climate Action HOME Migration and Home 
Affairs  
Home Affairs 
CNCT Comm. Networks, 
Content and 
Technology 
Digital Agenda ECHO European Civil 
Protection, Human 
Aid Operation 
International Cooperation, 
Human Aid and Crisis 
Response 
COMM Communication Communication HR Human Resources 
and Security 
Inter-Institutional 
Relations and 
Administration 
COMP Competition Competition MARKT Internation Market 
and Services 
Internation Market and 
Services 
ECFIN Economic and 
Financial Affairs 
Economic and Financial 
Affairs 
JUST Justice and 
Consumers 
Justice, Fund. Rights and 
Citizenship 
EAC Education and Culture Education, Culture And 
Youth 
MARE Maritime Affairs and 
Fisheries 
Maritime Affairs and 
Fisheries 
EMPL Employment, Social 
Affairs and Inclusion 
Employment, Social 
Affairs and Inclusion 
MOVE Mobility and 
Transport 
Transport 
ENER Energy Energy REGIO Regional and Urban 
Policy 
Regional Policy 
NEAR Neighbourhood and 
Enlargement 
Enlargement and European 
Neighbourhood Policy 
RTD Research and 
Innovation 
Research, Innovation and 
Science 
GROW Internal Market, 
Industry, 
Entrepreneurship 
Industry and 
Entrepreneurship 
SG Secretariat General  
ENV Environment Environment TAXUD Taxation and 
Customs Union 
Taxation and Customs 
Union, Audit, Anti-Fraud 
DEVCO International 
Cooperation and 
Development 
Development TRADE Trade Trade 
DIGIT Informatics  DGT Translation  
SCIC Interpretation  ESTAT Eurostat  
JRC Joint Research Centre  FPI Service for Foreign 
Policy Instruments 
 
Figure 8: Organisation of the Commission at political and administrative level 
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Based on figure 8, the sub-actors distinguished in sections chapters 4.2.1., 4.3.2. and 4.3.4. can now be 
identified. Technical officials correspond to the bureaucratic officials of the DG (subsequently: technical 
DG officials) that is in the lead on an issue58. Regulatory leaders are the Commissioner and the Director 
General leading a DG. Other bureaucratic actors are the DGs which can influence the pursuit of 
regulatory cooperation in certain context, but which focus on other objectives. In the pursuit of 
regulatory cooperation, these other bureaucratic actors are officials and the Director General from DG 
Trade as well as the Trade Commissioner59. For analytical simplicity it shall be assumed that preferences 
of technical officials within a DG overlap to a considerable extent60.  
Commissioners and Directors General are assumed to have slightly different preferences from technical 
officials (for this assumption see also Elsig & Dupont, 2012: 895). This reflects their lower structural 
embeddedness in a DG and a lower degree of structural uncertainty that enables them to consider new 
ideas and work on the basis of personal convictions.     
In the administration of day-to-day activities, technical DG officials have discretion in their decision 
and prioritisation of different issues (Pollack, 2005). Heads of units and department directors report to 
the leadership at administrative and political level about the administration of these day-to-day activities 
in two weekly coordination meetings: at administrative level between heads of units, department 
directors and the Director General and at political level including the participation of the Commissioner. 
Each meeting is chaired by the Director General of a DG and the responsible Commissioner respectively. 
Heads of units and department directors can use these coordination meetings with the Director General 
and the Commissioner to propose issues and tasks themselves. Due to the burden and overload of 
officials, this is, however, uncommon (see also Pollack, 2005).  
Officials from other DGs and Commissioners are likely to have different preferences than the technical 
DG regulators. Their preferences can be deduced in analogy to the deduction of the preferences of the 
technical DG regulators in the previous sub-section. Above I have specified that actors’ preferences are 
shaped by subjectively defined material interests and normative orientations. Besides, I have linked the 
subjective definition of a material interest to the ‘mandate’ of a regulator. One source of variation in 
preferences among regulatory actors within the Commission is thus the ‘mandate’ and the understanding 
of legitimate behaviour of a DG in the Commission. Another source are normative orientations, 
influenced by the personal beliefs held by actors. Among the individual regulatory actors specified by 
                                                     
58 The ‘lead’, i.e. the competence to draft a proposal, coordinate with DGs and implement a decision, reflects the 
mandate, or ‘missions’, of the different DGs. An issue, or ‘dossier’, is officially allocated to a DG that is 
subsequently in the lead by a decision of the College of Commissioners.    
59 This operationalisation reflects the distinction by Elsig and Dupont (2012) of three types of bureaucratic actors 
in trade and regulatory negotiations within the Commission: (1) bureaucratic officials in the lead DG, (2) officials 
who focus on other objectives (usually from other DGs) and (3) politically appointed agents, i.e. the 
Commissioners. 
60Empirical research by Kassim et al. (2013) finding a strong ideational coherence among officials working in a 
DG supports this assumption.  
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Elsig and Dupont (2012) above, only politically appointed agents, i.e. Commissioners, can be reasonably 
expected to have the capability in order to shape the preference of a regulator as an individual61.      
Bureaucratic pressure on regulatory cooperation arises at administrative and at political level within a 
DG and at political level within another DG. Existing research confirms that for the formation of the 
agenda, administrative and political leadership is important (Hartlapp et al., 2010: 10). First, in the 
coordination between the political and administrative level, bureaucratic pressure results from the 
availability of the Director General from the technical DG and the Commissioner to assume 
administrative and political leadership. At administrative or political level within a DG, the Director 
General of the DG and the respective Commissioner can task bureaucratic officials to elaborate a 
proposal or strategy on a regulatory cooperation issue. The task to identify issues for regulatory 
cooperation then sets off the strategy formation process outlined in the next sub-section.  
Second, in the coordination at political and administrative levels across the DGs, bureaucratic pressure 
results from a suggestion at political level in DG Trade, notably the Commissioner, to pursue regulatory 
cooperation through an international agreement rather than through discussions between regulators 
alone. The pursuit of regulatory cooperation through trade negotiations shifts the ‘lead’ from the 
technical DG to DG Trade. This leads to an overlap of internal jurisdictions, which may produce ‘turf 
wars’ between different individual Commission Directorate Generals (DGs) over the formation of the 
Commission strategies (Dijkstra, 2009). In line with the process illustrated in the next section, this 
suggestion should lead to a task to officials in DG Trade to identify issues for regulatory cooperation. 
As DG Trade has a different ‘mission’ than technical DGs, i.e. trade liberalisation, the assessment of the 
relative costs and benefits of regulatory cooperation likely differs from the -initial status quo- assessment 
of officials (and administrative and political leaders) of the technical DGs and may cause a different 
policy preference on regulatory cooperation within DG Trade than within technical DGs (Sapir, 2011). 
Bureaucratic pressure at political level in another DG, i.e. pressure exerted by the Trade Commissioner, 
can thus task officials from the technical DG to elaborate a proposal or strategy on an issue. In the latter 
case, officials from the DG Trade coordinate with officials from the technical DG to contribute and 
provide input on the issue, either through informal consultations or formal inter-service consultations. 
This process will be explained in further detail in the next sub-section. For now, it shall be maintained 
that both administrative or political leadership within the DG as well as political leadership in another 
DG, however, constrain the discretion of technical officials and force them to act.  
 
                                                     
61 There is a growing literature underlining the influence of personal convictions and ideas on institutional choices 
of actors, calling itself ‘actor-centred constructivism’ (e.g. Saurugger, 2013). For a detailed discussion of the 
influence of the mandate of a regulator, distinguished among different DGs within the Commission, see previous 
literature (Kassim et al., 2013; Smith, 2013; Trondal, 2012; Frennhoff-Larsén, 2007).  
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Figure 9 shows the two sources of bureaucratic pressure: 
 
Figure 9: Sources of bureaucratic pressure 
 
Political leadership of the Trade Commissioner and political leadership of the technical DG Director 
General or Commissioner are thus likely to shift the balance of internal assessments of costs and benefits 
of regulatory cooperation in favour of regulatory cooperation and thus lead to a collective Commission 
preference ‘regulatory cooperation’. Yet, it cannot be deduced that shifts in the leadership among 
different DGs and Commissioners can explain the choice among the regulatory cooperation strategies 
developed in chapter 3.3. The pursuit of regulatory cooperation may occur through any of the forms 
other than non-cooperation delineated in section 3.4. Hypothesis 1 can therefore be operationalised as 
follows: 
H1a: The presence of bureaucratic pressure from the Director General, Commissioner or Trade 
Commissioner leads technical lead DG officials to choose ‘regulatory alignment’, ‘equivalence’, 
‘alignment of implementation procedures’ or ‘information exchange’. 
H1b: The absence of bureaucratic pressure leads technical lead DG officials to pursue regulatory 
competition.  
Bureaucratic pressure arising from the involvement of the political and administrative 
leadership from the lead policy DG 
Bureaucratic pressure arising from the involvement of the political and administrative 
leadership from a non-technical DG, i.e. normally an external DG 
Information flows 
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In sum, this sub-section has operationalised the independent variable ‘bureaucratic pressure’ to specific 
actors within the Commission. It has shown that administrative or political leadership by the Director 
General of the technical lead DG, the respective Commissioner or the Trade Commissioner forces 
technical lead DG officials to act on an issue upon which they may not have acted otherwise.  
 
4.4.3. Conceiving the strategy formation process in the European Commission  
 
This sub-section now applies the causal mechanism described in chapter 4.3.3 to decision-making within 
the Commission and lays down the process of strategy formation. The Commission’s regulatory 
cooperation strategy can take two forms. It can be a proposal for a ‘regulatory alignment’ or 
‘equivalence’ decision by means of a delegated act or it can be a negotiating position or textual proposal 
to be pursued through negotiations on an international agreement. This sub-section therefore 
distinguishes between strategy formation for regulatory cooperation on individual regulatory measures 
through delegated acts and implementing acts and regulatory cooperation through the negotiation of 
international agreements62. 
If coordination between the administrative and the political level within a DG (see chapter 4.4.3) 
concludes that the Commission should engage in regulatory cooperation, the administrative level within 
the lead DG begins the work on the Commission’s strategy. It does by initiating coordination with 
officials of other DGs at administrative level to gather information. Besides, it consults with societal 
actors.  The scope of the consultation with societal actors and other DGs depends on the type of decision. 
For administrative decisions, the responsible unit in the lead DG consults with societal actors on an ad-
hoc basis and coordinates with other DGs informally. Additional informal coordination may for instance 
take place through the Inter-Service Group (Hartlapp et al., 2010: 6). Since the adoption of the ‘Better 
Regulation’ agenda in 2002, the Commission additionally commissions external scientific impact 
assessments on the decision or mandate public consultations (Parker & Alemanno, 2014: 25). As part 
of the ‘Better Regulation’ agenda, it is required to launch public consultations with societal actors and 
commission impact assessments (Parker & Alemanno, 2014: 14). Furthermore, Commission officials 
may initiate informal consultations with member state representatives in the Council (through the 
Council Working Groups or the Trade Policy Committee) and MEPs. Importantly, Commission officials 
consult with or anticipate demands of the foreign regulator.   
Technical officials in the lead DG then evaluate the knowledge and information that they have collected 
through the consultation with societal actors. This information is compared with own information and 
information obtained through the coordination with other DGs. Technical officials evaluate proposals 
                                                     
62 Although Memoranda of Understanding on ‘information exchange’ are also agreements, their nature as non-
treaty agreements makes the internal decision-making process equal to regulatory cooperation on individual 
regulatory measures.   
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of societal actors (as well as other actors) for regulatory cooperation with regard to expected effects of 
these proposals to preferences of the Commission. Subsequently, and taking into account the proposals 
submitted by societal actors and political actors, technical officials then elaborate draft textual proposals 
for regulatory cooperation.  
These draft textual proposals are then shared with other DGs who can comment on the draft textual 
proposal. For delegated and implementing acts, technical DG officials consult with other DGs through 
inter-service consultations. Likewise, for international agreements, the lead DG, i.e. DG Trade, 
coordinates with other DGs through inter-service consultations. In inter-service consultations, the DG 
which is responsible, i.e. ‘in the lead’, for a decision initiates the procedure. It is required to seek the 
approval of all DGs that are concerned by a decision and “have a legitimate interest in the draft text” 
(Commission, 2000: art. 23(2)). While the lead DG is required to consult the Commission’s Legal 
Service and the Secretariat General, it has discretion in deciding which other DGs it contacts (Hartlapp 
et al., 2010: 10). If a consulted DG blocks a decision, the lead DG and the blocking DG enter 
consultations. In practice, however, technical officials from the lead DG share documents with other 
DGs for comments already in advance of formal inter-service consultations.  
Besides, officials as well as administrative and political leaders of the lead DG continue to interact with 
societal actors. Notably, they employ the mechanisms of ‘managing permeability’ and ‘buffering’ 
outlined in chapter 4.3.4. They mobilise societal actors to provide additional information on comments 
submitted in the public consultation. Moreover, they mobilise societal actors to raise argumentative 
pressure in support of their proposed strategy both during and after the inter-service consultations.    
As an outcome of these consultations, the proposed strategy is amended or sent to the political level (for 
an in-depth discussion see Stroß, 2014: 64). At political level, an issue for which no agreement has been 
possible at technical level, is further discussed. Forums for discussion are the weekly hebdomadaire 
(‘Hebdo’) meeting between the heads of Cabinet of each Commissioner, chaired by the Secretariat-
General as well as the ‘special chef’ meetings chaired by a member of the President’s cabinet and 
composed of the relevant sectoral cabinet members responsible for a policy item. Issues which could 
not be resolved through either of these meetings at political level are sent to College meetings of the 
Commissioners (Stroß, 2014: 65). The textual proposal, i.e. strategy, is then formally adopted by the 
College of Commissioners.   
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Figure 10 shows the process of strategy formation.  
 
Figure 10: Process of strategy formation within the Commission 
 
The elaboration of the causal mechanism helps to clarify the relationship between the independent 
variables. The presence of bureaucratic pressure (IV1) initiates the process of strategy formation. 
Regulatory compatibilities (IV2) then determine which proposals and demands of societal actors and 
foreign regulators Commission officials take into consideration. Moreover, they guide the search of 
Commission officials for technical information on issues on which regulatory cooperation could be 
pursued. Regulatory compatibilities thus constrain the choice among different regulatory cooperation 
strategies.  
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4.5. Summary  
 
This chapter has deduced an Inter-relational Institutionalist framework as a theoretical basis to analyse 
the constraints that a regulator from a large jurisdiction considers in the formation of a bilateral 
regulatory cooperation.  The chapter has discussed actor-centred institutionalism and the New 
Interdependence Approach as the theoretical foundations for the ‘inter-relational institutionalist’ 
integrative framework. It has argued that the conclusions of the New Interdependence Approach that a) 
rule overlap is an opportunity structure for regulatory actors to enhance their preferences and b) their 
power is shaped by institutional complementarities between the domestic and international level derive 
a theoretical foundation for the engagement of a regulator from a large jurisdiction in bilateral regulatory 
cooperation. It has integrated these conclusions into an actor-centred institutionalism combining 
rational-choice and sociological-constructivist approaches. The discussion of the first building block of 
actor-centred institutionalism, ‘actor characteristics’ has led to the derivation of the independent variable 
‘bureaucratic pressure’ that explains the regulator’s choice between cooperation and non-cooperation. 
The discussion of the second building block, ‘actor constellations’ has allowed deducing the important 
two variants of the second independent variable ‘regulatory compatibilities’, i.e. ‘regulatory authority 
compatibilities’ and ‘regulatory principle compatibilities’. These are argued to explain its choice among 
different cooperation strategies, given that it has decided to engage in cooperation. The chapter also 
deduced a causal relationship between the variables.  
The variables will be tested in the empirical part of the book. The independent variable has been 
operationalised to internal politics in the Commission with three outcomes (no administrative or political 
leadership / administrative and political leadership by technical lead DG / administrative or political 
leadership by DG Trade). The important second independent variable ‘regulatory compatibilities’ has 
been operationalised dichotomously as ‘compatible’ and ‘non-compatible’. ‘Compatible regulatory 
authority structures’ have been understood as a centralisation of authority in both the EU and the third 
country. ‘Compatible regulatory principles’ have been defined as the absence of directly conflicting 
regulatory approaches.  
The major benefit of the ‘inter-relational institutional’ framework is its ability to grasp variation in 
bureaucratic dynamics and its influence on the engagement in bilateral regulatory cooperation as a form 
of external governance. At the same time, it contributes to reconcile previously conflicting explanatory 
approaches into one integrative framework and understand the structural-institutional factors which 
constrain the Commission’s choice among different regulatory cooperation strategies as mechanisms of 
external governance. The Inter-relational Institutionalism thus helps structure an in-depth empirical 
analysis of different sectors of EU internal market policy to reveal under which conditions and under 
which constraints the Commission forms a cooperation strategy in bilateral regulatory cooperation. 
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The hypotheses that will be tested in four empirical case studies can be summarised as follows: 
 
The next chapter discusses the methodology of this book before chapter 6 begins the empirical analyses.  
  
H1a: The presence of bureaucratic pressure leads regulators to choose ‘regulatory alignment’, 
‘equivalence’, ‘alignment of implementation procedures’ or ‘information exchange’. 
H1b: The absence of bureaucratic pressure leads regulators to pursue regulatory competition.  
 
H2a: If both regulatory authority structures and regulatory principles are compatible, the Commission 
pursues a strategy of ‘regulatory alignment’. 
H2b: If regulatory authority structures are compatible, but regulatory principles are incompatible, 
the Commission pursues a strategy of ‘equivalence’.  
H2c: If regulatory authority structures are incompatible, but regulatory principles are compatible, 
the Commission pursues a strategy of ‘alignment of implementation procedures’.  
H2d: If both regulatory authority structures and regulatory principles are incompatible, the 
Commission pursues a strategy of ‘information exchange’. 
 
H3: If regulatory leaders and regulatory officials succeed to mobilise societal actors in support of the 
strategy that is in line with regulatory compatibilities, regulators will pursue a strategy in line with 
regulatory compatibilities.  
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5. Methodology 
  
Under which constraints the Commission chooses a strategy for bilateral regulatory cooperation is the 
topic of this book. The EU has developed considerable regulatory capacity in a great number of policy 
fields and industry sectors, delegated discretionary authority to the Commission to adopt delegated and 
implementing acts. Besides, the member states have given the Commission discretion in its authority to 
interact with regulators from third countries as long as this interaction remains within the Commission’s 
discretionary authority. Many of these policy fields and industry sectors are characterised by high 
economic internationalisation and interdependence with other jurisdictions and are therefore subjects of 
both multilateral and increasingly also bilateral regulatory cooperation. 
This chapter develops the methodology in complement to the theoretical framework deduced in chapter 
3 and 4 for the empirical application of the Inter-relational Institutionalism. To test the framework, a 
comparative case study research design shall be employed. First, the chapter selects the case studies. It 
presents the universe of third countries with which the Commission has engaged in regulatory 
cooperation and selects the US as a regulatory cooperation partner based on a ‘least-likely’ logic for the 
influence of bureaucratic pressure. Then industry-sectoral regimes are drawn out of the population of 
industry sectors and EU governance regimes. A sample of four sectoral case studies is selected based 
on a combination of the ‘least-likely’ logic and the ‘method of difference’ on the independent variable 
‘regulatory compatibilities’. The selected sectoral case studies chemicals, engineering, food safety and 
ICT are briefly presented. For each of the four sectoral case studies, three sub-cases, i.e. different 
regulatory cooperation initiatives, are defined to ensure variation on the independent variable 
‘bureaucratic pressure’. From the history of transatlantic regulatory cooperation initiatives, the New 
Transatlantic Agenda (NTA), the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC) and the negotiations over a 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) are selected. 
Second, the chapter presents the method for data analysis. The within-case analysis examines the 
Commission’s choice of regulatory cooperation strategies for each of the three sub-cases, relying on 
process-tracing as the main method. Based on the results of the within-case analysis, a cross-case 
synthesis discusses the identified variables. Third, it discusses the methods of data collection. The 
document analysis is based on public and non-public documents of the Commission, complemented 
with analytical publications by think tanks and articles by specialist journals. Moreover, data has been 
collected through 26 semi-structured expert interviews conducted between 2015 and 2017. 
  
Methodology 
124 
 
5.1. Comparative case study research design 
 
Explaining the difference in strategies that the Commission aims for in bilateral regulatory cooperation 
is the object of this book. It thus pursues an ‘outcome-centric research design’ 
 (Dür, 2007). The ambition of this book is not to make inferences from a sample to a population, but 
rather to establish the causal mechanism that leads to a specific ‘outcome’ (Dür, 2007). It thus requires 
a research design to show that for a set of case studies, theoretically deduced hypotheses validly explain 
actual empirical phenomena. The following paragraphs lay down why this goal qualifies this study for 
the employment of a comparative case study research design. A case study shall be understood as a “an 
intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units” 
(Gerring, 2004: 342).  
The objective of any scientific study in the social sciences is to make descriptive or causal inferences 
based on empirical information about the “real world”. King, Keohane and Verba (1994) note that both 
qualitative and quantitative research is based on the logic of inference. A case study is only scientific if 
it allows drawing conclusions or understanding the world beyond the immediate information collected. 
‘Descriptive inference takes observations from the world to learn more about unobserved phenomena 
while ‘causal inference’ aims at learning about causal mechanisms. Woll (2008: 85-92) further 
distinguishes between the description of a ‘causal mechanism’ and ‘constitutive mechanism’. Within a 
causal mechanism, an element A generates an element B. A constitutive relationship implies, in turn, 
that B exists in virtue of A (Woll, 2008: 88). While this distinction helps to remind a case study 
researcher of the difficulty to postulate an actual causal relationship between observed factors, it is not 
taken up by this book. Instead, the notion shall be taken up that any description of a casual mechanism 
in the social sciences presupposes inferences about the relationship between factors that cannot be 
proven with ultimate certainty.      
The outcome-centric research design makes this study more amenable to qualitative rather than 
quantitative research methods. This book seeks to trace the chain of causal factors, the causal mechanism 
which leads to a given outcome. The study of causal mechanisms is difficult with a large-n quantitative 
design (see Dür, 2007: 155). The latter could rather be used to test the causal mechanism observed by 
this book across a larger set of cases. Yet, the small number of cases among which a researcher can 
choose constitutes an additional complexity for the employment of a quantitative research design. The 
engagement in regulatory bilateral regulatory cooperation presupposes power resources which, for the 
time being, only few entities in the world can fulfil. Apart from the EU these are the US, Canada, Japan 
and to a limited extent Korea (see below).  
This book nonetheless seeks to employ qualitative methods with the objective to draw causal inference. 
Case study methods aim at drawing causal inference by discarding powerful alternative explanations 
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(George & Bennett, 2005: 181). The purpose of a comparative research design is to cover cases that are 
able to explain variation to be expected from theory. As will be discussed in the following paragraphs, 
the ability of a comparative case study design to draw causal inference can be enhanced through a 
process of careful case selection). King, Keohane and Verba (1994) suggest that case selection based on 
the method of difference reduces the risk of selection bias. The selection of observations “according to 
the categories of the key causal explanatory variable” (King, Keohane & Verba, 1994: 137) reduces the 
risk of introducing bias because the selection procedure does not make any statements with regard to 
the expected outcome of a study.   
The units of analysis or cases of Inter-relational Institutionalism are the industry sectoral regimes. Units 
of analysis can be understood as ‘the sort of phenomena that constitute cases in a given research context” 
(Gerring, 2001: 160) This book thus reflects the delineation of cases based on industry sectors (Woll, 
2008; Vogel, 2012) by comparable studies in the past. In contrast to the focus on industry sectors, 
however, industry sectoral regimes comprise the regulatory policies, i.e. legislation, regulations and 
standards as well as implementation procedures that govern the authorisation and marketing of goods 
and services within an industry sector. 
The regulatory policies and implementation procedures within an industry sectoral regime constitute the 
phenomena and elements within a case. This delineation does not suppose that all issues addressed 
within a sectoral regime are homogenous elements. The adherence to a certain regulatory principle may 
for instance only apply to some issues within a sectoral regime, but not others (see also chapter 7.2.2.). 
Yet, a delineation of cases based on industry sectoral regimes can be justified for several reasons: First, 
regulatory cooperation dialogues are commonly structured around industry sectors. Commission 
officials that participate in a regulatory dialogue thus usually address several issues within an industry 
sector, but not from other industry sectors (Interview 21). This also reflects the conclusion of Peterson 
and Young (2014: 159) that most regulatory cooperation is sector-specific. When strategies for 
regulatory cooperation are formed, strategies are formed for each sector independently. Possible 
concessions in discussions are identified within, but not across sectors (Interview 21). In the same vein, 
Peterson and Young (2014: 159) emphasise that the scope for inter-sectoral trade-offs in regulatory 
cooperation is small. This ensures that cases identified and delineated are independent. Second, societal 
actors that are consulted and propose policy demands are organised around industry sectors. Delineating 
cases on the basis of sectors thus also helps delineating the societal actors that are likely to influence the 
behaviour of the Commission within a case study. The population of possible cases therefore covers, 
first, all third countries with which the EU pursues bilateral regulatory cooperation and, second, all 
industry sectoral regimes.  
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Selecting the EU as a promoter of bilateral regulatory cooperation 
 
Before the selection of cases for the subsequent empirical analysis is presented, a few arguments shall 
be put forward on the choice of the EU and the Commission as a promoter of bilateral regulatory 
cooperation. As indicated above, the universe of potential jurisdictions for which the formation and 
choice of a bilateral regulatory cooperation strategy can be studied is limited. Yet, the choice to study 
the formation of a bilateral regulatory cooperation strategy using the example of the Commission can 
be justified with both theory-driven arguments and empirical observations. 
First, the EU holds the power resources that the literature on international regulatory cooperation 
considers to be relevant for the capacity to externalise domestic regulatory measures (Damro, 2015; 
Farrell & Newman, 2014; Damro, 2012; Bach & Newman, 2007; see also chapter 2.4). The EU is argued 
to have a large internal market, have a high regulatory capacity and to show high regulatory stringency 
(Damro, 2015; Bradford, 2012; Vogel, 2012; Posner, 2010). Second, the literature widely notes that the 
EU has a normative orientation towards trade liberalisation (Siles-Brügge, 2014; Manger, 2009) as well 
as towards an externalisation of its norms and rules (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2009; Manners, 2006). 
Indeed, the argument that the Commission is a regulator with has an outward perspective has given rise 
to an entire literature on EU external governance (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2009 for a review). This 
makes the EU a ‘most likely’ candidate to engage in bilateral regulatory cooperation as the latter aims 
at both trade liberalisation as well as a ramification and spread of domestic levels of safety, health and 
environmental protection. 
Third, a focus on the EU can also be justified with observations in the specialist literature on regulatory 
cooperation that no other jurisdiction beside the EU has concluded a similar amount of regulatory 
cooperation agreements, notably Veterinary Equivalency and Mutual Recognition Agreements (Chase 
& Pelkmans, 2015; Pelkmans & Brito, 2015). The US which arguably also has a large internal market, 
high regulatory capacity and high regulatory stringency, has not concluded a similar number of 
corresponding agreements (see also Ahearn, 2009). A focus on the EU and the Commission to study 
strategy formation on bilateral regulatory cooperation can therefore be justified both with its power 
resources and its normative orientations which make the EU a ‘most likely’ jurisdiction to pursue 
regulatory cooperation as well as actual data on its engagement in bilateral regulatory cooperation.    
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Selecting a third country case 
 
Studies that follow an outcome-centric research design seek to discard alternative explanations through 
a comparative case study design. At the same time, the aim of case selection is to select a representative 
sample of the population and realise the maximum variance in the variables of theoretical interest 
(Seawright & Gerring, 2008: 296). This section therefore first creates a list of third countries with which 
the Commission has pursued bilateral regulatory cooperation at the time of writing.  
In line with the description of regulatory cooperation strategies in chapter 3.2, the list of third countries 
with which the Commission has engaged in bilateral regulatory cooperation can be constructed from the 
conclusion of Mutual Recognition Agreements, Veterinary Equivalence Agreements and the inclusion 
of regulatory cooperation provisions in bilateral Free Trade Agreements. Based on information provided 
by the Commission (2017a, 2017b), at the time of writing the Commission has pursued bilateral 
regulatory cooperation with the following third countries:  
 
Partner country Agreements  
Australia Veterinary Equivalence Agreement, Mutual Recognition Agreement 
Canada Veterinary Equivalence Agreement, Mutual Recognition Agreements, Free Trade 
Agreement (CETA) 
Chile Veterinary Equivalence Agreement 
Japan Mutual Recognition Agreements, Free Trade Agreement (JEITA, under 
negotiation) 
Korea Mutual Recognition Agreement, Free Trade Agreement (KOREU) 
New Zealand Veterinary Equivalence Agreement, Mutual Recognition Agreement 
Singapore Mutual Recognition Agreement 
United States Veterinary Equivalence Agreement, Mutual Recognition Agreements, Free Trade 
Agreement (TTIP, under negotiation)  
Table 7: Overview of EU regulatory cooperation agreements 
 
To test the empirical validity of the theoretically deduced hypotheses through a comparative case study 
design, selected cases are subjected to especially ‘hard’ empirical cases. Eckstein (1975) argues that the 
employment of ‘most-likely’ or ‘least-likely’ cases are essential tests for rival theories. The logic of a 
‘least-likely’ case is that if a hypothesis is not valid for this specific case, it is not likely to be valid for 
all or many other cases. The selection of a third country should therefore constitute a ‘least-likely’ case 
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for the explanatory relevance of the independent variable of the theoretical framework. Out of the 
countries listed above, the US is a ‘least-likely’ case for the need of bureaucratic pressure to push 
Commission officials to engage in regulatory cooperation. First, based on the New Interdependence 
Approach, incentives for regulators to engage in cooperation are high if the level of interdependence 
between the EU and the third country is high. Interdependence of the EU is arguably largest with the 
US. The Ecorys study (2016: 108) notes that in 2015 US subsidiaries of EU firms contributed two-thirds 
of total foreign direct investment in the US. Moreover, it notes that 60% of US imports from the EU and 
31% of US exports to the EU were intra-firm or related-party trade (Ecorys, 2016: 113). Second, based 
on theories of firms’ trade preferences, the high degree of intra-industry trade should drive EU firms 
with US subsidiaries and US firms with EU subsidiaries to prepare joint demands and lobby Commission 
officials for ‘regulatory alignment’ (see Eckhardt & Poletti, 2016). Differences in regulations and 
implementation procedures affect the competitive position of firms as well as the market share of foreign 
firms (Lütz, 2011: 4).   
At the same time, the US is an ‘extreme’ case for the Commission’s pursuit of regulatory cooperation 
rather than externalisation or functional extensions of EU rules and standards (Lavenex, 2014). The New 
Interdependence Approach (Newman & Posner, 2015) and the ‘Market Power Europe’ conceptual 
framework (Damro, 2015b; Damro, 2012) put forward that the ability of the Commission to externalise 
EU rules and standards reflects its relative market size and its relative regulatory capacity vis-à-vis the 
third country. The regulatory capacity of the US is particularly high and considered to be comparable to 
the one of the EU (Bach & Newman, 2010; Posner, 2010). Moreover, while all countries listed above 
have sizeable internal markets, the relative market asymmetry in favour of the EU is smallest with the 
US (Statista, 2017). Interactions between decision-makers and regulators of either jurisdiction are very 
dense, creating a ‘Euro-American regulatory condominium’ (Posner, 2009). Considering that the US is 
an ‘extreme’ case a third country for bilateral regulatory cooperation, chapter 7.2.4 will discuss the 
limitations of the generalisability of findings from an examination of regulatory cooperation cases with 
the US towards other third countries included in the population.  
   
Selecting industry sectoral regimes of EU-US regulatory cooperation as cases 
 
To select among potential industry sectoral regimes, it is necessary to first identify the universe of 
industry sectors which can be subject to regulatory regimes. The population of industry sectors for 
regulatory cooperation is derived from the list of sectors in the Single Market distinguished by the 
Commission (Commission, 2017c) and complemented with the list of sectors delineated by previous 
studies of regulatory cooperation (Chase & Pelkmans, 2015). The Commission distinguishes the 
following sectors in its internal market policy as shown in table 8 (next page): 
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Space/Aeronautics Automotive Biotechnology 
Chemicals Construction Cosmetics 
Defence Engineering Food / Food Safety 
Gambling Healthcare / Pharmaceuticals Information and Communications 
Technology  
Maritime  Medical devices Raw materials 
Textiles Toys  
Table 8: Overview of industry sectors 1  
 
Based on an empirical observation of the EU’s engagement in regulatory cooperation with the US, Chase 
and Pelkmans (2015: 33) add the following sectors. These are displayed in table 9:  
Financial services  Aircraft Transport services 
Table 9: Overview of industry sectors 2 
 
Alternatively, the population of cases could be constructed on the basis of policy fields (e.g. Falkner & 
Müller, 2013). The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU; parts three ‘Union Policies 
and Internal Actions’ and five ‘External Action’) distinguishes the following policy fields as shown in 
table 10: 
Agriculture  Foreign Affairs Regional Policy Development 
Fisheries Research Economic/Monetary Affairs Health 
Security Education and Culture Humanitarian Aid Taxation  
Employment/ Social Policy  Industry and Competition Trade Energy 
Internal Market Transport Environment Justice and Home Affairs 
Table 10: Overview of policy fields 
 
Out of these policy fields, only agriculture, health, economic and monetary affairs, industry and 
competition, internal market and environment are object to technical regulation and thus possible 
subjects of regulatory cooperation. Moreover, the boundaries of some of these policy fields are diffuse. 
The regulation of chemicals and automotive thus simultaneously falls into the fields of internal market 
and environment.  
The objective of a comparative case study research is to discard alternative explanations. Rejecting 
potential alternative explanations increases the internal validity of a finding of a comparative case study, 
i.e. the explanatory strength of the claim “that the postulated cause-effect relationship is really at work” 
(Dür, 2007: 161). Case study research frequently reflects the logic of Mill’s (1843) methods of 
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agreement and difference. The method of agreement argues that if only one of several explanatory 
factors is present in all cases, then this common explanatory factor must be the cause of the outcome. 
The method of difference takes cases with different outcomes and argues that if all but one factor is 
present in the cases, the one factor which is absent or different in each case must be the cause of the 
difference. King, Keohane and Verba (1994: 137) suggest that case selection based on the method of 
difference reduces the risk of selection bias compared to the method of agreement because the selection 
procedure does not make any statements with regard to the expected outcome of a study. Ragin (1987: 
41) further suggests that after categories of explanatory variables have been defined, observations should 
be matched to the different categories. 
The goal of this book is to explain the constraints on strategy formation and choice in bilateral regulatory 
cooperation and thus to understand why a regulator such as the Commission chooses different strategies 
in different regulatory contexts. Potential alternative explanations can thus be discarded if they are 
present in all cases and take the same value across cases. The literature review in chapter 2 already 
argued why ‘global regulatory capitalism’ and ‘domestic regulatory culture’ approaches taken in 
isolation struggle to explain the puzzle that motivates this book. The case selection of the subsequent 
empirical analysis should, however, also discard potential ‘international political economy’ 
explanations. For this reason, cases need to be selected which are characterised by dense interactions 
among regulators in international organisations and international organisations and agreements with 
judicial enforceability. These would support explanations within this field of literature that underline 
the influence of international institutions. The sectoral regimes of space/aeronautics, biotechnology, 
construction, defence, gambling, raw materials and transport services have until present not been subject 
to substantial regulation within international organisations (for a positive list of sectoral regimes that 
have been addressed by international organisations see Jorgensen et al., 2011). As table 11 shows, a 
number of potential cases can be discarded: 
Space/Aeronautics Automotive Biotechnology 
Chemicals Construction Cosmetics 
Defence Engineering Food / Food Safety 
Gambling Healthcare / Pharmaceuticals Information and Communications 
Technology  
Maritime  Medical devices Raw materials 
Textiles Toys Financial services 
Aircraft Transport services  
Table 11: Overview of sectoral regimes with international cooperation 
 
Moreover, an explanation supporting the Inter-relational Institutionalism must be able to discard rival 
Open Economy Politics explanations. Open Economy Politics contributions underline the influence of 
societal contestation and the aggregation of societal preferences. They stipulate that the ability of state 
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actors to engage in regulatory cooperation is constrained where the level of societal contestation is high 
and NGOs leverage resources against the pursuit of regulatory cooperation. To reject an Open Economy 
Politics explanation, first all sectoral regimes can be discarded that have not been the subject of intensive 
contestation and thus not subject of politicisation on the issue of regulatory cooperation between 
business actors and NGOs. The intensity of societal contestation on regulatory cooperation is 
approximated using the Commission’s assessment of societal contestation in its sectoral position papers 
on TTIP regulatory cooperation published in 2014. All sectors for which the Commission does not 
‘sensitive or controversial issues’ are discarded.  
Table 12 illustrates that despite the overall high level of politicisation during the TTIP negotiations, the 
level of societal contestation has remained relatively low for the automotive, maritime, textiles and toys 
sectoral (Commission, 2013f). The corresponding sectoral regimes can thus equally be discarded as case 
studies to test the explanatory strength of the Inter-relational Institutionalism. 
Space/Aeronautics Automotive Biotechnology 
Chemicals Construction Cosmetics 
Defence Engineering Food / Food Safety 
Gambling Healthcare / Pharmaceuticals Information and Communications 
Technology  
Maritime  Medical devices Raw materials 
Textiles Toys Financial services 
Aircraft Transport services  
Table 12: Industry sectoral regimes with politicisation 
 
To substantiate the rejection of alternative Open Economy Politics explanations, second, all sectoral 
regimes that are not characterised by high volumes of intra-industry trade should be discarded. High 
volumes of intra-industry trade increase the salience of a sector and thus the likelihood that societal 
actors mobilise resources proactively to gain access to decision-makers (for a discussion of salience on 
lobbying see Klüver, 2012; Mahoney, 2007). A proactive mobilisation of societal actors would weaken 
the argument that bureaucratic pressure is necessary to initiate the formation of a regulatory cooperation 
strategy. Sectoral regimes should thus be chosen in which underlying industry sectors show high levels 
of intra-industry trade. Besides, this decision further helps to disregard international political economy 
explanations that emphasise economic internationalisation. Figure 11 shows EU exports to the US by 
sales volume in the largest sectors (see next page; for complete data see Annex 3).  
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Figure 11: EU exports to the US by sector, 2016 
 
As a result, the relatively low-volume trade sectors medical devices and cosmetics are discarded as 
shown by table 13.   
Space/Aeronautics Automotive Biotechnology 
Chemicals Construction Cosmetics 
Defence Engineering Food / Food Safety 
Gambling Healthcare / Pharmaceuticals Information and Communications 
Technology  
Maritime  Medical devices Raw materials 
Textiles Toys Financial services 
Aircraft Transport services  
Table 13: Industry sectoral regimes with high intra-industry trade 
 
Besides, sectoral regimes within the Commission’s internal market policy can be assumed to be those 
sectors on which the Commission has authority to propose and adopt regulations on the ‘non-essential 
parts’ of the corresponding sectoral legislation. This point has been elaborated in chapter 4.4.1. This 
ensures that the Commission can in principle choose to pursue regulatory cooperation and avoids that 
the empirical analysis does not yield any results because the Commission is not entitled to form and 
choose a strategy.    
To test the Inter-relational Institutionalism, cases need to be selected to ensure variation on the 
explanatory variables. As variation on the explanatory variables requires itself an in-depth analysis of 
the regulations and implementation procedures governing each sector, cases are selected to maximise 
the likelihood that variation can be observed along the variables deduced in the theoretical framework. 
Variation must especially be especially ensured on the independent variables which constrain the 
formation and choice of a bilateral regulatory cooperation strategy. 
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The Inter-relational Institutionalism puts forward that the choice among bilateral regulatory cooperation 
strategies is constrained by regulatory compatibilities. It shall not be assumed that regulatory authority 
structures and underlying regulatory principles are homogenous for all regulatory policies and 
implementation procedures that govern a sectoral regime. The case studies rather seek to maximise the 
likelihood that all possible combinations of regulatory compatibilities and their effect on the constraint 
of the choice of a bilateral regulatory cooperation strategy can be observed. To estimate the likelihood 
that regulatory compatibilities vary across the sectors, existing literature is used.  
Vogel (2012) argues that distinct regulatory principles persist in the EU in the chemicals and food safety 
sectors because of the EU’s reliance on the precautionary principle. Naiki (2007) adds that in the 
chemicals sector, the EU adopts a distinct allocation of competences between the Commission and 
private actors. Büthe and Mattli (2011) conclude that in international technical standardisation, shaping 
notably the engineering sector, the allocation of authority in the EU is distinctly different from the 
authority on standardisation in the US.  
This book therefore chooses the industry sectoral regimes chemicals, engineering, food safety and 
information and communication technology (ICT) as case studies to apply the theoretical framework.  
Based on insights of existing literature, these sectors can be broadly matched to the combinations of 
regulatory compatibilities as illustrated by figure 12:  
 
Regulatory authority 
structures 
Regulatory principles 
Incompatible Compatible 
Incompatible Chemicals Engineering 
Compatible Food safety 
Information and communication 
technology (ICT) 
Figure 12: Regulatory compatibilities and case selection 
 
Case selection based on Mill’s methods has been criticised for the omission of potential causal 
explanatory variables and its inability to account for multiple causation. George and Bennett (2005: 153-
160) and Goldthorpe (2000: 49) criticise that in reality cases are not as clearly organised as demanded 
by theory and may score differently on different explanatory variables. While this problem cannot be 
entirely eliminated, this book seeks to control for this risk by basing the case selection on a 
comprehensive synthesis of the preceding literature review. King, Keohane and Verba (1994) criticise 
that neither of Mill’s methods can account for multiple causation as a variable is eliminated if it exerts 
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its influence only in combination with another variable. In particular if a variable exerts its influence 
only in combination with another variable, it will be eliminated by Mill’s methods. This problem is at 
least mitigated through systematic process-tracing within the case studies (see chapter 5.2).  
 
Selecting cooperation initiatives as sub-cases 
 
The empirical chapters of this book will analyse the four selected sectoral regimes with regard to the 
constraints that different Commission actors face in choosing a strategy for regulatory cooperation with 
the US. Thus, it needs to look at specific initiatives of transatlantic regulatory cooperation for which 
Commission actors formed regulatory cooperation strategies.  
The identification of such sub-cases needs to meet the following criteria: First, cooperation initiatives 
should cover all four selected sectoral case studies. Second, all cooperation initiatives should involve 
the mobilisation and consultation of societal actors to ensure positive outcomes on the independent 
variable ‘societal mobilisation’ and to allow an observation of the causal mechanism. Third, to test 
constraints on the formation of a regulatory cooperation strategy, the selection of cases should also 
reflect variation on the independent variable ‘bureaucratic pressure’. The participation of individual 
Commission actors in line with the delineation of chapter 4.4.2 should therefore vary between the 
cooperation initiatives.  
First, sub-cases should allow the observation of the formation of cooperation strategies in all selected 
sectoral case studies. This is necessary to keep the context of interaction constant for each sub-case 
across the sectoral regime case studies. Transatlantic regulatory cooperation between the EU and the US 
has begun in the early 1990s and since then taken place in different initiatives. Some initiatives were 
directly linked to other initiatives, creating mechanisms of preparation and oversight. Regulatory 
cooperation across various sectors was targeted in the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) that was linked 
to the Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP; Commission, 2001b; Commission, 2000b), in the 
High-Level Regulatory Cooperation Forum (HLRCF; Commission, 2005a) complemented by the 
Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC; Transatlantic Economic Council, 2007a) and in the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations (Commission, 2013f). In the Positive Economic 
Agenda (PEA), in turn, regulatory cooperation was restricted to insurance, financial services, public 
procurement and food regulation (Commission, 2003e). In the TEP, regulatory cooperation was only 
addressed horizontally, i.e. through the development of Guidelines for Regulatory Cooperation 
(Commission, 2001b; Commission, 1998). 
Table 14 (see next page) summarises the regulatory cooperation initiatives which have been established 
between the EU and the US. It shows that the HLRCF and the TEC were connected initiatives.   
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Name Established Topics  Organisation  
New Transatlantic Agenda 
(NTA) 
1995  Encompassing: 150 goals  Summits: biannual summits 
of EU and US leaders 
Senior Level Group: senior 
government officials from 
both sides 
Junior Task Force: 
technical-level interactions 
 
Agendas of different 
forums do not overlap   
Transatlantic Economic 
Partnership (TEP) 
1998  multilateral free trade in the agriculture, 
industrial tariffs, investment, competition 
and procurement 
general government guidelines for 
effective regulatory cooperation  
improving reciprocal access to regulatory 
procedures 
Co-chaired by EU Trade 
Commissioner and US 
Trade Representative for 
Europe 
EU-US Safe Harbour 
Agreement 
2000 Data privacy DG Justice 
US Department of 
Commerce 
Positive Economic Agenda 
(PEA) 
2002  regulatory cooperation in insurance, 
financial services, 
public procurement and food regulation 
Created out of the TEP 
Technical-level interactions 
Financial Market Regulatory 
Dialogue 
2002 Financial services 
Financial market regulation  
DG Internal Market 
US Securities and 
Exchange Commission  
High-Level Regulatory 
Cooperation Forum 
(HLRCF)   
2005  Various sectoral dialogues: insurance, 
financial services, 
public procurement food regulation, 
automobile safety, chemicals, radio and 
telecommunications 
Technical-level 
interactions 
Senior-level support 
Meets ahead of TEC 
meetings 
 
Transatlantic Economic 
Council (TEC) 
2007  Regulatory convergence in 40 public 
policy areas, including intellectual 
property rights, security standards for 
international trade, regulatory 
obstacles to investment and financial 
markets or innovation and 
technology in health industries 
Co-chaired by the 
Commissioner for Industry 
and the US Deputy 
National Security 
Advisor for International 
Economic Affairs 
oversees HLRCF 
Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) 
2013 Horizontal regulatory cooperation: 
regulatory coherence and Good Regulatory 
Practices 
Regulatory cooperation in food safety and 
animal and plant health (Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures), engineering 
(including Technical Barriers to Trade), 
chemicals, cosmetics, medical devices 
pesticides, ICT, pharmaceuticals, textiles, 
automotive vehicles  
DG Trade 
Technical DGs 
Table 14: Regulatory cooperation initiatives between the EU and US  
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Second, to ensure positive outcomes on the independent variable ‘societal mobilisation’ and to be able 
to observe variation on this variable over time, the initiatives should involve the consultation and 
mobilisation of societal actors. Table 15 shows that societal actors from both the EU and the US were 
involved in both the NTA, the HLRCF and the TEC as well as the TTIP (Commission, 2014l; 
Transatlantic Economic Council, 2009a; Commission, 2005a; European Council, 1998).  
 
Initiative Involvement of societal actors 
New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD) 
Transatlantic Consumers Dialogue (TACD) 
Transatlantic Labour Dialogue (TALD) 
Transatlantic Environmental Dialogue (TAED) 
Transatlantic Legislator Dialogue (TALD) 
High-Level Regulatory Cooperation Forum (HLRCF) / 
Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC) 
Public consultation in 2004 
Group of Advisors: Heads of the Transatlantic Business 
Council (TABC) and TACD 
Ad-hoc consultations: business associations, firms, NGOs 
and academia 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)  Three public consultations 
Stakeholder meetings at TTIP negotiation rounds 
TTIP Advisory Council: 14 members from EU business 
associations and NGOs  
 
Table 15: Involvement of societal actors in regulatory cooperation initiatives 
 
Third, the initiatives should vary as regards the participation of different actors within the Commission 
to ensure variation in the independent variable ‘bureaucratic pressure’. In the NTA, regulatory 
cooperation was allocated to the Junior Task Force and thus to officials from DGs on technical levels 
(Commission, 2001b; Commission, 2000b). In the HLRCF and in the TEC, the interactions between 
Commission and US technical officials were given oversight by senior officials and Commissioners 
(Transatlantic Economic Council, 2009; Transatlantic Economic Council, 2007a). The TTIP 
negotiations were prepared by a High-Level Working Group consisting in the EU mostly of officials 
from DG Trade (Inside US Trade, 2012d). The Commission position papers for the TTIP negotiations 
were then drafted under the joint lead of DG Trade and officials from the technical DGs (Inside US 
Trade, 2014f; Commission, 2013f).. The variation in the participation of actors within the Commission 
across the three cooperation initiatives which involved regulatory cooperation discussions in all sectors 
selected for the case studies of this book and mobilisation of societal actors can thus be summarised as 
follows: 
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This book therefore chooses the NTA, the HLRCF/TEC and the TTIP negotiations as sub-case studies 
within the sectoral case studies to apply the theoretical framework. Figure 13 shows that these sub-cases 
can be matched to the variation in bureaucratic participation as follows:  
Cooperation 
Initiative 
NTA HLRCF/TEC TTIP (High-Level 
Working Group) 
Commission 
bureaucratic politics 
Technical officials in Junior 
Task Force 
Technical officials  
+ Senior-level officials  
+ Lead Commissioners 
DG Trade (technical + 
senior-level) 
+ 
Technical DG (technical + 
senior-level)  
Figure 13: Variation in bureaucratic participation and case selection 
 
The New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) launched in 1995 was the first large-scale regulatory cooperation 
initiative between the EU and the US (Lütz, 2011; Pollack, 2005; Peterson et al, 2005; Peterson & 
Pollack, 2003; Pollack & Shaffer, 2001; Vogel, 1997; Kahler, 1995). It operated on the basis of biannual 
Summits of EU and US leaders, namely between the US President and a delegation of EU officials, 
consisting of the President of the Commission, the rotating Presidency of the Council of Ministers, and 
the High Representative of the EU for the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The Summit meetings 
were supplemented by meetings of the Senior-Level Group. Within the latter, high-level officials from 
both sides held regular meetings. The US Undersecretary of State and Commission Directors General 
were tasked to oversee the implementation of the work of the Senior-Level Group.  
In addition, a Junior Task Force was established to plan targets for the work in regulatory policy 
cooperation (Lütz, 2011: 6). It comprised technical specialist officials from the Commission 
Directorates General and the corresponding departments of the US Administration. US regulatory 
agencies were not part of the process. The Junior Task Force was tasked to remove or manage “behind-
the-border non-tariff barriers caused by domestic regulation of issues like product safety, food safety, 
data protection, and financial services” (Pollack, 2005: 905).  
Lower-level EU and US technical officials met in issue-specific working groups and committees. 
Therein, they exchanged information and established “laundry lists” of issues for the annual Summits 
(Pollack, 2005: 900) with a view to the harmonisation and mutual recognition of each other’s 
regulations. In support of this work, they consulted notably with the Transatlantic Business Dialogue 
(TABD)63. While in the first years of the NTA consultations often took place on very technical issues 
                                                     
63 The TABD was an initiative of a group of EU and US chief executive officers (CEOs) which was established 
just before the launch of the NTA. The CEOs held annual meetings to identify areas for transatlantic cooperation. 
Moreover, the CEOs met annually with US government and Commission officials and the participants of the 
annual EU-US Summits. After early successes, the CEOs soon lost interest in the TABD, in particular after they 
felt that the “low-hanging fruits” had been picked and that neither the EU nor the US could implement the reforms 
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such as testing and certification procedures, the agenda broadened after 1998 to include issues such as 
e-commerce and the regulation of capital markets (Commission, 2000b; Commission, 1998). Moreover, 
officials consulted with the Transatlantic Consumers Dialogue (TACD)64. The NTA continued until 
2004 when it had led to 33 bilateral, sectoral agreements and 49 dialogue structures at different technical 
and political levels (Peterson et al., 2005: 10).  
The HLRCF was established in 2005 and was active until 2011 (Commission, 2013f). It was created 
after the adoption of the non-binding set of Guidelines for Regulatory Cooperation and Transparency in 
2002 and the adoption of the Roadmaps for EU-US Regulatory Cooperation in 2004 and 2005 
(Commission, 2005a; Commission, 2004b; Commission & US Trade Department, 2002). The latter 
identified priority areas for regulatory cooperation across a range of policy issues. Besides, it committed 
the EU and the US to establish the HLRCF. The HLRCF included senior-level officials from different 
Commission Directorates General and US regulatory agencies (Commission, 2005a). On the EU side, it 
was co-chaired by the Director General of DG Enterprise and the US side by the Associate Administrator 
of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) which is part of the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB; Commission, 2006a). Its task was to monitor the progress of the cooperation 
priorities identified under the Roadmaps and set objectives for the future (Commission, 2006c). For the 
latter, senior officials met with societal actors in public sessions that were part of the bi-annual meetings 
(Commission, 2007a).  
The TEC was established in parallel to the HLRCF at the 2007 US-EU Summit by President Bush, 
German Chancellor Merkel and Commission President Barroso (Transatlantic Economic Council, 
2007a). It was a ministerial-level body to oversee, guide and accelerate implementation of the work 
under the HLRCF. Meetings took place bi-annually. The TEC was co-chaired by the EU Commissioner 
for Industry and the Director of the US National Economic Council (Transatlantic Economic Council, 
2007a). On the EU side, the permanent members of the TEC in addition to the EU Co-chair were the 
Commissioners for External Relations, for Trade and for Internal Market and Services. On the US side, 
the Secretaries for Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, Health and Human Services, Labour and the heads 
of many regulatory agencies attended the meetings (US Department of State, 2007). In 2007, only few 
Commissioners other than Verheugen supported the TEC process. In particular Environment 
Commissioner Dimas and Health Commissioner Vassiliou reportedly actively opposed the TEC and 
                                                     
which the TABD had proposed. Besides, as a result of the decreasing interest in the TABD among firms, the TABD 
after 2002 encountered problems to recruit CEOs for its rotating leadership. The TABD was subsequently 
relaunched, but sustaining the interest of CEOs still proved difficult as many CEOs struggled to see tangible 
benefits in the structured dialogue (Cowles, 2005).  
64The TACD was a networking group for EU and US consumer organisations. Although it suffered from a number 
of financial difficulties and disagreements in its beginning during the mid-1990s, it succeeded to coordinate 
positions of EU and US consumer organisations and produced a number of position papers on important issues 
within its working groups. Authors point out, however, that frustration among members grew as they felt that they 
did not enjoy the same level of access to the US government or the Commission as members of the TABD (Peterson 
et al., 2005: 55).  
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refused to participate in TEC meetings despite the inclusion of "their" issues on the agenda. (US 
Department of State, 2007). Technical officials from Commission DGs, US government departments 
and regulatory agencies worked on issues identified for cooperation under the TEC in the time between 
meetings (Transatlantic Economic Council, 2008). Technical officials, could, however, not make policy 
decisions (Transatlantic Economic Council, 2009). During TEC meetings, both political representatives 
and technical officials also met with societal actors, notably the Transatlantic Business Council (TABC), 
which replaced the former TABD, and the TACD.  
The TEC included six pillars, i.e. regulatory cooperation, capital markets integration, investment, 
innovation, IPR protection and transport security (Transatlantic Economic Council, 2010a). Under the 
regulatory cooperation pillar, the Commissioners intended to address regulatory impediments in the 
food, drug, chemical, automotive, and electrical/electronic sectors. TEC members dropped regulatory 
cooperation issues from the agenda after US Cabinet members criticised that technical issues were not 
worth of Cabinet-level focus (Transatlantic Economic Council, 2011a; US Department of State, 2009b). 
Since then, regulatory cooperation shifted to the innovation pillar (Transatlantic Economic Council, 
2010a). With the launch of the TTIP negotiations, ministerial-level meetings within the TEC structure 
stopped (Commission, 2013f).  
The TTIP negotiations were prepared by a High-Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth (HLWG) 
which was chaired by the US Trade Representative and the EU Trade Commissioner (Inside US Trade, 
2012d). The HLWG was tasked to identify measures to enhance trade and investment between the EU 
and the US. To this purpose, it elaborated a report (High-Level Working Group, 2013). DG Trade 
proposed regulatory cooperation as a major instrument to achieve the increase in trade and investment. 
In order to identify issues for regulatory cooperation, DG Trade launched a public consultation in 2012, 
asking societal actors to submit comments and “concrete ideas” how to align regulations in specific 
economic sectors (Inside US Trade, 2012a). The results of this consultation entered the Report of the 
High-Level Working Group which was endorsed by both Commission President Barroso and US 
President Obama in February 2013 (High-Level Working Group, 2013). With the endorsement of the 
Report, the TTIP negotiations were formally launched. The first round of TTIP negotiations was held in 
July 2013. 15 negotiation rounds took place until October 2016 (Commission, 2016i). Since then, 
negotiations are frozen. 
The TTIP negotiations were chaired by the EU Trade Commissioner and the US Trade Representative. 
The negotiations were divided into three equal pillars: market access, regulatory cooperation, and rules. 
Under the regulatory cooperation pillar, EU and US officials discussed regulatory cooperation in eleven 
sectors: TBT, SPS, chemicals, cosmetics, engineering, medical devices, pesticides, ICT, 
pharmaceuticals, textiles and vehicles (Commission, 2013f). Moreover, they negotiated overarching, so-
called ‘horizontal’, regulatory cooperation provisions which should apply to all sectors. On the EU side, 
lead negotiators were both officials from DG Trade and officials from technical DGs (Commission, 
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2015b). Since the fourth round, both EU and US negotiators met with societal actors at the margins of 
each negotiation round in stakeholder meetings in which societal actors could present their priorities in 
brief public presentations (Commission, 2014n)65.  
In sum, this sub-section has selected the cases which will be used and examined in the empirical analysis 
of the subsequent chapter. It has briefly outlined the reasons why the EU and the Commission are an 
appropriate object to study the formation of a regulatory cooperation. It has then argued why the US is 
a ‘least likely’ case for EU regulators to require bureaucratic pressure in order to initiate the formation 
of a bilateral regulatory cooperation strategy. Four industry sectoral regimes have then been selected 
with a view to discard potential alternative explanations and to ensure variation on the independent 
variable 2, ‘regulatory compatibilities’. In a next step, three regulatory cooperation initiatives between 
the EU and the US have been defined as sub-cases, ensuring variation on the independent variable 1, 
‘bureaucratic pressure’. Besides, they have been selected to safeguard the possibility of positive 
outcomes on the independent variable 3, ‘societal mobilisation’ for all three sub-cases.    
 
5.2. Data analysis 
 
The empirical case studies of this book examine the four selected sectoral regimes by using qualitative 
case study methods. I argue that case study methods are suitable to understand the complex and dynamic 
interactions that influence processes of strategy formation in a complex institutional setting such as the 
EU.  
The main research question of this book ‘What constrains the Commission’s formation and choice of a 
bilateral regulatory cooperation strategy?’ presupposes that it closely examines the processes of 
strategy formation that connect the variables of its theoretical framework. It aims at establishing the 
causal mechanism, understood as “the processes and intervening variables through which an explanatory 
variable exerts a causal effect on an outcome variable” (Bennett 1997). The processes that influence the 
strategy formation are crucial to understand the constraints on the Commission’s pursuit of bilateral 
regulatory cooperation. A case study offers the conduct of a detailed and deep analysis.  
To examine the collected data, this book relies both on within-case and between-case analysis. Mahoney 
(2005: 389) distinguishes both based on the level of aggregation. While between-case analysis compares 
variables between cases in an aggregate, within-case analysis compares within cases in disaggregation 
                                                     
65 In line with the rules for the conduct of trade negotiations in the EU that have described in chapter 4.4.1, DG 
Trade and other negotiating DGs also informed Council representatives in the TPC as well as members of the 
European Parliament in the INTA Committee after each negotiation round and consulted them before upcoming 
rounds (Commission, 2014, Commission, 2015).  
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(Mahoney 2005: 389). The sub-cases within the four sectoral case studies are analysed separately to 
show the interplay of the different independent and dependent variables.  
Between-case analysis seeks to establish the causal relationship between the independent variable 
‘regulatory compatibilities’ and the dependent variable. The sectoral regime cases have been selected 
based on the method of difference to realise a maximum variance on the independent variable 
‘regulatory compatibilities’. The between-case analysis focuses on finding the distinctive patterns that 
lead to differences in the constraints on the bilateral regulatory cooperation strategies at which the 
Commission aims (Yin 2009: 156-160). The generalisability of these findings increases because this 
book has employed several case studies. As noted in the previous section, the selection of cases based 
on the method of difference especially enhances the generalisability of the results.  
Within-case analyses employ methods with which “hypotheses are evaluated by elucidating intervening 
processes” (Mahoney 2005: 17). George and Bennett (2005) give pattern-matching, causal narratives 
and process-tracing as examples of methods for within-case analyses. Among these, process-tracing is 
arguably the most frequently employed one to establish causal relationships between variables. Process-
tracing allows increasing the number of observations and understanding the causal mechanism which 
links variation in explanatory factors to observed outcomes. It “attempts to uncover what stimuli the 
actors attend to, the decision process that makes use of these stimuli to arrive at decisions, the actual 
behaviour that then occurs, the effect of various institutional arrangements on attention, processing, and 
behaviour, and the effect of other variables of interest on attention, processing, and behaviour (George 
& McKeown, 1985: 35; in Dür, 2007: 189). The advantage of process-tracing is that it does not only 
allow determine correlations between variables, but also establishing that there is a causal relationship 
between the variables. Process-tracing enables inferences about how certain o9utcomes come to happen 
(Beach and Pedersen 2013: 2). This book thus uses process-tracing for the within-case analyses. It relies 
on process-tracing notably for the TEC and TTIP sub-cases in which bureaucratic processes are 
theorised to shape the formation of regulatory cooperation strategies66. 
Beach and Pedersen (2013) distinguish theory-testing, theory-building, and explaining outcome variants 
of process-tracing. As the goal of this book is to test the causal mechanism theorised by the Inter-
relational Institutionalism, it relies on the theory-testing variant of process-tracing. The causal 
mechanism linking the variables was derived from previous theoretical literature. The use of process-
tracing shall thus examine if the theorised mechanism is verified by the empirical evidence.  
                                                     
66 The difficulty to obtain sufficiently detailed data on the processes of strategy formation during the NTA restricts 
the use of systematic process-tracing for the first sub-case. At the time, the discretion of technical officials in the 
formation of specific cooperation strategies and the consequently less complex decision-making processes also 
make the use of process-tracing less suitable for the first sub-cases.   
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The combination of between-case and within-case analysis allows this book to first test the hypotheses 
on the integrated reasoning of the New Interdependence Approach and actor-centred institutionalism 
and then use the cross-case synthesis of the within-case analyses to substantiate and confirm the findings.      
 
5.3. Data collection   
 
To make inferences, case study methods require reliable data. Data collection refers to methods for 
collecting reliable evidence, e.g. participant observation, randomised experiments, content analysis or 
sample surveys (King, Keohane & Verba 1994: 51). The choice of a data collection method needs to 
reflect the choice of the method of data analysis. For the use of process-tracing in case study research, 
Bennett and Elman state that “the researcher examines histories, archival documents, interview 
transcripts, and other sources to see whether the causal process (…) is in fact evident” (2007: 6). This 
implies that all data that can help to elucidate the constraints relevant for the strategy formation process 
of the Commission is relevant. The formation of regulatory cooperation strategies is not only a recent 
process, but has been relevant since the inception of the transatlantic regulatory cooperation in the early 
1990s. This book thus needs to rely on both recent and historical documents to understand the constraints 
considered in the strategy formation process. The data collection combines document analysis with 
expert interviews. This section will discuss both document analysis and expert interviewing.  
 
Document analysis 
 
One of the methods frequently applied in case study research is document analysis (King, Keohane & 
Verba, 1994: 51). Document analysis is also an important source of collecting reliable data. The next 
paragraphs discuss how and which documents were collected for the within-case analyses of this book. 
They adopt the frequent distinction between primary and secondary sources. A primary source is a 
document which is created during the process examined whereas a secondary source constitutes an 
analysis or interpretation of a primary source.  
This book is interested in all primary and secondary sources that help it trace the decision-making 
process for the formation of a strategy in the Commission. This involves documents from first drafts of 
issues for cooperation written by technical officials in a Commission DG to the adoption of negotiating 
texts in the College of Commissioners and conclusions of EU-US working groups or Summit meetings. 
Relevant primary sources are both public documents of the Commission that refer to the strategy that 
the Commission seeks to adopt in regulatory dialogues with the US and non-public documents that offer 
background information and explanations of the Commission’s choice of strategy.  
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Public primary documents can be mostly obtained from the website of the Commission. For the 
Commission’s formation of a strategy for regulatory cooperation, the most important public documents 
are annual Trade Barriers Reports, roadmaps for regulatory cooperation dialogues, the position papers 
for regulatory cooperation in individual sectors in the TTIP negotiations, textual proposals for the TTIP 
negotiations and EU-US Summit conclusions. Trade Barriers Reports indicate which regulatory 
measures the Commission considers as particularly important for potential discussion in regulatory 
cooperation. The contrast of EU-US Summit conclusions with Trade Barriers Reports and internal 
Commission documents reveals how and which issues the Commission translated from the definition of 
trade barriers into demands for regulatory cooperation.  
Non-public primary documents of the Commissions which were produced as a preparation or in the 
context of regulatory cooperation discussions are equally essential. Examples for internal documents are 
meeting reports, drafts for inter-service consultations and strategic notes sent by the Commission to the 
Trade Policy Committee in the Council. Usually, internal documents are not accessible to the public and 
need to be retrieved by researchers by filing an Access to Document request under Regulation 
1049/2001. Many internal documents on the TTIP negotiations have, however, been requested by 
NGOs, especially Greenpeace and the Corporate Europe Observatory, under the Regulation and have 
subsequently been released to the public on the websites of these organisations. Confidential documents 
have also been leaked by Members of the European Parliament and members of national parliaments, 
notably the German Bundestag, and have been placed on platforms such as Correctiv.org. Internal 
Commission documents on the HLRCF and TEC have been released by the platform Wikileaks. The 
empirical chapters will refer to these documents.   
Secondary sources analysing or commenting the Commission’s engagement in regulatory cooperation 
comprise several kinds of documents. This book obtained essential information from academics and 
policy-observers following the Commission’s pursuit of regulatory cooperation. Important sources were 
policy papers published by Brussels-based think tanks, e.g. the TTIP series published by the Centre of 
European Policy Studies. Position papers published by societal actors offered background information 
on the content of regulations and the design of implementation procedures in the EU and the US as 
perceived by societal actors. Their use in this book is nonetheless important as descriptions in these 
position papers also informed Commission officials and offered background knowledge to their 
decision-making behaviour. Insights into discussions among Commission DGs were further retrieved 
from articles by the specialist journal ‘Inside US Trade’. Information on decision-making in the 
Commission and its behaviour in meetings with US officials could also be obtained from classified 
reports of the US government that were released on Wikileaks. Other sources include academic journal 
articles which examine regulatory cooperation notably within the NTA and regulatory cooperation 
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between the EU and other third countries67. A crucial source were also legal science articles on EU and 
US regulatory frameworks and policy papers commissioned by the European Commission, notably the 
Ecorys Impact Assessment studies, as well as International Trade (INTA) Committee of the EP. 
Secondary sources are referenced in the empirical chapters.  
 
Expert interviews 
 
Case study research further often requires additional ‘insider knowledge’ that cannot be obtained from 
document analysis alone, but relies on expert interviews (Cohen, 1999; Leech, 2002). Following 
Manheim and Rich (1995: 161), ‘experts’ are understood as those individuals who were directly 
involved in the process under examination and who have first-hand knowledge that can help to answer 
the research questions (Manheim & Rich 1995: 161-2). A person is interviewed because of her 
knowledge of an issue. As this book concentrates on the decision-making that takes place within the 
Commission, process-tracing needs to consider the views and experiences of the officials who are 
involved in the formation of the regulatory cooperation strategy. The goal of expert interviews is to 
‘assist in reconstructing some event or discerning a pattern in specific behaviors’ (Manheim & Rich, 
1995: 162). Expert interviews are often used in case study research relying on process-tracing because 
they increase the number of observations and allow shedding light on the actions and decisions that 
establish the chain of events producing a decision and thus elucidate the functioning of the causal 
mechanism (Tansey, 2007: 765-66). An interview can thus gain access to information that is otherwise 
not available. They also enable assuming an ‘insider perspective’ and gain insights on the importance 
of individual actors. Moreover, expert interviews allow triangulating inferences that were drawn from 
document analysis. 
By assuming an ‘insider perspective’, the expert interviews helped structure the research in two ways: 
First, they allowed better understanding the relevance of regulatory cooperation as a topic. The initial 
objective of this study was to understand why the EU only reduced some non-tariff trade barriers in its 
trade liberalisation efforts, but left others in place. Early interviews with both government officials and 
business representatives indicated that this question was both too broad and abstract to be effectively 
addressed through a dissertation. Instead, interviewees drew attention to the regulatory cooperation 
efforts that the Commission was undertaking in the context of the TTIP negotiations and before. 
Moreover, they stressed that it was much more important to understand the political dynamics that were 
underlying these efforts than the patterns of business mobilisation shaping traditional trade negotiations. 
                                                     
67 For a discussion of the use of previous academic literature as observations in process-tracing see (Leuffen, 2007: 
157)  
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Expert interviews thus helped make the research question both more precise and direct it to dynamics 
which were considered as relevant by policy experts.  
Second, the expert interviews guided the search for empirical information already available elsewhere.  
Little of the information obtained through expert interviews is new or unavailable. Interviews, however, 
show a researcher what information to look for to understand an issue or a process. Moreover, the 
interviews clarified which officials and associations are ultimately closely involved in the consultation 
for and the drafting of position papers and thus the formation of the EU’s regulatory cooperation 
strategy. An internet search of these people helped find documents, including often detailed minutes, of 
meetings they attended, positions they took in interviews with other researchers or journalists, or even 
personal or scientific accounts of their reflections on regulatory cooperation interactions in the past. 
Frequently employed interview techniques are standardised questionnaires, semi-structured and non-
structured, open question interviews (Leech, 2002).  Standardised interviews frequently measure 
political attitudes or specific political behaviour such as voting. Non-structured interviews often take 
the form of a conversation in which the role of the researcher is comparable to that of an ethnographer. 
This book builds on semi-structured interviews as a method to carry out expert interviews. Semi-
structured interviews aim at grasping the experiences, opinions and perspectives of interviewees. They 
give interviewees the opportunity to elaborate certain points and share personal reflections and 
interpretations of an event or process (Marsh & Stoker, 2010: 138). Moreover, interviewees share the 
relative weight they attach to individual factors for a decision. Despite its embedding in rational-choice 
literature, opinions and perceptions are important in institutionalist accounts. The technical details, but 
also the personal observations, reflections and experiences of interviewees help to reconstruct the 
considerations that led to the development of a specific regulatory cooperation strategy.  Semi-structured 
interviews are thus a suitable technique for the conduct of expert interviews for this book. 
Semi-structured interviews rely on an interview guide of building block questions that interviewees 
respond to freely and in a non-standardised way. The interviewer may change and adapt the order of 
questions to the interview context and handle the interview guide flexibly. Besides, during the interview 
the interviewee may add further information or suggest additional topics. Responses of interviewees are 
not coded or analysed by statistical means. 
Methodology 
146 
 
The interview guides were constructed according to a comparable structure for all interviews even if 
questions were adapted to both the role and the likely knowledge of interviewees. The following box 
offers general examples of questions that were asked in most of the interviews (for full interview guides 
see Annex 2).  
  
Many of these questions address sensitive information on intra-institutional relations and relations with 
US regulators. To ensure that responses would constitute reliable information, interviewees were 
assured both in the initial contact with the interview request and at the beginning of the interview that 
their answers would be treated anonymously. To further demonstrate interviewees that their responses 
would be handled with care, the interviews were not recorded. Instead, extensive notes were taken during 
the interview. A list of all interviews is provided in the annex. To protect the identity of interviewees, 
only their affiliation is indicated (Commission / societal actor).  
The selection of interviewees for semi-structured expert interviews is crucial. Unlike other interview 
techniques, expert interviews are not based on random sampling. Instead, interviewees are selected 
deliberately because of their knowledge. To identify adequate interviewees, this study relied on 
purposive sampling and snowball sampling (Tansey, 2007: 770). For purposive sampling, research was 
carried out to identify the units and officials that were responsible for regulatory cooperation within a 
sector. Rather than selecting several interviewees from the same DG, the selection of interviewees 
focused on ensuring interviews with officials from all DGs that contributed to the formation of the 
strategy in the relevant processes. Interviewees were also identified and contacted through the 
participation in two Stakeholder Dialogues on 24 February 2016 and 13 July 2016 at the margins of the 
TTIP negotiations. Moreover, through snowball sampling interviewees were asked to suggest persons 
that could be contacted for the research project.  
The number of interviewees who are sufficiently knowledgeable of the processes that influence the 
formation of the Commission’s strategy on regulatory cooperation as well as the factors and technical 
• Which processes have contributed to the formation of the Commission’s regulatory 
cooperation strategy in …? 
• How were you involved in these processes? How has the agenda of … been set?  
• Why did you participate in these processes? What has been your interest? 
• Please describe the US regulatory approach on …. How do you think that it differs from 
the EU approach on this issue?  
• Why did you decide to take position … on issue … ?  
• Have you changed your position later? 
• Which actors in the Commission have contributed to … [inter-service consultations]? 
• What have been the positions of these actors? 
• How do you assess your ability to influence these processes? 
• How have the EP/the Council/societal actors influenced the Commission’s decision?  
• What other influences have there been?   
 
•  
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issues determining its choice of strategy is limited. In many cases, snowball sampling illustrated that it 
was enough to speak to one person within a DG to understand how this DG contributed to the 
Commission’s strategy. This study concentrated on obtaining interviews with all relevant interviewees. 
Substantial time was spent on ensuring that all relevant interviewees could be contacted. In many cases, 
the frequent travels of Commission officials between Brussels and Washington during the TTIP 
negotiations made it difficult to contact officials on an issue that was in itself already politically highly 
sensitive. Moreover, due to the rotation of officials between DGs, EU institutions and even between the 
Commission and private organisations it proved difficult in some cases to identify interviewees through 
either purposive or snowball sampling that had knowledge of the Commission’s behaviour in regulatory 
cooperation initiatives before the TTIP negotiations. In a considerable number of cases, however, 
officials had been working on an issue, even if not always in the same position, for more than 10 years 
and freely shared their impressions and recollections of regulatory cooperation under the TEC and 
before. 
Almost all interviews were conducted in person. Only in three cases was the interview conducted over 
the phone. Nonetheless, the level of depth attained in particular on a technically complex and politically 
sensitive issue was higher in the interviews that were held in person. No conversation was shorter than 
30 minutes and interviews lasted mainly between 60 and 120 minutes. In three cases, the interviews 
lasted three hours and interview partners continued sharing their perceptions and insights after all topics 
on the interview guide had been addressed.   
It proved essential for the conduct of the interviews to demonstrate both professionality and expertise 
towards interview partners. Several interview partners shared their discontent that despite anonymity 
requests, previous researchers had not only publicly attributed statements to individual interview 
partners, but also cited them incorrectly or changed crucial elements of statements. While all interview 
partners contacted for this book signalled their openness to conduct an interview and their interest in the 
topic, creating an atmosphere of trust proved a challenge. The decision to take extensive notes rather 
than recording the conversation noticeably eased the atmosphere in a number of cases. Moreover, 
demonstrating expertise in the subject was a crucial factor to establishing this trust. Knowing the 
meaning of ‘SDoC’ or of a ‘Notified Body’ was as important as using regionalisation or audits in the 
appropriate context. In one interview, mistaking terms caused the concentration of the interviewee to 
drop and required considerable effort to win back the attention of the interviewee. Each interview thus 
required substantial preparation. Besides, interviewees who had been described as particularly 
knowledgeable or insightful on regulatory cooperation across sectors were only at the later stage of the 
research to ensure that they could be approached with sufficient expertise. 
The reliance on expert interviews to ascertain the importance of the independent variables must be put 
into perspective. Extrapolating their relative weight relied on building a ‘narrative’ or story that linked 
the insights and perceptions shared by interviewees. The constraints identified in this way rely on 
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observation. The actual preference of an actor is difficult to identify. Yet, it seems that there are no better 
research methods to approach this question. Sending out standardised questionnaires would be subject 
to the same measurement problems in this regard as observations based on expert interviews and 
document analysis. To ensure the reliability of the responses shared by interviewees, statements of 
interviewees were triangulated with responses collected in interviews with member state representatives 
and societal actors. The selection of interviewees for triangulation also followed purposive and snowball 
sampling. Interviews with societal actors concentrated on representatives of firms and business 
associations as both purposive and snowball sampling indicated that these were more likely to have the 
technical knowledge of EU and US regulations and implementation procedures. This technical 
knowledge was considered as necessary to be able to understand and reconstruct the Commission’s 
decision to choose one rather another strategy regarding a specific issue.  
Rules for identifying the number of necessary and sufficient expert interviews are less clear-cut than for 
standardised interviews. An indicator for the number of interviews to be conducted became the 
knowledge of the subject. In the last interview conducted for each sector, the responses of interviewees 
could be often anticipated. Moreover, interviewees confirmed that the most relevant interviewees had 
been identified and contacted.  
In sum, 26 interviews were carried out between 2015 and 2017. Table 3 lists the interviews broken down 
to governance regimes, government and business representatives, and their level of activity, i.e. at the 
EU or member state-level (for the full list of interview see Annex 1).  
 
 Chemicals Engineering Food ICT Horizontal Sum 
Gov.  Business Gov. Business Gov. Business Gov. Business Gov. Business  
EU 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 16 
MS  1 1 1  1   1 5 10 
Sum 3 5 5 4 9 26 
Table 16: Breakdown of interviews 
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Nonetheless, in the context of strategy formation for regulatory cooperation a few indicators can be 
developed. First, early interviews with member state representatives confirmed that strategy formation 
on regulatory cooperation occurs mainly at the EU level. While member states’ support and endorsement 
of regulatory cooperation is essential for the pursuit of regulatory cooperation by the Commission and 
its success, member states are usually little involved in the details of strategy formation as long as it 
involves issues on which EU-level rules already exist. This reduced the necessity to speak to a large 
number of member state representatives. Second, the number of Commission officials working on 
regulatory cooperation on a specific issue is relatively small- in many cases position papers are drafted 
and meetings are attended by two or three people. They are well connected and maintain close working 
relationships. Quickly, interview partners confirmed that important actors shaping the strategy formation 
process had been contacted. 
                   
5.4. Summary  
 
This chapter has discussed the methodology of this book to employ a case study-based research design.  
The book combines case selection according to a least-likely logic with the method of difference. Out 
of eight possible third countries with which the EU has pursued bilateral regulatory cooperation in the 
past, the United States was selected as a least-likely case for the influence of bureaucratic politics. The 
method of difference was then applied to select cases based on variations on the independent variable. 
The cases were selected to ensure variation on the compatibility and incompatibility of regulatory 
authority structures in combination with the compatibility and incompatibility of regulatory principles 
while at the same time holding rival explanatory factors constant to discard potential alternative 
explanations. As a result, four industry sectoral regimes were selected out of a population of 20 industry 
sectors for in-depth empirical examination in case studies: chemicals, engineering (mechanical and 
electrical safety), food safety and information and communications technology. Within each case study, 
three sub-cases were defined to ensure variation on the independent variable ‘bureaucratic pressure’. 
Out of five potential transatlantic regulatory cooperation initiatives, three were selected in line with 
variation on the independent variable ‘bureaucratic pressure’ between politico-administrative leadership 
by DG Trade, politico-administrative leadership by the lead technical DG and no politico-administrative 
leadership.  
The empirical analysis employs with-in case analysis. The main method of data analysis is process-
tracing of the strategy formation within the selected case studies. Through a close examination of the 
processes that lead to the formation of regulatory cooperation strategy, the causal relationship between 
the factors identified in the theoretical framework is established. A cross-case synthesis compares the 
findings for the case studies.  
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Besides, the chapter has discussed the two main data collection methods employed by this book, i.e. 
document analysis and expert interviews, and has argued why they allow drawing inference from the 
material collected. The document analysis relies on public and non-public primary documents, including 
previously unavailable material leaked by NGOs, and secondary documents, including think tank 
reports, academic studies and policy documents by specialist journals such as ‘Inside US Trade’. Expert 
interviews have built on a semi-structured approach with interviewees selected non-representatively 
based on their expertise. Document analysis and expert interviews are used to triangulate information 
on the Commission’s choice and formation of a bilateral regulatory cooperation strategy.  
The subsequent empirical analysis applies the ‘inter-relational institutionalist’ framework on the 
Commission’s strategy choice in the industry sectoral regimes chemicals (chapter 6.1), engineering 
(chapter 6.2), food / food safety (chapter 6.3) and information and communications technology (chapter 
6.4). These sectors have been addressed in most of the transatlantic regulatory cooperation initiatives 
and are also particularly important for the EU’s engagement in regulatory cooperation due to their large 
volumes of intra-industry trade between the EU and the US as well as other third countries. The depth 
and dimension of regulatory cooperation that the Commission aims at with the US can thus also have 
repercussions on the setting of global rules and standards beyond the transatlantic relationship. The 
empirical analysis will show how regulatory compatibilities constrain the Commission’s choice of the 
depth and dimension of regulatory cooperation and bureaucratic politics influences the formation of the 
regulatory cooperation strategy. The empirical chapters will therefore concentrate on the behaviour of 
officials within both internal and external constraints.  
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6. European Commission strategies in transatlantic regulatory 
cooperation  
 
The main hypothesis proposed by this book is that the choice of a regulatory cooperation strategy is 
constrained by the compatibility of both regulatory authority structures and regulatory principles 
between a domestic and a foreign jurisdiction. This hypothesis has been incorporated into an integrative 
framework, the Inter-relational Institutionalism, which also clarifies the role of and relationship between 
different political and societal actors. Based on the selection of case studies that has been elaborated in 
the previous chapter, this chapter puts the explanatory power of the Inter-relational Institutionalism to 
test. It presents case studies for four industry sectoral regimes that were selected based on maximum 
variation in the distribution of regulatory case studies. As noted in this previous chapter, this book does 
not assume that regulatory authority structures and underlying regulatory principles are homogenous for 
all regulatory policies and implementation procedures that govern a sectoral regime. The case studies 
rather seek to maximise the likelihood that all possible combinations of regulatory compatibilities and 
their effect on the constraint of the choice of a bilateral regulatory cooperation strategy can be observed. 
Expectations for the distribution of regulatory compatibilities between the EU and the US in the chosen 
sectoral regime case studies have been formed on the basis of previous analyses.  
To look at the effect of regulatory incompatibilities for both regulatory authority structures and 
regulatory principles, this chapter first examines the Commission’s choice of regulatory cooperation 
strategies towards the US in the chemicals regulatory regime (chapter 6.1.). The second case study, 
transatlantic engineering cooperation, investigates the constraining effects of incompatible regulatory 
authority structures under compatible regulatory principles (chapter 6.2.). To examine the constraint that 
exert compatible regulatory authority structures, but incompatible regulatory principles, the third case 
study looks at the Commission’s choice of regulatory cooperation strategies towards the US in the food 
safety regulatory regime (chapter 6.3). Lastly, the fourth case study, transatlantic ICT cooperation 
analyses the constraints on the choice of a regulatory cooperation strategies where both regulatory 
authority structures and regulatory principles in the EU and the US are compatible (chapter 6.4.). 
Each case study is developed analogously to facilitate the comparability of the analyses and findings 
across the four case studies. A first sub-section outlines the scope of the corresponding regulatory regime 
and identifies major issues for regulation and implementation. Moreover, it presents the level of 
transatlantic trade flows to prove that goods and services falling within the sectoral regulatory regimes 
are subject to high levels of intra-industry trade and to show that the EU and US economies are 
interdependent as regards the regulation of sectoral regime. It also presents major societal actors that 
shape decision-making within the sectoral regime.  
A second sub-section summarises the agreements that have already been taken through international 
regulatory cooperation within the given regulatory regime. This information is intended to clarify the 
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context in which Commission officials choose bilateral regulatory cooperation strategies and helps 
identify and exclude issues within a given regulatory regimes on which Commission regulatory officials 
may seek to cooperate with their US counterparts.   
A third sub-section introduces the distribution of authority structures and identifies the principles to 
which the Commission adheres in the EU. This sub-section only examines EU-level regulations and 
implementation procedures to ensure that the Commission has in principle authority to act and cooperate 
on an issue through transatlantic regulatory cooperation. The presentation of the regulatory regimes does 
not aim at a comprehensive discussion of the underlying legal framework, but presents the regulatory 
regime in a reduced, focused manner to identify and indicate regulatory authority structures and 
regulatory principles. The discussion of the regulatory regime is thus directed at the operationalisation 
of the independent variable 2 of this book and the preparation of the subsequent analysis of regulatory 
cooperation strategies. The description of the regulatory regime is based on the status at the time of 
writing to enable comprehensiveness. As sectoral regulatory regimes evolve, new regulatory policies 
and implementation procedures build on decisions and experiences of past policies and procedures. The 
decision to focus the description of the regulatory regime at the time of writing reflects the assumption 
of this book that changes to individual regulatory policies and implementation procedures rarely 
overthrow the fundamental authority structures and principles that govern a sectoral regime as a whole.    
The fourth sub-section of each case study contrasts the regulatory regime of the EU with the regulatory 
regime of the US for each selected sectoral regime. Again, the objective of this sub-section is not to 
offer a comprehensive discussion of the US framework in question. On the contrary, the presentation is 
directed at an immediate contrast of the EU and US approaches. US regulatory policies and 
implementation procedures are presented in light of their compatibility with the EU approaches. For the 
reasons laid down in the previous paragraph, the analysis concentrates on the contrast of EU and US 
regulatory regimes at the time of writing. The contrast of regimes is intended to elucidate issues on 
which the Commission may choose to cooperate along the strategies in line with distribution of 
regulatory compatibilities.  
A fifth sub-section formulates expectations for the Commission’s choice of regulatory cooperation 
strategies towards the US in the given sectoral regime. These expectations offer the specific 
operationalisation of hypothesis 2 for each of the case studies. Expectations are on the one hand 
formulated with regard to the ‘maximum’ regulatory cooperation strategy that the Commission is 
constrained to choose based on the distribution of regulatory compatibilities. On the other hand, they 
name specific issues within each regulatory regime on which the Commission may cooperate with the 
US, based on the prior contrast of regulatory regimes. 
The sixth sub-section of each case study presents the analysis of the Commission’s choice of regulatory 
cooperation strategies. This part is divided into three sub-parts in line with the definition of sub-cases 
explained in chapter 5.1. The process-tracing in this sub-section identifies the sequence of activities and 
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behavioural steps that lead to the formation of a given regulatory cooperation strategy and thus clarifies 
the relationship between decisions of regulatory officials and the mobilisation of societal actors. 
Moreover, it presents interview evidence from the perspective of both Commission officials and societal 
actors on the rationale of Commission officials to aim at cooperation on a specific issue along the chosen 
strategy.                 
A seventh sub-section discusses the findings of the empirical analysis of the Commission’s choice of 
regulatory cooperation strategies on specific issues over time. On the one hand, the discussion examines 
the influence of bureaucratic pressure (IV1) and societal mobilisation (IV3) in each case study on the 
initiation and formation of a regulatory cooperation strategy. On the other hand, it investigates if the 
choice of a regulatory cooperation strategy on a specific issue is in line with the expectation that has 
been developed from the distribution of regulatory compatibilities in the fifth sub-section. A last 
paragraph in each case study casts a look at potential transatlantic regulatory cooperation within the 
sectoral regime in the future.     
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6.1. Commission strategies in transatlantic chemicals cooperation  
 
This section proposes a case study for which existing literature implies that both regulatory authority 
structures and regulatory principles in the EU and US are incompatible. It is thus a case in which the 
Commission can be expected to pursue ‘information exchange’. This case study covers the 
Commission’s choice of regulatory cooperation strategies in transatlantic regulatory cooperation in the 
chemicals regime.  
 
6.1.1. Introduction 
  
Chemicals regulations broadly aim at two distinct objectives: the assessment of risks of chemicals to 
measures to human health and the environment and the management of these risks. Risk management 
measures pertain to questions of the authorisation or restriction of chemicals. They are subject to 
regulatory policies as they determine the substances which can be sold and marketed in a jurisdiction 
and have implications for the level of safety, environmental and public health protection. Policy issues 
also pertaining to risk management are the classification and labelling of chemicals. The labelling and 
classification of a chemicals often entails legal effects with regard to the ability to market a chemical 
and the ability to use a chemical in certain products. Debates have emerged if and to what extent specific 
substances, e.g. endocrine disruptors, or the use of substances in specific and new applications, e.g. 
nanotechnology, require distinct regulatory specifications and what these specifications should be. Risk 
assessment measures, in turn, refer to questions of the evaluation and testing of chemicals. As these are 
measures that are applied to ascertain and verify if substances fall under the restrictions established by 
regulatory policies, risk assessment measures fall under the category of ‘implementation procedures’ 
defined in chapter 3.1.3. 
Due to the internationalisation of the chemicals industry, chemicals regulations extend beyond domestic 
regulatory boundaries. Chemicals producers and users thus face strong rule overlap and conflicting 
regulatory requirements as they sell or buy substances across jurisdictional boundaries. In 2013, 25% of 
safety data dossiers submitted to the EU chemicals database was submitted by non-EU firms 
(Biedenkopf, 2015: 125). In the transatlantic relationship, Francois et al. (2013) estimate that regulatory 
differences amount to trade costs of 19.1% for EU exports to the US and 13.6% for US exports to the 
EU. Only a part of these barriers are tariffs, which between the EU and the US range between 3% and 
6%, but for many chemical substances they are already zero. The remaining non-tariff measures reflect 
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regulatory differences between the EU and the US68. Figure 14 shows the development of trade flows 
between the EU and the US in the chemicals sector between 2006 and 201669.   
 
 
Figure 14: Trade Flows in the Chemicals Sector 2006-2016 
 
Numerous societal actors engage in chemicals regulations. On the business side, lobbying is crucially 
shaped by large multinational companies which also organise in business associations, notably the EU-
level chemicals association Cefic. Due to their transnational operations and their spread of production 
across global value chains, multinational chemicals firms often organise in both domestic and foreign 
business associations, including the US business association American Chemistry Council (ACC) at the 
same time. Chemicals production and trade is, however, also involves the non-negligible participation 
of SMEs. Due to the risks chemicals potentially present to both the environment and public health, 
chemicals regulations and their implementation procedures have involved the mobilisation and 
participation of many NGOs and CSOs, including Chemical Watch, Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth 
and the EU lead consumer organisation BEUC. 
This chapter proceeds as follows: It first outlines the distribution of regulatory authority structures and 
principles in the EU chemicals regulatory framework and then outlines divergences of the US regulatory 
framework to the distribution of regulatory authority structures and principles in the EU. It then 
formulates expectations on the Commission’s choice of regulatory cooperation strategies with the US, 
based on the compatibilities of EU-US regulatory authority structures and principles. The subsequent 
sections present the regulatory cooperation strategies the Commission pursued in the three phases of 
                                                     
68 Important barriers to trade are also due to characteristics of substances themselves, including challenges to 
transport substances over longer distances or explosion risks. 
69 The choice of the time period reflects data availability constraints (Eurostat, 2017).  
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transatlantic regulatory cooperation delineated in chapter 6.3. and contrast them with the mobilisation 
of societal actors. The Commission’s choice of regulatory cooperation strategy is then contrasted with 
the formulated expectations and the patterns of societal mobilisation. The final section concludes.     
 
6.1.2. International chemicals cooperation  
 
This section briefly summarises the subjects of regulatory cooperation in international organisations. It 
offers background and contextual information for the adoption of regulatory principles in both the EU 
and the US. In line with the theoretical framework developed in chapters 3 and.4, international 
organisations are, however, not expected to have causal influence on the choice of strategies in bilateral 
regulatory cooperation.   
Regulatory cooperation on chemicals in international organisations has especially concentrated on 
regulatory within the United Nations Subcommittee of Experts on the Globally Harmonised System of 
Classification and Labelling of Chemicals (UN GHS) of the United Nations Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC) Committees and the OECD. Regulatory cooperation on chemicals within UN 
Committees and the OECD has addressed risk management, including the classification and labelling 
of chemicals, as well as risk assessment70.  
With regard to risk management, the OECD Secretariat has pushed to seek and define best practices and 
new methods for risk management, and develop methodologies and joint action with regard to specific 
chemicals. For chemicals produced in high volumes, the OECD has established a programme in which 
companies report health and environment information for specific chemicals to the OECD(OECD, 
2013a). The EU has accepted that data submitted to the OECD can in principle be used for the 
registration of chemicals under REACH (Quick, 2011: 281). Yet, it has not changed its methods of risk 
management in light of risk management methods proposed and elaborated by the OECD. The US has 
not (yet) accepted data submitted to the OECD as a basis for recommendations to ban substances.    
Regulatory cooperation with regard to the classification and labelling of chemicals has been pursued by 
both the EU and the US through several UN committees. A Globally Harmonised System of 
Classification and Labelling of Chemicals (UN GHS) was initiated by the United Nations Conference 
on Environment and Development in 1992 as an initiative to promote harmonised criteria for the 
classification of chemicals according to different hazard categories for health, physical and 
environmental hazards. The standards were subsequently negotiated and endorsed within different UN 
committees in the early 2000s, encouraging UN members to implement them by 2008. The respective 
GHS document, however, only consists of recommendations for states and lays out a ‘building block 
                                                     
70 More informal regulatory cooperation also occurs within the Strategic Approach to International Chemicals 
Management (Zeitlin, 2011).  
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approach’, which therefore allows differential implementation of the Globally Harmonised System in 
different hazard classes and categories (Quick, 2011: 277). The EU has followed this ‘building block 
approach’, implementing the GHS where it corresponds to its own previous classification of chemicals. 
It sought to prevent a provision making the implementation of the entire GHS mandatory. The US also 
sought to prevent making the GHS mandatory, emphasising instead that the adoption of the GHS should 
remain voluntary (Interview 2).  
Concerning risk assessment, regulatory cooperation has been pursued notably by the EU within the 
OECD under its chemical safety programme(OECD, 2013a). It has supported the OECD in the 
development of Test Guidelines for the testing of chemicals. Moreover, it has promoted an agreement 
on principles of Good Laboratory Practices. The development of Test Guidelines for the testing of 
chemicals and the agreement on principles of Good Laboratory Practices facilitated a binding agreement 
among OECD members on the Mutual Acceptance of Data (Quick, 2008). The agreement on the Mutual 
Acceptance of Data obliges signatories to accept chemical safety data from other OECD states and 
additional seven countries (e.g. India, Brazil, Singapore, South Africa), given that the safety data have 
been generated based on OECD Test Guidelines and OECD Good Laboratory Practices (OECD, 2013a).  
Subsequently, efforts notably of the EU and the US have consisted in determining possibilities of 
‘burden-sharing’ among OECD members notably on the assessment of ‘high-production-volume’ 
chemicals. Moreover, the OECD Secretariat has proposed discussions on a harmonisation of industry 
dossiers for chemicals and review reports for pesticides (Elliott & Pelkmans, 2015: 17).     
Although regulatory cooperation within the OECD covers “an impressive range of chemical safety 
issues” (Quick, 2011: 279), it has not been able to resolve the differences between the EU and the US 
both with regard to risk management and risk assessment. “Regulatory cooperation in the OECD has 
overall been good” (Interview 1) and “the US and the EU have been leading in this [the OECD] work” 
(Elliott & Pelkmans, 2015: 15). However, both the US and the EU have restricted regulatory cooperation 
through the OECD, albeit to different extents on different issues (OECD, 2013a). Important obstacles 
persist in the implementation of the OECD Test Guidelines, partly also due to constraints in the capacity 
of test laboratories in some OECD member states (Interview 1). Overall, regulatory cooperation in an 
international organisation essentially presupposes that the EU and the US reach an agreement among 
each other before they can advance regulatory cooperation through the OECD (Interview 1).  
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6.1.3. EU chemicals regime 
 
This section outlines the distribution of regulatory authority structures and principles in the EU 
chemicals regulatory framework, both with respect to the regulatory policies anchored in the chemicals 
framework REACH as well as the Classification, Labelling and Packaging Regulation and the 
implementation procedures established by REACH.  
The development of an EU regulatory framework for the risk management of chemicals reflected 
Council conclusions from the late 1990s, tasking the Commission to elaborate a coherent chemicals 
legislative framework. After intense discussions in both the Council and the Parliament, the Regulation, 
to become known as REACH, was adopted by both the Council and the Parliament in late 2006. REACH 
centralises EU chemicals regulation, leading authors emphasise that the regulatory framework of the EU 
is very ‘coherent’ (Elliott & Pelkmans, 2015: 2)71. REACH establishes a three-step approach to placing 
chemical substances on the EU market: registration, evaluation and authorisation. Under registration, 
manufacturers and importers of existing and new chemicals have to submit data on the properties of 
chemicals and their uses in a database with the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) before they can 
bring them to the market. This data is used during evaluation to assess the potential risks of chemical 
substances to human health and the environment. Evaluation follows a prioritisation approach. 
Authorisation by the Commission is then necessary for substances which have been found during 
evaluation to pose risks before they can be placed onto the market. Beside formulating the regulatory 
policy framework for chemicals, REACH establishes the corresponding implementation procedures. It 
establishes e.g. the type of information that needs to be submitted for substance registration. It further 
establishes the Community Rolling Action Plan (CoRAP) which specifies that the ECHA and member 
states need to define risk-based criteria for the selection of substances for prioritised evaluation 
(Biedenkopf, 2015: 110). Risk management also addresses the classification and labelling of chemicals. 
On the latter, the EU adopted the Classification, Labelling and Packaging Regulation in 2008, 
Regulation(EC)1272/2008, which implemented the UN Global Harmonised System(GHS). It 
implements the UN GHS according to the ‘building-block approach’, i.e. in hazard classes and 
categories that were compatible with existing EU classification and labelling rules, but deviated where 
either UN GHS classes and categories are not part of the EU system or where the UN GHS does not 
cover categories of the EU system (Quick, 2011: 278)  
Under REACH, risk management falls within the authority of the Commission, i.e. the DGs 
Environment and Grow. The Commission decides on applications for the authorisation of chemicals 
                                                     
71 While REACH centralises chemicals regulation at the EU-level, Biedenkopf (2015: 108) argues that it reaches 
beyond EU borders in three ways: First, it extends internal EU processes to non-EU actors. Second, the data 
concerning the intrinsic properties of chemical substances and possible safer alternatives generated through 
REACH procedures can be used by non-EU regulators in their own domestic policies. Third, REACH constitutes 
a model of chemicals regulation that can exert external effects on policy-making processes outside the EU. 
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through comitology procedures72 as REACH gives the Commission the authority to authorise or ban 
substances. Moreover, the Commission has the authority to impose restrictions on chemicals, including 
but not only for ‘substances of very high concern’. In deciding on applications for authorisations, the 
Commission takes into account the scientific opinion of the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA)’s 
Committee for Risk Assessment. REACH thus centralises authority for regulatory policies, i.e. risk 
management for chemicals, at the EU level.   
Risk management follows the regulatory principle of the ‘precautionary principle’. The Commission has 
defined that it applies the precautionary principle “where scientific information is insufficient, 
inconclusive, or uncertain and where there are indications that the possible effects on the environment, 
or human, animal or plant health may be potentially dangerous and inconsistent with the chosen level 
of protection” (Commission, 2000: 5). The application of the precautionary principle in the EU is 
strongly revealed in three aspects, two of which relate to REACH. Reflecting the precautionary 
principle, REACH first establishes a general obligation to register all substances above a production or 
sales volume of 1t (with a few exceptions)73. Unless producers or importers register substances in the 
ECHA database, they cannot bring them to the market. Second, the Commission requires that it needs 
to authorise substances for which the evaluation has indicated potential risks to human health and the 
environment. In line with the precautionary principle, REACH thus stipulates that substances which 
may potentially entail hazard are banned from the market unless they are authorised (Elliott & Pelkmans, 
2015; Vogel, 2012). For these ‘substances of very high concern’ (SVHCs), i.e. substances which are 
‘carcinogenic, mutagenic or toxic to reproduction’ or ‘persistent organic polluters’, REACH demands 
that they need not only be properly controlled, but also, where economically and technically feasible, be 
progressively replaced with alternative substances. Besides, REACH specifies that SVHCs can only be 
authorised if they provide an overall benefit to society. SVHCs are not authorised as substances, but on 
a firm basis. Third, the classification of substances entails immediate legal consequences. The 
classification of a substance as a SVHC immediately restricts its use in certain products (regardless of 
societal implications), e.g. biocides or pesticides. The regulatory principle for chemicals regulatory 
policies in the EU is thus the precautionary principle.   
Risk assessment is coordinated by the EU-level agency ECHA. ECHA also approves testing proposals 
and adopts the CoRAP. Yet, risk assessments are conducted by member state authorities under a joint 
division of labour, so that one member state authority is responsible for the evaluation of one specific 
substance. Member state authorities do not generate test data themselves, but rely on the data submitted 
by firms. REACH specifies that firms need to submit safety test data to the ECHA database on the 
internal properties of substances during the registration of chemicals. The distribution of authority for 
                                                     
72 The authorisation of substances is conducted under comitology procedures with the scrutiny of the EP. 
Comitology procedures are e.g. also used to set rules on test methods (Biedenkopf, 2015: 113). 
73 This is called the ‘no data, no market’ approach (Biedenkopf, 2015: 109).   
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implementation procedures, i.e. risk assessment, in turn, is thus shared between ‘government’ authorities 
and private actors and therefore non-centralised. 
Risk assessment follows the proportionality principle. Rather than requiring the full test data sheets, it 
only requires the submission of so-called ‘robust summaries’ that do not contain potentially confidential 
business information e.g. on the exact composition of a substance. With the submission of data, firms 
are required to form ‘Substance Information Exchange Forums’. It implies that firms need to form 
consortia in which firms registering the same substance regulate the allocation of data ownership and 
costs between them (Kommerskollegium, 2015: 50). This does not exclude that the ECHA demands also 
complete data sheets in exceptional cases. According to REACH, the ECHA can also request complete 
data sheets for individual chemical substances and has in a limited number of cases also used this right 
in the past (on average in one or two cases per year; Interview 1). As a regulatory principle of the 
implementation procedures, the EU thus applies the proportionality principle.      
 
6.1.4. Contrast of the EU and US chemicals regimes  
 
This section summarises divergences between the EU and US regulatory frameworks for chemicals. It 
demonstrates that differences exist both with regard to the distribution of regulatory authority structures 
and regulatory principles. The regulation of chemicals in the US is mostly74 shaped by the US Toxic 
Substances Control Act (TSCA) adopted in 1974 and amended in 2015.  
In the US, chemicals regulation largely lies within the authority of the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) (for regulations aiming at environmental protection), but chemicals are also controlled and 
regulated by the Occupational Safety and Health Agency (OSHA; for regulations aiming at safety at the 
workplace) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) (Interview 1). The authority of the US 
regulatory agencies is limited. Although the EPA has legal powers to restrict or ban a chemical substance 
if it poses an unreasonable risk to human health or the environment, its de facto ability to do so is limited. 
To prohibit or restrict a substance, the EPA needs to demonstrate that this is the least restrictive measure. 
Moreover, restrictions or prohibitions of chemical substances are subject to legal review. Courts have 
narrowly interpreted whether a restriction or prohibition is least restrictive. As a result, the EPA de facto 
in most cases only issues recommendations (Interview 1). Recommendations of the US agencies to 
restrict substances are subject to legal review. For this reason, authors note that the EPA has in the past 
effectively struggled to ‘ban’ hazardous substances (Schwarzman & Wilson, 2011), citing the inability 
of the EPA to ban asbestos due to company lawsuits under legal review as an example of a certain 
                                                     
74 In practice, US regulatory agencies use a number of regulatory acts and administrative procedures to restrict the 
use of chemical substances (Elliott & Pelkmans, 2015).   
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‘under-regulation’ (Elliott & Pelkmans, 2015). Under the TSCA, the EPA has only restricted the use of 
six chemical substances since 1976 (Kommerskollegium, 1976: 47).  
The amendment of the TSCA arguably enhances the authority of the EPA to restrict hazardous 
substances. (Interview 1). According to the amendment, the EPA can request further test data in order 
to decide on a recommendation to ban or restrict of substances, thus bringing the TSCA closer to 
REACH (Interview 2). Still, the subject of restrictions to legal review means that the EPA has only 
limited regulatory authority. Regulatory authority on regulatory policies in the US is thus non-
centralised. The distribution of regulatory authority structures for regulatory policies in the chemicals 
sector between the EU and the US is thus incompatible.  
For risk management, i.e. the adoption of regulatory policies, the EPA and other US agencies apply the 
science and risk principle (Elliott & Pelkmans, 2015; Vogel, 2012). This shows in two important policy 
aspects: First, US agencies do not have a general registration obligation for substances (Renn & Elliott, 
2011). Second, chemicals are allowed for production and marketing unless the EPA or another agency 
has issued a recommendation to restrict a substance (Schwarzman & Wilson, 2011). If the EPA finds 
that a chemical presents a risk to human health or the environment, it can adopt regulatory restrictions 
on the production or marketing of a chemical to eliminate the risk. This is a juxtaposition of the EU’s 
regulatory principle requiring the authorisation of a substance before it is allowed to be produced or 
sold. As a similarity of principles to the EU, the classification of chemicals also entails legal 
consequences in the US, i.e. restricting their use in certain products or environments, e.g. at the work 
place (Schwarzman & Wilson, 2011). The legal consequences of classifications for certain uses differ, 
though. As classifications may restrict the use of substances of certain products or contexts, the 
implementation of the international classification scheme (UN GHS) in the US is partial and differs 
from the EU (Interview 2). Notably, the UN GHS has been implemented by the OSHA, but not by the 
EPA (Elliott & Pelkmans, 2015). Yet, the application of the science and risk principle in the US creates 
immediate conflict with the precautionary principle in the EU. The EPA only proposes a restriction for 
a chemical substance if scientific evidence indicates safety risks for human health or the environment 
(Vogel, 2012). The Commission can, however, restrict a chemical even if scientific evidence does not 
clearly indicate safety risks, but is only inconclusive (Interview 3). The regulatory principles of the EU 
and the US for chemicals regulatory policies are thus incompatible.   
The EPA does not delegate the submission of test data to private actors, i.e. firms. Instead, the EPA can 
determine which test data it uses to evaluate the safety of chemicals75.If the EPA believes that a 
substance may pose an unreasonable risk, it can require that the substance be tested. If test data is 
unavailable, the EPA can mandate firms to conduct tests (EPA, 2017). It can also conduct tests itself to 
determine the safety risks of chemicals (Interview 2). However, if the EPA wants to restrict a substance, 
                                                     
75 The EU’s reliance on firm safety data is cited by Naiki (2010) as a hurdle for Japanese authorities to adopt 
REACH. He cites that Japanese authorities did not trust the validity of safety data submitted by producers.   
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it needs to present the data itself which show that a substance poses heavy risk. To require further 
information from firms, the EPA needs to demonstrate the risk first. This implies that the EPA must also 
generate test data itself if companies are unwilling to share data (Kommerskollegium, 2015: 49). 
Regulatory authority for implementation procedures in the US is thus centralised. As regulatory 
authority for implementation procedures in the EU is non-centralised, the distribution of regulatory 
authority structures in the EU and the US incompatible.       
For risk assessment, the EPA request complete safety data sheets for the evaluation of the safety risks 
of chemicals (Interview 1).76 These safety data sheets contain full hazard and exposure assessments 
(EPA, 2017). As a side-effect of the submission of full safety data sheets, firms can demand that the 
EPA treats their data as confidential business information (Interview 2). This contrasts with the 
treatment of risk assessment by the ECHA which relies on ‘robust summaries’. The regulatory principles 
for implementation procedures in the EU and the US are thus also incompatible.  
If the different regulatory systems in the EU and the US offer different levels of consumer health and 
environmental protection, is nonetheless subject to debate. Some observers both from the EU and the 
US attribute a higher level of protection to the EU system, as a likely consequence of the higher 
coherence of the EU’s REACH framework and underlining the inability of the EPA to restrict certain 
hazardous substances (Vogel, 2012; Schwarzman & Wilson, 2011). Others question that there are 
principle divergences beyond product- and case-specific differences (Elliott & Pelkmans, 2015: 15). 
The latter refer to the voluntary withdrawals of chemicals by firms under EPA pressure and the effects 
of tough liability cases on the marketing of chemicals in the US as well as potential ‘over-regulation’ 
under REACH without benefits for environmental protection or consumer health. While there is a lack 
of systemic data comparing levels of protection, studies analysing the regulatory stringency for specific 
chemical substances find that the level of protection offered in either the EU or the US differs for 
individual substances rather than systemically across the two jurisdictions (Renn & Elliott, 2011).  
  
                                                     
76 The reason for this difference in data policy appears to mostly be linked to differences in resources of EU 
authorities and the EPA. Indeed, observers argue that the ECHA contents itself with robust summaries rather than 
complete data sheets because of its limited staff resources. 
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Figure 15 summarises the contrast of the EU and US chemicals regulatory regimes.          
Dimension Regulatory 
instrument 
Authority 
distribution 
EU US 
Regulatory 
policies 
Legislation  REACH 
Classification, Labelling and Packaging 
Regulation 
Toxic Substances Control Act 
Regulations  
 
Standards  
Centralised Precautionary principle 
- Authorisation of substances that 
have been found to pose risks 
- Restrictions, authorisation of 
SVHCs on a firm basis,  
- Legal guillotine clause for 
specific classifications of 
chemicals: restricted use in all 
products    
 
Non-
centralised 
 Science and risk principle 
- no general registration 
requirement 
- marketing of substances unless 
recommendation to restrict 
- recommendation to restrict 
requires conclusive scientific 
evidence 
- No legal guillotine effects of 
classifications: restrictions for 
certain uses and applications  
Implementation 
procedures 
Centralised  Full data sets: 
- Risk assessment: Submission of 
complete safety data sheets 
Non-
centralised 
Proportionality principle 
- Risk assessment: Submission of 
robust summaries 
 
Figure 15: Contrast of EU and US chemicals regulatory regimes 
 
In sum, this sub-section has compared the distribution of regulatory authority structures and regulatory 
principles in the EU and the US. It has concluded that the distribution of regulatory authority is 
incompatible as assessment authority is allocated to the EPA in the US whereas it is allocated to firms 
in the EU. At the same time, the Commission has authority to authorise substances in the EU whereas 
the EPA does not have such authority. Moreover, the previous sub-section has summarised that the EU 
and US follow incompatible regulatory principles, both related to regulatory policies and 
implementation procedures. Whereas the EU follows the precautionary principle in cases of scientific 
uncertainty, the US strictly adheres to the scientific risk principle. With regard to assessment, the EU 
follows a proportionality principle for data submissions whereas the US relies on full data sheets.  
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6.1.5. Expectations: Commission strategies in transatlantic chemicals cooperation 
 
Based on the contrast of the chemicals regulatory regimes in the EU and the US and the distribution of 
regulatory compatibilities, this sub-section formulates expectations for Commission strategies on 
transatlantic chemicals cooperation. These expectations operationalise the hypothesis derived on the 
influence of regulatory compatibilities on the constraints of a choice of a regulatory cooperation strategy 
that has been presented in chapter 4.3.2. As bureaucratic pressure within the Commission has already 
been operationalised in chapter 4.4. and the presence of bureaucratic pressure across the three regulatory 
cooperation initiatives has been outlined in chapter 5.1., this sub-section will not re-formulate 
expectations for the influence of bureaucratic pressure. Besides, societal actor mobilisation across the 
three selected transatlantic regulatory cooperation initiatives has also been outlined in chapter 5.1 and 
will not restated in this sub-section. 
Both in the EU and the US the authorisation or ban of chemicals is subject to legislation adopted by 
legislatures. As changes to legislation require approval by legislatures and thus lie beyond the regulatory 
authority of both EU and US regulators, it should be expected that the Commission does not pursue 
changes to the authorisation or ban of chemicals under REACH and the TSCA77. Besides, as the 
regulatory principles underlying the authorisation or ban of chemicals in the EU and the US are 
incompatible, it should be expected that the Commission does not pursue an alignment of chemicals 
authorisations. Likewise, as the classification of chemicals entails conflicting legal implications in the 
EU and the US, it should be expected that the Commission does not pursue an alignment of chemicals 
classifications. Moreover, given that the authority of the Commission and the EPA on the authorisation 
or restriction of chemicals is incompatible, the Commission should neither pursue an ‘equivalence’ of 
authorisation decisions. At the same time, as the distribution of regulatory authority on implementation 
procedures in the EU and the US is incompatible, the Commission should also not pursue an alignment 
of testing procedures beyond the work that has been carried out in the OECD. Likewise, as regulatory 
principles for implementation procedures in the EU and the US are incompatible, the Commission 
should also not choose a strategy to mutual recognise safety data sheets.  
Instead, given the incompatible distribution of both regulatory principles and authority structures, the 
Commission can be expected to choose a strategy with the aim of ‘information exchange’. This 
‘information exchange’ should target implementation procedures, i.e. testing procedures and the 
provision of safety test data requirements, as well as new and emerging issues for regulatory policies.  
 
                                                     
77 These expectations do not make statements about the adoption of REACH elements by non-EU actors through 
learning, emulation or diffusion. Biedenkopf (2015: 128) offers examples of learning and emulation from US 
Congressional hearings, enhanced data transparency of the EPA as well as the adoption of REACH elements by 
authorities in Japan and South Korea. Yet, under these processes, regulatory conflicts often do not fully disappear 
as other jurisdictions do not copy REACH or other EU Regulations one-by-one (Heyvaert, 2009).    
European Commission strategies in transatlantic regulatory cooperation 
165 
 
6.1.6. Commission strategies in transatlantic chemicals cooperation   
 
This section lays down the Commission’s choice of regulatory cooperation strategies during the three 
regulatory cooperation initiatives selected in chapter 5.1. 
 
New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) 
 
At the launch the NTA, the initiative of DG Trade to establish the Transatlantic Business Dialogue 
(TABD) mobilised in particular the EU and US chemicals industries (Quick, 2007). The TABD 
presented comprehensive proposals for regulatory cooperation entailing both ‘equivalence’ and an 
‘alignment of implementation procedures’ (see below). Far-reaching joint proposals submitted by EU 
and US chemicals industry under the TABD raised demands for the Commission to pursue ‘equivalence’ 
and an ‘alignment of implementation procedures’. The TABD proposed ‘equivalence’ with regard to 
low-risk polymers, suggesting that the Commission and its US counterparts negotiate an ‘equivalence’ 
agreement (Quick, 2007). Until the Commission presented its White Paper for a EU-level chemicals 
regulation, both EU and US chemicals industries considered a mutual recognition of the functional 
‘equivalence’ of EU and US regulatory frameworks as in principle possible (Quick, 2011: 254; TABD: 
2000). Furthermore, the TABD tabled proposals on the application and use of the classification and 
labelling of chemicals (Quick, 2007; TABD, 1996). With regard to an ‘alignment of implementation 
procedures’, the TABD put forward that the EU and the US should implement the previous OECD 
Agreements on Good Laboratory Practices and the Mutual Acceptance of Data and negotiate a Mutual 
Recognition Assessment for test data (Quick, 2011: 250; TABD: 1996). Moreover, it suggested 
negotiations over Conditional ‘equivalence’ Agreements on risk assessment. Industry thus sought to 
align implementation procedures by enhancing mutual understanding and acceptance of the methods 
used for hazard and risk assessment (Elliott & Pelkmans, 2015: 11). 
However, Commission officials from DG Environment and DG Enterprise did not take up these 
proposals. The administrative and political leadership of both DGs was reluctant to endorse regulatory 
cooperation in the chemicals sector because it wanted to concentrate administrative resources on the 
domestic adoption of a coherent EU-level chemicals policy that should replace the previous fragmented 
system (Quick, 2007; Pelkmans, 2005). In the elaboration of REACH, the leadership of DG 
Environment and DG Enterprise put only limited emphasis on avoiding trade frictions with the US. One 
observer notes that the Commission “adopted its [REACH] proposal in full knowledge that it would 
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violate the cooperation requirements contained in the Guidelines on Regulatory Cooperation” (Quick, 
2011: 260)78.  
Commission officials, however, took up demands of the TABD to include exceptions for low-risk 
chemicals in line with US exceptions at least to some extent into (Elliott & Pelkmans, 2015: 10). Besides, 
they took into consideration the demand of the TABD that REACH should not a require registration of 
polymers if component monomers have already been registered and agreed to exceptions for Research 
& Development chemicals (Quick, 2011: 262). Above all, however, both DGs wanted to protect the 
EU’s regulatory framework and arguably reinforce regulatory competition by adopting a domestic 
framework that would enhance the regulatory capacity of the Commission.  
Despite an “intensive lobbying battle” of the US Administration to influence the design of REACH 
(Interview 1), the political and administrative leadership of DG Environment and DG Enterprise sought 
to protect and defend the regulatory autonomy of the Commission. Through the adoption of a coherent 
and stringent regulatory framework, the Commission crucially wanted to enhance its capacity to shape 
the design of chemicals regulatory frameworks worldwide (Interview 3). Any regulatory cooperation 
with the US should not obstruct the ability of the Commission to develop a  regulatory framework that 
would allow it to develop high regulatory capacity. The Commission therefore pursued a strategy of 
‘non-cooperation’.  
At the same time, the administrative and political leadership of DG Enterprise raised that officials 
improve their understanding of the US regulatory framework for chemicals, the TSCA. To achieve the 
first, Commission officials invited contributions from the TABD to demonstrate ‘compatibilities’ 
between the EU and US chemicals frameworks. Yet, the Commission did not pursue any of the 
recommendations of the TABD. Quick (2011: 259) criticises that by 2002, none of the TABD 
recommendations had been implemented. However, DG Environment, DG Enterprise maintained 
occasional dialogues with the US EPA and pursued, to some extent, ‘information exchange’, including 
on envisaged legislative projects. These exchanges were, however, not sustained by demands of the 
administrative and leadership of either DG. The pursuit of ‘information exchange’ remained sporadic 
and “coincidental” (Interview 1).  
 
High-Level Regulatory Cooperation Forum (HLRCF)/Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC) 
 
With the launch of the High-Level Regulator Cooperation Forum, Commissioner Verheugen, the new 
Commissioner for Industry and Entrepreneurship, emphasised chemicals policy as a priority sector for 
                                                     
78 The Guidelines on Regulatory Cooperation were adopted by the EU and the US in 2002. They demand regular 
consultation, exchange of data and information as well as mutual information on envisaged regulations. 
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regulatory cooperation with the US (US Department of State, 2007; Commission, 2005a). Supported by 
the administrative leadership of DG Enterprise, Verheugen proposed the institutionalisation of informal 
exchanges between officials DG Environment, DG Enterprise, the ECHA and the EPA (US Departmetn 
of State, 2007; Commission, 2006a; Commission, 2005a). Officials should use these informal dialogues 
to inform each other about legislative and regulatory activities of past months and outline envisaged 
legislative projects. Moreover, officials should exchange information with regard to specific questions, 
including the implementation of adopted policies and possible approaches to emerging issues. The 
Roadmap on Regulatory Cooperation under the HRLCF further outlines the establishment of staff 
exchanges between Commission officials and officials of the EPA (Commission, 2005b). Starting with 
2006, the Commission DGs used these informal dialogues primarily to defend their regulatory policies 
in REACH. The US EPA and USTR heavily criticised the Commission for its regulatory policies 
adopted in REACH, arguing they would cause heavy trade frictions between the US and the EU, and 
sought to push the Commission to align REACH with provisions contained in the TSCA (Interview 1, 
Interview 2, Interview 3)79. Officials from both DG Environment and DG Enterprise responded to the 
US criticism by defending EU policies and explaining to the EPA why it preferred to maintain regulatory 
competition (US Department of State, 2007b). They emphasised that REACH did not discriminate 
against foreign producers because both domestic and foreign producers had to register substances above 
a production volume of 1t in the ECHA database (Commission, 2007d; Interview 1). At the same time, 
DG Enterprise and DG Environment wanted to explain the logic and functioning of REACH to their US 
counterparts with the aim to raise acceptance of the EU approach in the US. In 2007, Commission 
officials admitted that REACH was flawed in its treatment of imported cosmetic ingredients and offered 
a pragmatic remedy to mitigate this issue (US Department of State, 2007). 
Besides, given the adoption of REACH by the Council and the EP, Commissioner Verheugen 
encouraged the use of the HLRCF to promote regulatory cooperation in a sector that was characterised 
by high volumes of intra-industry trade (Quick, 2007). Technical officials in DG Enterprise were 
therefore tasked to evaluate opportunities for bilateral regulatory cooperation. Both DGs agreed that 
neither strategies subsumed ‘regulatory approximation’ or ‘equivalence’ of authorisations of chemicals 
should be the objective (US Department of State, 2008a). This was mainly explained with the divergence 
of the regulatory approaches encoded in REACH and the US TSCA (Quick, 2011). This initiated 
consultations especially with the newly established Transatlantic Business Council (TABC) that 
replaced the TABD.  
The TABC lowered its level of ambition and limited itself on demanding an implementation of the UN 
GHS for the classification and labelling of chemicals and the implementation of the OECD Agreement 
                                                     
79 The USTR even considered lodging a complaint against REACH under the WTO, but gave up these 
considerations in 2007 in order not to escalate the discussions with the EU (Interview 2). 
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on the Mutual Acceptance of Data (Quick, 2007). At the same time, the TABC concentrated on 
criticising the newly adopted REACH (Interview 1).  
Under the continued demands for regulatory cooperation by Commissioner Verheugen and the 
administrative leadership of DG Enterprise, technical officials took up the proposals of the TABC on 
both classification and labelling under the UN GHS and on Good Laboratory Practices under the OECD 
(Commission, 2007b). Neither Commission officials from DG Enterprise nor DG Environment nor their 
administrative and political leaderships, however, chose to make any commitments on specific outcomes 
beyond the objectives set within the respective international organisation (Commission, 2007c). 
Regulatory cooperation should not constrain the autonomy of the Commission to take its own decisions 
(Interview 2). In particular, the DGs agreed not to pursue an ‘equivalence’ of US and EU classifications 
and labels because of the divergent regulatory responsibilities of the EPA and the Commission, but to 
maintain the existing ‘building block approach’ of the UN GHS (Interview 2). Besides, the EPA had 
made clear that it did not want to change its classification system along the guidelines of the UN GHS 
because it reflected different procedural approaches (Interview 2). Moreover, neither Verheugen nor the 
administrative leadership of DG Enterprise proposed to pursue attempts to ‘align implementation 
procedures’, e.g. through the development of common test methods. Although these issues remained on 
the agenda of exchanges in the High-Level Regulatory Cooperation Forum, an internal report of the US 
Department of State from 2009 correspondingly notes “that the discussion of pure chemical issues was 
[…] quick” (US Department of State, 2009a).  
When the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC) was launched in 2007, Commissioner Verheugen 
again sought to use his role as Co-Chair of the TEC to promote regulatory cooperation on chemicals 
(Transatlantic Economic Council, 2007b; US Department of State, 2007a). Alongside the ‘information 
exchange’ promoted on the ongoing work in the UN on classification and labelling and the OECD work 
on mutual acceptance of test data, the Commissioner proposed to explore opportunities for regulatory 
cooperation under the ‘innovation’ pillar of the TEC (US Department of State, 2007a). Rather than 
concentrating regulatory cooperation on existing issues, the identification of emerging issues should 
facilitate cooperation work (US Department of State, 2007b).  
With the task to identify issues for regulatory cooperation on emerging issues, officials between DG 
Enterprise and DG Environment coordinated and identified the development of common risk assessment 
methodologies for manufactured nanomaterials. Commissioner Verheugen insisted that the Commission 
should use the TEC to cooperate with the EPA on this issue (Commission, 2007b). Regulatory 
cooperation with the EPA on an emerging issue should entail a double benefit for the Commission: First, 
it should contribute to establish procedures that would be considered as appropriate by societal actors in 
both the EU and the US. The joint development of common assessment methodologies would thus be 
an instrument to ensure that these would not be subject to special interests in either the EU or the US. 
Second, it should avoid unnecessary trade barriers and thus enhance business opportunities for chemicals 
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firms (Commission, 2007b; (Interview 3). DG Enterprise confirmed that nanotechnology would be a 
sufficiently relevant issue to raise the interest of high-level politicians interacting in the TEC (Interview 
1). Exchanges among officials and bureaucratic support by the administrative and political leadership 
notably of DG Enterprise should help to develop common understandings of methodologies how the 
safety risks of manufactured nanomaterials could be assessed (Commission, 2007c). If pursued 
successfully, the development of common test methodologies for manufactured nanomaterials would 
have led to an ‘alignment of implementation procedures’. 
The EPA initiated rule-making procedures on the development of common test methodologies for 
manufactured nanomaterials in 2008. As the notice-and-comment procedure and the subsequent 
evaluation by EPA officials consumed considerable time, officials in DG Enterprise and DG 
Environment suggested moving ahead with the development of EU procedures in order not to leave this 
issue unregulated (Interview 1). The EPA insisted that it wanted to engage with the Commission on this 
only after its domestic consultations with other agencies on this issue had been completed (Transatlantic 
Economic Council, 2008). The slow response of the EPA arguably also caused also Commissioner 
Verheugen to lose interest in regulatory cooperation on chemicals and concentrate available resources 
elsewhere (US Department of State, 2008a; Interview 2).  
After both the political and administrative leadership of DG Enterprise had lost most of their interest in 
regulatory cooperation with the US on chemicals issues, the administrative and political leadership only 
raised a few issues at the margins of the annual HLRCF and TEC meetings (Transatlantic Economic 
Council, 2009; Transatlantic Economic Council, 2008b). In 2009, DG Environment, DG Enterprise 
initiated discussions with EPA to discuss hazardous substances. (US Department of State, 2009b). 
Moreover, they encouraged the formalisation of dialogues between the ECHA and EPA. This led to the 
signature of a Memorandum of Understanding between the ECHA and the EPA in 2010, promoting data 
and ‘information exchange’ (ECHA, 2010). Subsequently, officials of both agencies have met once or 
twice per year, often through video conferences, and exchanged information on which issues they were 
currently working (Interview 1). 
Officials from DG Environment and DG Enterprise maintained ‘information exchanges’ with the EPA, 
but did not pursue strategies of ‘alignment of implementation procedures’. Beside the ‘alignment of 
implementation procedures’ outlined above, this alignment could have potentially also consisted in an 
alignment of the databases of the ECHA and the EPA through which they each give access to test data 
to stakeholders (Interview 1). Yet, to protect their autonomy, both the ECHA and the EPA chose to 
establish their respective platforms in a parallel process with little or no coordination among each other 
(Interview 2). Besides, the EPA had argued the test data submitted by EU firms as sufficient to take 
decisions on recommendations for bans of chemical substances (Interview 2). Given this difference in 
regulatory approaches, DG Enterprise did not consider an alignment of ECHA and EPA databases as 
sufficiently important to mobilise political resources and push the ECHA to coordinate the establishment 
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of its platform with the EPA. As a result, data on identical substances disseminated through the website 
of either the ECHA or the EPA is not available through the platform of the other (Interview 1). The 
‘information exchanges’ which the Commission chose to pursue with the EPA remained informal and 
non-binding. While both sides were interested in learning about regulatory priorities of the other side, 
neither the EPA nor DG Environment or Enterprise did not want to make any commitments to use the 
dialogues to elaborate common work programmes or proposals for joint projects to safeguard their 
autonomy. Moreover, given different regulatory approaches, possibilities for policy cooperation were 
considered very small (Interview 1).  
To sum up, the Commission used the interactions in the framework of the TEC during the second phase 
to promote ‘information exchange’ between Commission DGs, the ECHA and their US counterparts, 
notably the EPA. It hoped that this ‘information exchange’ would promote an ‘alignment of 
implementation procedures’ within the OECD. The Commission did, however, not promote an 
‘alignment of implementation procedures’ in direct interactions with US officials. At the same time, it 
defended regulatory competition over the policies shaping the chemicals regulatory frameworks in both 
jurisdictions and pushed back US demands for ‘regulatory alignment’ in line with the US TSCA.  
  
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 
 
With the drafting of the High-Level Working Group Report in 2012 that prepared the TTIP negotiations, 
the ‘lead’ in the Commission on regulatory cooperation shifted to DG Trade (Inside US Trade, 2012a). 
Especially Trade Commissioner de Gucht believed that regulatory cooperation would be an instrument 
to strengthen the global influence of the EU and facilitate trade in previously unaddressed areas 
(Interview 3). He therefore tasked officials in DG Trade to identify sectors in which economic gains 
from regulatory cooperation would be greatest (Interview 1). The focus of DG Trade on chemicals was 
thus motivated by the search for sectors in which the trading volume was perceived to be particularly 
large (Interview 1). Chemicals is thus mentioned as one of three priority sectors for regulatory 
cooperation in the High-Level Working Group Report that the Commission adopted with the USTR in 
2012 (High-Level Working Group, 2013). 
The focus of Trade Commissioner de Gucht and DG Trade on exploring opportunities for regulatory 
cooperation in the chemicals sector shaped the public consultation for the launch of trade negotiations 
with the US. The EU and US industry associations Cefic and ACC were “fast” in elaborating a joint 
position paper that they presented even before the launch of the public consultation (Interview 1). The 
Cefic-ACC paper suggests cooperation through an ‘alignment of implementation procedures’ and 
‘information exchange’. With regard to ‘information exchange’, Cefic and ACC put emphasis on 
“common prioritisation principles and burden-sharing for assessments of high-priority chemicals” 
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(Cefic & ACC, 2012: 2) and call for “enhanced information-sharing while protecting confidential 
business information” (Cefic & ACC, 2012: 3). To move towards an ‘alignment of implementation 
procedures’, the position paper proposed the “recognition of each other’s data and studies and 
harmonised standards and methodologies for hazard and risk assessment […] for effective burden 
sharing” (Cefic & ACC, 2012: 2). 
DG Trade and DG Grow officials called on Cefic and the ACC to elaborate on their ideas and supply 
more detailed proposals (Interview 3; Elliott & Pelkmans, 2015: 15). This call arguably reflected two 
motivations. On the one hand, DG Trade wanted to mobilise business associations to supply more 
detailed information in order to substantiate the demands of Trade Commissioner de Gucht for 
regulatory cooperation on chemicals. On the other hand, DG Grow was sceptical in particular with 
regard to Cefic-ACC calls for the identification of existing barriers for information-sharing        
(Interview 3).  
Subsequently, DG Grow and DG Environment evaluated the proposals submitted by Cefic and the ACC. 
The focus of the Trade Commissioner on regulatory cooperation on chemicals led to a request for DG 
Grow80 and DG Environment to elaborate a joint position paper for the Commission on chemicals 
regulatory cooperation (Commission, 2013a; Interview 2).  The position paper was drafted jointly by 
technical officials from both DGs with the lead, however, being with DG Grow (Interview 1).They took 
up industry proposals to pursue ‘information exchange’ with regard to developing a mechanism for the 
common prioritisation of chemicals and exchange information on the classification and labelling of 
chemicals (Commission, 2013a; Interview 2). The Commission’s choice to pursue ‘information 
exchange’ strongly reflects the priorities formulated by Cefic and the ACC81. Yet, both DG Grow and 
DG Environment were very reluctant to pursue the demands of the chemicals industry related to the 
‘alignment of implementation procedures’ (Interview 2). Officials explained their choice to discard 
demands on a recognition of each other’s data and studies with a double argument. First, whereas the 
ECHA and the Commission relied on firm data for the evaluation and authorisation of chemicals, the 
EPA had discretion in selecting data for the assessment of chemicals. This difference in competence 
made the EPA reluctant to recognise EU data. At the same time, the Commission emphasised that the 
obligation of firms to supply data should not be undermined (Interview 2). Second, the EPA was 
reluctant to work with robust test summaries that were supplied by firms to the ECHA database. While 
the Commission could legally also request full test sheets of firms, it generally considered robust 
summaries as sufficient to evaluate a chemical. Its limited administrative resources also implied that 
work with robust summaries with most effective to meet regulatory objectives in the evaluation and 
authorisation of chemicals (Interview 1). 
                                                     
80 DG Enterprise was renamed as DG Grow with the entry into office of the Juncker Commission in 2014.  
81 Suggestions to exchange data were also by US stakeholders including the Government Accountability Office in 
2013 in a Congressional hearing on the reform of the TSCA, calling the data of the ECHA a valuable resource for 
the EPA (Biedenkopf, 2015: 126).  
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In its 2013 position paper on chemicals, DG Grow and DG Environment thus propose three issues for 
regulatory cooperation on chemicals: First, they suggest cooperating on the prioritisation of chemicals 
for risk assessment and assessment methodologies. Second, they promote the alignment in the 
classification and labelling of chemicals. Third, they propose to ascertain possibilities for further 
information-sharing (Commission, 2013a). 
The first and third proposal correspond to the ‘information exchange’ strategy defined in the typology 
in chapter 3.3.1. Under the first proposal, the prioritisation of chemicals for risk assessment, the 
Commission DGs aimed at establishing a mechanism for mutual consultation between EU and US 
authorities, i.e. the ECHA on the EU and the EPA on the US side, which chemicals should be prioritised 
for risk assessment (Interview 1). It reflected an expectation especially within DG Grow that a 
mechanism for mutual consultation could help both the ECHA and the EPA to concentrate their limited 
resources on the assessment of those chemicals which required an assessment the most (Interview 2). 
Moreover, DG Grow hoped that a mutual consultation mechanism for the assessment of chemicals 
would enable the Commission to share burdens with the US regulator and therefore eventually 
concentrate resources on few substances to ensure high-quality assessment. This would help the 
Commission to use its resources most effectively with regard to minimising safety risks coming from 
chemicals (Interview 1). In short, the Commission hoped that the establishment of a mechanism for 
mutual consultation would enhance both its autonomy and legitimacy. The third proposal to ascertain 
possibilities for further information-sharing should push officials in the negotiations to consider 
additional pathways for regulatory cooperation through ‘information exchange’ and thus convince both 
the EPA and the Council in the EU that chemicals regulatory cooperation is a beneficial exercise 
(Interview 1). It avoids, however, aiming at policy or deep forms of cooperation that would constrain 
the policy autonomy of the Commission. 
The second proposal to promote the alignment of the classification and labelling of chemicals equally 
does not make commitments beyond the pursuit of ‘information exchange’. Exchanges among regulators 
should facilitate “ways of establishing a common list of classification for substances” (Commission, 
2013a). The wording avoids, however, a commitment to adopt the UN GHS in full. Both DG 
Environment and DG Grow officials argued that the existing classification and labelling system in the 
EU established clear information and were beneficial to EU producers, giving them little reason to 
change its policies (Interview 2). At the same time, Commission officials reportedly emphasised that 
the EPA was unwilling to adopt the UN GHS and change its existing practices, notably due to lobbying 
of pesticide producers in the US (Elliott & Pelkmans, 2014: 10). Further ‘information exchange’ on the 
classification and labelling with the EPA would, however, help promote the Commission’s approach 
and insulate it against possible demands for adaptations in the future (Interview 3). The establishment 
of further ‘information exchanges’ with the EPA on the classification of chemicals should pave the way 
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for a commitment of the EPA to implement the UN GHS for a broad range of chemicals within a 
specified timeframe (Interview 1). 
With the presentation of the position paper by DG Grow and DG Environment, DG Trade was arguably 
reassured that regulatory cooperation on chemicals was a feasible way to facilitate transatlantic trade 
through the TTIP (Interview 2). Correspondingly, DG Trade invited the representative of the chemicals 
industry as one of the members of the TTIP Advisory Group (Commission, 2014l). Yet, after the TTIP 
negotiations had begun, the EU business association Cefic struggled to uphold the coalition with the US 
association ACC. On the one hand, ACC questioned the benefit of increased ‘information exchange’ for 
chemicals producers (Interview 1). Firms were concerned that data exchange between EU and US 
authorities would lead to a leak or loss of confidential business information, given the different 
implementation principles regarding data that firms need to submit to regulators (Interview 2)82. They 
requested that firms should be contacted for agreement before regulators should be allowed to pass on 
confidential business information (Interview 1)83. Firms also rejected demands for a further alignment 
of substance classifications given the legal effects of the classification of a substance as ‘carcinogenic’ 
in the EU and the US84. The weakening of the transatlantic chemicals business coalition during the TTIP 
negotiations is most evidently shown by the absence of the ACC from business presentations at 
stakeholder meetings during negotiation rounds (Commission, 2015n)85. Moreover, the ACC published 
a position paper on the TTIP negotiations in which it called for changes to REACH, a view reportedly 
not shared by EU chemicals industry (Interview 2)86. The ACC also published a position paper within 
the International Chemistry Council whose policy lines runs largely counter to the joint position paper 
with Cefic 87(Interview 1).  
At the same time, with the launch of the TTIP negotiations, NGOs became very active on chemicals 
(e.g. BEUC, 2016; Chemicalwatch, 2016; Greenpeace, 2015; Seattle to Brussels Network, 2015; Centre 
for International Environmental Law, 2014; Corporate Europe Observatory, 2014). Their mobilisation 
                                                     
82 In the past, criticism with regard to inappropriate protection of confidential business information has been 
expressed primarily by the ACC that views data-sharing between the ECHA and third-country authorities as a 
possible threat to the protection of confidential business information.    
83 Observers call into question that data exchange between agencies would still make sense under these conditions. 
Rather than requesting authorities to exchange data, firms could directly submit their data to the ECHA and EPA 
(Interview 1; Interview 2). Moreover, the concerns of ACC with regard to confidential business information is 
likely overstated as existing REACH provisions already allow for the exchange of confidential business 
information.    
84 While reasons and conditions at present diverge, one could hypothetically eliminate the controversy by upward 
harmonisation and in case of a divergence always take the more stringent classification. In this case, however, a 
classification of a chemical as carcinogenic in the US which would not be classified as carcinogenic in the EU 
could result in a market ban for this chemical in the EU as the identification of a substance as a SVHC automatically 
bans it from its use in pesticides.   
85 The absence of the US chemicals industry from these stakeholder meetings contrasts with the presence of 
transatlantic business coalitions across many other sectors (Young, 2016; Commission, 2015; Commission, 2014) 
86 This implies that US chemicals producers did hope to gain leverage on amending at least parts of REACH 
through the TTIP negotiations. 
87 This decision may be explained with a loss of interest among US chemicals firms in transatlantic regulatory 
cooperation once they realised that one of their priorities, amending REACH, could not be achieved. 
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triggered the high politicisation of the chemicals negotiations (Eliasson, 2014). Among the non-business 
societal actors, only one animal welfare NGO supported efforts of the Commission to enhance 
information-sharing between EU and US authorities (Humane Society, 2015). Yet, most NGOs strongly 
mobilised against regulatory cooperation on chemicals as part of a TTIP agreement (especially 
Greenpeace, 2015; Centre for International Environmental Law, 2014). They directed their criticism 
mainly at two aspects, that the US would seek to “soften” the provisions of REACH (Corporate Europe 
Observatory, 2014), and that consultation with US regulators in the future would lead to a “regulatory 
chill” (Centre for International Environmental Law, 2014). The criticism of NGOs likely reflected 
suspicions and fears that the exercise of the precautionary principle may become more limited under 
regulatory cooperation and that the EU may eventually become convinced that its present approach may 
be overly precautionary. For this reason, some NGO (Greenpeace, 2015) demanded that the Commission 
exclude the chemicals sector from regulatory cooperation and stop the TTIP negotiations altogether. 
Besides, the Centre for International Environmental Law (CIEL) warned that ‘information exchanges’ 
on the assessment of chemicals could obstruct the process of testing and regulating substances (Inside 
US Trade, 2014e). 
Despite the growing contestation among societal actors, DG Grow in coordination with DG 
Environment continued to work on the priorities outlined in the 2013 position paper. Emphasis was put 
on ‘information exchange’ between the ECHA and EPA. In a non-paper from early 2014, DG Grow 
outlined four ideas of issues on which it or the ECHA could consult with the US EPA (Commission, 
2014a; see also Commission, 2014f): First, it suggested ‘information exchange’ on the update of the 
Community Rolling Action Plan (CoRAP) under REACH88. Second, it proposed ‘information 
exchange’ on the nomination of ‘substances of very high concern’ (SVHCs) for the candidate list of 
authorisation. Third, it flagged ‘information exchange’ on the prioritisation of SVHCs that are to be 
moved from the candidate list to authorisation. Fourth, it put forward ‘information exchange’ and 
involvement of the US EPA on the listing of a substance for restriction in the Commission’s so-called 
‘Registry of Intent’ (Commission, 2014a).  
The choice of these issues reflected the evaluation of DG Grow and DG Environment officials where 
‘information exchange’ between the ECHA and EPA could contribute most to improve the substance of 
evaluation data for the Commission. Exchange of information on the identification of chemicals for 
prioritised assessment would substantiate corresponding decisions of the Commission whose 
identification of chemicals as SVHC were often controversial (Interview 3). ‘Information exchange’ 
would thus enhance the legitimacy of Commission decisions to classify chemicals as priority chemicals 
                                                     
88 The CoRAP specifies the substances that are to be evaluated over a period of three years. It is established by the 
ECHA in cooperation with the authorities of member states (ECHA, 2017). In the EU, substances are selected 
based both on the potential hazard they pose along with exposure and production volumes, then put on what is 
known as the "community rolling action plan" (CoRAP) list following the opinion of a member state committee. 
ECHA then conducts a risk assessment. If the risk assessment determines that a substance has not been properly 
controlled, it could be subject to further scrutiny and restrictions (Inside US Trade,2014a). 
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for assessment. At the same time, it would help protect the Commission against demands of chemicals 
producers to re-classify substances (Interview 3).    
Although the transatlantic chemicals business coalition had weakened and opposition of many NGOs 
had grown by 2014, the political and administrative leadership of DG Trade sustained its interest in 
using chemicals as a case for regulatory cooperation. Besides, the continued demands for regulatory 
cooperation should help business associations to mobilise firms in support of regulatory cooperation 
(Interview 1). In the Stakeholder Dialogues, officials from DG Trade and DG Grow criticised NGOs 
that they did not engage with the substance of their position paper (Commission, 2014m). In particular, 
they sought to diffuse fears of NGOs that the TTIP negotiations could be used as a vehicle to change 
REACH89. They emphasised that legislation could not be changed without the approval of the Council 
and the EP. Moreover, the different regulatory approaches in the EU and the US made” a mutual 
recognition of the frameworks impossible” (EU Chief Negotiator Garcia Bercero, TTIP Stakeholder 
Dialogue 24 February 2016).     
The weakening of the chemicals business coalition contributed to decrease the focus of DG Grow on 
‘information exchange’ with a view to initiate a process for the harmonisation of the classification and 
labelling of chemicals thus decreased. After DG Grow and DG Environment had taken up exchanges 
with the EPA, EPA officials made clear that it did not consider the adoption of the UN GHS a priority. 
This was partly due to lobbying from pesticides firms both US firms and US subsidiaries (Interview 1). 
Besides, the EPA did not feel that an adoption of the UN GHS would be beneficial for its autonomy90 .  
The insistence of DG Trade to achieve tangible results in chemicals regulatory cooperation led it to 
propose ‘information exchange’ and consultation on emerging issues. Upon demands of the US 
Administration, it asked DG Grow to consider the statements put forward by the USTR on endocrine 
disruptors91. It considered that cooperation on endocrine disruptors could be a test case for ‘information 
exchange’ on emerging issues in the future (Interview 3). At the same time, it supported the 
administrative leadership of DG Grow to encourage the pursuit of envisioned pilot projects with the 
EPA for the prioritisation of chemicals for risk assessment. DG Grow established a pilot project to see 
if the EU and the US shared their evaluations of substances to be assessed under a priority. It tasked the 
ECHA to share its proposed 2015 update of the Community Rolling Action Plan (CORAP) and invite 
the US EPA for comments (Commission, 2015gl: 13). At the same time, it convinced the US EPA in 
                                                     
89 Trade Commissioner de Gucht had sent a letter to 116 NGOs in March 2014 to emphasise that REACH would 
not be changed and the Commission (and neither the US Administration) pursued a strategy to harmonise or 
mutually recognise the chemicals regulatory frameworks.  
90 With around 17000 employees the EPA does not face the same resource constraints as DG Grow or DG 
Environment. Reducing the regulatory burden is thus likely to be less a reason to cooperate with regulators from 
other jurisdictions for the EPA than it is for DG Grow or DG Environment.  
91 Endocrine disruptors are substances believed to interfere with the human neurological system. The Commission 
proposal foresaw restricting those substances because their dangerous effects were not immediately detectable and 
cannot be mitigated by restricting exposure (Inside US Trade, 2013e). 
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the interactions during the negotiation rounds to share its Work Plan Update with the ECHA92. The 
exchange of the CoRAP documents and the EPA Work Plan showed that the ECHA and EPA had an 
overlap of 17 substances to be evaluated over a period of three years (Commission, 2015g: 13). Under 
the pilot project, both the ECHA and EPA chose priority substances to be evaluated according to their 
respective procedures in 2015, four EU member states agreed to participate in the project. The lists of 
priority substances were compiled without prior coordination. The ECHA published draft updates of its 
priority list. But the US EPA did not use its opportunity to comment on the priority list (Interview 1).  
Subsequently, the identification of substances in the EU and the US showed that the EU priority list had 
no matches with the list of priority chemicals of the US EPA (Commission, 2015g: 13). 
By late 2015, hoping to achieve some visible success on chemicals regulatory cooperation, the 
administrative and political leadership of DG Grow encouraged a continuation of the pursuit of the 
implementation of the UN GHS (Inside US Trade, 2016c). DG Grow thus set up a pilot project on 
classification and labelling with the US OHSA, which had already implemented the UN GHS. Under 
this pilot project, the Commission exchanged lists of substances with ongoing or forthcoming 
classification with the US Occupational Safety and Health Agency (OSHA) and the National Toxicology 
Programme (NTP). The Commission and the US National Toxicology Programme showed interest in 
individual proposals of the other side and commented on them (Commission, 2016: 14). Under a third 
pilot project, the Commission persuaded the OSHA to prepare a first analysis to compare the content of 
‘Safety Data Sheets’ in the EU and the US (Commission, 2016e: 15).               
As DG Trade maintained demands to move ahead with regulatory cooperation including in the chemicals 
sector, DG Grow and DG Environment elaborated a draft textual proposal for a Chemicals Annex in 
TTIP. The proposal had been adopted through inter-service consultations and presented on 14 July 2016. 
The textual proposal lays down the strategy that the Commission chose to pursue in the TTIP. It takes 
up the initiatives described above, but mainly focuses on the idea to exchange information on the review 
and assessment of high-priority chemicals. It mentions four main objectives (Commission, 2016e, art. 
1.6 (a)-(d) TTIP Chemicals Annex textual proposal; emphasis added by the author):  
 
“a) Enhance cooperation on the review and assessment of chemicals of common priority to 
enable governments and stakeholders, including in particular small and medium-sized 
enterprises, to better use their limited resources; 
b) Enhance scientific cooperation related to hazard identification and risk assessment 
methodologies;  
c) Improve the exchange and/or availability of information and data generated on chemicals for 
regulatory purposes, while ensuring the protection of confidential business information;  
                                                     
92 The US EPA has a similar procedure to the CoRAP under the Toxic Substances Work Plan. (Inside US Trade, 
2014a).   
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d) Promote alignment in classification and labelling of chemicals based on the UN GHS 
including inter alia:  
i. classification and labelling of individual chemicals; ii. identification of differences in the 
Parties' respective requirements for Safety Data Sheets (SDS)” 
 
The list of objectives demonstrates that the Commission’s strategy was the pursuit of ‘information 
exchange’. Its strategy on the assessment of priority substances (Commission, 2016e; art. 6 TTIP 
Chemicals Annex) entailed that each side “shall inform each other promptly when updating the lists of 
priority substances foreseen in their respective legislations with a view to allowing the responsible 
authorities of the other Party to comment on the selection of such priority substances and on the planned 
timing of their assessments” (art. 6.1 TTIP Chemicals Annex). It underlined, however, that “the 
responsible authorities of each Party shall conduct assessments of priority substances in line with their 
respective rules and procedures” (art. 6.3 TTIP Chemicals Annex).  Likewise, with regard to risk 
assessment methodologies, the Commission suggested that “the responsible authorities of the Parties 
shall inform each other promptly when reviewing their respective methodologies for the assessment of 
priority chemicals and related scientific issues, in particular those related to hazard and risk assessment” 
(art. 7.1 TTIP Chemicals Annex). Yet, it emphasised that it did not aim at an alignment of 
implementation, i.e. assessment procedures, but rather that the Commission and the ECHA should 
engage in ‘information exchange’ with the EPA to avoid ‘unnecessary’ divergences of testing 
procedures: “Upon request of a Party, the Parties shall enter into discussions when assessment 
methodologies are reviewed or technical guidance documents are developed or reviewed by either Party, 
with a view to avoid divergences, where feasible[…]” (art. 7.3 TTIP Chemicals Annex).  
With regard to the implementation of the UN GHS, the textual proposal foresees that “each Party shall 
implement the UN GHS as comprehensively as considered feasible within its respective system […] 
unless there are specific reasons to apply a different labelling system for particular chemical products” 
(art. 8.1. TTIP Chemicals Annex).  Moreover, the “Parties commit to periodically examine cases in 
which the building block approach and in-built flexibilities of the UN GHS have led to divergent 
implementation in the Parties” (art. 8.2 TTIP Chemicals Annex). The Commission thus puts forward 
that commitments made under the UN GHS should be implemented. Crucially, it does, however, not 
propose that both sides should consider their classifications as equivalent where either EU or US 
classifications and labels differ from the UN GHS or they deviate within permitted flexibilities of the 
UN GHS.93 At the same time, the Commission does not seek to urge the EPA to adopt the UN GHS or 
align its classification and labelling schemes with those of the EU. Rather, it pursues a strategy of 
'information exchange’: “When the responsible authorities of each Party consider to classify individual 
                                                     
93 This shall not call into question the importance of a further implementation of the UN GHS pursued by the 
Commission. Both Commission officials and industry representatives underline the tremendous ‘progress’ a 
further implementation of the internationally agreed UN GHS would constitute for the alignment of chemicals 
classifications and labels.  
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substances, […], in accordance with its respective procedures, they shall give the responsible authorities 
of the other Party, upon their request, the possibility to express their views within those respective 
procedures” (art. 8.3. TTIP Chemicals Annex).  
Besides, the Commission proposed ‘information exchange’ through cooperation “on the dissemination 
of data related to chemicals safety” (art. 9.1. TTIP Chemicals Annex), including the “exchange of non-
confidential information among the relevant responsible authorities” (art 9.2. TTIP Chemicals Annex). 
Finally, the Commission proposed ‘information exchange’ related to “regulatory initiatives on 
individual chemicals” (art. 10 TTIP Chemicals Annex) and with regard to “new and emerging issues of 
common interest” (art. 11 TTIP Chemicals Annex).       
  
6.1.7. Discussion 
 
The previous sub-section has shown that during all three cooperation initiatives, including the TTIP 
negotiations, the Commission has restricted its choice of regulatory cooperation strategies to 
‘information exchange’. This sub-section discusses the Commission’s choice of regulatory cooperation 
strategies during the three regulatory cooperation initiatives in view of the hypotheses derived from the 
Inter-relational Institutionalism. Particular emphasis is put on a contrast of the empirical findings from 
the previous sub-section with the expectations formulated in section 6.1.5.   
The process-tracing conducted for each of the three cooperation initiatives has demonstrated the need 
for bureaucratic pressure to initiate the engagement in regulatory cooperation and the formation of a 
regulatory cooperation strategy (Hypothesis 1). During the NTA, bureaucratic pressure on technical 
Commission officials was low to engage in chemicals regulatory cooperation. Instead, Commissioners 
and Directors General of DG Enterprise and DG Environment agreed that priority should be placed on 
the strengthening of the EU chemicals regulatory regime. In line with hypothesis 1, this led to the pursuit 
of non-cooperation. During he HLRCF and the TTIP negotiations, the presence of bureaucratic pressure 
from Commissioner Verheugen and Commissioner de Gucht drove technical officials to explore 
opportunities for transatlantic chemicals cooperation. In the first case, demands of Commissioner 
Verheugen were reinforced by support from the administrative leadership of DG Enterprise. This led to 
the pursuit of ‘information exchange’, notably with regard to classification and labelling of chemicals 
and emerging issues. Likewise, when bureaucratic pressure decreased during later phases of the TEC, 
the pursuit of cooperation by technical Commission officials also weakened. The need for bureaucratic 
pressure to initiate the engagement in regulatory cooperation and the formation of a regulatory 
cooperation strategy, however, decreased with the TTIP negotiations. Although the insistence of Trade 
Commissioner de Gucht on regulatory cooperation in chemicals as a high-volume trade sector strongly 
contributed to the engagement in regulatory cooperation, interview evidence collected for this study 
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suggests that technical officials themselves considered ‘information exchange’ an opportunity structure. 
The presence of bureaucratic pressure rather supported the formation of a strategy because officials 
could anticipate that their technical counterparts in US regulatory agencies would respond to cooperation 
offers if bureaucratic pressure was also present in the US. The presence of bureaucratic pressure has, 
however, not pushed Commission officials another strategy as ‘information exchange’. 
The empirical finding of the strategies selected under bureaucratic pressure during the HLRCF and the 
TTIP negotiations confirms the expectations formulated in section 6.1.5. The strategy choice reflected 
the distribution of regulatory compatibilities between the EU and the US in the chemicals sector 
(Hypothesis 2).  
Arguably most evidently, the Commission has not sought ‘regulatory alignment’. On the contrary, it 
stressed in its initial TTIP position paper that “neither full harmonisation nor mutual recognition seems 
feasible on the basis of the existing framework legislations in the US and the EU” (Commission, 2013). 
The Commission invoked three reasons for its choice to maintain ‘regulatory competition’ between 
REACH and the TSCA: First, it noted that the REACH review concluded in 2013 did not indicate any 
need to amend the framework. Indeed, the Commission had been keen on finalising the REACH review 
before it began the third phase of regulatory cooperation, expecting that both the USTR and US 
industries might otherwise use the TTIP negotiations to demand changes to REACH (Interview 3). The 
Commission preferred to show that REACH in its existing form was considered as legitimate by non-
business societal actors and also was accepted by chemicals producers. In the TTIP stakeholder 
dialogues, a Commission official emphasised that “REACH was working well for EU businesses. We 
don’t see a need to change it.” (Commission official, Stakeholder dialogue 24 February 2016). Second, 
it stresses that the US does not share the EU’s view that substances should be registered before they can 
be marketed, a “fundamental requirement under REACH”, as evidenced by the absence of a general 
registration obligation in the draft TSCA proposal (Interview 3). Third, the Commission underlined that 
the US does not share the EU’s view to authorise chemicals rather than restrict them after initial 
marketing (Commission, 2013). Crucially, a difference stressed concerned the EU’s ban of chemical 
substances it considers as hazardous whereas the US EPA issues recommendations (Interview 1). 
Without addressing a potential compatibility or incompatibility of regulatory authority structures, the 
Commission thus emphasised the incompatible regulatory principles with regard to the registration and 
authorisation of chemicals as reasons not to pursue ‘regulatory alignment’.   
Likewise, the Commission has not sought to pursue ‘equivalence’. ‘equivalence’ could have been 
pursued through a recognition of ‘equivalence’ of chemicals classifications (Interview 2). Yet, the 
Commission emphasised that an ‘equivalence’ of classifications would be “difficult” because both in 
the EU and the US classifications had legal effects with regard to the authorisation or ban of chemical 
substances for certain uses, i.e. their use in biocides or pesticides (Interview 1). The recognition of a 
classification according to EU or US law by the respective other side without the legal effect linked to 
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that classification would thus restrict upon the autonomy of either the Commission or the EPA to 
authorise or ban a substance. For this reason, it was unwilling to envisage an ‘equivalence’ of 
classifications (Interview 1). Instead, the Commission wanted to exchange information for a reduction 
of divergence of future classifications where these it did not entail legal effects with regard to their 
authorisation or ban for certain uses. The different regulatory authority structures with regard to the 
ability of central-level regulators to restrict substances based on their classifications thus contributed to 
prevent the Commission from pursuing an ‘equivalence’ of classifications and labels.    
Third, the Commission has not pursued an ‘alignment of implementation procedures’. The latter could 
notably have been pursued through an alignment of assessment methodologies for substances or a 
mutual recognition of test results (Interview 2). Yet, the Commission did not suggest that either of these 
should be the objective of TTIP negotiations. Interview partners stated that the criteria applied by the 
Commission and the EPA to consider scientific evidence as relevant for the authorisation and ban of 
chemical substances differed in the EU and the US, obstructing an alignment of assessment 
methodologies (Interviews 1, Interview 3). At the same time, the noted that EPA officials were sceptical 
of tests conducted by firms in certain EU member states, making EPA unwilling to accept evidence 
produced by such firms as a basis for their decision to ban a chemical substance (Interview 2). Both the 
divergence of regulatory authority structures, i.e. the allocation of the responsibility to conduct 
assessments, and the principles followed in the assessment of chemicals stopped the Commission from 
pursuing an ‘alignment of implementation procedures’. 
For this reason, the Commission concentrated on pursuing ‘information exchange’ on chemicals in line 
with the expectation formulated in section 6.1.5. It is noteworthy that the Commission does not refer to 
diverging standards or diverging levels of environmental protection and consumer health as reasons for 
maintaining ‘regulatory competition’ over the regulatory frameworks (Interview 1, Interview 2, 
Interview 3). 
Yet, the issues covered by the Commission’s pursuit of ‘information exchange’ have expanded over the 
three phases of regulatory cooperation. While the Commission was reluctant to engage in regulatory 
cooperation during the first phase and instead sought to reinforce ‘regulatory competition’ by the 
adoption of REACH, Industry Commissioner Verheugen pushed officials to pursue ‘information 
exchanges’ with the US EPA under the TEC during the second phase. With the beginning of the third 
phase and the TTIP negotiations under the participation of DG Trade, DG Grow and DG Environment 
extended ‘information exchange’ to the assessment of priority chemicals, risk assessment procedures 
and new classifications of chemical substances. Besides, Commission officials pursued ‘information 
exchanges’ on new and emerging issues, notably related to the reform of the chemicals framework in 
the US and envisaged legislation on endocrine disruptors in the EU. 
The choice of issues within the chemicals regulatory regime on which the Commission has pursued 
‘information exchange’ has been shaped by the mobilisation of societal actors (Hypothesis 3). The effect 
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has been twofold: During the HLRCF and the TTIP negotiations, Commission officials took up 
proposals of the TABC, Cefic and the ACC to direct the pursuit of ‘information exchange’ on the 
assessment of priority chemicals, procedures for risk assessment and the classification and labelling of 
substances. These issues were in line with regulatory compatibilities between the EU and the US 
chemicals regulatory regimes. In the case of classification and labelling, industry proposals also built on 
earlier international chemicals cooperation. At the same time, mobilisation within industry groups for 
strategies going beyond ‘information exchange’ failed to influence the strategies pursued by the 
Commission. This also applies to mobilisation by some NGOs against the pursuit of regulatory 
cooperation under any strategy during the TTIP negotiations. Still, the influence of Commissioner 
Verheugen at the launch of the TEC and the participation of DG Trade at the launch of TTIP negotiations 
have pushed and supported Commission officials to pursue ‘information exchange’ rather than ‘non-
cooperation’.  
In sum, this section has shown that the Commission has restricted the choice of strategies in transatlantic 
regulatory cooperation to ‘information exchange’. This choice reflects the incompatible distribution of 
regulatory authority structures related to the assessment of substances and the ability to restrict 
substances as well as the incompatible regulatory principles related to the registration and authorisation 
of substances between the EU and the US. It remains to be seen how the changes in the EPA leadership 
under the Trump Administration will affect the engagement of the Commission in regulatory 
cooperation with the US EPA. Two scenarios are imaginable: On the one hand, the opposition of the 
new EPA executive to the regulatory principles pursued by the Commission may discourage the 
Commission from pursuing regulatory cooperation, given that US EPA responses to previous strategies 
have been limited. On the other hand, resource costs imposed onto the EPA under the Trump 
Administration may increase the interest of the US EPA to exchange data with the ECHA and develop 
coordinated plans for the assessment of priority chemicals. Yet, unless the distribution of regulatory 
compatibilities changes, it should not be expected that the Commission goes beyond ‘information 
exchange’ in regulatory cooperation on chemicals with the US.  
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6.2. Commission strategies in transatlantic engineering cooperation  
 
This section proposes a case study for which existing literature implies that regulatory authority 
structures in the EU and US are incompatible, but regulatory principles are compatible at least for some 
policies. It is thus a case in which the Commission can be expected to pursue an ‘alignment of 
implementation procedures’. This case study covers the Commission’s choice of regulatory cooperation 
strategies in transatlantic regulatory cooperation in the engineering regime.  
 
6.2.1. Introduction 
 
Engineering regulations aim at the mechanical and electrical safety of products to human health and the 
environment. They thus address issues of mechanical safety, electrical safety, electromagnetic 
compatibility and explosion protection. Engineering regulations cover products of both mechanical and 
electrical, and electronics industries. Products can be as diverse as industry machines, household 
products, hand tools, sports and leisure equipment. Mechanical safety refers to the mechanical aspects 
of a product and the conditions under which its failure can pose a risk to the user of a product. It thus 
addresses the design and shape of a product, its potential e.g. to squeeze body parts, its durability 
characteristics as well as the design of safety components including screws. Electrical safety refers to 
the potential risk that users of a product experience an electrical shock and thus addresses e.g. the 
avoidance of current leakage, the strength of electrical insulation. Electromagnetic compatibility 
describes the ability of a product to function safely in its electromagnetic environment without causing 
electromagnetic disturbances. Explosion protection refers specifically to the prevention of ‘pressure 
equipment’ from explosion during use. Environmental safety invokes especially the functionality of a 
product under extreme weather conditions and its resistance to corrosion94.   
In many jurisdictions, these issues are regulated by regulatory policies, often legislation, giving 
guidelines for the human health and environmental safety requirements of a product. Standards offer 
technical specifications and solutions for producers to meet the human health and environmental safety 
requirements of legislation for a product. These are usually developed by standards development 
organisations (SDOs). Implementation procedures address the measures verifying that products conform 
to the safety requirements of regulatory policies, i.e. the conformity assessment procedures. Moreover, 
                                                     
94 Specific ‘horizontal’ environmental regulations may additionally address the production or recycling of a 
product or its components.    
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they refer to testing procedures used to assess the conformity of a product with the requirements of 
regulatory policies.        
The engineering industry is highly internationalised, entailing that producers and buyers of products 
face high rule overlap and conflicting regulatory requirements as they buy or sell engineering products 
across jurisdictional boundaries. While some engineering firms are large, multinational firms with 
production sites across many jurisdictions, a high number are small- and medium-sized enterprises with 
nonetheless a high integration into global value chains and the fragmentation of the production chain 
into different components. In the transatlantic relationship, Francois et al. (2013) show that technical 
barriers to trade costs amount to 19.1% for EU exports to the US and 13.6% for US exports to the EU. 
In particular EU engineering firms are highly competitive, causing EU engineering exports to account 
for more than 30% of total EU exports to the US in 2012 (Francois et al, 2013).  Figure 16 shows the 
development of trade flows between the EU and the US in the engineering sector between 2006 and 
201695.   
 
 
Figure 16: Trade Flows in the Engineering Sector 2006-2016 
 
Both business societal actors and NGOs engage on engineering cooperation. In the EU on the business 
side, lobbying is crucially shaped by EU-level and German business associations, i.e. Orgalime, VDMA 
(mechanical safety) and ZVEI (electrical safety). Besides, firms are densely involved in standards 
development. Standards development organisations may also act as societal actors. Among NGOs, 
notably the consumers lead organisation BEUC has mobilised on engineering issues. 
                                                     
95 The choice of the time period reflects data availability constraints (Eurostat, 2017).  
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This section proceeds as follows: It first outlines the distribution of regulatory authority structures and 
principles in the EU chemicals regulatory framework and then outlines the incompatibility of US 
regulatory authority structures and compatibility of regulatory principles. It then formulates expectations 
on the Commission’s choice of regulatory cooperation strategies with the US, based on the 
incompatibility of EU-US regulatory authority structures and compatibility of regulatory principles. The 
subsequent sections present the regulatory cooperation strategies the Commission pursued in the three 
phases of transatlantic regulatory cooperation delineated in chapter 5.1 and contrasts them with the 
mobilisation of societal actors. The Commission’s choice of regulatory cooperation strategy is then 
contrasted with the formulated expectations and the patterns of societal mobilisation. The final sub-
section concludes.  
 
6.2.2. International engineering cooperation  
 
This section briefly summarises the subjects of regulatory cooperation in international organisations. It 
offers background and contextual information for the adoption of regulatory principles in both the EU 
and the US. Regulatory cooperation with regard to mechanical and electrical safety in engineering 
products is addressed by the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) and standardisation within the international standard development organisations 
International Standardisation Organisation (ISO) and International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). 
The TBT Agreement in its form at the time of writing entered into force after the conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round in 1995. It does not specifically refer to or address mechanical or electrical safety, but 
has particular relevance for the engineering sector because the latter is relatively less regulated than 
other industry sectors (Interview 6). The TBT Agreement specifies that technical regulations and 
standards must ensure non-discrimination between domestic and foreign products and not treat domestic 
products more favourably than imported products (art. 2.1 TBT Agreement). While states are free to 
pursue any objective they consider as appropriate, the TBT Agreement requires them to develop 
technical regulations and standards which are not more trade-restrictive than necessary to achieve a 
legitimate public policy objective (art. 2.2. TBT Agreement). Legitimate public policy objectives are 
enumerated e.g. as environmental or consumer protection. Where ‘international standards’ exist96, the 
                                                     
96 While the EU understands ‘international standards’ as those standards developed by international standardisation 
organisations, i.e. ISO and IEC, with international membership, the US understands ‘international standards’ 
which are used by firms internationally (Interview 4,6; for further elaboration on the background of the 
‘international standards’ discussion see also Pelkmans, 2015b). 
Here it should be noted that for firms, including EU firms, standards promulgated by US standard development 
organisations, e.g. ASTM, have also become de facto world standards. Firms with transnational activities are used 
to adopt two standards simultaneously. EU firms use US standards too in products not specifically designed for 
export to the US due to their claimed high quality and specialisation (Interview 6). 
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TBT Agreement requires WTO members to use them as a basis for technical regulations, standards and 
conformity assessment procedures. The use of international standards establishes the presumption that 
states and jurisdiction conform with their multilateral obligations. Yet, states can adopt measures more 
stringent measures than international standards in pursuit of legitimate public policy objectives, given 
that they follow the procedure laid down in the Agreement (WTO, 1995a, art. 2.4 TBT Agreement). 
Non-discrimination also applies to conformity assessment procedures, implying that conformity 
assessment procedures need to grant access not less favourably to importers than domestic producers 
(WTO, 1995a, art. 5.1. TBT Agreement).  
Related to engineering products, the ISO develops standards for mechanical safety whereas the IEC 
develops standards for electrical safety. Besides, related to implementation procedures, the ISO also sets 
standards for the testing of products to establish conformity assessment. The ILAC (International 
Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation) sets standards for test laboratories. Moreover, the IAF 
(International Accreditation Forum) has developed standards for the accreditation of conformity 
assessment bodies.  
Despite regulatory cooperation in these international organisations, differences persist in the regulatory 
frameworks between countries, including and notably between the EU and the US. First, jurisdictions 
have rejected the implementation of international standards for a lack of compatibility with domestic 
standards. Second, they have adopted regulatory policies and implementation procedures beyond 
international standards to pursue public policy objectives in light with their rights under the TBT 
Agreement. 
 
6.2.3. EU engineering regime 
 
This section describes the distribution of regulatory authority structures and regulatory principles in the 
EU. The first part of this section looks at the distribution of authority structures and principles with 
respect to regulatory policies, the second part at authority structures and principles with respect to 
implementation procedures, i.e. procedures of conformity assessment and testing.  
Regulatory policies shaping engineering regulation in the EU can be divided into legislation and 
standards. Legislation mostly falls under the ‘New Legislative Framework’ (Regulation (EC) 764/2008 
and Regulation (EC) 765/2008), a reform of the so-called ‘New Approach’ in 2008. These have been 
proposed under the lead of DG Grow. Within the ‘New Legislative Framework’, mechanical safety is 
regulated in the Machinery Directive (Directive 2006/42/EC), electrical safety in the Low Voltage 
Directive (2006/95/EC and 2014/35/EU), electromagnetic compatibility in the Electromagnetic 
Compatibility Directive (2014/30/EU) and explosion protection in the Pressure Equipment Directive 
(2014/68/EU).  
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Almost all legislation governing mechanical and electrical safety has been adopted at the EU-level after 
the establishment of the Single Market. The very few remaining member state laws have been subjected 
to mutual recognition since 1995.97 The directives adopted at the EU-level set ‘essential requirements’ 
for mechanical and/or electrical safety that engineering products need to meet. Member states have no 
authority to formulate regulations setting other ‘essential requirements’. Technical standards in support 
of EU-level legislation, so-called ‘harmonised standards’, are developed or provided by the European 
Standards Organisations (ESOs) CEN (European Committee for Standardisation) and CENELEC 
(European Committee for Electrotechnical Standards) 98,99. Although the ESOs are private actors, the 
Commission maintains a contractual relationship with them, based on the General Guidelines for 
Cooperation (Commission, 2003c), which designates the ESOs as the only providers of harmonised 
standards, and provides public funding to them. Within the contractual relationship, the Commission 
elaborates and publishes annual standardisation requests to the ESOs. It notifies stakeholders of its draft 
standardisation work programmes and invites them for comments on them (Egan & Pelkmans, 2015: 8). 
The ESOs are hierarchical organisations with the national standards bodies of EU member states are 
members. Each member state recognises only one singular standards body. Standards are developed in 
technical committees in which a wide range of stakeholders including SMEs, non-EU firms, consumers, 
and trade unions participate. Voting rights are, however, restricted to the representatives of the national 
standards bodies which subsequently adopt standards as ‘harmonised standards’. The hierarchical 
organisation of the EU standardisation system entails an obligation for member state standards bodies 
to remove and withdraw conflicting national standards once a harmonised standard is adopted (Büthe & 
Mattli, 2011). At the same time, the Commission requires CEN and CENELEC to verify existing 
relevant standards in the world before they develop own ones. Through the Vienna and Dresden 
Agreements from 1991 and 1996 respectively a commitment exists to adopt internationally agreed ISO 
and IEC as ‘harmonised standards’100.  
CEN and CENELEC do, however, not have authority to adopt binding standards. Standards in the EU 
are only binding if they are directly incorporated into Regulations or Directives. In the so-called ‘New 
Legislative Framework’ Directives, i.e. the directives governing mechanical and electrical safety, this is 
very rare. Yet, CEN and CENELEC standards offer firms a ‘presumption of conformity’. On the one 
hand, if the Commission accepts that a ‘harmonised standard’ fulfils an ‘essential requirement’ laid 
down in a directive, the use of this standard by a firm offers it a ‘presumption of conformity’ of their 
                                                     
97 The following paragraphs draw on the illustration in Egan & Pelkmans (2015).   
98 Member state laws in areas of member state competence delegate standard development or provision to national 
standards bodies.   
99 The role of ETSI as a setter of telecommunications standards is briefly outlined in chapter 6.4. CENELEC 
develops or provides standards for electrotechnical equipment and components. CEN develops or provides 
standards for all products not covered by ETSI or CENELEC.   
100 These agreements foresee that new ISO/IEC standards are written jointly with EU standards, with the same 
European experts participating in international and European Standards Organisations. Egan and Pelkmans (2015: 
12) show figures that 72% of CENELEC standards are identical to IEC standards, and 31% of CEN standards 
identical to ISO ones.   
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product with the relevant safety and health objectives laid down in the directive. This guarantees the 
firm free movement of its products within the Single Market. On the other hand, the use of a ‘harmonised 
standard is not mandatory to show compliance with the ‘essential requirements’ of EU legislation. 
Producers can demonstrate compliance with the ‘essential requirements’ through other means, e.g. by 
developing their own standards101. Nonetheless, the authority to formulate ‘essential requirements’ for 
mechanical and electrical at the EU-level upon proposal of the Commission and the delegation of the 
development and provision of standards for the technical specification of these ‘essential requirements’ 
means that regulatory authority on regulatory policies in the EU is centralised.  
In the formulation of ‘essential requirements’, the Commission does not seek to eliminate potential risk 
to human health and the environment that could possibly arise, but pursues the principle to eliminate all 
risk that can arise under conceivable ‘normal’ uses of a machine (Interview 2)102. The Directives listed 
above only lay down ‘essential requirements’, i.e. technical expressions of safety and health objectives 
that products need to meet (Egan & Pelkmans, 2015: 10)103. The regulatory principle followed by the 
Commission in the proposal of regulatory policies, i.e. directives governing mechanical and electrical 
safety, is therefore the risk principle104.  
For conformity assessment, the Commission has the authority to propose the content of implementation 
procedures. However, the procedures themselves are conducted by firms and member state authorities. 
Product safety is foremost the responsibility of producers. The product directives listed above obliges 
them to manufacture and place safe products on the market (European Parliamentary Research Service, 
2015: 8). Producers thus conduct the conformity assessment themselves. By affixing the CE mark on 
their product, they affirm that their product complies with the safety requirements. Market surveillance 
authorities in EU member states monitor products placed on the market and guarantee that products 
placed on the market comply with the safety requirements of EU legislation (Commission, 2016j: 114-
117). Yet, for products requiring conformity assessment through third-party testing, the authority to 
conduct tests is partially centralised (see the next paragraph). The ‘New Legislative Framework’ 
designates conformity assessment bodies (CABs) which are allowed to conduct third-party assessment 
(European Parliament & Council, 2008). These designated CABs, called ‘Notified Bodies’, need to be 
recognised, i.e. accredited, by a member state. To be able to be accredited by a member state, a CAB 
                                                     
101 For this reason, the Commission underlines that standards remain ‘voluntary’ even if they are adopted as a 
harmonised standard (Commission, 2014: 3). A choice not to use ‘harmonised standards’, however, has 
implications for the applicable procedures for conformity assessment, leading to higher costs for firms. US 
business associations and the US Trade Department (USTR) therefore argue that ‘harmonised standards’ are de 
facto binding.  
102 This follows the ‘economics of regulation’ (Egan & Pelkmans, 2015: 9), according to which the elimination of 
all potentially conceivable risk leads to highly restrictive markets, stifling competition and innovation.     
103 These are also called ‘safety, health, environmental and consumer’ (SHEC) objectives (Egan & Pelkmans, 
2015: 5)   
104 In contrast e.g. to chemicals and food safety, engineering is a relatively lowly regulated sector. This limits the 
possible presence of regulatory principles.  
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needs to maintain an office in that member state105. Member states agree to mutually recognise the 
conformity assessments of the ‘Notified Bodies’ conducted in another member state106. If regulatory 
policies require third-party testing for a product, thus only conformity assessment by a ‘Notified Body’ 
gives a firm the certification of conformity with the requirements formulated by regulatory policies. 
Regulatory authority over implementation procedures in the EU is thus centralised. 
For conformity assessment of products with mechanical and electrical safety requirements, the 
Commission relies on ‘Supplier Declaration of Conformity’ (SDoC) and, to a very limited extent, ‘third-
party conformity assessment’(Interview 4). Under SDoC, the declaration of conformity lies in the 
responsibility of the producing firms. Firms apply the testing requirements for conformity assessment 
and provide data and technical documentation that their product meets the ‘essential requirements’ of 
regulatory policies. For ‘high risk’ products, the principle for conformity assessment is ‘third-party 
conformity assessment’. The conformity of high-risk engineering products needs to be assessed by a 
‘Notified Body’ in line with the distribution of regulatory authority described in the previous paragraph. 
The ‘third-party conformity assessment’ applies e.g. to dangerous machinery and explosion protection 
in the EU (Interview 6).  Products that conform to the ‘essential requirements’ laid down in regulatory 
policies and whose conformity to the ‘essential requirements’ has been tested according to the applicable 
conformity assessment procedure are allowed to carry the CE mark107. Principles for the testing of 
products to establish conformity assessment are ISO standards, i.e. ILAC (International Laboratory 
Accreditation Cooperation) standards for test laboratories in firms for SDoC and IAF (International 
Accreditation Forum) standards for the accreditation of CABs under ‘third-party conformity 
assessment’. Regulatory principles in conformity assessment procedures followed by the EU are thus 
SDoC and, to a very limited extent, ‘third-party conformity assessment’. 
    
6.2.4. Contrast of the EU and US engineering regimes  
 
This section summarises divergences between the EU and US regulatory frameworks for engineering 
products. It demonstrates that incompatible differences exist mostly with regard to the distribution of 
regulatory authority structures while regulatory principles are compatible especially for regulatory 
policies.  
                                                     
105 This requirement is also known as the ‘territoriality’ requirement.  
106 Member states are responsible to control a Notified Body if problems are detected in a product certified by 
‘Notified Body’ (Interview 4). In the negotiations of the ‘New Legislative Framework’, this has been a 
precondition by certain member states for the mutual recognition of conformity assessments. In exchange for the 
legal responsibility to control ‘Notified Bodies’, member states demand that they establish an office in their 
jurisdiction (Interview 5).  
107 The CE mark states that products conform to EU technical requirements and grants producers free movement 
of their products in the Single Market. 
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US regulations on mechanical and electrical safety are made at both the central, sub-central and local 
level (Interview 6; Orgalime, 2014: 6). Central-level safety regulations are adopted mainly by the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and, less frequently, by the US Consumer 
Product Safety Commission (CPSC). They exist only if central-level regulatory agencies have been 
mandated by Congress to develop regulation with a view to regulate a specific safety risk108. Otherwise, 
sub-central safety regulations persist where issues have not been regulated by central-level regulatory 
policies. These may establish diverging and conflicting safety requirements across states109.    
If OSHA or the CPSC have received mandates, i.e. authority, to adopt central-level safety regulations 
with regard to a risk or a product, they can only regulate this risk or product within a defined scope. The 
OSHA does not have authority to regulate safety features of all engineering products brought onto the 
US market, but regulates the safety characteristics that products must have if they are used within the 
area of its mandate, i.e. at the workplace110.  
Standards are developed by both accredited and non-accredited standard development organisations 
(SDOs) and authority is not centralised to eliminate or withdraw competing standards. More than 200 
SDOs are accredited in the US, the most important ones of them being former sectoral business 
associations. The umbrella organisation of US SDOs and the main interlocutor of the ESOs in 
transnational dialogues, the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), only assumes a coordination 
and accreditation function for the various SDOs. Besides, ANSI has authority to represent the US in the 
international standardisation bodies ISO and IEC and thus is a platform for promoting standards 
internationally. Yet, ANSI does not have authority to develop standards or provide standards itself. 
Moreover, standards are also set by SDOs, consortia and forums not accredited by ANSI (Egan & 
Pelkmans, 2015: 9). Likewise, ANSI does not have the authority to adopt or recognise standards and 
demand a withdrawal of rival or competing standards111. The US regulatory framework allows for the 
                                                     
108 A great number of central-level regulations exist on electrical safety while central-level regulations on 
mechanical safety are rare (Interview 6; Orgalime, 2014: 6).  
109 If safety issues are regulated by sub-central regulations in a US State or local area, products not complying with 
the safety requirements of these sub-central regulations cannot be sold in that State or area. Unlike the EU, the US 
does therefore not have an internal market for all engineering products. 
110 Within its authority, the OSHA may thus restrict the use of ‘unsafe’ products at the workplace, but it cannot 
restrict the use of ‘unsafe’ products outside the workplace, e.g. in private households. As one interview partner 
described this logic as follows: “Everything can be produced, but not everything can be used.” (Interview 6). 
OSHA regulations may, however, have indirect effects on machines used in households as firms will avoid 
duplicative production of machines for households and workplace to use economies of scale.   
111 Various SDOs compete over the development of standards. A standard becomes relevant in the US if it is used 
by many firms. Neither ANSI nor a regulatory agency, however, has the authority to determine which standard is 
more suitable to meet consumer health and safety requirements.     
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existence of multiple parallel standards developed by multiple SDOs112. In turn, the adoption and 
implementation of internationally agreed ISO and IEC standards is weak113.  
US agencies, e.g. the OSHA, have, however, authority to develop or adopt standards if they use 
standards to give technical specifications in regulations. They can ‘reference’ standards in regulations 
which makes compliance with these standards binding114. When regulatory agencies ‘reference’ a 
standard, they can choose any available, i.e. published, standard that they consider suitable for their 
regulatory objective. Once an agency has selected an already published standard or several standards 
for incorporation into a regulation, it collects stakeholder comments through notice-and-comment 
procedures115. If they do not find a suitable standard, they also have the authority to set so-called 
‘government unique standards’ themselves116. Moreover, agencies have the authority to participate 
themselves as members in private standards development.  
As US regulations on mechanical and electrical safety are made at both the central, sub-central and local 
level, the authority of central-level regulatory agencies is restricted to specific and narrowly defined 
mandates and standards are set by both accredited and non-accredited SDOs, regulatory authority in the 
US is non-centralised for engineering regulatory policies. The previous section has shown, however, 
that regulatory authority in the EU for engineering regulatory policies is centralised to ensure the 
functioning of the Single Market. This makes the distribution of regulatory authority structures between 
the EU and the US incompatible. The authority of the Commission to regulate safety requirements for 
engineering products in the EU can thus not be extended to the US which only regulates specific risks 
in specific contexts. Likewise, the Commission has authority to only ‘reference’ standards – itself a rare 
practice in the EU- that are ‘harmonised’ standards. The technical specification of ‘essential 
requirements’ through the ‘harmonised standards’ adopted within the ESOs creates the obligation for 
member state SDOs to withdraw rival and conflicting standards. This creates a contradiction with the 
authority of the OSHA to ‘reference’ multiple and conflicting standards for the technical specification 
                                                     
112 In practice, however, many prominent standards are developed by only very few independent SDOs. Among 
these, the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), 
the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
(IEEE) are arguably the most important ones and are claimed to enjoy a recognised status in many markets 
internationally (Egan & Pelkmans, 2015: 9). 
113 Reasons for the reluctance of the US to adopt ISO and IEC standards have been widely discussed in the literature 
(e.g. Büthe & Mattli, 2011; Egan & Pelkmans, 2015: 13). On the one hand, explanations put forward that the EU, 
represented by all 27 member states, has many more votes than the US with only one vote and that the US thus 
risked being outvoted by the EU. Yet, with the expansion in membership of the ISO and the IEC this argument 
has arguably lost track. A second explanation offered is that US agencies choose not to use ISO and IEC standards 
for ‘quality’ reasons, given that ISO and IEC standards often represent compromises among their large 
membership. 
114 Although US agencies incorporate standards into regulation through ‘referencing’, the relative number of 
standards incorporated into US public law is argued to be relatively small (Egan & Pelkmans, 2015: 11). 
115 While US agencies make consultation on published standards, the Commission publishes draft standardisation 
programmes for comment (Interview 5).  
116 In the latter case, however, US regulatory agencies need to justify why they develop a ‘government unique 
standard’ if there is an existing private consensus standard (Egan & Pelkmans, 2015: 10)  
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of safety requirements117. Although the distribution of regulatory authority structures on engineering 
safety is overall incompatible between the EU and the US, it may be compatible in specific cases if the 
OSHA has the authority to regulate a product for the US market and the product is mainly used in 
workplaces.  
The US Congress and regulatory agencies follow the ‘risk principle’ in regulatory policies on 
engineering safety issues (Pelkmans, 2015b). Overall, they seek to regulate those risks which can 
possibly occur under ‘normal’ conditions and seek to keep regulation proportional to the intensity of the 
risk118. The practical application of the ‘risk principle’ in US regulations differs, however, from the 
application in the EU regulatory policies. While EU directives formulate only ‘essential requirements’ 
with regard to safety and health objectives, OSHA and CPSC regulations lay down detailed technical 
specificities119. Interview partners have noted that US agencies and US SDOs sometimes argue that the 
‘quality’ of US standards, i.e. the level of safety risk protection, is higher than the ‘compromise’ 
standards agreed on ISO, IEC or within the ESOs (Interview  4, Interview 5), OSHA officials are cited 
to concede, however, that referenced US standards are functionally equivalent in terms of SHEC 
objectives to ISO or IEC standards (Orgalime, 2014: 11). Regulatory principles on engineering 
regulatory policies can thus be considered compatible. The pursuit of comparable regulatory objectives 
and priorities underlines the compatibility of regulatory principles even if OSHA and other relevant US 
agencies make technical specifications of safety requirements directly in regulations whereas 
Commission directives only formulate ‘essential requirements’.   
With regard to conformity assessment procedures, the OSHA has the authority to designate conformity 
assessment bodies, so-called ‘Nationally Recognised Testing Laboratories’ (NRTLs) for mandatory 
third-party certification. For a long time, the OSHA assigned only Underwriters Laboratories (UL) as 
an NRTL for third-party certification. Since 2011, OSHA recognises 12 NRTLs120. Other agencies, 
including the CPSC, do, however, not designate specific CABs for third-party conformity assessment. 
In these cases, firms can choose among all existing CABs for third-party testing. The authority of OSHA 
to designate specific NRTLs for mandatory conformity assessment makes the distribution of regulatory 
                                                     
117 Moreover, the authority of agencies including OSHA to set ‘government unique standards’ and participate in 
standard development itself contrasts with the delegation of standard development to the ESOs in the EU and the 
lack of authority of the Commission to participate in standard development.  
118 This offers an explanation why the OSHA has adopted many regulations on electrical, but not mechanical 
safety.   
119 One interview partner has explained the different application of the ‘risk principle’ in the EU and the US with 
the mandate and accountability of US regulatory agencies such as the OSHA. Whereas the Commission has the 
mandate to ensure a high level of protection from safety risks while simultaneously promoting competition among 
firms, the OSHA only has the mandate to promote the protection of workers at the workplace. Moreover, the 
OSHA is liable in judicial review for failures of its regulations to control and eliminate safety risks. When the 
OSHA thus adopts a regulation, it seeks to eliminate the risk to the highest degree possible to protect workers. It 
does not consider other implications of the regulation, e.g. for competition among producers (Interview 6).      
120 About 30 state agencies and a number of local agencies, however, continue to recognise only UL. Besides, UL 
remains in a dominant position because it does not accept the certification of components and parts of other NRTLs 
(Interview 6).  
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authority over implementation procedures in the US centralised for the OSHA, but non-centralised in 
other cases. The centralisation of authority on implementation procedures in the US under the 
designation of NRTLs is thus compatible with the centralisation of regulatory authority for 
implementation procedures in the EU.  
Like the EU, the US also applies ‘Suppliers Declaration of Conformity’ (SDoC) and ‘third-party 
conformity assessment’ as principles of conformity assessment. Yet, US agencies require third-party 
testing for many engineering products121. At the same time, US agencies do not require that firms put a 
label on products such as the CE mark to indicate conformity with the essential safety requirements of 
legislation122. Only products whose conformity to regulatory requirements has been assessed by a third 
party, i.e. a CAB, carry a label in the US (Interview 5). For the accreditation of CABs and the 
establishment of rules for testing procedures, the OSHA partly relies on international ILAC and IAF 
standards for some issues, yet also relies on divergent US standards (Pelkmans, 2015b: 15). From an 
overall perspective, regulatory principles for implementation procedures on engineering products are 
therefore mostly compatible. Even if the OSHA relies on divergent testing standards for conformity 
assessment, these do not establish different safety procedures and are therefore in principle compatible. 
The OSHA and other agencies, however, widely rely on third-party conformity assessment whereas the 
use of third-party testing in the EU is reserved to dangerous machines and pressure equipment. 
Regulatory principles for implementation procedures are hence only compatible if both US agencies and 
the Commission use ‘SDoC’ or ‘third-party conformity assessment’ for the same risk or product123.  
To summarise, regulatory policies in the engineering sector in the EU and the US are characterised by 
compatible regulatory principles, but incompatible regulatory authority structures. The distribution of 
regulatory authority is incompatible as, unlike in the EU, regulations on mechanical and electrical safety 
in the US are made at both the central, sub-central and local level and standardisation authority is 
decentralised. While the Commission has authority to regulate mechanical and electrical safety risks for 
the entire EU market, the OSHA and the CPSC regulate only specific uses or risks of a product. Besides, 
central-level regulations in the US are complemented with conflicting sub-central and local regulations. 
Moreover, whereas the Commission has the authority to task the EU standards development 
                                                     
121 Even if US regulatory agencies do not require third-party conformity assessment, US firms have signed 
voluntary agreements to use third-party testing for the assessment of their products’ conformity with the regulatory 
safety requirements. The latter allows firms to defer liability for marketed products in court action on product 
safety requirements under tort law.   
122 This difference reflects the divergent distribution of regulatory authority. US agencies such as the OSHA or 
CPSC do not regulate the entire US market, they only regulate the use of products at the workplace or in households 
respectively. This implies in the words of one interview partner that while “everything is allowed to be sold, not 
everything may be used” (Interview 6).    
123 The debate about the relative benefits of SDoC and third-party certification has in the view of observers often 
been “ideological in nature” (Interviews 4,5; Pelkmans, 2015: 28). Interview partners stress that neither principle 
per se offers a higher level of protection of human health and the environment (Interviews 4,5). Moreover, they 
stress that producer liability laws in the US make it impossible for firms to sell ‘unsafe’ products on the markets. 
Due to producer liability reasons, voluntary commitments exist among firms to use third-party testing e.g for the 
consumer safety of electrical products, where this is not required by CPSC regulations (Orgalime 2014: 10).   
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organisations with the elaboration of standards that invalidate conflicting sub-central standards, 
standards development in the US is decentralised and leads to multiple, conflicting standards. Both the 
EU and the US, however, adopt the risk principle in the design of regulatory policies on mechanical and 
electrical safety although the risk principle is applied slightly differently in the EU than in the US. Figure 
17 summarises the contrast of the EU and US engineering regulatory regimes.     
      
Dimension Regulatory 
instrument 
Authority 
distribution 
EU US 
Regulatory 
policies 
Legislation Centralised New Legislative Framework: 
Machinery Directive, 
Low Voltage Directive, 
Electromagnetic Compatibility 
Directive, Pressure Equipment 
Directive 
e.g. Occupational Safety and Health Act  
Regulations  
 
Standards  
Centralised Risk principle 
- Elimination of all safety risks that 
arise under normal circumstances 
- Regulation of safety risks for 
specific products 
Risk principle 
- Elimination of all safety risks that 
arise under normal circumstances 
Full protection principle 
- Elimination of all potential safety 
risks  
- Regulation of safety risks for 
specific uses and applications of 
products   
Non-
centralised 
 Full protection principle 
- Elimination of all potential safety 
risks  
- Regulation of safety risks for 
specific uses and applications of 
products   
Implementation 
Procedures 
Centralised SDoC:  
- testing of most products, testing 
according to ISO standards  
Third-party conformity assessment:  
- only high-risk products, testing 
according to ISO standards  
IAF:  
- accreditation of CABs according 
to ISO standards  
Third-party conformity assessment: 
- as a general rule applies to most 
products, testing according to US 
standards 
US accreditation:  
- accreditation of CABs and Testing 
according to US standards or 
agency monopoly  
 
Non-
centralised 
  
Figure 17: Contrast of EU and US engineering regulatory regimes 
 
While regulatory authority structures for implementation procedures between the EU and the US are per 
se incompatible, they can be made compatible. Authority on conformity assessment procedures in the 
EU is centralised through the designation of ‘Notified Bodies’, but it is mostly decentralised in the US, 
unless an agency lists a specific CAB – such as the OSHA in the past. However, an extension of 
autonomy for both the Commission and the OSHA is possible if the Commission recognises US CABs 
as ‘Notified Bodies’ and the OSHA recognises ‘Notified Bodies’ as NRTLs. Regulatory principles are 
overall compatible, but incompatible for risks and products for which the Commission assigns SDoC 
and US agencies assign ‘third-party assessment’. Besides, regulatory principles applying to accreditation 
procedures for CABs and testing procedures to ascertain conformity are overall compatible.   
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6.2.5. Expectations: Commission strategies in transatlantic engineering cooperation   
 
Based on the contrast of the engineering regulatory regimes in the EU and the US and the distribution 
of regulatory compatibilities, this sub-section formulates expectations for Commission strategies on 
transatlantic engineering cooperation. As in chapter 6.1.5, these expectations operationalise the 
hypothesis derived on the influence that regulatory compatibilities have on constraining the choice of a 
regulatory cooperation strategy. No separate operationalisations will be presented for the effects of 
bureaucratic pressure within the Commission and societal actor mobilisation as this has already been 
done in chapters 4.4.2. and 4.4.3 respectively. 
Given that US regulations on mechanical and electrical safety are often developed at state- or regional-
level and OSHA and CPSC regulations mostly cover highly specific risks, it should not be expected that 
the Commission pursues ‘regulatory alignment’ or ‘equivalence’ with regard to mechanical or electrical 
safety regulations. Exceptions to this expectation may apply if the Commission is able to identify a 
safety regulation which applies to the same product or risk and prescribes the same level of safety 
protection in the EU and the US. In the latter case, the Commission can be expected to pursue 
‘equivalence’. Likewise, as standards in the EU are developed under a centralised authority to offer a 
presumption of conformity whereas the US maintains a competitive system of rival standards, it should 
not be expected that the Commission chooses ‘regulatory alignment’ or the recognition of ‘equivalence’ 
with regard to standards.  
As the compatibility of regulatory authority structures on conformity assessment procedures can in 
principle be established and regulatory principles are compatible, the Commission can be expected to 
pursue an ‘alignment of implementation procedures’ with regard to a mutual recognition of conformity 
assessments where both the EU and the US require third-party testing. Besides, the Commission can be 
expected to pursue an ‘alignment of implementation procedures’ regarding testing procedures where 
both the EU and the US engineering regulatory regimes require third-party testing. Furthermore, the 
Commission can be expected to choose an ‘alignment of implementation procedures’ related to 
accreditation procedures. At the same time, the Commission should not pursue an ‘alignment of 
implementation procedures’ where the EU and US regulatory require establish diverging requirements 
for the application of third-party testing or SDoC.  
The Commission can also be expected to choose ‘information exchange’ with regard to the development 
of new electrical safety regulations and standards in support of these regulations.  
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6.2.6. Commission strategies in transatlantic engineering cooperation  
 
This section lays down the Commission’s choice of regulatory cooperation strategies during the three 
regulatory cooperation initiatives selected in chapter 5.1.   
 
New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) 
 
During the NTA, the Commission pursued an ‘alignment of implementation procedures’ in line with the 
expectation derived in section 6.2.5. DG Trade opened negotiations on six Mutual Recognition 
Agreements (MRAs) in 1995 with the US Trade Department (USTR), one of which covers electrical 
goods (Pelkmans & de Brito, 2015: 3). DG Trade was driven by optimism that the negotiation of the 
MRAs would pave the way to lower the “a quick route to lowering the costs of EU/US TBTs” (Egan & 
Nicolaidis, 2001: 891). The optimism of DG Trade also persuaded DG Industry and its Commissioner. 
Both hoped to realise a double benefit with the negotiation of the MRAs. First, they held the belief that 
the MRA would be an easy way to facilitate and promote trade including in engineering products (Egan 
& Nicolaidis, 2001: 893; see also Peterson et al, 2005). In this regard, DG Trade and later also DG 
Industry not only noted the motto of the TABD supporting the negotiation of the MRA (“one standard, 
one test, approved everywhere”), they greatly welcomed it (Commission, 2000a). In their view, the 
MRA would create significant benefits for EU firms and should therefore be supported (Commission, 
2001a)124. Second, DG Industry held the belief that a mutual recognition of conformity assessment that 
would facilitate transatlantic trade would also enhance the support of firms and especially member state 
authorities for the EU’s own internal system of a mutual recognition of conformity assessment 
(Commission, 1998). At the time of the NTA, especially authorities and CABs in Northern member 
states were sceptical that CABs across the EU delivered the same level of safety protection for 
consumers (Interview 4). The recognition of the EU’s model by the US was thus also seen by the 
Commission as a way to reduce opposition to the EU’s conformity assessment system within the Internal 
Market125. The negotiations were successfully concluded in 1998.   
The MRA followed the notion to reduce trade restrictions resulting from conformity assessment 
procedures in the TBT Agreement. It established that for electrical products requiring ‘third-party 
conformity assessment’ in the EU and the US126, EU member state authorities accept the results of 
conformity assessment procedures conducted in the US according to the regulatory requirements of the 
                                                     
124 This can be read as an indicator that the Commission promoted the MRA to enhance its legitimacy.  
125 The hope to reduce opposition of member state authorities and CABs suggests that the Commission also used 
the MRA to enhance its autonomy.  
126 The MRA thus did not cover electrical products whose assessment with regulatory requirements was subject to 
Suppliers’ Declaration of Conformity (SDoC) in the EU.   
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EU. Likewise, it established that the OSHA accepts the results of conformity assessment conducted in 
the EU according to the regulatory requirements of the US (Commission, 1999)127.   
Kept out of the negotiations on the MRA, the OSHA, however, considered the ‘quality’ of the 
designation for CABs for conformity assessment in the EU as unsatisfactory (Interview 4). It therefore 
rejected EU designations of CABs and began conducting on-site reviews of CABs in the EU starting in 
1999 to evaluate their ability to assess conformity with regulatory requirements. At the same time, the 
OSHA refused to accept the results of conformity assessments conducted in the EU. After it continued 
to refuse implementing the MRA on electrical goods negotiated between DG Trade and the USTR, the 
Commission officially suspended the Agreement in 2004 (Interview 5)128. Moreover, at the time it 
considered the OSHA principle to require ‘third-party conformity assessment’ for most electrical 
products as “excessively burdensome” (Interview 5) because it regarded the safety risk emanating from 
most electrical products to human health as very low.  
Technical officials in DG Industry came to suspect the OSHA of protectionism for an industry in which 
trade statistics implied that the EU had a competitive advantage over the US (Interview 5). Frustrated 
about the failure to align implementation procedures through the MRA, the support for regulatory 
cooperation at the ‘political’ level of the Commission slowed down (Pelkmans & de Brito, 2015: 6). 
Where regulatory cooperation in the engineering sector should thus still take place, this had to occur in 
the Junior Task Force. Both Egan and Nicolaidis (2001) and Pollack (2005) offer reasons why technical 
officials did not further pursue regulatory cooperation at the technical level. First, regulatory cooperation 
was considered a burdensome process with resources of DG Industry officials bound in the preparation 
of the New Legislative Framework Directives. Second, after the failure of DG Trade and DG Industry 
to negotiate an MRA that would be implemented by the OSHA, officials did not consider it worthwhile 
to invest their limited time resources into a process that was unlikely to deliver tangible results. Their 
‘legitimacy’ towards both firms and consumers in the EU was arguably better ensured by investing 
resources into the New Legislative Framework Directives.  Technical officials thus did not pursue any 
further bilateral regulatory cooperation with the US during the NTA (Interview 5)129.       
 
 
                                                     
127 For an in-depth description of the negotiations leading to the conclusion of the MRA see Egan and Nicolaidis 
(2001) 
128 Besides, the Commission was dissatisfied with the degree of US market access the MRA gave to EU producers 
of electrical goods.   
129 Pelkmans (2015: 20) interprets the refusal of the OSHA to implement the MRA and the Commission’s 
suspension of the MRA as an indication of a lack of trust between both regulators. He argues that neither side 
made efforts to appreciate the choice of each side to choose SDoC and ‘third-party conformity assessment’ 
respectively. Moreover, he argues that the OSHA’s decision to inspect CABs in the EU demonstrates the high 
level of mistrust OSHA had in tests conducted by EU CABs.  
European Commission strategies in transatlantic regulatory cooperation 
197 
 
High-Level Regulatory Cooperation Forum (HLRCF)/ Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC) 
 
At the beginning of the HLRCF in 2005, technical officials and senior-level bureaucrats did not consider 
engineering products as a priority sector for regulatory cooperation and did not mention it in the 
Roadmap for Regulatory Cooperation (Commission, 2005a). This changed when in 2007, the HLRCF 
was superseded with the TEC. Industry Commissioner Verheugen who co-chaired the TEC for the EU, 
insisted that the Commission also take up regulatory cooperation on engineering again (US Department 
of State, 2007; Interview 5).  
Mobilisation of societal actors in support of regulatory cooperation in the engineering sector was scarce.  
The TABC who provided business input to the TEC rather focused on regulatory cooperation in other 
sectors, such as cars (US Department of State, 2007; Interview 14). Engineering industries were only 
represented by a few large firms comprising engineering departments, e.g. Siemens (Interview 6). To 
promote regulatory cooperation as means to trade liberalisation and better regulatory policy-making, the 
Commissioner had to task his DG to identify issues for regulatory cooperation itself. This search was 
guided by an assumption that for electrical goods, US standards resembled EU standards. In line with 
the prediction in chapter 6.2.5., senior-level officials in DG Enterprise sought to implement the demands 
of Commissioner Verheugen by seeking regulatory cooperation through an ‘alignment of 
implementation procedures’. This alignment should, however, this time not be sought through a mutual 
recognition of conformity assessment procedures, but an alignment of the conformity assessment 
procedure itself (Commission, 2006c).  
In 2007, DG Enterprise submitted a proposal to the OSHA to accept SDoC for low-risk electrical goods, 
i.e. those governed by the Low Voltage Directive in the EU. In the statement, it argued that “third-party 
conformity assessment of "low-risk electrical and electronic products […] imposes unnecessary 
additional costs and market-entry barriers on exporters of these goods” (OSHA, 2008)130. The 
Commission emphasised that certain products lay outside the scope of this request and the Commission 
continued to require the third-party conformity assessment for them131. In meetings with the OSHA, DG 
Industry sought to explain why it relied on SDoC as a principle for conformity assessment of low-risk 
electrical products and to persuade the OSHA of its benefits (Interview 5). Moreover, it supplied 
statistics to the OSHA on compliance failures of self-certified low-risk electrical products, provided by 
the authorities in member states responsible for market surveillance132. The OSHA rejected the request 
of the Commission in a long ‘Notice’ in 2010 (OSHA, 2010). First, it argued that the statistical data 
                                                     
130 For the OSHA’s full request of information and a summary of the Commission’s request see (OSHA, 2008) 
131This included e.g. electrical equipment for use in an explosive atmosphere (OSHA, 2008).  
132 Yet, the Commission could not rely on systematic accident statistics and across-the-board statistics from market 
surveillance itself (Pelkmans, 2015: 22) as the EU approach does not offer incentives to collect such systematic 
information (Interview 4). Besides, the Commission does not have the organisational resources to collect 
corresponding statistics itself or conduct annual inspections. 
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submitted by the Commission failed to demonstrate that the SDoC used in the EU achieved the same 
level of protection than the third-party certification in the US. Second, it claimed that the EU system to 
select a conformity assessment procedure based on proportionality and cost-benefit considerations was 
incompatible with its own mandate for the elimination or reduction of risk for the safety of workers133 
(Pelkmans, 2015b: 21).  
DG Enterprise responded to the OSHA, rejected the interpretation of the OSHA that its application of 
SDoC as a principle of conformity assessment was overall incompatible with the risk principle134. In 
exchanges with the OSHA during the TEC, DG Enterprise officials emphasised that the statistics 
submitted by the Commission to the OSHA did not allow inferences why compliance failures in the case 
of self-certified low voltage electrical products had occurred (see Pelkmans, 2015b: 21). It put forward 
that compliance failures could not only be the result of product failures, but also be due to inappropriate 
paperwork, inappropriate conduct of workers or consumers or indeed the safety of the products 
(Interview 5; Pelkmans, 2015b: 21). Instead, the argument that had been developed in internal 
coordination meetings within DG Enterprise was that there was no systematic statistical evidence that 
self-certified products of suppliers were more likely to show product failures and thus cause safety risks 
to human health than products whose conformity assessment was assessed by third-party testing 
(Interview 4)135. Essentially, DG Industry argued that the SDoC principle was compatible with the third-
party testing principle in the US for low-risk electrical products. In response to the OSHA Notice, the 
Commission did, however, not further seek to persuade the OSHA to align its implementation 
procedures with those of the EU in the framework of the TEC. On the contrary, it began to think 
internally how it could reduce the compliance failures detected by the OSHA and improve inspections 
and market surveillance by member state authorities (Interview 4).  
Given the renewed failure to achieve an ‘alignment of implementation procedures’, support at the 
‘political’ level of the Commission for regulatory cooperation once again dropped by the time of 2009 
(Transatlantic Economic Council, 2009a). Technical officials in DG Enterprise were also reluctant to 
pursue regulatory cooperation in the absence of political support in the HLRCF (US Department of 
State, 2009b). An ‘alignment of implementation procedures’ now seemed difficult to achieve, given that 
the OSHA had opposed to implement both the MRA and to adopt SDoC. Moreover, the fragmentation 
of regulatory authority in the US in the engineering sector made officials reluctant to adopt a different 
regulatory cooperation strategy and attempt policy cooperation. The Ecorys (2009) study had signalled 
Commission officials that important trade barriers in the engineering sector were not federal regulations, 
                                                     
133 The assessment of an ‘incompatibility’ between the risk principle applied by the Commission and the OSHA 
should be read as a perception and interpretation of the OSHA.    
134 I have described that the risk principle characterises the adoption of regulatory policies in the EU (see chapter 
6.2.3).    
135 Interview partners (Interviews 4,5) noted that where product failures were detected in the EU during market 
surveillance by member state authorities, these were often found in products tested through third-party conformity 
assessment.   
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but State-level regulations (Interview 4) . Potential attempts towards policy cooperation with the OSHA 
were thus seen as non-beneficial to EU societal actors, given that ‘equivalence’ or ‘regulatory alignment’ 
would offer only limited market access to EU firms (Interview 18). The lack of mobilisation of 
engineering associations during the TEC was unable and unwilling to dispel this impression.  
At political level in the Commission, regulatory cooperation remained, however, a priority. Agenda-
setting by Commissioner Verheugen and senior-level officials sought to address the divergence in EU 
and US technical standards that firms had indicated as an important trade barrier in the Ecorys (2009) 
study. Regulatory cooperation was thus seen by the administrative and political leadership of DG 
Enterprise as an instrument to enhance the legitimacy of the Commission towards societal firms, notably 
engineering firms many of which were SMEs (Interview 5). In light of the Commission’s inability to 
align implementation procedures on conformity assessment with the OSHA, the administrative and 
political leadership of DG Enterprise tasked officials to look for alternative means to facilitate 
transatlantic trade not only, but also in engineering products. They proposed to consider ‘information 
exchange’ on standardisation in view of the divergence in standards used in the EU and the US in support 
of legislation (Commission, 2011a)136. Commissioner Verheugen supported this proposal for enhanced 
‘information exchange’ between the European standardisation organisations (ESO) and the coordinator 
of US standard development organisations, ANSI (Transatlantic Economic Council, 2010). DG 
Enterprise and the Commissioner presented their strategy to pursue ‘information exchange’ on standards 
for discussions in the TEC (Commission, 2010; Inside US Trade, 2010b). At the December 2010 
meetings of the TEC and the High Level Regulatory Cooperation Forum, the Commission reached an 
agreement with the US Department of State to formulate joint improvements to each side’s processes 
for the use of voluntary standards in regulation (Commission, 2011a). Upon the Commission initiative, 
the EU and US negotiated a joint document, “Building bridges between the US and EU standards 
systems” in November 2011 (Commission, 2011a). In the document, the Commission and the US 
Department of State agreed to enable and facilitate ‘information exchange’ in processes of the use of 
voluntary standards in regulation137. Furthermore, both sides gave a political commitment to encourage 
the ESOs and the American National Standardisation Institute (ANSI) to strengthen transparency and 
facilitate comments by stakeholders on draft standards (Commission, 2011a: 3)138.  
 
                                                     
136 As pointed out in chapter 6.2.4, the divergence in EU and US standards results from the use of multiple, 
competitive standards in the US, the decentralised distribution of regulatory authority, allowing sub-central 
regulatory agencies to ‘reference’ standards, many of which are US standards and not ISO or IEC standards, and 
the authority of OSHA to ‘reference’ any standard, including non-ISO or IEC standards, in its technical regulations.   
137 The US State Department gave a political commitment to instruct federal agencies to consider international 
standards when developing regulatory measures, consistent with their procedures (Commission, 2011a: 3). 
138 Itself, the Commission agreed that in its standardisation requests to the ESOs, it would instruct them to consider 
"consensus standards developed through an open and transparent process and that are in use in the global 
marketplace". 
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Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 
 
With the drafting of the High-Level Working Group Report in 2012 that prepared the TTIP negotiations, 
the ‘lead’ in the Commission shifted to DG Trade. Yet, engineering was not a priority sector for DG 
Trade when the High-Level Working Group Report was finalised and the TTIP negotiations were 
launched in 2013 (High-Level Working Group, 2013). Engineering products were only addressed in 
general through the position paper on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). While there was no 
disagreement within DG Trade that a potential TTIP should have a chapter on TBT139, the consideration 
of the engineering was not a priority (Interview 6).  
DG Trade organised the public consultation for the launch of FTA negotiations with the US (Inside US 
Trade, 2012d). The German engineering associations VDMA and ZVEI participated in this consultation 
(Commission, 2012c). Yet, unlike e.g. in the chemicals sector, they did not present a joint position paper 
with a US engineering association (see ZVEI, 2015; VDMA;.2013) Subsequently, DG Trade officials 
evaluated the contributions of business associations and NGOs to the consultation. In coordination with 
DG Grow officials, but under the lead of DG Trade they drafted a position paper on TBT (Interview 4, 
Interview 5, Interview 6).  
DG Trade published a position paper on TBT on 16 July 2013 (Commission, 2013b). In the paper the 
Commission chose issues in line with a strategy to pursue an ‘alignment of implementation procedures’. 
DG Trade and DG Grow officials thus proposed to agree on common criteria to be applied when either 
side introduced new conformity assessment rules (Commission, 2013b: 6). This should enhance the 
consideration of these criteria as appropriate by regulators in other countries, but also by societal actors 
within the EU (Interview 5). Moreover, Commission officials suggested an alignment of accreditation 
processes of conformity assessment bodies (CABs), seeing “some merit in encouraging the greater use 
of the ILAC and IAF agreements to facilitate the mutual recognition of accreditation certificates” 
(Commission, 2013b: 6). Commission officials hoped that the spread of ILAC and IAF standards for the 
accreditation of CABs would substantiate support within member states for EU rules on the accreditation 
of CABs. Moreover, an alignment of accreditation procedures for CABs would make it easier for EU 
CABs to sell their services in the US and thus support trade.   
Beside an ‘alignment of implementation procedures’, the Commission also chose to pursue ‘information 
exchange’. The choice of issues for ‘information exchange’ covers mainly the adoption of regulatory 
policies, notably regulations and standards. The proposals for ‘information exchange’ on regulatory 
policies build on previous documents, i.e. the ‘Guidelines for EU-US Regulatory Cooperation and 
                                                     
139 The inclusion of a TBT Chapter was also important to protect the ‘template’ for EU FTAs. ‘Template’ 
considerations were particularly important for the TTIP as DG Trade envisioned extending a potential TTIP to 
other third countries or at least use certain chapters as templates for negotiations with other third countries.   
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Transparency’ (Commission & USTR, 2002) and the ‘Building bridges between the US and EU 
standards systems’ (Commission, 2011a). With regard to technical regulations, the Commission chose 
to persuade the OSHA to enhance transparency and exchange information for the development of 
coherent future regulations (Commission, 2013b: 4). This would make it easier for EU firms and NGOs 
to anticipate future OSHA regulations and at the same time help avoid technical differences that obstruct 
transatlantic trade (Interview 4). Regarding standards, officials put forward to encourage SDOs in the 
EU and US to develop joint standardisation work programmes. The position paper proposes to ‘link’ the 
standardisation systems notably through the encouragement and consideration of an “exchange of 
technical information between expert committees in the development of standards” (Commission, 
2013b: 5). This link would offer a triple benefit to the Commission: First, it would reduce the likelihood 
that technical specifications of regulatory requirements would differ between the EU and the US, thus 
reducing adjustment costs for EU firms seeking to export to the US. Second, it would promote the spread 
of EU standards and thus support their consideration as appropriate by societal actors in the EU and 
outside the EU. Third, it would reduce political pressure by foreign governments on the Commission 
that considered the EU standardisation system as closed and protectionist (Interview 5).   
The choice of implementation procedures to be aligned thus reflects results and failures of the previous 
transatlantic regulatory cooperation initiatives. The Commission, however, neither proposed a mutual 
recognition of conformity assessments nor an adoption of SDoC as a conformity assessment procedure 
for low-risk engineering products (Commission, 2013b). The OSHA had made clear to Commission 
officials that it did not consider an adoption of SDoC as appropriate to ensure a high level of consumer 
safety (Interview 5). At the same time, the Commission arguably wanted to prevent an open discussion 
on the respective benefits of SDoC and third-party conformity assessment in the EU. CABs were starting 
to lobby the EP, but also member state representatives that third-party conformity assessment was able 
to provide a higher level of consumer safety (Interview 4; for the argument of CABs see VdTÜV, 2014). 
Both officials in DG Trade and DG Grow were sceptical of this argument, pointing out that most 
incidents of product failure and thus higher consumer safety risk in the EU had occurred in products 
which had been subject to third-party conformity assessment (Interview 4, Interview 5, Interview 6). 
Moreover, both DG Trade and DG Grow wanted to avoid a discussion that would subsequently raise 
costs for firms through domestic pressure to introduce third-party conformity assessment without 
potentially raising the level of consumer protection (Interview 6).  
After the publication of the position paper, DG Trade began in early 2014 to mobilise engineering 
associations to provide input to discussions on TBT within the Commission. Moreover, they should help 
to raise societal support for the conduct of the TTIP negotiations. NGOs, but also some business 
associations representing small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), notably from Germany, openly 
questioned that a potential TTIP agreement would offer benefits to small firms (for a discussion see 
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Götz, 2018). The important role played by SMEs in the engineering industry subsequently led DG Trade 
to focus mobilisation efforts on the engineering industry (Commission, 2014c).    
The request of DG Trade to engineering industry to provide technical input led to the publication of a 
series of position papers by the EU-level engineering association Orgalime (Orgalime, 2016; Orgalime, 
2015; Orgalime, 2014). Many of these position papers reflect or are translated versions of position 
papers published by the German engineering associations VDMA and ZVEI (ZVEI, 2015; VDMA, 
2013). In its position papers, Orgalime raises mostly demands aiming at an ‘alignment in implementation 
procedures’ and ‘information exchange’. With its 2015 position paper, it also makes suggestions for a 
limited ‘regulatory alignment’ and ‘equivalence’ (Orgalime, 2015). Regarding an ‘alignment in 
implementation procedures’ with regard to the accreditation of conformity assessment bodies. It 
encouraged the Commission to demand a “NRTL mutual recognition system” based on the European 
accreditation system (Orgalime, 2014: 5)140. Moreover, Orgalime proposed an alignment of testing 
procedures (Orgalime, 2014: 6). At the same time, it warned against an immediate mutual recognition 
of conformity assessment procedures as it viewed that this would be disadvantageous to EU industries 
(Orgalime, 2014: 6). Proposals for ‘information exchange’ aim at the establishment of a “transparent 
system […] including notifications of planned developments” (Orgalime, 2014: 4). This notification 
system should be built on the practices of the EU standardisation system (Interview 6)141.  
Orgalime also presented vague proposals which implied a one-sided ‘equivalence’ of standards. This 
one-sided ‘equivalence’, however, only concerned the ‘referencing’ of ISO and IEC standards in 
addition to US standards in technical regulations of the OSHA142,143. Orgalime warned, however, against 
a two-sided mutual recognition or equivalence of ‘harmonised standards’ in the EU with US 
standards144. Moreover, Orgalime in 2016 presented a comprehensive list of mechanical safety, electrical 
safety and explosion protection technical regulations (Orgalime, 2016) which it considered as possible 
for ‘regulatory alignment’ or ‘equivalence’.  
                                                     
140 The 2014 position paper once again praises the “liberal nature of the successful European market access system” 
while Orgalime in its 2013 and 2015 position papers outlines the heavy and costly forms of conformity assessment 
in the US with the de-facto monopoly of UL (Orgalime, 2015; Orgalime, 2014; Orgalime, 2013). 
141 Orgalime highly praises the openness, transparency and predictability of the EU standardisation system, while 
heavily criticising the decentralised standardisation system of the US which “makes it difficult for European 
companies […] to participate in the development of standards […] and results in the need to purchase standards 
from more sources” (Orgalime, 2014: 5-6). 
142 In the long term, only standards developed in close connection with ISO and IEC should be used for compliance 
with EU and US legislation (Orgalime, 2014: 6). 
143 The approximation of NEMA and Orgalime positions on standardisation likely reflect the increasingly frequent 
adoption of IEC standards in the US after 2010. The latter, in turn, indicates concerns of US industry that their 
international competitiveness suffers if US standards differ from IEC standards (Pelkmans, 2015b: 23; Interview 
6).  
144 US businesses would then be able to use US standards as a presumption of conformity with EU requirements 
while EU firms would still need to go through third-party certification in the US. The latter would give US 
producers immediate access to the EU market, given that US standards would thus qualify for compliance with 
‘essential requirements’, and could self-certify their products. EU firms, however, would still have to pay for 
‘third-party conformity assessment’ in the US (Interview 6).    
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Moreover, NGOs mobilised against regulatory cooperation on engineering products, especially the 
European Environmental Citizens Organisation for Standardisation (2016) and the German Social 
Accident Insurance (DGUV; 2014). They warned that a “mutual recognition of standards” would lower 
the level of health and safety protection and implied that the Commission should therefore pursue 
‘regulatory competition’.  
Demands for an ‘alignment of implementation procedures’ were then also raised by EU conformity 
assessment bodies (CABs), notably Verein der TÜV (2014). The CABs demanded a mutual recognition 
of conformity assessment bodies and a mutual recognition of conformity assessments which would 
apply in sectors enumerated in a ‘positive list’ third-party conformity assessment (VdTÜV, 2014: 8). 
This list contains engineering products currently not subject to third-party conformity assessment in the 
EU, such as machines or low-voltage electrical products. The position paper also outlines demands for 
the accreditation of CABs without, however, explicitly requiring an accreditation based on ILAC and 
IAF standards. Instead, VdTÜV promoted a mutual recognition of accreditation, based on the 
accreditation rules of the country of origin, and laid down the establishment of a centralised accreditation 
body in both the EU and the US as a possible long-term objective. Yet, CEN and CENELEC (2013) 
urged Commission negotiators not to accept US requirements for specifically applicable conformity 
assessment procedures and work towards the elimination of these requirements. The objective of the 
Commission should be to achieve ‘equivalence’ for the recognition of conformity assessment bodies 
where recognition, i.e. accreditation, follows internationally recognised practices (CEN & CENELEC, 
2013: 9)  
Subsequently, DG Trade began to concentrate its efforts to ‘align implementation procedures’ on the 
accreditation of CABs for third-party conformity assessment. DG Trade emphasised that the OSHA 
should recognise conformity tests of CABs accredited according to IAF standards (Commission, 2015b). 
It argued that US standards for the accreditation of CABs did not invoke different principles than IAF 
standards. A recognition of tests conducted by CABs that were accredited according to other than US 
accreditation standards would therefore not undermine the ‘quality’ of accreditations demanded by the 
OSHA in the US. The differences in accreditation procedures between the Commission and the OSHA 
rather reflected different bureaucratic practices145(Interview 5). Both DG Trade and DG Grow agreed 
that key to aligning accreditation procedures would be a separation of functions between SDOs and 
CABs in the US (Commission, 2015d)146. Besides, the OSHA had the regulatory authority to designate 
                                                     
145 Likewise, the Commission also demanded the elimination of duplicative testing requirements for components 
by restricting the reassessment of components for the certification of final products (art. 7.5 Commission TTIP 
TBT Proposal). 
146art. 7.3 Commission TTIP TBT Proposal. Some US SDOs also conduct conformity assessment. This allows 
them developing standards which designate them as the only CAB able to conduct the corresponding conformity 
assessment. If the OSHA ‘references’ a standard developed by a SDO which also conducts conformity assessment, 
it may create a monopoly for conformity assessment with the relevant ‘referenced’ standard.   
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CABs that it considered as capable of conducting third-party conformity assessment147. Aligning 
accreditation procedures would help to reduce the high costs of third-party certification for EU exporters 
(Interview 4). From the perspective of DG Trade, it would thus enhance the legitimacy of the 
Commission.      
At the same time, DG Grow began to examine whether it could technically accredit US CABs as 
‘Notified Bodies’ for conformity assessment in the EU and thus also align accreditation procedures in 
this way (Interview 5; Commission, 2015d). DG Grow officials presented the CETA Protocol to USTR 
and the OSHA, seeking to persuade them that this could be a template for recognising US CABs for 
testing and certification for the EU market (Interview 5; see also Commission, 2016f). Besides, officials 
sought to learn if accreditation practices of the OSHA as well as other agencies, e.g. the CPSC, could 
provide an equivalent solution for the enforcement of product safety rules of products certified by CAB 
(Interview 5)148. Both approaches were intended to enhance the consideration of appropriateness of the 
EU accreditation system for CABs that at the time of writing continues to be the subject of criticism by 
some member state authorities. This would enhance the legitimacy of the Commission’s system.    
Yet, especially DG Trade officials rejected demands of the USTR for a mutual recognition of conformity 
assessments until accreditation procedures had been aligned (Interview 4). They emphasised that a 
mutual recognition of conformity assessments149 remained its objective for the long-term (Interview 4, 
Interview 5, Interview 6). The reason for the pursued sequencing in the ‘alignment of implementation 
procedures’ was mostly a tactical one. The experience of the failed MRA had shown that such regulatory 
cooperation would not be beneficial to EU firms unless the Commission succeeded to break the 
monopoly of certain US CABs on third-party conformity assessment first (Interview 6). Given that the 
designation of CABs was well within the authority of the OSHA, the Commission needed the bargaining 
leverage to ensure that regulatory cooperation would enhance its legitimacy with regard to societal 
actors, notably EU firms150.  
Simultaneously, DG Grow pushed back emerging demands of the USTR for an ‘equivalence’ of EU and 
US standards (Interview 4). Moreover, it rejected USTR demands for an alignment of EU and US 
standardisation procedures (Interview 5). In the Commission’s view, the latter would have undermined 
the centralised distribution of regulatory authority on standardisation in the EU (Interview 5)151. The 
                                                     
147 Interview partners underlined that the decision of the OSHA to break the monopoly of UL in 2012 and appoint 
12 CABs as designated CABs demonstrated the authority of OSHA to take these decisions (Interviews 4,5,6).   
148 The Commission emphasised explaining the relevance of the ‘territoriality’ rule for the designation ‘Notified 
Bodies’ given that member state authorities in which a CAB is territorially placed have obligations to control 
accredited CABs.  
149 This is the regulatory cooperation strategy pursued with the MRAs during the first phase.  
150 Mutual recognition of conformity assessments was also a strong interest of the USTR (Interview 4).  
151 In chapter 4.1.2., I have excluded the necessity of institutional change as a consequence of a regulatory 
cooperation strategy. The demand of the US is thus arguably more ‘far-reaching’ than the strategies pursued by 
the Commission. This acknowledgement raises potential limitations of the theoretical model derived in chapters 3 
and 4 with regard to its transferability to other regulators than the Commission.   
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Commission emphasised that an ‘equivalence’ of standards152 would give US standards the basis for a 
presumption of conformity with ‘essential requirements’ defined by EU legislation (Interview 4)153. 
Likewise, DG Grow pushed DG Trade to reject US demands to change the EU standardisation system 
itself. Notably, it rejected US demands that the Commission establish an obligation for CEN and 
CENELEC to involve US experts in the standards development process, underlining that unlike US 
agencies, it did not have authority to establish rules for SDOs (Commission, 2015e; Commission, 
2016f). 
The European Standardisation Organisations (ESOs) began to mobilise against the demands of the 
USTR. They fended off demands of the USTR for a “mutual recognition”, i.e. ‘equivalence’, of US and 
EU standards (CEN & CENELEC, 2014: 2)154. Their warnings notably reflected fear that national 
standards bodies could potentially also demand greater individual authority and demand the recognition 
of national standards in parallel to harmonised standards (Interview 4). Especially DG Grow was wary 
of the recognition of US standards as it could undermine the centralised distribution of standardisation 
authority in the EU (Interview 4). In the view of the Commission, this would challenge the integrity of 
the Single Market (Interview 6). Moreover, the recognition of rival or competing standards in addition 
to ‘harmonised standards’ would undermine the authority of the ESOs to demand the withdrawal of 
conflicting standards (Interview 5; Commission, 2016h). Both the ESOs and Commission DGs feared 
that SDOs in member states could raise claims to regain authority over the development of standards 
(Interview 6). As a consequence, it would also undermine the autonomy of the Commission to issue 
standardisation requests in support of regulatory requirements and accept ESO standards as technical 
specifications of regulatory requirements. 
Instead, DG Grow officials sought to address the demand of the US for an alignment of standards by 
proposing reinforced ‘information exchange’ between the ESOs and US SDOs (Commission, 2016h). 
In the view of the Commission, enhanced ‘information exchange’ between the ESOs and US SDOs 
could promote using existing standards of the other side rather than developing own standards and 
thereby help align standards (Interview 5, Interview 6). This proposal built on the ‘information 
exchange’ established among the ESOs and ANSI through the ‘Building Bridges’ document 
(Commission, 2011a). In this regard, DG Grow sought to persuade US negotiators that enhanced 
information exchange between EU and US SDOs would already facilitate mutual access of technical 
experts (Interview 5; Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie, 2014: 8). 
                                                     
152 This refers to equivalence as understood by the USTR.  
153 This implies that in addition to an incompatible distribution of regulatory authority, equivalence of standards 
would also be incompatible with the implementation principles of the EU.  
154 CEN and CENELEC warned that an ‘equivalence’ of standards would undermine ‘SHEC’ objectives, fragment 
the EU market, reduce opportunities for stakeholders to participate and create unbalanced market opportunities 
favouring US firms. Moreover, ‘equivalence’ would undermine their authority to withdraw conflicting national 
standards.  
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Moreover, the ESOs promoted proposals for reinforced ‘information exchange’. They proposed to 
Commission negotiators to promote improving transparency of the US standardisation system by 
publishing information on draft standards and thereby enable participation of stakeholders- including 
ESOs- in the development of standards (CEN & CENELEC, 2013: 7)155. Commission officials took up 
this suggestion and put forward that US SDOs publish their planned standardisation work and open it 
up for comments by other actors, including the Commission156. In exchange for possibilities to comment 
on planned standardisation activities of US SDOs, DG Grow officials offered that they would establish 
a commitment for ESOs to consider existing US standards when it issued standardisation requests for 
ESOs to develop or provide standards (Interview 4, Interview 6). Moreover, they offered that the 
Commission publish drafts of its annual standardisation work programmes and its standardisation 
requests so that stakeholders, including US regulators, could comment on them (Interview 5; 
Commission 2016h)157.  
During 2015, DG Trade officials continued to demand input from the engineering industry and 
encouraged it to present joint EU-US industry positions on provisions beyond a TBT Chapter. By late 
2014, the EU engineering association Orgalime was, however, able to present a joint position paper with 
the US association of electrical equipment manufacturers (Orgalime & NEMA, 2014)158. Although 
demands expressed in the joint position paper remained vague and without specific policy prescriptions, 
DG Trade used it to promote further regulatory cooperation through the TBT negotiations. This 
encouraged DG Grow to reinforce efforts on an already previously proposed issue, i.e. ‘information 
exchange’ between the Commission and the OSHA (Commission 2016h). DG Grow officials thus 
proposed a change in the notification practices of the OSHA and other agencies for the development of 
technical regulations and the referencing of standards in technical regulations. This should include the 
possibility to receive feedback from regulators of the other side and the possibility to give written replies 
to these comments and the ability of regulators to communicate with each other during the comments 
procedures (Interview 5). The Commission demanded that the OSHA and other US agencies should 
make public their intention to ‘reference’ a standard in a technical regulation to allow stakeholders, 
including EU regulators, to comment on the preselection of standards for referencing (Commission, 
2016h; Commission, 2015e). Interview partners noted that ‘information exchange’ could facilitate the 
ability of the Commission to persuade the OSHA to consider internationally agreed or EU ‘harmonised 
                                                     
155 They also underline that bilateral exchanges between EU and US SDOs should not weaken incentives for US 
SDOs to seek cooperation in ISO and IEC (CEN & CENELEC, 2013:7), argued by Büthe and Mattli (2011) to be 
preferred venues for the ESOs.   
156 Commission, 2014; art. 6.2 TBT textual proposal 
157 In reality, this offer did not propose to change existing procedures in the EU. It has been a practice of the 
Commission to publish draft standardisation programmes and requests for comments.    
158 The difficulty of Orgalime to develop a joint position paper with a US association reflects not only a lack of 
overlapping preferences, but also, if not mainly, the organisational structure of US engineering associations. While 
EU industries are organised hierarchically in horizontal associations representing the various subsectors of the 
engineering industry, US industries are represented in a fragmented manner through subsector associations 
without, however, an overarching horizontal association. The difficulty for Orgalime to present a transatlantic 
business position thus at least partly reflects collective action problems within the US industry (Interview 6).   
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standards’ when it selects standards for referencing in technical regulations (Interview 4, Interview 5). 
They stressed that inviting other actors, including other regulators such as the Commission, for 
comments on envisaged technical regulations would not affect or restrict the ability of OSHA or another 
agency to adopt technical regulations that reflected its public policy objectives159 (Interview 5). Higher 
transparency by introducing a notification for envisaged regulations would thus not restrict the 
autonomy of an agency160. However, the exchange of technical data during the preparation of technical 
regulations could help agencies make their regulations ‘better’ and strengthen them in the view of a 
judicial review of their regulations (Interview 5)161. At the same time, the Commission could gain limited 
access to the preparation of rule-making procedures in the US and demonstrate its willingness to address 
concerns of societal actors. 
Until 2015, especially DG Grow officials had been reluctant to put forward proposals for ‘equivalence’ 
or an ‘alignment’ of regulations. It feared that the limited centralisation of authority on regulations in 
the US could open the way to calls that such alignment provided asymmetric benefits to US firms and 
support for calls in member states for sub-central regulations (Interview 6). At the same time, DG Trade 
noted the results of the Ecorys study (2009) that diverging EU and US regulations posed adjustment 
costs for EU SME exporters. DG Grow lacked, however, the technical knowledge on which issues 
OSHA technical regulations posed trade problems for EU exporters, but ensured the same level of 
protection as the essential requirements formulated in EU directives. Moreover, it did not have 
information on which issues OSHA had the authority to formulate regulations for the US market 
(Interview 5). DG Trade thus mobilised engineering industries to put forward proposals on which issues 
the pursuit of ‘equivalence’ would be feasible. In a comprehensive position paper on regulatory 
cooperation, Orgalime listed individual EU and US regulations in the areas of mechanical safety, 
electrical safety and pressure equipment that DG Grow could consider for ‘equivalence’ (Orgalime, 
2016). Although NGOs continued to mobilise against regulatory cooperation on engineering products, 
especially the European Environmental Citizens Organisation for Standardisation (2016) and the 
German Social Accident Insurance (DGUV), DG Grow agreed to evaluate and consider these proposals 
(Interview 6). It did not exclude any more that it would also pursue ‘equivalence’ or ‘regulatory 
alignment’ on very limited issues (Interview 5; Commission, 2015e). It acknowledged that ‘equivalence’ 
could be a means to facilitate trade while ‘regulatory alignment’ could also reinforce the autonomy of 
the Commission to avoid particularistic policies. DG Grow refused, however, to make a commitment to 
                                                     
159 In line with this terminology of this dissertation, information exchange is thus without regard to the 
compatibility of ‘regulatory principles’ that a US agency a foreign regulator adopt.  
160 Correspondingly, the Commission only included a ‘best endeavours’ statement, i.e. giving discretion to deviate, 
in its TBT textual proposal that EU and US should ensure compliance with referenced standards remains voluntary 
for manufacturers to demonstrate conformity with regulatory requirements (Commission, 2014; art. 6.5 TBT 
textual proposal). 
161 The Commission hoped that enhanced information exchange during the preparation of technical regulations 
would help to reduce ‘unnecessary’ divergences between EU and US technical regulations on issues in which the 
EU and the US followed the same regulatory principle (Interview 5).  
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address ‘equivalence’ on any of these regulations within the TTIP negotiations themselves as it first 
wanted to ascertain the OSHA’s competence on these regulations as well as the level of protection 
provided by these regulations (Interview 5).  Yet, until the TTIP negotiations were put on freeze in 
January 2017, the Commission did not select specific issues or regulations for ‘equivalence’ or 
‘regulatory alignment’ (Commission, 2016l; Commission, 2016i; Commission, 2016d).162 
Under demands of DG Trade to present a regulatory cooperation proposal on engineering, DG Grow in 
coordination with DG Trade elaborated a textual proposal for a regulatory cooperation chapter on 
engineering based on the discussions between 2013 and 2016. This proposal was adopted by the College 
of Commissioners in June 2016 and then presented to US negotiators on 15 July 2016 (Commission, 
2016d). In substance, the textual proposal for an engineering chapter reflects the draft textual proposal 
for a TTIP chapter on TBTs adopted by the College and presented in March 2014 (Commission, 2014). 
The textual proposal summarises the strategy of DG Grow with regard to engineering regulatory 
cooperation. 
The textual proposal lists a number of broader issues that the Commission may consider for regulatory 
cooperation with the US in the future:  
“The Parties shall co-operate […] on the following areas: a) mechanical and electrical safety, b) marking 
requirements, including safety signs and labels, c) exhaust emissions from non-road mobile machinery, d) energy 
efficiency, e) food contact materials used in equipment, f) electromagnetic compatibility (electromagnetic disturbance 
and immunity to electromagnetic disturbance), g) interoperability of equipment.” (Commission, 2016d; art. 5.1 TTIP 
Engineering Annex Textual Proposal). 
Likewise, related to conformity assessment procedures “the Parties shall co-operate […] aiming at 
avoiding unnecessary duplication of testing and administrative burden.” (Commission, 2016d; art. 5.2 
TTIP Engineering Annex Textual Proposal). 
The Commission’s TTIP Engineering textual proposal, however, avoids specific commitments on 
regulatory cooperation on specific issues. The TTIP TBT proposal that complements the Commission’s 
strategy on engineering regulatory cooperation (Interview 4, Interview 5) underlines that the 
Commission restricts its choice of regulatory cooperation strategies to an ‘alignment of implementation 
procedures’ and ‘information exchange’:  
With regard to an ‘alignment of implementation procedures’, the Commission demanded that regulatory 
agencies should abolish enlisting only one CAB for third-party conformity assessment and avoid 
dominant positions of CABs (Commission, 2015f, art. 7.5(a), 7.7 TTIP TBT Proposal)163. Moreover, it 
                                                     
162 This suggests that DG Grow agreed to search for issues and technical regulations for possible ‘equivalence’ or 
‘regulatory alignment’ as a ‘trust-building exercise’. Rather than promoting ‘equivalence’ or ‘regulatory 
alignment’ in the context or during the TTIP negotiations, the Commission sought to initiate exchanges with the 
OSHA to identify areas in which ‘equivalence’ or ‘regulatory alignment’ could structurally be possible.   
163 The Commission in essence proposed that the OSHA align the structure of conformity assessment procedures 
in the US to the distribution of regulatory authority structures in the EU, if it has the regulatory authority to do so. 
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proposed that both the Commission and OSHA should review their conformity assessment procedures 
to “move progressively towards the least burdensome possible procedures commensurate with the risk 
that the underlying technical regulations are intended to address (Commission, 2015f; art. 7.1 TTIP TBT 
Proposal). It thus encouraged a movement in selected conformity assessment procedures towards 
Suppliers’ Declaration of Conformity. The textual proposal, however, left out the idea expressed in the 
2013 position paper to agree on common criteria for the choice of an appropriate conformity assessment 
procedure and to mention internationally agreed standards as a basis for conformity assessment. Besides, 
it does not explicitly promote the accreditation of CABs based on the ILAC and IAF standards.   
Moreover, DG Trade and DG Grow emphasised ‘information exchange’ in the textual proposal. With 
regard to ‘information exchange’ on technical regulations, the textual proposal specifies that the EU and 
US “shall provide information regarding the objectives of, legal basis and rationale for, a technical 
regulation or conformity assessment procedure, that the Party has adopted or is proposing to adopt” 
(Commission, 2015f; art. 5.2(a) TTIP TBT Proposal). Related to ‘information exchange’ on standards, 
the Commission proposed to encourage SDOs to cooperate more closely and exchange information164, 
thereby provide early notification of planned standardisation work and publish drafts for public 
comments (Commission, 2015f; art. 6.2 TTIP TBT Proposal)165. 
 
6.2.7. Discussion 
 
The previous sub-section has laid down that during all three cooperation initiatives, including the TTIP 
negotiations, the Commission has mostly restricted its choice of regulatory cooperation strategies to an 
‘alignment of implementation procedures’. This sub-section discusses the Commission’s choice of 
regulatory cooperation strategies during the three regulatory cooperation initiatives in view of the 
hypotheses derived from the Inter-relational Institutionalism. Particular attention is put on the analysis 
of the expectations on the constraints on regulatory cooperation formulated in section 6.2.5.   
The process-tracing of the formation of the regulatory cooperation strategies within the three selected 
transatlantic cooperation initiatives confirmed the influence of bureaucratic pressure on the engagement 
of Commission officials in bilateral regulatory cooperation (Hypothesis 1). During the NTA, when 
bureaucratic pressure was low or even absent, Commission officials largely refrained from the 
                                                     
The competition among CABs which are, however, ‘enlisted’ by the regulator resembles the ‘Notified Bodies’ 
working in the EU.     
164 The Commission presents ‘information exchange’ as a means to “facilitate (b) the harmonization of standards 
based on mutual interest and reciprocity, according to modalities to be agreed directly by the standardization bodies 
concerned, (c) the development of common standards, and (d) the identification of suitable areas for such 
cooperation on new technologies.” (Commission, 2015f: art 5.3 Commission TTIP TBT Proposal)  
165US agencies do not publish draft standardisation requests. They rather choose standards autonomously for 
‘referencing’ in technical regulations and subsequently publish chosen standards for notice-and-comment 
(Interview 5).    
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engagement in regulatory cooperation. An exception to this is the negotiation of the MRA on electrical 
goods. As the MRA was, however, initiated and negotiated under the leadership of DG Trade, it supports 
the relevance of bureaucratic pressure through the involvement of non-technical, non-regulatory DGs to 
begin the engagement in regulatory cooperation. During the HLRCF; the Commission’s engagement in 
regulatory cooperation largely followed from demands of Commissioner Verheugen who tasked 
technical officials to explore opportunities for regulatory cooperation also in the engineering sector. The 
importance of bureaucratic pressure on the formation of a regulatory cooperation strategy is also 
revealed by the subsequent decline in the pursuit of regulatory cooperation by DG Enterprise officials. 
In the latter case, bureaucratic pressure by the political and administrative leadership slowed down after 
the OSHA refusal to accept SDoC. The engagement in engineering cooperation during the TTIP 
negotiations also underlines the need for bureaucratic pressure to initiate strategy formation. Interview 
evidence collected for this book and reports of TPC meetings suggest, however, that in the engineering 
case, bureaucratic pressure by DG Trade on DG Grow followed from demands of member states, notably 
Germany and Spain on DG Trade to explore opportunities for cooperation on the engineering regulatory 
regime. While this does not invalidate the hypothesis that bureaucratic pressure initiates strategy 
formation, it recalls that traditional principal-agent relations may continue to play a role even where the 
discretionary authority of the ‘agent’, i.e. the Commission as a regulator, is high. 
The empirical finding of the strategies selected under bureaucratic pressure during the NTA, HLRCF 
and the TTIP negotiations again confirms the expectations formulated in section 6.2.5. The strategy 
choice reflected the distribution of regulatory compatibilities between the EU and the US in the 
engineering sectoral regime (Hypothesis 2).  
Chapter 6.2.6. has shown that the Commission has mostly refrained from ‘regulatory alignment’ or 
‘equivalence’. Instead, in line with the expectations of chapter 6.2.5, the Commission has chosen to 
pursue the strategies ‘alignment of implementation procedures’ and ‘information exchange’. ‘regulatory 
alignment’ through a harmonisation of standards should rather be pursued through international 
organisations and agreements (Interview 4). Besides, the Commission did not suggest the ‘equivalence’ 
of standards which are currently used as technical specifications for essential requirements of EU 
legislation or referenced in US regulations. The lack of OSHA authority to regulate notably mechanical 
safety has been mentioned by all interview partners as a main reason why the Commission did not 
promote ‘regulatory alignment’ (Interview 4, Interview 5, Interview 6). Moreover, the fragmentation of 
the US standardisation system and the persistence of competing standards have been cited as reasons 
why the Commission did not promote an ‘alignment’ or ‘equivalence’ of standards (Interview 4, 
Interview 5)166.  
                                                     
166 In its TBT position paper on TTIP, the Commission stressed that it wanted to “allow each [the EU and the US 
standardisation system] to maintain its distinctive character” and instead to “improve links between the two 
systems” (Commission, 2013b: 4). 
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Only during the TTIP negotiations the Commission began to contemplate persuading the OSHA to 
consider the development of common or coherent technical regulations in the future. The Commission 
suggested that common or coherent technical regulations could be developed “where neither side has 
regulations in place” (Commission, 2013b: 3). It is in this sense that the Commission welcomed the list 
of engineering industry of mechanical safety, electrical safety and explosion protection issues on which 
it could pursue ‘regulatory alignment’ and ‘equivalence’. It does, however, not call into question the 
explanatory validity of the regulatory compatibilities framework. On the contrary, the absence of an 
observable strategy to promote ‘regulatory alignment’ or ‘equivalence’ in engineering until the time of 
writing supports the interpretation that the Commission used the list as an indication on which issues it 
could enhance ‘information exchange’ with the OSHA to potentially consider policy cooperation in the 
future. The consideration of regulatory policy cooperation in the future suggests, however, that there are 
risks and products within the engineering regulatory regime for which the distribution of regulatory 
authority is compatible so that policy cooperation is a feasible strategy. 
The Commission’s choice to pursue an ‘alignment of implementation procedures’ reflects the 
compatibility of regulatory principles. The compatibility of regulatory principles for policies indeed led 
to the pursuit of an ‘alignment of implementation procedures’ in line with the expectations of chapter 
6.2.5. within all three cooperation initiatives. In conformity with the expectation formulated in chapter 
6.2.5, with the MRA under the NTA, Commission officials promoted a mutual recognition of conformity 
assessments where engineering regulatory regimes required third-party testing both in the EU and the 
US. Moreover, also in line with the expectation formulated above, the Commission promoted a mutual 
recognition of accreditation procedures and an alignment of testing procedures. 
Yet, beyond the expectations formulated in chapter 6.2.5., the implementation procedure for which the 
Commission pursued alignment varied across the three initiatives. This variation in the implementation 
procedure for which the Commission has chosen to pursue alignment has been argued to reflect tactical 
considerations in the negotiations. The Commission thus rejected the idea of incorporating or extending 
the existing Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs) negotiated during the TTIP negotiations, stressing 
that the divergence of the substantive requirements underlying the conformity assessment has not 
become smaller (Commission, 2013: 6). As laid down in chapter 6.2.6, the Commission feared that a 
mutual recognition of conformity assessment would create asymmetric benefits for firms located in the 
US as long as the OSHA did not respond to Commission demands on testing procedures and the 
recognition of CABs.  
Besides, counter to the expectation formulated above, the Commission chose to promote the adoption 
of SDoC as a conformity assessment procedure by the OSHA in the second phase. Exchanges with the 
OSHA after the request to extend SDoC and the response of the OSHA arguably changed the opinion 
Commission officials held about the compatibility of implementation principles for conformity 
assessment. As a consequence, the Commission argued that it did not seek to promote SDoC during the 
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third phase any more (Commission, 2013b: 6). These observations do, however, not invalidate 
hypothesis 2, but rather state that in addition to regulatory compatibility reflections, tactical 
considerations may play a role in decisions regarding the specific issue to which a regulatory cooperation 
shall apply.  
As in the chemicals case study, the choice of issues within the engineering regulatory regime on which 
the Commission has pursued the ‘alignment of implementation procedures’ has been shaped by the 
mobilisation of societal actors (Hypothesis 3). The promotion of a mutual recognition of accreditation 
procedures and the alignment of testing procedures reflects corresponding demands by Orgalime and 
the ESOs. Besides, the decision to propose an ‘alignment of implementation procedures’ supposedly 
also reflected proposals of firms participating in the TABC. The provision of technical information and 
expertise also shaped the content of other regulatory cooperation strategies. The issue-related content of 
Commission strategies on ‘information exchange’ and potential ‘regulatory alignment’ thus reflected 
issues proposed by Orgalime and the ESOs.  
The Commission’s rejection of proposals of societal actors shows that this has occurred where societal 
actor demands were either not in line with regulatory compatibilities or violated tactical considerations 
of the Commission aiming at the creation of benefits for many societal actors in the EU. For the second 
reason, the Commission has not taken up demands of CABs during TTIP for a mutual recognition of 
conformity assessment procedures. For the first reason, the Commission chose to address the deviation 
of US standards from ISO and IEC standards by promoting enhanced ‘information exchange’ between 
EU and US SDOs and enhanced ‘information exchange’ between the Commission and OSHA in the 
development of technical regulations. Discussions with the OSHA should serve as a ‘trust-building 
measure’ rather than realise ‘regulatory alignment’ during the TTIP negotiations. Likewise, the 
Commission acknowledged the warnings of NGOs against a “mutual recognition of standards”. It did, 
however, not choose ‘regulatory competition’ because it argued that its ambitions reflecting an 
‘alignment of implementation procedures’ and ‘information exchange’ would not lead to the lowering 
of health and safety levels feared by NGOs167.    
Furthermore, the process-tracing reveals the causality between regulator activities and societal actor 
mobilisation. Both interview evidence and the temporal sequence of statements show that societal actor 
mobilisation was mostly reactive. Activities of the engineering associations to draft position papers in 
which they indicated potential issues for regulatory cooperation as well as the elaboration of joint 
position papers with US engineering associations followed after Commission officials expressed 
demands to business associations for specific technical knowledge.  
                                                     
167 Remark made by Commission negotiator Garcia Bercero at the TTIP stakeholder dialogue on 24 February 2016 
in Brussels.  
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The high degree of technical complexity of the engineering regulatory regime and the low degree of 
large-scale regulatory innovation in this sectoral regime makes it unlikely that Commissioners and 
Directors General will invest bureaucratic pressure to demand engineering cooperation under regulatory 
dialogues. Moreover, the difficulty encountered by Orgalime and VDMA to form a transatlantic 
business alliance further decrease chances that they will maintain mobilisation on engineering 
cooperation when bureaucratic pressure is low. At the same time, the extensive position paper and the 
list of potential issues for regulatory cooperation may offer guidance to regulatory officials once a future 
Commissioner and/or Director General will reconsider transatlantic engineering cooperation.      
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6.3. Commission strategies in transatlantic food safety cooperation 
 
This section proposes a case study for which existing literature implies that regulatory authority 
structures in the EU and US are compatible, but regulatory principles are incompatible for many policies. 
It is thus a case in which the Commission can be expected to pursue ‘equivalence’ according to the Inter-
relational Institutionalism. This case study covers the Commission’s choice of regulatory cooperation 
strategies in transatlantic regulatory cooperation in the food safety regime.  
 
6.3.1. Introduction 
 
Food safety policy refers to the regulation of the production and marketing of food for the protection of 
human, animal, and plant health. Regulatory issues in food safety concern the hygiene of food, the use 
of additives, residue limits of pesticides and veterinary drugs as well as food contamination (Hristova, 
2013: 58). Issues of food safety are delineated from issues of food security and food quality (Josling & 
Tangermann, 2015a). While food security denotes the availability and affordability of (basic) food, food 
quality refers to the provision of information to consumers in order to allow an informed choice. Food 
quality regulations thus address questions of labelling, animal welfare or the geographical origin of a 
product168. While food safety is subject to extensive cooperation in international organisations (see 
below), engagement on food quality is relatively low. In view of the objective of this book to examine 
the regulatory cooperation strategies of the EU in case studies where cooperation in international 
organisations is dense, the following discussion will concentrate on regulatory cooperation on food 
safety issues. In practice, the delineation in particular between food safety and food quality is not always 
clear, and regulatory conflicts between the EU and the US have in the past especially emerged where 
the attribution of an issue to food safety or quality has been contested between both sides (Josling & 
Tangermann, 2015a: 164).   
Firms affected by questions of food safety are both farms, food processors, and retailers. Especially 
farms, but also many food processors tend to be small- and medium-sized enterprises with their 
production usually concentrated at one site, notwithstanding the existence of large multinational 
corporations notably among food processors and retailers. Nonetheless, EU food producers are highly 
integrated into global value chains, relying on imports for animal feed or fertilisers in the case of farms 
or agricultural imports in the case of food processors. Similarly, both EU farms and food processors sell 
their output on global markets, either to processors or through retailers also to end consumers outside 
                                                     
168 The use of Geographical Indications to indicate the origin of a product from a particular city or region is an 
example of the EU’s policy on food quality.  
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the EU. Figure 18 shows the development of trade flows between the EU and the US in the food sector 
between 2006 and 2016169.   
 
 
Figure 18: Trade Flows in the Food Sector 2006-2016 
 
In the EU on the business side, lobbying is crucially shaped by the EU-level sub-sectoral agricultural 
associations, i.e. notably Freshfel (fruit producers), UECBV (meat producers) and Eucolait (dairy 
producers), as well as the horizontal farmers’ association Copa-Cogeca, and to a lesser extent, the food 
producer association FoodDrinksEurope. EU business associations did not, however, succeed to form 
transatlantic coalitions with US business associations. Non-governmental and civil society organisations 
were also highly active. Through the Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue (TACD), EU and US consumer 
protection organisations succeeded to present a common lobbying position.  
As shown by figure 18, the EU is a net exporter of food products to the US. EU exports to the US are 
high in produced foods, e.g. meat preparations, cheese and olive oil) whereas the US has a trade surplus 
in agricultural commodities, including meat, fruits, vegetables and nuts). The graph below illustrates the 
balance of EU-US trade in different food products. Impact assessments conducted for the purpose of 
TTIP negotiations estimate that non-tariff measures (NTMs) raise the price of EU imports to the US by 
51.3% and US imports to the EU by 48.2% (Fontagné et al., 2013).170   
Regulatory policies on food safety specify the requirements of the food allowed to be sold on a market, 
including requirements for the hygiene of food, the use of additives, the allowance of residue limits of 
pesticides and veterinary drugs in food products. Implementation procedures refer to the criteria 
                                                     
169 The choice of the time period reflects data availability constraints (Eurostat, 2017).  
170 For a list of NTMs identified through a large-scale business survey see Ecorys (2009).   
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determined to assess the hygiene of a product, the inspection of businesses to ascertain compliance with 
regulatory requirements, the authorisation of businesses for export or import, the issuance of certificates 
to indicate compliance. Although not a food safety issue in the narrow sense, analysts also add 
procedures to identify and control animal diseases such as BSE and avian flu to food safety issues, 
including so-called regionalisation decisions of authorities to restrict animal movements from an 
infected region and zoning decisions to contain infected animals within a defined zone.       
This chapter will first lay down the regulatory policies and implementation procedures set and defined 
by the EU. It will then describe regulatory cooperation on policies and implementation procedures 
established through and within international organisations and institutions. A subsequent section 
presents divergences between the EU and the US in regulatory policies and implementation procedures 
based on a survey of the academic literature. The following two sections will describe the strategies that 
the EU, represented through the Commission, has employed to seek regulatory cooperation with the US.     
 
6.3.2. International food safety cooperation  
 
Cooperation on food safety in international organisations arguably begins with the establishment of the 
Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex), a standard-setting body jointly established by the World 
Health Organisation and the Food and Agriculture Organisation, in 1963. The Codex develops standards, 
codes of practice, recommendations, and guidelines in permanent expert committees which focus on 
e.g. food additives, pesticide and veterinary drug residues, food labelling, food hygiene, and animal 
health. Yet, Codex standards are non-binding and only become effective when they are transposed into 
domestic law. 
International regulatory cooperation on food safety became more legally binding and enforceable with 
the adoption of the “Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures” (SPS) under 
the WTO. The SPS Agreement specifies the conditions under which domestic food safety measures are 
justified to interfere with international trade. It is legally binding as it subjects governments’ violations 
of their obligations to the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism. The SPS Agreement confirms the right 
of governments to “take sanitary and phytosanitary measures necessary for the protection of human, 
animal or plant life or health.” Yet, it requires governments to build such measures on the principles of 
“scientific evidence”, “risk assessment”, “appropriate level of protection”, “harmonisation” and 
“‘equivalence’” (WTO, 1995b). The agreement combines US and EU requests.  
In line with US demands during the SPS negotiations, the agreement requires “scientific evidence” for 
the adoption and maintenance of food safety measures (Poli, 2004). Moreover, it requires “risk 
assessment” to “determine the appropriate level of protection”, thus emphasising the inclusion of 
economic cost-benefit considerations into the comparison of alternative food safety measures. While it 
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allows governments to deviate from international standards and adopt a higher level of protection, the 
agreement requires that governments give a scientific reason for their decision, reflecting US demands 
(Hristova, 2013: 62). EU demands are, in turn, reflected in provisions specifying that where scientific 
evidence remains insufficient, governments may adopt measures on “the basis of available pertinent 
information”. These provisions have been interpreted as a reference to the precautionary principle 
although it is not explicitly mentioned (Josling & Tangermann, 2015a: 172).   
In the SPS Agreement, the EU and the US realised their shared preferences for the establishment of the 
concepts of ‘equivalence’” and harmonisation. Following the principle of “harmonisation”, the 
agreement requires WTO members to base their sanitary and phytosanitary measures on international 
standards, referring specifically to Codex standards in the case of food safety. The domestic 
transposition of Codex standards offers governments a presumption of conformity with their WTO 
obligations. Moreover, the agreement encourages the use of “‘equivalence’”, proposing that WTO 
members “shall accept the sanitary or phytosanitary measures of other Members as equivalent, even if 
these measures differ from their own. […], if the exporting Members objectively demonstrates to the 
importing Member that its measures achieve the importing Party’s appropriate level of sanitary or 
phytosanitary protection.”  
Attempts of the EU member states171 in 1997 to externalise the use of the precautionary principle and 
the consideration of “other legitimate factors” to standard-setting procedures in the Codex mostly failed. 
The US rejected the request of EU member states that international standard-setting should be possible 
even in cases of scientific uncertainty and thus to incorporate the precautionary principle, arguing that 
precaution was already included in risk assessment. Besides, the US argued that the precautionary 
principle was not recognised or elaborated in international law (Hristova, 2013: 64; Poli, 2004). The 
eventual working principles of 2003 lay down that standards can only be developed if there is sufficient 
scientific certainty. Under uncertainty, Codex should only adopt codes of practices. EU member states, 
in turn, and against the preference of the US which had advocated a science-only approach to 
standardisation, succeeded to incorporate a reference to “other legitimate factors” into the Procedural 
Manual of Codex for the development of standards of food safety standards. Yet, this reference remains 
general, vague and subject to restrictions, notably that “other legitimate factors” cannot override 
scientific evidence (Hristova, 2013: 66). 
With the adoption of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety in 2000 (see Oberthür & Gehring, 2006), the 
EU succeeded to establish an alternative multilateral framework governing trade in GMOs, seeking to 
ensure an adequate level of protection in the transfer, handling and use of GMOs. Besides, it could 
incorporate both the “precautionary principle” and other legitimate factors” into the Protocol. Authors 
argue that the adoption of Cartagena Protocol gave rise to legal pluralism as the relationship between 
                                                     
171 The Commission only became a full member of Codex in 2003 after its application for membership in 2001.  
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the SPS Agreement and the Biosafety Protocol remained unclear (Delreux, 2012; Wouters et al., 2012; 
Vogel, 2012). 
With regard to implementation procedures, the SPS Agreement defines standards on regionalisation and 
zoning procedures during the outbreak of an animal disease in a WTO member state, giving authorities, 
however, discretion in taking more stringent measure if they deem that appropriate.        
Subsequent international cooperation between the EU and the US centred on the development of 
standards in the Codex, and to a lesser extent with regard to GMOs, also the OECD. In Codex, the EU 
adopted an active role and facilitated the agreement on international standards even where the eventually 
adopted standards deviated from EU requirements. In these cases, the EU promoted the adoption of 
standards setting lower residual limits than the residual limits previously agreed in the EU to facilitate 
an agreement. Alternatively, it chose to set deviating residual limits from internationally agreed 
standards in domestic regulations afterwards (Young, 2011). In few cases, the EU decided to prevent 
the adoption of a standard by delaying the decisions. Only in very few cases, among them the prominent 
ractopamine case (see below), the EU sought to block a decision.  
 
6.3.3. EU food safety regime 
 
This section outlines the distribution of regulatory authority structures and principles in the EU food 
safety regulatory framework, both with respect to the regulatory policies anchored in the General Food 
Law (Regulation EC/178/2002) and the Regulation on Good Hygiene Practices (EC/852/2004) and the 
implementation procedures established by the Official Food and Feed Controls Regulation 
(EC/854/2004).  
The division between risk management and risk assessment to delineate regulatory policies from 
implementation procedures can mostly also be applied to the regulatory framework on food safety. 
While risk management falls within regulatory policies, implementation procedures address mainly the 
assessment of safety risks. The development of the EU food safety framework followed the 
Commission’s adaptation of the ‘New Approach’ which allowed it to expand both the scope and depth 
of EU food safety legislation. After the food scandals related to mad cow disease and dioxins in food 
products of the late 1990s and early 2000s, comprehensive food framework laws were adopted in the 
early 2000s. Before, food safety had been regulated under a system of comprehensive mutual recognition 
of member states’ national food safety laws in reflection of the Cassis de Dijon judgement of the 
European Court of Justice (Hristova, 2013: 59).  
The General Food Law specifies that food and feed imported into the EU must comply with EU 
requirements, conditions that are recognised as equivalent to EU requirements by the EU, or 
requirements laid down in specific agreements between the EU and third countries. The Regulation on 
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Good Hygiene Practices specifies the responsibility of businesses for ensuring the compliance with 
hygiene requirements. After the food safety scandals of the late 1990s and 2000s, the competence to 
propose and administer legislation governing food safety was shifted from DG Agriculture to the DG 
Health and Consumer Protection, renamed as the Directorate General for Health and Consumers, or DG 
Sanco. Exceptions to this persist in risk management with regard to the authorisation of genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs). Until 2015, member states could not block the application of a GM 
authorisation by the Commission, but in practice delay its implementation (see Josling & Tangermann, 
2015a: 198)172. Yet, a reform in 2015 allows individual member states to ban the sale of EU-authorised 
GM varieties, now making regulatory policies non-centralised. Except for the authorisation of GM 
varieties, regulatory authority on food safety regulatory policies is thus centralised in the EU. 
The General Food Law specifies that in risk management, EU food safety measures should be adopted 
on the basis of risk assessment, giving consideration to other factors under specified and clearly defined 
conditions. The General Food Law regulates all stages of the food production process from feed 
production to food processing and distributing, also known as the ‘farm-to-fork’ approach, and thus 
requires the traceability of products along the production and distribution chain (Hristova, 2013: 60)173. 
The application of the Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) system reflects the ‘traceability 
principle’ (Interview 7). As a policy consequence of the farm-to-fork approach, the EU has banned the 
use of certain ‘pathogen reduction treatments’ (PRTs) or anti-microbial washes in slaughterhouses, 
arguing that this covers up “unsatisfactory practices at an earlier stage” of the production process 
(Josling & Tangermann, 2015a: 177). PRTs banned in the EU has notably concerned the use of chlorine 
washes in poultry as well as the use of lactic acid in beef. Instead, the EU has adopted animal welfare 
legislation which it sees as enhancing animal hygiene, thus also enhancing food safety. Moreover, the 
General Food Law also the Commission to rely on other principles, notably the ‘precautionary 
principle’, on issues in which scientific advice is inconclusive or not available. In the understanding of 
the Commission, recourse to the precautionary principle is possible where “potentially dangerous effects 
deriving from a phenomenon, product or process have been identified, and […] scientific evaluation 
does not allow the risk to be determined with sufficient certainty” (Commission, 2000: 1). The 
precautionary principle applies e.g. to the regulation of GM varieties, in particular with regard to their 
                                                     
172 Under the authorisation process until 2015, the Commission proposed a decision to the Council committee in 
charge on the authorisation of a GM variety based on the results of the scientific investigation by the EFSA. 
Member states in the Council could, however, challenge the decision of the Commission, following comitology 
rules. If the Council and appellate committees could not agree on a position, the Commission could still approve 
a variety, although it was not obliged to do so. Once approved, member states could not block the application of a 
GM authorisation by the Commission, but in practice delay its implementation.  
173 Food-producing firms in the EU are thus required to follow the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points 
(HACCP) system developed within the Codex Alimentarius.  
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cultivation. The EU allows the non-authorisation of GM varieties for cultivation if scientific evidence 
leaves uncertainty regarding the risk of the product174.  
Aside from the ‘risk assessment’ principle, regulatory policies on food safety in the EU are thus shaped 
by the ‘traceability’ and the ‘precautionary principle’. 175  
The Official Food and Feed Controls Regulation specifies the implementation procedures for controlling 
compliance with the safety requirements, i.e. the control and inspection procedures, as well as the risk 
assessment procedures for ensuring compliance of importers with safety requirements. It also specifies 
procedures for the approval of pre-export checks by third-country authorities. The General Food Law 
delegates the conduct of risk assessment and the provision of a scientific opinion to an independent 
scientific agency at the EU level, the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), under the realm of DG 
Sante. The EFSA is mandated to conduct risk assessment and give scientific opinions to inform the 
Commission and member states on food safety measures, including the development of international 
food safety standards in Codex (Weimer & Vos, 2015: 60)176. Under the Official Food and Feed Controls 
Regulation, audits and the authorisation of agricultural businesses in third countries for imports into the 
EU lies with EU Food and Veterinary Office (FVO) under the control of DG Sante. The FVO carries 
out official controls, i.e. inspections and audits, in third countries to verify compliance and/or 
‘equivalence’ with the EU food safety requirements177. The Commission can also designate bodies in 
third countries, so-called ‘competent authorities’, for pre-export checks in the third country to verify 
compliance, i.e. establish a ‘unilateral’ recognition of conformity assessment178(Weimer & Vos, 2015: 
                                                     
174  With regard to the regulation of GMOs, the application of these regulatory principles has arguably not always 
been entirely consistent. Due to conflicts among member states, the Commission established a de facto moratorium 
on the authorisation of new GMOs in 1997. Moreover, some member states implemented national bans on certain 
GM varieties for cultivation although the Commission had authorised them for cultivation in the EU as a whole, 
following a positive scientific assessment of the EFSA. Both measures later triggered complaints by the US under 
WTO rules (see below). Most GM products authorised for sale in the EU are varieties of maize, soybeans, rapeseed, 
sugar beets, cotton and potatoes. In effect, only one GM variety (maize MON810) can currently be planted 
commercially in the EU, most of which is cultivated in Spain. More recently, the stance of the Commission against 
GMOs has shifted towards a risk-based approach with the Low Level Presence Regulation from 2009, referring to 
the marketing of GMOs in animal feed, which now allows the minimal presence of non-approved GM material in 
approved GM products at a level of 0.1%.  
175Some authors (e.g. Hristova, 2013: 64) have added another regulatory principle to the EU regulatory framework, 
namely the consideration of ‘other legitimate factors’. While they lack a precise definition, authors often 
understood considerations about the technological need, consumer attitudes, environmental concerns, socio-
economic sustainability and animal welfare as these ‘other legitimate factors’. Other authors, however, question 
whether these considerations are part of the food safety framework or should rather be counted to the framework 
on food quality (Josling & Tangermann, 2015: 179). 
176 While the EFSA absorbed previous scientific committees on food, animal nutrition, veterinary measures, and 
measures related to animal health and welfare, member states still held on to their national health and safety 
agencies. 
177 Weimer and Vos (2015: 55) emphasise that these controls in practice are not only of a top-down nature. FVO 
officials also engage in dialogue and deliberative exercises with federal or local authorities of third countries as 
well as exporting businesses during their missions to third countries. Even when a third country body has been 
recognised as a competent authority to establishment conformity of products with EU safety requirements, the 
FVO maintains deliberative interactions with these bodies, also to ensure their effectiveness in determining 
compliance.  
178 The establishment of a ‘unilateral’ recognition of conformity assessment follows comitology procedures. 
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56). Risk management in the case of a pest crisis in a third country is captured under the Rapid Alert 
System for Food and Feed (RASFF). After notification of a serious risk detected in food or feed by a 
third country authority, the Commission can decide on measures to be taken by third-country authorities, 
e.g. pre-export checks, and additional import checks.   
Inspections of agricultural businesses in member states are conducted by member state authorities. 
Member state authorities thus also authorise EU businesses for export. However, the FVO is tasked to 
ensure the proper implementation and enforcement of EU food safety laws and undertakes market 
surveillance. It audits the ability of member state authorities to conduct effective control and to this 
purpose also inspects individual premises itself to ensure that legal requirements are met. Regulatory 
authority over implementation procedures is thus centralised with regard to risk assessment of 
substances, audits of inspections and the authorisation of imports. It is also centralised with regard to 
the inspection of businesses and the authorisation of businesses for exports although member state 
authorities conduct the inspections and authorisations.   
The risk assessment of food products is based on scientific evidence, with the EFSA as a provider of 
scientific advice to the Commission and member states179. Import controls reflect the risk of a product 
to human, animal or plant health. Put simply, the higher the risk of a product for human, animal or plant 
health, the stricter the import controls (Weimer & Vos, 2015: 55). A large number of food products 
considered to be low-risk are therefore not subject to systematic border controls (Interview 8; Weimer 
& Vos, 2015: 55; Alemanno, 2011)180. For the inspection and audits of agricultural businesses in third 
countries, the FVO focuses less on inspecting individual businesses, but rather controlling the 
effectiveness of the regulatory system as a whole (Weimer & Vos, 2015: 63). When the Commission 
finds that a third country has an effective control system in place, it designates third country bodies as 
‘competent authorities’ and allows them to determine which firms are to be included in the list of 
establishments approved for export to the EU181. If subsequent FVO audits and inspections find 
ineffectiveness of the control system of a third country, FVO reports can form the basis for restrictive 
measures of the Commission against that third country. In implementation procedures the Commission 
thus follows two regulatory principles, the ‘risk principle’ and the ‘systems-based approach’.  
This section has established that both regulatory authority on regulatory policies and implementation 
procedures in the EU is centralised. While regulatory policies follow the regulatory principles ‘scientific 
                                                     
179 The selection of scientific evidence by the EFSA for risk assessment has in the past often been contentious 
(Interview 11). Risk assessment is conducted by a Working Group comprising EFSA members and scientists that 
assesses ‘available scientific information’, drawing on data supplied by member states, research institutes and 
firms (Dreyer & Renn, 2009: 71-82). 
180 In the case of an animal disease in a third country, the EU follows ‘regionalisation’ based on internationally 
agreed standards, thus restricting imports only from the region (not country) affected in line with measures of 
third-country authorities. 
181 Third country ‘competent authorities’ issue export certificates that indicate presumed ‘equivalence’ with EU 
safety requirements. The EU reduces the frequency of full border checks for these products. 
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risk assessment’, ‘traceability’ and the ‘precautionary principle’, implementation procedures follow the 
‘risk principle’ and the ‘systems-based approach’.   
 
6.3.4. Contrast of the EU and US food safety regimes 
 
This section summarises divergences between the EU and US regulatory frameworks for food safety. It 
demonstrates that compatibilities exist with regard to the distribution of regulatory authority structures 
while regulatory principles are mostly incompatible.  
Most US food safety regulations are federal regulations (Josling & Tangermann, 2015a: 167). 
Depending on the regulatory issue, these are adopted by the US Department of Agriculture (USDA; for 
meat, poultry and eggs), by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA; for all other foods) or the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA; for the use of inputs including fertilisers). The new framework 
food safety legislation adopted in 2011, the Food Safety Modernisation Act (FSMA), does not 
substantially change this division of competences, but strengthens the role of the federal agencies vis-à-
vis producers. On issues on which US federal states do or cannot agree on the need to issue a mandate 
for a federal agency to develop federal regulation, the federal states have also adopted state-level 
regulations themselves, such as restrictions of the use of GMOs and other biotechnology in food 
products or provisions on animal welfare (Josling & Tangermann, 2015a: 183). Yet, the majority of food 
safety regulations are adopted by federal agencies (Josling & Tangermann, 2015a: 184).  This makes 
the distribution of regulatory authority for regulatory policies centralised. The distribution of regulatory 
authority in the US and the EU for regulatory policies are therefore compatible. 
US regulatory agencies follow the principle that food safety regulation should reflect the results of 
scientific risk assessment. The FSMA has strengthened the reliance on scientific risk assessment in the 
development of food safety regulations. Moreover, it emphasises the importance of a risk-based 
approach, in order to concentrate available regulatory resources on the containment of the greatest risks. 
Scientific risk assessment thus is inter alia reflected in the US milk rules defined by the ‘Grade A 
Pasteurised Milk Ordinance’ of the FDA. Other regulatory principles beyond the reliance on scientific 
risk assessment are, however, not applied at least in federal US regulations. The latter thus neither 
officially recognise the ‘precautionary principle’ nor specifically mention ‘other legitimate factors’ as a 
basis for the development of food safety regulations. As a consequence, biotechnology and genetically 
modified products are not subject to other treatment than ‘conventional’ food products182. Similarly, 
where scientific evidence is inconclusive, US agencies do not and are not allowed to ban substances as 
                                                     
182 The FDA is responsible for approving new plant varieties in food use and requires safety testing by the firm 
introducing the variety. The USDA needs to review the test results, considering the effects of variety on the safety 
of other crops and animals. The EPA oversees the incorporation of pesticide genes into the variety. (Dabroska-
Klosinska, 2015).  
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a result of scientific uncertainty. This explains the permission to use growth-enhancing hormones in the 
US, such as beef hormones or ractopamine for pigs183.  
Moreover, US regulations neither consistently follow the ‘farm-to-fork’ or ‘traceability’ approach.  On 
the contrary, US regulations concentrate on ensuring the ‘safety of the end product’, thereby often – put 
simplified- ‘sterility’. This principle explains the use and requirement of anti-microbial pathogen 
reduction treatment in meat, e.g. the use of chlorine washes to treat chicken or the use of lactic acid to 
wash beef. Equally, it is responsible for the bans of certain raw milk cheese produced in the EU. US 
central-level regulations thus follow the ‘scientific risk assessment’ and ‘safety of the end product’ 
principles. With the reform of US food safety law, however, the FSMA requires that US food producers 
develop and implement plans that track the handling steps of food184 (Interview 7). This can be 
considered as a partial adoption of the ‘traceability’ principle. As demonstrated above, the 
Commission’s adoption of the ‘precautionary principle’ is incompatible with the ‘scientific risk 
assessment’ principle pursued by the USDA and the FDA. Moreover, its ‘traceability’ principle is 
incompatible with the ‘safety of the end product’ followed by US agencies.          
With regard to implementation procedures, registrations and inspections of agricultural businesses are 
carried out by the FDA (for non-meat producing farmers) or the FSIS, a service under the auspices of 
the USDA (for meat producing farmers). Related to the authorisation of agricultural businesses for 
import, the Food Safety Modernisation Act of 2011 has expanded the scope of third-party certification 
of businesses in third countries (Interview 8). The Food Safety Modernisation Act allows the 
authorisation of businesses for import by recognising accreditation bodies which accredit third-party 
auditors to certify foreign food facilities and imports (Egan & Pelkmans, 2015: 8). Risk assessment in 
the US is also conducted by federal agencies although producers also often supply their assessment data 
to the agencies. Moreover, agencies have discretion in choosing which scientific evidence they prefer to 
use for assessing the safety of a product185. Regulatory authority on implementation procedures in the 
US is thus centralised. This makes the distribution of regulatory authority structures in the EU and the 
US compatible.  
Related to implementation procedures, the FDA and FSIS also conduct inspections of agricultural 
businesses based on the perceived risk of a product. In inspections, the FDA and the FSIS thus also 
follow the ‘risk principle’. Interview partners have noted, however, that both the FDA and FSIS conduct 
extensive border controls (Interview 7). Moreover, the FSMA requires that all businesses register 
                                                     
183 Despite growing scientific evidence that the use of antibiotics in animal raising has contributed to the growth 
of disease-resistant bacteria, the US agencies have not yet enacted regulation restricting the use of antibiotics 
beyond medical treatment, but only relied on voluntary guidelines and limits on the use of drugs. The lack of 
regulations on the use of antibiotics, however, also reflects the long time needed to adopt regulations in the US 
due to notice-and-comment procedures (Interview 7).     
184 At the time of writing, the FDA has mandatory requirements for traceability for juice and the USDA for meat.  
185 Observers thus criticise that the discretion of US agencies in risk assessment with regard to the selection of 
scientific evidence can be politically controlled and that risk assessment is thus not entirely independent 
(Interviews 7,8). 
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individually with the responsible agency. This applies to agricultural businesses producing fruit that 
need to register individually every two years with the FDA and to meat-producing firms that need to 
register with the USDA186. Moreover, the FDA conducts audits of individual businesses and does not 
recognise entire systems (Interview 7). In implementation procedures, while the US therefore relies on 
the ‘risk principle’ for audits and inspections. it does not rely on the ‘systems-based approach’ for the 
authorisation of businesses for import and export. This makes the regulatory principle for inspections 
and audits adopted in the EU and the US compatible, but incompatible for import authorisation.  
Figure 19 summarises the contrast of the EU and US food safety regulatory regimes.          
Dimension Regulatory 
instrument 
Authority 
distribution 
EU US 
Regulatory 
policies 
Legislation  General Food Law 
Regulation on Good Hygiene Practices  
 
Numerous Acts 
Since 2011: Food Safety Modernisation 
Act  
Regulations  
 
Standards  
Centralised Risk assessment principle 
- Scientific testing of food products 
Precautionary principle 
- Non-authorisation of GM varieties 
and other technology under 
inconclusive scientific evidence  
Traceability principle 
- Ban of pathogen reduction 
treatments and anti-microbial 
washes 
Risk assessment principle 
- Scientific testing of food products 
 
Non-
centralised 
  
Implementation 
Procedures 
Centralised Risk principle 
- Import controls according to the 
risk of a product 
Systems-based approach  
- Audits and inspections of third-
country businesses on a system-
basis, designation of competent 
authorities in third countries  
Risk principle: 
- Import controls according to the 
risk of a product (but in practice 
extensive border controls) 
Individual registration of businesses 
- Audits of individual businesses, 
no recognition of entire systems  
 
Non-
centralised 
  
Figure 19: Contrast of the EU and US food safety regulatory regimes  
In sum, this section has shown that regulatory authority structures in the EU and the US are compatible 
while regulatory principles are incompatible187. Moreover, regulatory authority structures are 
compatible with regard to implementation procedures whereas regulatory principles are compatible for 
inspections and audits and incompatible for import authorisations.    
                                                     
186 The FDA and the FSIS adopt changes in import approvals through rule-making. As these require notification 
of proposed rules and consultation of stakeholders through a process of notice-and-comment, implementation 
procedures in the US require substantially more time than implementation procedures in the EU where the 
Commission can rely on implementing acts (Interviews 7,9). 
187 Authors do, however, not attribute a fundamental difference in the level of health and safety protection provided 
by either regulatory system (Josling & Tangermann, 2015; Vogel, 2012). Although the EU system is considered 
by some as the more stringent one (Vogel, 2012), others call into question that it is systematically more 
precautionary than the US food safety system (e.g. Egan & Pelkmans, 2015).   
 
European Commission strategies in transatlantic regulatory cooperation 
225 
 
6.3.5. Expectations: Commission strategies in transatlantic food safety cooperation  
 
Based on the contrast of the food safety regulatory regimes in the EU and the US and the distribution of 
regulatory compatibilities, this sub-section formulates expectations for Commission strategies on 
transatlantic food safety cooperation. As in chapters 6.1.5 and 6.2.5., these expectations operationalise 
the hypothesis derived on the influence of regulatory compatibilities on constraining the choice of a 
regulatory cooperation strategy. No separate operationalisations will be presented for the effects of 
bureaucratic pressure within the Commission and societal actor mobilisation as this has already been 
done in chapters 4.4.2. and 4.4.3 respectively. 
Crucial elements of the EU and US food safety regulatory regimes are subject to legislation and thus 
require the approval of legislatures in both the EU and the US to change them. This concerns decisions 
on the authorisation of modern agricultural technologies (including cloning) and fundamental changes 
on the cultivation of GM varieties and hormone treatments of live animals. As these issues lie outside 
the regulatory authority of the Commission, it should not be expected that the Commission pursues 
changes to authorisation of modern agricultural technologies, cultivation of GM varieties and hormone 
treatments through regulatory cooperation. At the same time, it should be expected that the Commission 
will seek to exclude demands from the third country (in this case study the US) from regulatory 
cooperation discussions as this would entail the involvement of other decision-makers in the EU and 
thus reduce its discretionary authority within the regulatory cooperation process. 
Moreover, food safety regulations elaborated and adopted by central-level regulators both in the EU and 
the US reflect incompatible regulatory principles with regard to the reliance on the precautionary 
principle and the traceability principle. Where these incompatible regulatory principles have an 
immediate effect on regulation, it should be expected that the Commission will choose to maintain 
regulatory differences and competition. This concerns in particular regulations on the use of growth-
promoting hormones, i.e. ractopamine in pigs and the use of beef hormones. It also refers to the 
authorisation of pathogen reduction treatments for beef and chicken in the EU and the authorisation of 
certain raw-milk cheeses for marketing in the US. For these issues, it should be expected that the 
Commission chooses not to pursue ‘regulatory alignment’. 
For regulations under the authority of the Commission which only underlyingly reflect the precautionary 
principle and traceability principle (as part of the EU food safety regulatory regime), but where existing 
regulations do not explicitly state one of the principles, the Commission can be expected to pursue 
regulatory cooperation if the level of safety cooperation for consumers is not reduced. This concerns 
notably food safety regulations for pesticide residuals in fruits as well as bacteria presence levels for 
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milk and dairy products. For these issues the Commission can be expected to choose ‘equivalence’ as a 
regulatory cooperation strategy188.     
Regulatory authority structures in the EU and the US are compatible with regard to implementation 
procedures. Moreover, regulatory principles are compatible related to inspections and audits of 
agricultural businesses. For these issues, the Commission can be expected to pursue an ‘alignment of 
implementation procedures’. Besides, regulatory principles shaping decisions on import approvals can 
be argued to be non-conflicting. The Commission can thus additionally be expected to pursue an 
alignment of import approval procedures.  
Notwithstanding the distribution of regulatory compatibilities, the Commission can be expected to 
pursue ‘information exchange’. ‘Information exchange’ should concern the development of regulations 
on new, emerging issues in the food safety regime such as anti-microbial resistance189.  
 
6.3.6. Commission strategies in transatlantic food safety cooperation 
 
This section lays down the Commission’s choice of regulatory cooperation strategies during the three 
regulatory cooperation initiatives selected in chapter 5.1. 
 
New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) 
 
Transatlantic regulatory cooperation on food safety began with the negotiations of a Veterinary 
‘equivalence’ Agreement in 1991. Under the lead of DG Agriculture, Agriculture Commissioner 
MacSherry initiated the negotiations of Veterinary ‘equivalence’ Agreements with the US, Canada and 
New Zealand. The negotiation of these Veterinary ‘equivalence’ Agreements was embedded within a 
larger initiative of MacSherry and DG Agriculture to facilitate trade through the negotiations of bilateral 
cooperation agreements that were promoted by the SPS Agreement under negotiation in the WTO 
(Josling &Tangermann, 2015a: 180).  
DG Agriculture officials thus sought to negotiate an agreement with the US that would establish the 
procedures to establish ‘equivalence’ of sanitary measures. The agreement would allow the recognition 
that individual products and establishments are not subjected to the specific standards of the importing 
                                                     
188 In addition, it can be expected that the Commission it should be expected that the Commission does not pursue 
‘equivalence’ with regard to standards adopted in Codex, but not implemented by either the EU and the US due to 
more stringent domestic requirements as for these cases the assessment of the maintenance of the level of 
protection is likely negative.  
189 Anti-microbial resistance describes the resistance of humans to antibiotics against bacterial infections as a result 
of a high use of antibiotics in animals among agricultural producers.  
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country. The EU and the US would accept measures as equivalent as long as they meet the level of 
public and animal health protection required of the domestic industry. To ensure ‘equivalence’, domestic 
authorities assess the overall production hygiene and the ability of the importer to deliver an effective 
inspection system (Commission, 1997a). In the Veterinary Equivalency Agreement, the EU and US 
agreed on a list of animal products for which they recognise each other’s measures as achieving the 
importing party’s appropriate level of sanitary protection. To this purpose, the Commission convinced 
the US to incorporate the definition of ‘equivalence’ of the WTO SPS Agreement (Interview 8). Except 
for fish, the highest possible ‘equivalence’ was, however, granted to very few products immediately 
(USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, 2005). 
DG Agriculture officials, however, refused to recognise the ‘equivalence’ of US sanitary measures for 
chicken and beef that were subjected to pathogen reduction treatments. The Commission maintained 
“that the veterinary discussions are about public health and its protection. While veterinary measures 
have trade implications, this should not be the main concern” (Commission, 1997a). They noted that the 
approach of the US to achieve food safety through pathogen reduction treatment conflicted with the 
requirement for EU producers to ensure food hygiene through rearing conditions in agricultural 
establishments. DG Agriculture defended the Commission against criticism of the USDA that the EU’s 
ban of pathogen reduction treatments was scientifically unjustified protectionism, notably the use of 
chlorine washes for chicken and the use of lactic acid for beef. DG Agriculture insisted on maintaining 
the respective regulatory approaches190. A conclusion of the negotiations was facilitated, if not enabled 
by US concerns over the implications of the BSE crisis. The USDA then demanded an agreement on 
certificates of compliance with international food safety standards rather than a resolution of the 
different approaches to risk management. The Veterinary Equivalence Agreement was concluded in 
1999.  
After the outbreak of the BSE crisis in 1999, lead authority in the Commission was shifted to DG Sanco. 
DG Sanco also represented the EU in the Joint Committee of the EU-US Veterinary ‘equivalence’ 
Agreement191. Within the Joint Committee, DG Sanco and the USDA and FDA could have determined 
the ‘equivalence’ of sanitary measures for further products that were not yet covered by the 
‘equivalence’ list (Josling & Tangermann, 2015a: 182). However, DG Sanco officials criticised that the 
list of products considered as equivalent was highly asymmetrical. While the Commission recognised a 
considerable number of US animal products as equivalent, the USDA and FDA showed almost no 
flexibility in recognising EU animal products as equivalent (Interview 7). Moreover, the political and 
administrative leadership of DG Sanco did not consider regulatory cooperation with the US as a 
                                                     
190 Besides, DG Agriculture pursued discussions with US authorities, notably the USDA and the FDA. These 
discussions between the EFSA, the Commission and US authorities that aimed at ‘information exchange’ focused 
notably on responses to the BSE crisis and attempts to resolve regulatory disputes (Pérez & Dudley, 2016; 
Dabroska-Klosinski, 2014).   
191 Moreover, DG Sanco represented the Commission in Codex. 
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priority192. DG Sanco did thus not resume work to evaluate which US animal products would qualify 
for ‘equivalence’. No further products were added to the list until 2002. The Veterinary Agreement was 
thus essentially “dysfunctional” (Interview 7) 193.  
With regard to food safety, DG Agriculture pursued a strategy of ‘equivalence’, given that evaluations 
showed both EU and US sanitary measures achieve the same level of protection. Given the lack of 
political and administrative leadership and in response to a lack ‘equivalence’ granted to EU products 
by the USDA and FDA, DG Sanco later shifted towards ‘regulatory competition’. 
 
High-Level Regulatory Cooperation Forum (HLRCF)/Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC) 
 
With the launch of the HLRCF in 2005, DG Sanco resumed efforts on transatlantic regulatory 
cooperation on food safety (Commission, 2005b). The administrative leadership and senior-level 
officials in DG Sanco as well as the political leadership of DG Agriculture had proposed to consider 
regulatory cooperation on food safety under the Regulatory Cooperation Roadmap (Commission, 
2005a). Demands of the administrative leadership of DG Sanco and DG Agriculture for regulatory 
                                                     
192 In parallel, DG Sanco and DG Trade were in a number of trade disputes with the USDA at that time. DG Sanco 
sought to export EU regulatory principles to the international level against regulatory principles adopted and 
defended by the US. This concerns notably the recognition of the precautionary principle also by the US. Here, 
the Commission sought to establish a rival regime through the Cartagena Protocol (Hristova, 2014; Josling & 
Tangermann, 2015, Dabroska-Klosinski, 2014). On other issues, the Commission defended itself against 
complaints of the USDA. This concerned two complaints of the US under the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism, i.e. on the maintenance of the ban to use growth-promoting hormones in beef (“EC-Beef Hormones 
case”; Demortain, 2012) and the moratorium on authorisations of genetically modified organisms (2003) and the 
imposition of bans by certain member states on the cultivation of GMOs (EC-Biotech case). 
On the use of six growth-promoting hormones in beef, the EU maintained its ban established in 1985 against 
suspicions that these were detrimental to human health, despite the ruling of the WTO panel that the EU’s decision 
was against existing scientific evidence. The US, supported by a number of beef-producing countries such as 
Canada, implemented retaliatory sanctions. The Commission, however, maintained its position and upheld its ban 
of beef hormones, arguing that its decision was justified as a provisional measure because the scientific evidence 
available was insufficient. In the GMO case, the Commission slowly restarted GMO authorisations in 2004 for a 
short period, but did not change its policies nor its regulatory principles regarding the authorisation of GMOs for 
either cultivation or marketing.  neither changed its policy with regard to the authorisation of GM varieties. The 
WTO panel ruling had agreed with the US complaint that the moratorium on GMO pre-market approvals for 
marketing as well as the member state bans on cultivation were taken without scientific risk assessment and thus 
violated the obligations of both the EU and the member states under the SPS Agreement. The Commission argued 
that the possible health effects of modified crops are scientifically uncertain and that its caution with regard to the 
approval of imports is therefore justified. The WTO ruling, however, remained procedural in its argument and was 
either unable or unwilling to evaluate the substantive issues of scientific uncertainty and the risks of GMOs.  
193 There is arguably one exception to this: Following the inspections of businesses by the FVO in the US and its 
exchanges with businesses and authorities and the reports the FVO delivered to the Commission, the Commission 
established risk-based approval for US slaughterhouses in its Food Hygiene Package from 2004, thus expanding 
the implementation procedures it applied to businesses in the EU also to businesses in the US (Interview 7). The 
expansion of the risk-based approach to US businesses without demands for reciprocity can be seen as an indication 
that the Commission and the FVO trusted in the ability of US authorities to control the hygiene of slaughterhouses 
(Weimer & Vos, 2015: 66). With regard to the expansion of risk-based approval to US slaughterhouses, the 
Commission thus pursued an ‘alignment of implementation procedures’, building on the use of persuasion and 
learning.      
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cooperation on food issues, including food safety, led to ad-hoc consultations between DG Sanco 
officials and societal actors. The purpose of these consultations was to identify issues on which 
regulatory cooperation would help EU producers to export to the US. Especially EU milk and beef 
producers complained about a lack of access to the US market (Interview 7, Interview 9). 
Under the administrative leadership in DG Sanco, DG Sanco officials began in 2003 to resume work in 
the Joint Committee of the Veterinary Agreement and encourage the FDA to recognise EU animal 
products as equivalent, DG Sanco resumed evaluations of US animal products for ‘equivalence’ already 
in 2004 (USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, 2005)194. Commission officials hoped that this would 
facilitate trade for EU exporters and at the same time help to decrease US pressure to change existing 
EU standards on products proposed for ‘equivalence’ by the USDA and FDA. DG Sanco thus recognised 
‘equivalence’ for US gelatine in 2003, boneless beef in 2005 and fish in 2006 (Interview 7, Interview 
9).  
Moreover, at the margins of the TEC, DG Trade under Trade Commissioner Brittan began engaging 
with the USTR on food safety trade irritants on an ad-hoc basis (Commission, 2007e). DG Trade 
officials thus mobilised and consulted with representatives of producer groups in the Market Access 
Group (Interview 10). They were interested to learn on which issues the Commission should seek 
regulatory cooperation with the US to create export opportunities for EU producers. Producer groups in 
the EU argued that the relatively higher level of regulation in the EU put them at a competitive 
disadvantage vis-à-vis US producers (Interview 8, Interview 10). DG Trade thus coordinated positions 
with DG Sanco based on the issues raised by EU producers. 
As a result of this coordination, DG Trade put particular emphasis on the re-establishment of beef 
imports from the EU which were banned from the entire EU after the outbreak of BSE in the 
UK(Commission, 2008; Commission, 2007e)195. While the ban had initially not caused political tension 
as also some EU member states had closed their national markets to beef imports from the UK, the 
maintenance of that ban subsequently became considered as a trade barrier by the Commission 
(Commission, 2008). The Commission underlined that the World Animal Health Organisation had 
upgraded the status of EU member states to “negligible risk” (Commission, 2007d; Commission, 
2007e). 
Moreover, both DG Trade and DG Sanco officials agreed that US milk rules make market access to EU 
milk producers for dairy products, notably milk and fresh, perishable milk products, almost impossible 
                                                     
194 Moreover, the Director General of DG Sanco pushed for a Memorandum of Understanding with the FDA that 
was signed in 2006 (Interview 8; Pérez & Dudley, 2016). This Memorandum of Understanding should incorporate 
existing exchanges between the DG Sanco, the EFSA and the FDA on the exchange of scientific information into 
a more formalised framework. It represents a pursuit of ‘information exchange’.  
195 For elaborations on the Commission’s position on beef exports to the US see (Commission, 2014i; Commission, 
2012).  
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(Commission, 2008)196. DG Sanco officials argued that the requirements specified under the Grade A 
PMO are based on the specific conditions of production and processing plants in the US. Although 
defined differently, the Commission argued that EU standards on milk and fresh milk products achieve 
an equivalent level of protection (Interview 7, Interview 8). 
With the launch of the TEC in 2007, inter-service consultations put pressure on DG Sanco to reconsider 
its position with regard to pathogen reduction treatments on meat (Commission, 2007e). Under the TEC, 
the lead had shifted to DG Grow and Commissioner Verheugen who co-chaired the TEC meeting for 
the Commission. Health Commissioner Kyprianou was opposed to regulatory cooperation on food 
safety in the TEC and according to US reports initially refused to participate in the meetings (US 
Department of State, 2007a). However, the US Administration had demanded from the Commission to 
address its concerns on food safety as a commitment before the US would consider engaging in 
regulatory cooperation on other issues with the EU (US Department of State, 2007a). The USDA 
criticised in particular that US chicken producers could not export chicken to the EU because of the EU 
ban on pathogen reduction treatment, i.e. the use of chlorine washes (US Department of State, 2007b). 
In the subsequent inter-service consultations and discussions between Commissioners in the College, 
other DGs, notably DG Trade and DG Enterprise, but also Commissioner Verheugen put pressure on 
DG Sanco and Health Commissioner Kyprianou to revise their positions (US Department of State, 
2008a). The Commissioner and other DGs did not want to threaten regulatory cooperation that would 
result in more effective regulations and trade facilitation because of the issue of chicken washes. With 
the change of lead under the TEC and the pressure created by the other DGs, DG Sanco eventually gave 
in to US demands in 2008. DG Sanco agreed to accept the use of chlorine washes for pathogen reduction 
treatment in chicken in 2008 (Johnson, 2012)197. The Commission proposal was, however, rejected by 
the Council of Ministers198.  
Frustrated about the failure to achieve ‘equivalence’ for milk and dairy products and EU beef with the 
US by 2008, the administrative leadership of DG Sanco looked for new issues for regulatory cooperation 
DG Sanco and DG Trade officials increased their consultations with societal actors in the EU. Important 
interlocutors were UECBV, Freshfel and Eucolait (Interview 7, Interview 9, Interview 10). They drew 
particularly attention to difficulties to export their products to the US due to US import approval 
procedures (Commission, 2009). DG Sanco officials took up this point from agricultural producers. The 
administrative leadership of DG Sanco criticised the US that for meat products EU member states 
                                                     
196 For explanations of the Commission’s position on access of EU milk and dairy producers to the US market see 
Commission, 2013d; Commission, 2016c: 5, Commission, 2014f; Commission, 2012e.  
197 The agreement of DG Sanco to authorise the use of chlorine treatment in chicken was a strategic one. Its 
strategic purpose was to enable discussions with the US Administration on regulatory cooperation in the 
framework of the TEC. Interview partners outlined that in 2008, there was no movement within the Commission, 
in particular DG Sanco, the recognise the adequacy of pathogen reduction treatments for safeguarding food safety 
in principle (Interviews 7,9). 
198 For a comprehensive review of the Commission’s decision on the permission of chlorine treatment of chicken 
in 2008 see (Johnson, 2012).    
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needed to submit applications for import approval procedures per product per country (Commission, 
2009: 44). The US should, however, not differentiate among producers within the EU as their products 
could circulate freely within the Single Market. DG Sanco thus demanded that the US should recognise 
the EU as a ‘Single Entity’ (see also Commission, 2012)199. It hoped that the recognition of the EU as a 
Single Entity would substantiate the authority of the DG Sanco over the Single Market and increase its 
international recognition as the regulator in the EU on food safety. This would increase the power of 
DG Sanco in both domestic regulation as well as the representation of the EU in international forums. 
With the adoption of the US Food Safety Modernisation Act (FSMA) in 2011, DG Sanco thus similarly 
demanded that the FDA authorise the EU as a ‘Single Entity’ for imports of fruits, notably apples and 
pears200 (Commission, 2012). 
In order to underline its authority in regulation and strengthen its regulatory autonomy towards member 
state authorities, the administrative leadership of DG Sanco tasked officials to identify additional issues 
for cooperation. Officials noted the frequency of audits and inspections of the FDA and APHIS of 
businesses in the EU. Senior-level officials believed that an acceptance of audits and inspections 
conducted by EU authorities by US authorities would not only facilitate exports of EU producers to the 
US, but also strengthen the acceptance of the EU auditing system among sceptical member state 
authorities within the EU. DG Sanco thus encouraged the  the FVO engaged in regular exchanges with 
US officials, including an exchange of officials, to persuade US authorities that EU authorities were 
capable of controlling EU businesses to a level equivalent to the US (Weimer & Vos, 2015). As a 
consequence, the US authorities should reduce the frequency of inspections of EU businesses (Interview 
7, Interview 8). The Commission also sought to persuade the US that in the adoption of the Food Safety 
Modernisation Act in 2011, it recognise the Commission as a body being able to audit exporting 
businesses in the EU for compliance with US food safety requirements (Interview 7; Egan & Pelkmans, 
2015: 8; see also Commission, 2012)201. 
By 2009, the Commission, however, had failed to achieve ‘equivalence’ for its priorities, notably dairy 
products (Josling & Tangermann, 2015a: 169; Commission, 2009). Besides, it failed to achieve 
recognition as a ‘Single Entity’ to enable exports of fruits and meat. By 2012, only Spain was authorised 
for exports of apples and only Lithuania could export beef (Interview 7; Commission, 2012).   
To summarise, the Commission thus continued to pursue ‘equivalence’, concentrating on ‘equivalence’ 
for EU beef, milk and dairy products. To pursue ‘equivalence’, DG Sanco complemented more 
formalised exchanges between the Commission, EFSA and the FDA of scientific data through the MoU 
                                                     
199 If the EU is recognised as a ‘Single Entity’, producers from all countries within the EU who are authorised for 
export by the Commission can export their products.     
200 DG Sanco criticised that for many fruit products, the US maintains a ‘positive list approach’ for the approval 
of fruit for import, meaning that only products analysed for pests by the US plant health authorities and approved 
as safe can enter the US market (Josling & Tangermann, 2015: 180). 
201The Commission subsequently considered this achievement as a “successful example of good regulatory 
cooperation” (Commission, 2012f).   
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with bargaining and offers of reciprocity in the recognition of ‘equivalence’. Upon consultations with 
societal actors, notably agricultural producers, the Commission also pursued an ‘alignment of 
implementation procedures’, demanding that the US move towards a risk and systems-based approach 
for import approval procedures for meat and fruits and a recognition of the EU as a ‘Single Entity’. In 
response to the proposals of EU agricultural producers, DG Sanco thus proposed an adoption of its own 
systems-based approach for US import approval procedures for meats and fruits and the recognition of 
the EU as a ‘Single Entity’. DG Sanco rejected, however, the adoption of US standards, exporting its 
own standards or promoting ‘regulatory alignment’, e.g. on pathogen reduction treatment.  
 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 
 
With the preparation of the TTIP negotiations, the ‘lead’ in the Commission shifted to DG Trade. In 
2012, before the launch of the TTIP negotiations, DG Trade agreed with the USTR to exchange mutual 
concessions in what was called a “stock-taking exercise” (Inside US Trade, 2012a, 2012b). The USTR 
had demanded the resolution of food safety issues as a precondition for the consent of the US to the 
launch of trade negotiations (Interview 8). Under its lead, DG Trade thus coordinated issues the 
Commission should demand in this stock-taking exercise with DG Sante. Subsequently, DG Trade 
demanded that the US lift its import ban on EU beef, given that also the WHO had found in 2010 that 
the risk of BSE in EU beef was “negligible” (Interview 8). All EU producers which were not affected 
by BSE restrictions should thus be able to export beef to the US.  
In exchange for its demand to the US to allow the import of EU beef, DG Trade agreed to demands of 
the USTR to recognise the use of lactic acid to wash beef202,203. After intense internal discussions, DG 
Sanco authorised the use of lactic acid for the cleaning of beef. It followed a mandated scientific risk 
assessment by the EFSA that its use was safe for human health. Moreover, it argued that lactic acid also 
occurred naturally in beef and did therefore not amount to a non-natural treatment such as chlorine 
washes. Interview partners agreed that the EU’s move on the issue of lactic acid was “revolutionary” 
(Interview 7, Interview 8)204. 
DG Trade insisted that a potential agreement should include a chapter on regulatory cooperation on food 
safety measures given the importance of non-tariff measures obstructing trade in food products between 
                                                     
202 Note that the use of lactic acid constitutes a pathogen reduction treatment and is therefore opposed to the 
regulatory principle followed by the Commission to ensure food safety through a ‘traceability’ of food products.  
203 Moreover, the USDA demanded that the Commission authorise the use of tallow. DG Sanco also responded to 
this demand and presented a technical solution that would US producers to export tallow to the EU (Inside US 
Trade, 2012b). However, US producers and the USDA did not accept the technical solution presented by DG 
Sanco and demanded instead that the Commission adopt the regulatory approach of the US.   
204 DG Trade did not want to risk an agreement of the US government to the launch of TTIP negotiations by putting 
forward demands in this “stock-taking exercise” which the US government could consider as “excessive”. 
European Commission strategies in transatlantic regulatory cooperation 
233 
 
the EU and the US. Trade Commissioner de Gucht and DG Trade officials thus demanded to include a 
chapter on sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS) into a potential TTIP agreement. The public 
consultation for the launch of FTA negotiations with the US should help identify issues that were 
considered important by societal actors. 
For the 2013 stakeholder consultation of the Commission on TTIP, Copa-Cogeca and 
FoodDrinksEurope conducted an ‘internal stock-taking exercise’ in which they attempted to compile a 
list of regulatory barriers in the US for EU exporters (Copa-Cogeca & FoodDrinksEurope, 2013). Yet, 
only Bundesverband der Ernährungsindustrie (BVE), the German member association of 
FoodDrinksEurope subsequently included demands for ‘regulatory alignment’ in its position paper 
(Bundesverband der Ernährungsindustrie, 2014). Its position paper states suggestions that the 
Commission should seek ‘regulatory alignment’ on low-level presence of non-authorised GM varieties 
in food products and cooperate with its US counterparts on emerging issues, including the use of 
nanotechnology in food (Bundesverband der Ernährungsindustrie, 2014)205.  
NGOs, in turn, warned in particular of a perceived threat of a regulatory “race-to-the-bottom” if the 
Commission agreed to a mutual recognition of regulations that would undermine the regulatory 
principles of the EU, which they connect to a higher level of food safety as well as animal health. 
Notably, they warned that regulatory cooperation on food safety in TTIP could undermine the 
application of the precautionary principle in the EU, “lower” standards in food labelling and undermine 
the ban of pathogen reduction treatments, whose existence NGOs considered linked to the traceability 
principle of EU food safety regulation (e.g. BEUC, 2013; Greenpeace, 2013). NGOs and CSOs saw 
little to no potential benefits of regulatory cooperation to raise the level of food safety (and animal 
health) in both the EU and the US. 
Subsequently, DG Trade and DG Sante elaborated and jointly drafted a position paper (Commission, 
2013a). Both DG Trade and DG Sante emphasised that this position paper – as well as the subsequently 
elaborated draft textual proposal- was drafted “in a spirit of cooperation” in contrast to conflicts between 
DG Trade and DG Sante over food safety cooperation in the past.  
Following the consultation with societal actors, the Commission indicated in its position paper on SPS 
that it published in July 2013 (Commission, 2013a) that it wanted to include a mechanism for 
‘equivalence’ for further animal products in the SPS Chapter. DG Sanco and DG Trade officials agreed 
to concentrate initial discussions with US negotiators on ‘equivalence’. They criticised that EU 
agricultural producers could not sell milk and fresh dairy products in the US due to the ‘Grade A PMO 
Ordinance’(Commission, 2014i; Inside US Trade, 2014d);206. For this reason, DG Trade in coordination 
                                                     
205 The position paper does, however, not add evidence why ‘regulatory alignment’ would uphold the level of 
health protection provided by the EU and the US. 
206 The Commission reiterated its view that the ‘Grade A PMO Ordinance’ was a “non-tariff barrier” (Commission, 
2016: 6) as its technical specificities were based on production practices in the US and did not reflect concerns for 
a higher level of protection. On the contrary, the Commission emphasised that US dairy producers producing 
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with DG Sanco proposed ‘Grade A’ dairy products produced in the EU to be recognised as equivalent 
by the FDA. France, the Netherlands and Ireland then applied for the determination of ‘equivalence’ for 
its ‘Grade A dairy products’ by the US (Commission, 2016n: 10). With regard to milk and dairy 
products, the EU thus continued to pursue ‘equivalence’.  
Yet, the discussions with the USDA and the FDA soon showed DG Trade officials that the FDA rejected 
the proposal of the Commission for an ‘equivalence’ article in TTIP (Commission, 2014g). Subsequent 
exchanges revealed that the FDA rejected this article because it implied for the FDA that it should allow 
the import of a product without further certification (Inside US Trade, 2014h). The Commission clarified 
that equivalence did not entail that products should be imported without further certification 
(Commission, 2015c). Rather, equivalence implied that EU exporters could export all products for which 
the FDA had determined equivalence without a demonstration that they complied with all technical US 
food safety requirements. The Commission thus sought to persuade the FDA of the benefits of its 
equivalence approach (Interview 8). Subsequently, the FDA agreed to determine equivalence of the 
dairy systems in France, the Netherlands and Ireland and conducted audits (Commission, 2016n: 11).  
In 2013, discussions between DG Trade and DG Sanco also centred on the question how the 
Commission should position itself with regard to USTR demands for an approval of another pathogen 
reduction treatment, i.e. chlorine to wash chicken (Josling & Tangermann, 2015a: 181). Although EU 
business associations considered the benefits of pathogen reduction treatments to achieve a higher level 
of food safety, they did not take a position on this issue in the TTIP negotiations (Interview 7, Interview 
9).  
DG Trade officials continued to mobilise societal actors in support of its objective to use regulatory 
cooperation as an instrument to liberalise trade (Corporate Europe Observatory, 2014). Both DG Trade, 
but also DG Sante received numerous comments from societal actors and engaged in numerous 
exchanges with both agricultural producers and NGOs. Besides, especially EU producer groups actively 
participated in stakeholder dialogues (Commission, 2014n). Business lobbying with a view to regulatory 
cooperation was subsequently dominated by the sub-sectoral associations, notably Freshfel, Eucolait, 
UECBV (Interview 9, Interview 10). DG Trade and DG Sante also engaged with numerous NGOs 
(Corporate Europe Observatory, 2014). However, both in public statements and at the Stakeholder 
Dialogues officials criticised that NGOs failed to engage with the food safety objectives defined by the 
Commission in its position paper (Interview 7, Interview 8, Interview 9, Interview 10, Interview 11). It 
can be argued that NGOs appear to confuse the concepts of ‘equivalence’ and ‘regulatory alignment’, 
arguing against ‘equivalence’ on the basis that this would trigger a “downward” ‘regulatory alignment’.  
                                                     
according to the ‘Grade A PMO Ordinance’ struggled to meet food safety requirements of the EU as the level of 
consumer health protection of EU dairy standards was at least as high, if not higher (Interview 8, 11).  
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The demands of firms and business associations, however, concentrated on simplifying import approvals 
and ensuring approval for dairy products, fruits and beef for export to the US (Eucolait, 2014; Freshfel, 
2013; UECBV, 2013). Noteworthy is the absence of EU business demands for ‘regulatory alignment’ 
on food safety (both “trading up” or “trading down”). They did not demand an expansion of the 
precautionary principle to the US nor advocated a ‘regulatory alignment’ on specific emerging issues 
(Interview 2). Despite interactions with respective US business associations, EU business associations 
did not succeed to form alliances and formulate common position papers207. Instead, EU agricultural 
producers thus put emphasis on a pursuit of an ‘alignment of implementation procedures’208,209  
While pursuing its objective to negotiate a mechanism for ‘equivalence’, DG Trade now reinforced its 
concentration on the establishment of a single approval procedure for imports, thus reflecting demands 
of business associations for an ‘alignment of implementation procedures’ (Commission, 2015b). The 
single approval procedure for import became a core objective of DG Trade for the TTIP negotiations 
(Commission, 2015c). Especially DG Sante emphasised the importance that the EU should be 
recognised as a a ‘Single Entity’. It argued that that agricultural products authorised in the EU could 
circulate freely within the Single Market. The Commission would monitor that products authorised for 
the Single Market complied with the food safety requirements formulated by the EU food safety regime 
(Interview 7)210. 
Moreover, in accordance with consultations with EU producer groups, the Commission began to 
increasingly emphasise during the negotiations that the US APHIS authorise fruits produced in the EU 
for export to the US and eliminate additional control measures (Commission, 2015b). This concerned 
notably apples and pears, but also citrus fruits, apricots and peaches (Interview 8; Commission, 2016: 
10). Several member states subsequently applied for import approval of fruits in the US. Also with 
regard to fruits, the Commission thus pursued an ‘alignment of implementation procedures’. 
Subsequently, however, the APHIS only approved Spain for export of citrus fruits and apricots. 
Moreover, it authorised Lithuania for export of apples. Although APHIS published draft rules for the 
                                                     
207 One explanation for this is that especially sub-sectoral food associations in the US focus on service provision 
to their members and do not engage in interest representation to the same extent as business associations in the EU 
(Interview 9). At the same time, interactions were overshadowed by concerns of regulatory cooperation over 
implications on immediate trade flows. One interview partner stated that it “takes time and trust for both sides to 
find common positions on this” (Interview 10).  
208It is noteworthy that business associations put less emphasis on the recognition of the EU as a ‘Single Entity’. 
Interview partners from business associations noted instead that the Commission’s strategy to be recognised as a 
‘Single Entity’ was inevitably difficult to achieve, given the responsibility of member state authorities for 
inspections of businesses and hesitations among member states themselves to recognise the EU as a ‘Single Entity’.    
209 UECBV (2013) adds that under trade liberalisation EU producers may be disadvantaged due to higher animal 
welfare standards in the EU, but does not demand ‘regulatory alignment’ of animal welfare regulations as an 
objective of the TTIP negotiations. 
210 Beside the facilitation of trade flows, the Commission’s emphasis on the recognition of a ‘Single Entity’ was 
in the view of one interview partner motivated by its preference to be recognised by the US as the responsible 
authority for the control of food safety requirements in the EU (Interview 10). The practice of the FDA to authorise 
member states individually for export to the US signalled to the Commission that authority on export authorisation 
lay with the member states, a signal that the Commission wanted to dispel.    
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approval of apples from other EU member states in January 2015, it did not approve additional member 
states for export during the same year211 (Interview 10; Commission, 2016n: 10). Several interview 
partners expressed frustration about the lack of approvals of member states for exports. They also shared 
their opinion that the reluctance of the FDA or APHIS to authorise EU products for import were 
“political and not technical” (Interview 7, Interview 8). Likewise, the FDA continued to inspect 
businesses in the EU at a high rate (Interview 7, Interview 9). This undermined the efforts of the 
Commission to achieve a mutual recognition of inspections through the TTIP negotiations. Again, 
interview partners shared their perception that the motivation of the FDA for the high rate of inspections 
was “political and not technical”. 
With the priority of DG Trade to negotiate a SPS Chapter, DG Sante also emphasised the importance of 
another issue raised previously. DG Sante underlined that the US FSIS and FDA recognise the audits 
conducted by the FVO in the EU and the inspections carried out by the member state authorities as a 
determination of import authorisations (Commission, 2016f; Commission, 2015e). The recognition of 
the audits and inspections conducted by the FVO and member state authorities respectively should help 
to “eliminate redundant control measures” (Commission, 2016l). At the same time, it should underline 
the autonomy of the Commission in controlling implementation procedures in the EU (Interview 10).     
Commission officials emphasised that EU and US authorities had already long mutually inspected their 
businesses and could thus build up a certain level of mutual trust in the inspections and audits of the 
other side212. Interview partners suspected the high frequency of inspections of EU businesses by the 
FDA and FSIS was mostly a “political rather than a technical issue” (Interview 7). With regard to the 
establishment of a single approval procedure and the pursuit of a mutual recognition of inspections and 
audits, the Commission thus shifted towards pursuing an ‘alignment of implementation procedures’ in 
the TTIP negotiations.  
Besides, the entry into office of Health and Food Safety Commissioner Andriukaitis213 began to push 
for a regulatory cooperation article on anti-microbial resistance in a TTIP agreement (Commission, 
2014k). The selection of this issue reflected an expected double benefit: On the one hand, it should 
address concerns of NGOs that regulatory cooperation would create downward pressure on regulations, 
but not lead to a higher level of protection for consumers. On the other hand, the Commission also 
sought to commit itself to regulatory work on an issue that was subject to controversial debates among 
domestic producer groups (Interview 10).  
                                                     
211 Interview partners noted the commitment of US Ambassador Froman to support an approval of Polish apple 
exports to mitigate the effect of the Russian embargo in 2015. Yet, they criticised that the Ambassador’s 
commitment did not accelerate the approval procedure of the APHIS. On the contrary, they reported that APHIS 
prolonged the comment period during the notice-and-comment procedure after the publication of the draft rule that 
would have approved Polish exports.  
212 Interview partners noted that the socialisation among the FVO with the FDA and APHIS in this regard.   
213 Commissioner Andriukaitis has an academic background in medicine and is thus reported to have personal 
affiliations to the issue of Anti-Microbial Resistance.  
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While especially DG Trade had demonstrated some willingness to accommodate demands of the USDA 
and US producer groups at the beginning of the negotiations, it subsequently arguably chose to delay 
decisions on issues pursued and promoted by the US (Commission, 2016l). At the beginning of the TTIP 
negotiations in 2014, the Commission had abolished the moratorium on GM approvals and accelerated 
authorisation procedures of GM varieties for marketing in the EU (Commission, 2014i)214. The 
constraint in bargaining space then concerned US demands for an authorisation of pathogen reduction 
treatments beyond chlorine washes for chicken (Josling & Tangermann, 2015a: 173) in line with EU 
procedures. The USDA had submitted a request to the EFSA to ascertain if the use of peroxyacid, a 
‘natural’ alternative to chlorine washes, would be safe for human health (Inside US Trade, 2014h). The 
EFSA confirmed the safety of peroxyacid for humans (Inside US Trade, 2014h). The Commission 
initiated a comitology procedure to assess the authorisation of the treatment (Commission, 2016n: 3). 
Yet, at the time of writing, a decision on the authorisation was still pending. It can be argued that the 
Commission chose to delay a decision, given that an authorisation would deliver substantial market 
access for chicken. One interview partner noted that the Commission through this delay avoided giving 
in to a crucial USDA demand (Interview 9). Once the USDA had achieved market access for chicken 
cleaned with pathogen reduction treatments, it would be even more difficult for the EU to obtain 
concessions from the US on regulatory cooperation priorities of the Commission215.  
Moreover, DG Trade and DG Sante mobilised NGOs to engage with their position papers to enhance 
the legitimacy of their objectives and demands. The TACD in a 2016 joint EU-US position paper 
comprehensively commented on the Commission’s textual proposal for an SPS Chapter (TACD, 2016b) 
. In the paper, the TACD states it is not in principle opposed to an ‘alignment of implementation 
procedures’, yet underlines that both the EU and the US make available “the adequate resources to 
implement the right to regulate and an appropriate level of protection” (TACD, 2016b: 3). The TACD 
warns that an ‘alignment of implementation procedures’ should not lead to an inclusion of non-experts 
into the implementation of food safety regulations. Instead, the TACD proposes an ‘alignment of 
implementation procedures’ on risk assessment and the publication of audit verification results (TACD, 
2016b: 5), requiring to make the data that regulators use for risk assessment public. Lastly, it states that 
an ‘alignment of implementation procedures’ on animal welfare is insufficient, at the same time, 
however, considering a ‘regulatory alignment’ of animal welfare regulations based on EU principles 
“unenforceable” (TACD, 2016b:9). 
                                                     
214 The acceleration of the authorisation of GM varieties followed existing EU procedures (see chapter 6.3.3.). The 
Commission did not alter or amend authorisation procedures to increase the scope for bargaining with the US. It, 
however, decisively rejected US demands for an alignment in the corresponding implementation procedure, i.e. 
the US demand to introduce the ‘notice-and-comment’ procedure applied in the US (Interview 8).  
215 The interview partner noted that both the Commission and producer groups were well aware of the benefits of 
pathogen reduction treatments to consumer health, notably to address salmonella infections. Rates of salmonella 
infections in the EU demonstrated that the pursuit of the traceability principle was insufficient to ensure a very 
high level of consumer protection.  
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By end 2016, however, the Commission had not succeeded to persuade the FDA of its ‘equivalence’ 
approach. Moreover, the FDA had not concluded the ‘equivalence’ determinations for the applicant 
member states France, Netherlands and Ireland on milk products (Commission, 2016n: 10). 
Under demands of DG Trade to present a regulatory cooperation proposal on SPS issues, DG Sante in 
coordination with DG Trade elaborated a textual proposal for an SPS chapter based on the discussions 
in 2012 and 2013. This proposal was adopted by the College of Commissioners in 2014 and then 
presented to US negotiators on 29 September 2014 (Commission, 2014h). Upon the initiative of some 
member states in the Council (notably Denmark and Sweden) and demands by Health Commissioner 
Andriukaitis DG Sante elaborated an article anti-microbial resistance to include in the textual proposal 
(Interview 7; Commission, 2014k). This article was adopted in College in September 2015 and presented 
to US negotiators on 19 October 2015 (Commission, 2015i). The textual proposals summarise the 
strategy of the Commission regarding food safety regulatory cooperation.  
With regard to ‘equivalence’, the Commission follows the language of the SPS Agreement and proposes 
that “the importing Party shall accept sanitary and phytosanitary measures of the exporting Party as 
equivalent to its own if the Party objectively demonstrates to the importing Party that its measures 
achieve the importing Party’s appropriate level of protection.” (Commission, 2014h; art. 9.1 SPS TTIP 
Textual Proposal).  
With regard to conformity assessment, the Commission effectively demanded a mutual recognition of 
conformity assessment, putting forward that EU and US authorities shall “recognise each other's 
competent authorities as responsible to ensure that establishment, facilities and products eligible for 
exports meet the applicable sanitary or phytosanitary requirements of the importing Party.” 
(Commission, 2014h; art. 8.1 SPS TTIP Textual Proposal). Moreover, “the importing Party shall accept 
establishments or facilities that were authorized and listed by the exporting Party without re-inspection, 
third party certification or any other additional guarantees.” (Commission, 2014h; art. 8.2 SPS TTIP 
Textual Proposal). 
Besides, and also with regard to implementation procedures, the Commission sought to align auditing 
procedures, putting forward that “audits shall follow a systems-based approach” (Commission, 2014h; 
art. 11.1 SPS TTIP Textual Proposal). Besides, it sought to move towards a mutual recognition of audits 
and verifications, proposing that “the importing Party shall endeavour to rely on audits and verifications 
undertaken by the competent authority of the exporting Party.” (Commission, 2014h; art. 11.3 SPS TTIP 
Textual Proposal).   
Related to anti-microbial resistance, the article that the Commission proposed sought to establish an 
enhanced ‘information exchange’ and an exchange of implementation procedures. The Commission 
suggested “to create a Technical Working Group, consisting of expert level representatives, with a 
dedicated work plan under the Joint Management Committee of this Chapter on reduced use of 
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antibiotics in animal production to combat antibiotic resistance” (Commission, 2015i; art. 21.1 SPS 
TTIP Textual Proposal). The Technical Working Group shall “facilitate the exchange of information, 
expertise and experiences in the field of antibiotic resistance and animal production” (Commission, 
2015i; art. 21.2 SPS TTIP Textual Proposal). Besides, it shall “support the development of a harmonised 
system for surveillance of antibiotic resistance, and a harmonised system for collection and analysis of 
data on the use of antibiotics in animal production […].” (Commission, 2015i; art. 21.2 SPS TTIP 
Textual Proposal).  
In sum, during the TTIP negotiations, the Commission continued to pursue ‘equivalence’ notably with 
regard to beef, milk and dairy products. A lack of success on ‘equivalence’ and the lobbying by societal 
actors, especially EU agricultural producers, in favour of a single import approval procedure contributed 
to a shift in emphasis of the Commission towards an ‘alignment of implementation procedures’, both 
with regard to import approval procedures, inspections and Anti-Microbial Resistance.    
 
6.3.7. Discussion 
 
The previous sub-section has laid down that during all three cooperation initiatives, including the TTIP 
negotiations, the Commission has ‘at maximum’ restricted its choice of regulatory cooperation strategies 
for food safety issues to ‘equivalence’. Especially during the TTIP negotiations, however, the 
Commission has shifted its emphasis from ‘equivalence’ to an ‘alignment of implementation 
procedures’. This sub-section discusses the Commission’s choice of regulatory cooperation strategies 
during the three regulatory cooperation initiatives in view of the hypotheses derived from the Inter-
relational Institutionalism. Emphasis is put on the analysis of the expectations on the constraints on 
regulatory cooperation formulated in section 6.3.5.   
Similar as in the previous case studies, the process-tracing of the formation of food safety cooperation 
strategies within the three selected transatlantic cooperation initiatives confirmed the influence of 
bureaucratic pressure on the engagement of Commission officials in bilateral regulatory cooperation 
(Hypothesis 1). It may, however, be added that bureaucratic officials have maintained regulatory 
cooperation especially under strategies of ‘information exchange’ once regular, institutionalised meeting 
forums such as the Joint Committee were in place. Across the three regulatory cooperation initiatives, 
the engagement of DG Sanco/Sante officials in regulatory cooperation has been crucially shaped by the 
presence of bureaucratic pressure. During the NTA, the negotiation of the Veterinary Equivalency 
Agreement still fell under the lead of DG Agriculture and was embedded under a wider initiative of 
Commissioner MacSherry. Subsequently, when DG Sanco assumed the lead for food safety within the 
Commission, DG Sanco officials mostly did not engage in regulatory cooperation as bureaucratic 
pressure was absent. The absence of bureaucratic pressure followed a perception across all levels within 
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DG Sanco that the existing achievements under the Veterinary Equivalency Agreement asymmetrically 
favoured the US. During the HLRCF and TEC, DG Sanco was pushed into cooperation by DG 
Enterprise, and notably Commissioner Verheugen, although the political leadership of DG Sanco was 
largely opposed. As a response, DG Sanco increased its search for issues that could be addressed in 
regulatory cooperation and that would be beneficial for DG Sanco and societal actors in the EU. With 
the launch of the TTIP negotiations, DG Trade and Trade Commissioner de Gucht pushed for regulatory 
cooperation on food safety issues to facilitate trade, thus again driving DG Sanco to identify issues for 
cooperation. Importantly, the interest of Health Commissioner Andriukaitis in anti-microbial resistance 
promoted the inclusion of a corresponding article on regulatory cooperation on this issue into the 
Commission’s SPS Textual Proposal. In parallel, however, already at the end of the NTA senior-level 
officials in DG Sanco encouraged the engagement in regulatory cooperation through a resumption of 
work in the Joint Committee of the Veterinary Equivalency Agreement. Similarly, senior-level officials 
supported the ‘information exchange’ between the Commission, EFSA and FDA.   
The empirical finding of the strategies selected under bureaucratic pressure during the NTA, HLRCF 
and the TTIP negotiations for the most part confirms the expectations formulated in section 6.3.5. The 
maximum strategy choice reflected the distribution of regulatory compatibilities between the EU and 
the US in the food safety regime (Hypothesis 2). For reasons to be discussed further below in this sub-
section, the Commission shifted the emphasis of its food safety cooperation choices to an ‘alignment of 
implementation procedures’ during the TTIP negotiations.   
As predicted in chapter 6.3.5, the Commission excluded regulatory cooperation on a) issues which are 
subject to legislation and thus requires the participation of legislatures in the EU and the US and b) 
issues for which incompatible regulatory principles would prevent a ‘regulatory alignment’. This has 
been evidenced e.g. by the Commission’s rejection of e.g. US demands for ‘regulatory alignment’ on 
GMOs during the NTA as well as the rejection of USDA demands for ‘regulatory alignment’ on beef 
hormones and the use of ractopamine in pigs during the HLRCF and TTIP. The same applies to some 
extent to the decision of the Commission to reject US demands for an alignment of pathogen reduction 
treatment regulations216. Interviewees confirmed that the Commission’s rejection of demands for 
approximation or regulatory change reflected diverging understandings of Commission officials from 
US officials what constituted an appropriate regulatory response to the specific policy problem. 
Correspondingly, at the launch of the TTIP negotiations, these issues were described as ‘non-
negotiables’ by officials of both DG Trade and DG Sanco (Commission, 2014i; Commission, 2012).  
  
                                                     
216 Especially DG Sanco/Sante for a long time rejected the application of pathogen reduction treatments as it 
considered it incompatible with the traceability principle (Interview 7, Interview 8). This has reportedly somewhat 
changed at the time of the TTIP negotiations. In addition to compatibility considerations, DG Sante rejected US 
demands for an authorisation of pathogen reduction treatments for chicken as they felt this would give US 
demanders asymmetrical market access to the EU without similar gains for EU producers.   
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In line with the predictions of the Inter-relational Institutionalism, the Commission’s choice for 
‘equivalence’ followed from compatible regulatory authority structures, but incompatible regulatory 
principles between the EU and the US. The choice for ‘equivalence’ has been demonstrated by the 
Commission’s choice to pursue ‘equivalence’ for citrus fruits and ‘Grade A’ milk as well as the 
recognition of ‘equivalence’ for further products, including boneless beef and almonds. While the 
recognition of some EU and US products as functionally equivalent extended the geographical effect of 
technical EU regulations, it at the same time protected existing EU regulations against pressure by 
domestic and foreign societal actors for regulatory change. Besides, DG Sanco could facilitate trade for 
EU exporters and thus enhance its legitimacy towards EU firms. In line with predictions, Commission 
officials collected scientific evidence to determine that the level of protection especially for consumers 
under status quo regulations in both the EU and the US was functionally equivalent.  
Although on many issues regulatory principles in the EU and the US are incompatible, the Commission 
officials promoted an ‘alignment of implementation principles’ after bureaucratic pressure arose during 
the HLRCF and the TTIP negotiations. According to a narrow operationalisation of the Inter-relational 
Institutionalism, the incompatibility of regulatory principles should obstruct the choice for an ‘alignment 
of regulatory principles’. However, the interview evidence stated in the sub-section above confirms the 
more refined and ‘wider’ operationalisation of the Inter-relational Institutionalism conducted in chapter 
6.3.5. Commission officials sought to verify that the principles guiding the design of implementation 
procedures in the US did not establish conflicting objectives to those adhered to in the EU. Scientific 
evidence as well as socialisation with US officials through interactions and staff exchanges played an 
important role. The Commission’s choice to promote a mutual recognition of conformity assessment as 
well as a mutual recognition of audits and verifications during the TTIP negotiations provide illustrative 
examples. At the same time, the decentralisation of executive competences for implementation 
procedures in the EU to member state authorities required the Commission to convince US authorities 
that the decentralisation of authority did not imply that it had no control over the effectiveness of 
implementation in the member states.  
As in the previous two case studies, the choice of issues within the food safety regulatory regime on 
which the Commission has pursued ‘equivalence’ as well as the maintenance of that strategy relative to 
‘lower dimension’ strategies has been shaped by the mobilisation of societal actors (Hypothesis 3). First, 
societal actors have been crucial in proposing issues for which ‘equivalence’ could be pursued. The 
issues on which the Commission has sought regulatory cooperation with the US were strongly 
influenced by demands (or the absence of those demands) of societal actors. Second, mobilisation of 
societal actors has been crucial to maintain the choice for ‘equivalence’. After the mobilisation of EU 
producers and exporters concentrated on demands for import authorisations during the TTIP 
negotiations, DG Trade and subsequently also DG Sante reduced their focus on ‘equivalence’ and 
concentrated additionally on achieving an ‘alignment of implementation procedures’. Indeed, since the 
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beginning of regulatory cooperation with the US on food safety, the Commission has reduced initial 
ambitions and shifted from seeking ‘regulatory alignment’ through an expansion of the precautionary 
principle and a recognition of its GMO policies to seeking ‘equivalence’ of specific products in the TTIP 
negotiations. The strong emphasis of EU business to obtain import approvals of EU products and thus 
market access encouraged the Commission to insist on an ‘alignment of implementation procedures’ in 
the TTIP negotiations. The Commission’s formation of a regulatory cooperation strategy reflects the 
mobilisation and proposals put forward by societal actors as the Commission seeks to ensure that its 
pursuit of regulatory cooperation is considered as legitimate and appropriate by societal actors. At the 
same time, EU business associations did until the freeze of negotiations in 2017 not succeed to form 
transatlantic coalitions with US business associations in support of deeper regulatory cooperation 
strategies.  
Third, demands of societal actors for either ‘regulatory alignment’ or regulatory competition have failed 
to shape the strategy choices of Commission. Associations that advocated – albeit vaguely- deeper 
regulatory cooperation such as food processors (Bundesverband der Ernährungsindustrie, 2014) failed 
to shape the Commission’s choice of a regulatory cooperation. This also applies to US agricultural and 
food processor associations that demanded an authorisation of GMOs and the use of beef hormones.  
While transatlantic regulatory cooperation on food safety issues has been difficult across all regulatory 
cooperation initiatives, the identification of new and emerging issues such as anti-microbial resistance 
likely helps to prolong cooperation between Commission, FDA and other US agency and service 
officials. Frequent and dense exchanges between EU and US officials may moreover enable information 
exchange on food safety issues not yet covered by regulatory cooperation, e.g. the use of nanotechnology 
in food packaging. Lower mobilisation by NGOs on issues such as pathogen reduction treatments may 
encourage business associations to propose these issues for ‘equivalence’ where specific pathogen 
reduction treatments are in line with the EU traceability principle. At the same time, the difficulty to 
address long-standing divergences of implementation procedures even under bureaucratic pressure in 
the TTIP negotiations, makes it unlikely that either administrative leaders or business associations will 
mobilise in support of these issues for regulatory dialogues.    
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6.4. Commission strategies in transatlantic ICT cooperation 
 
This last empirical section on the Commission’s choice of strategies in transatlantic regulatory 
cooperation in the sectoral regime information and communication technology (ICT) proposes a case 
study for which existing literature implies that regulatory authority structures and regulatory principles 
in the EU and US are compatible at least for some policies. It is thus a case in which the Commission 
can be expected to pursue ‘regulatory alignment’.   
  
6.4.1. Introduction 
 
ICT policies refer to the regulation of the provision of products or services using ICT. While the 
definition of ICT itself is contested, many studies follow a definition of the OECD which puts emphasis 
on the functionality of a product. The OECD has proposed that “ICT goods must either be intended to 
fulfil the function of information processing and communication by electronic means, including 
transmission and display, or use electronic processing to detect, measure and/or record physical 
phenomena, or to control a physical process” (OECD, 2008a: 5).  
Attempts to structure ICT policies into sub-issues distinguish between ICT content, access to ICT, ICT 
services, and ICT infrastructure (OECD, 2008a). ICT content policies refer to legislation on copyright, 
ICT-specific intellectual property such as software patents and content protection through encryption.  
ICT access policies regulate the accessibility of ICT products to different persons, access of ICT to 
innovative solutions, notably e-health, and end user information on ICT products. They also include 
standards on technology such as cloud computing or the Internet of Things. ICT services policies 
formulate rules on e-commerce, online marketing, e-payment solutions and the digital identity of 
consumers. They also address questions of data protection and privacy. Besides, they establish rules on 
service provision across borders through data localisation requirements or commitments to free data 
flows. ICT infrastructure policies include rules on Internet regulation, notably rules on net neutrality, 
and the regulation of digital platforms such as Google, Amazon or Facebook, e.g. through rules on 
intermediary liability.  
Only policies on ICT access and services, however, address questions of consumer protection. At the 
same time, only policies on technological accessibility, end user information, access technology and e-
payment solutions also entail technical regulations and standards comparable to the regulation of 
products discussed in the previous sectors and give a regulator authority to adopt regulations or mandate 
standards. The focus of this chapter will therefore be on regulatory cooperation strategies related to ICT 
accessibility, end user information, access technology and e-payment solutions.  
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Questions of data protection and privacy are closely related to these issues as ICT accessibility and 
access technology involves the transfer and processing of data. Yet, regulatory frameworks on data 
protection commonly do not give regulators authority to formulate technical regulations or issue 
standards. Data protection is thus unlikely to be the object of regulatory cooperation strategies as the 
regulations studied in the previous empirical case studies. Besides, data protection at least in the EU 
follows distinct regulatory principles and authority structures that differ substantially from regulation of 
ICT access technology. For the sake of clarity, the authority structures and principles on data protection 
will be briefly discussed in the next sections. Yet, to ensure analytical conciseness and avoid excessive 
complexity, the analysis of the Commission’s choice of regulatory cooperation strategies will 
concentrate on the ICT access issues listed above and their conformity assessment procedures. Figure 
20 shows the development of trade flows between the EU and the US in the food sector between 2006 
and 2016217 
 
 
Figure 20: Trade Flows in the ICT Sector 2006-2016 
 
On the business side, lobbying is crucially shaped by the EU-level business association, Digitaleurope, 
as well as a number of other associations and ad-hoc coalitions. NGOs engaging in advocacy work on 
ICT issues are both the consumer protection associations organised in BEUC as well as emerging digital 
rights NGOs such as European Digital Rights (EDRi). 
This chapter proceeds as follows: It first outlines the distribution of regulatory authority structures and 
principles in the EU ICT regulatory framework and then outlines the incompatibility of US regulatory 
authority structures and compatibility of regulatory principles. It then formulates expectations on the 
                                                     
217 The choice of the time period reflects data availability constraints (Eurostat, 2017). For the period between 
2010 and 2017, OECD data on trade in ICT services has been added to the Eurostat data on trade in ICT goods.   
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Trade Flows in the ICT Sector 2006-2016 in millions of euros
EU imports from US EU exports to US
European Commission strategies in transatlantic regulatory cooperation 
245 
 
Commission’s choice of regulatory cooperation strategies with the US, based on the compatibility of 
EU-US regulatory authority structures and regulatory principles. The subsequent sections present the 
regulatory cooperation strategies the Commission pursued in the three phases of transatlantic regulatory 
cooperation delineated in chapter 5.1. and contrast them with the mobilisation of societal actors. The 
Commission’s choice of regulatory cooperation strategy is then contrasted with the formulated 
expectations and the patterns of societal mobilisation. The final section concludes.  
  
6.4.2. International ICT cooperation  
 
This section briefly summarises the subjects of ICT regulatory cooperation in international 
organisations. It offers background and contextual information for the adoption of regulatory principles 
in both the EU and the US. Regulatory cooperation with regard to ICT access and services is addressed 
by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) through the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
from 1995 and the Information Technology Agreement (ITA) agreed in 1996 and expanded in 2015 and 
standards are developed within the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). Regulatory 
cooperation is also promoted by the OECD and within the Internet Governance Forum (IGF).  
The GATS Agreement forms the legal basis for the liberalisation of trade in services, including ICT 
services. Crucially, it also lays down the legal basis for the exception for data protection from services 
liberalisation. Article XIV GATS underlines the right of GATS signatories to adopt and enforce laws 
and regulations, including data protection related to the processing and dissemination of data. The ITA 
has abolished tariffs on ICT products including computers and telecommunications equipment while its 
expansion stipulates avoiding the duplication of conformity assessment, promotes the use of 
international standards and encourages the reliance on e-labelling. International standards for 
telecommunications equipment are developed within the ITU.   
Regulatory cooperation in the OECD has addressed many of the issues shaping ICT policies which have 
been presented in the introduction to this section: In 2014, the OECD has formulated Principles for 
Internet Policy Making (OECD, 2014). It has put forward policy guidance related to specific ICT 
policies, including Policy Guidance on Digital Content, Policy Guidance for Protecting and 
Empowering Consumers in Communication Services, Policy Guidance on Online Identity Theft  and 
Policy Guidance on Convergence on Next Generation Networks. Moreover, recommendations have 
been formulated with regard to Consumer Protection in e-Commerce and E-Commerce. Already in 
1980, the OECD proposed Privacy Protection and Trans-Border Data Flow Principles (OECD, 1980), 
reviewed in 2013 in the OECD Privacy Guidelines (OECD, 2013c).       
Within the Internet Governance Forum (IGF), a global, multi-stakeholder platform, regulators have 
discussed questions relating to all ICT issues with societal actors, including the technical and academic 
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community. The IGF has been established in 2006 and has held annual meetings since then (Interview 
13). Issues discussed range from network neutrality to platform responsibility and the Internet of Things.  
Despite regulatory cooperation in these international organisations, differences persist in the regulatory 
frameworks between countries, including and notably between the EU and the US. Jurisdictions have 
not always adopted international standards. Moreover, regulatory cooperation in the OECD and in 
particular within the IGF has remained limited to informal discussions and non-binding policy 
guidelines.  
 
6.4.3. EU ICT regime  
 
This section describes the distribution of regulatory authority structures and regulatory principles on 
ICT access and services in the EU. The first part of this section looks at the distribution of authority 
structures and principles with respect to regulatory policies, the second part at authority structures and 
principles with respect to implementation procedures, i.e. procedures of conformity assessment. 
The regulatory framework for ICT access only began to arise during the period of investigation of this 
book. At the time of writing, the ICT access framework consists of the Radio Equipment Directive from 
2014 (2014/53/EU), repealing the Radio & Telecommunications Equipment Directive from 1999 
(1999/05/EC). The Radio Equipment Directive is a ‘New Legislative Framework”, i.e. it specifies 
‘essential requirements’ that ICT access goods need to meet with regard to health and safety objectives. 
The technical specifications are then provided by means of ‘harmonised standards’ (see chapter 6.2.3). 
Most of these ‘harmonised’ standards correspond to IEC or ITU standards.   Related to accessibility, 
notably the Regulation on Electronic Instructions for the Use of Medical Devices from 2012 
(Commission Regulation 207/2012) and the Directive on the Accessibility of the Website and Mobile 
Applications of public sector bodies (2016/2102) have relevance. The Regulation on Electronic 
Instructions for the Use of Medical Devices authorises and regulates electronic labelling (‘e-labelling’) 
on medical devices, but restricting its application to consumer instructions for use.  End-user information 
is also addressed by the mandated standard on e-accessibility, making ICT accessible to persons with 
disabilities through the M376 standards mandate. The corresponding standard was published by ETSI 
in January 2014. Moreover, it increasingly addresses standards on data technologies, cloud computing 
and the Internet of Things218,219.  
                                                     
218 Related to ICT access is also the Regulation on Open Internet Access that establishes provisions on net 
neutrality and banning blocking and throttling of internet content and giving users full and open Internet regardless 
of their connection. The Regulation stipulates, however, exceptions for providers of ‘specialised services (e.g. 
IPTV, video-on-demand or business-critical data-intensive cloud applications; Commission, 2016).  
219 ICT access goods are also affected by ‘horizontal’ legislation that specifies the energy use or recycling of ICT 
products. Examples are the Ecodesign Directive, the Regulation on Hazardous Substances, the Waste of 
Electrical and Electronic Equipment as well as REACH (Kommerskollegium, 2015: 38).  
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These measures are flanked with the EU’s privacy framework, notably the Data Protection Directive 
from 1995 (Directive 95/46/EC) and the General Data Protection Regulation (Regulation 2016/679) 
adopted in April 2016, replacing the previous Data Protection Directive220. The General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) follows the seven privacy sub-principles defined within the OECD Privacy 
Protection and Trans-Border Data Flow Principles in 1980. Specifically, it requires that data collectors 
need provide notice to data subjects when data is being collected, to collect and use data only for the 
purpose stated, not to disclose data with the data subject’s consent, to inform data subjects as to who is 
collecting data, to offer data subjects access to their data and to enable data subjects to hold data 
collectors accountable. However, it exceeds OECD guidance by requiring consent to data collection to 
be explicit, requiring that data collection remain proportionate, establishing a right for data subjects to 
delete data and ‘be forgotten’ in the online environment and by introducing a right for data subjects to 
information how their data is handled. Like the Data Protection Directive, the GDPR regulates the 
transfer of corporate data to third countries, requiring that these are only permitted if the third country 
can ensure an adequate level of protection.      
Implementation procedures include the conformity assessment procedures for ICT access products221, 
and the procedures to ascertain the compliance of services and technology with privacy provisions. 
Conformity assessment procedures for ICT access products are specified by the General Product Safety 
Directive. Compliance procedures with privacy provisions are specified by the e-Privacy Directive and 
the GDPR.    
Directives and regulations on ICT access and services have been developed by DG Connect222 whereas 
ICT products have been proposed by DG Grow. The lead authority on data protection lies with DG 
Justice223. ‘Harmonised standards’ in support of e.g. the Radio Equipment Directive as well as technical 
standards on ICT access are set by the European Telecommunication Standards Institute (ETSI). 
Although ETSI is a private actor, the Commission maintains a contractual relationship with it (see 
chapter 6.2.3), and designates it as the only provider of harmonised ICT standards224. ETSI does not 
only have the member state standardisation organisations as its members, but also firms (unlike non-EU 
firms) and other societal actors with full voting rights225. Yet, the use of ‘harmonised standards’ in ICT 
policy is (at the time of writing) relatively scarce. Instead, the Commission supports the use of standards 
                                                     
220 For a comprehensive overview see Savin and Trzaskowski (2014).   
221 For a more detailed description of conformity assessment procedures see chapter 6.2. Conformity assessment 
procedures for engineering.  
222 DG Connect was called DG Information Society before 2012.  
223 The ‘harmonised standard’ on e-accessibility has been mandated by DG Employment. Its involvement in ICT 
regulatory policies in this case is, however, exceptional (Interview 13).   
224 If ICT standards are to be used in electrotechnical equipment, they may also be developed within CENELEC.  
225 ETSI currently has more than 800 members, among them the well-known large ICT multinational firms as well 
as small- and medium-sized enterprises. It is thus considered to be more open to participation of non-SDO actors 
than CEN and CENELEC.   
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developed within industrial consortia to promote industrial development. Regulatory authority on ICT 
policies is thus centralised at the EU level for the issues examined in this section226. 
The Radio Equipment Directive, Regulation on Electronic Instructions for the Use of Medical Devices 
and the Directive on the Accessibility of the Website and Mobile Applications of Public Sector Bodies 
concentrate on regulating the function of the incorporated technology rather than individual products. 
By regulating the function technology rather than adopting product-by-product prescriptions, the 
Commission seeks to enable ICT and its interoperability across products to the greatest extent possible 
while ensuring a high level of consumer protection. In regulatory policies on ICT access, the 
Commission thus follows the ‘functionality principle’(Interview 12).  
The GDPR, in turn, refers to privacy as a fundamental right that prevails over competing interests, 
underpinned by the fundamental Right to Privacy as enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
(Renda & Yoo, 2015: 31; Hartzog & Solove, 2014). The incorporation of this principle is primarily 
demonstrated by the requirement formulated in the GDPR to make consent to data collection explicit, 
to remain data collection proportionate, to establish a right for data subjects to delete data and ‘be 
forgotten’ in the online environment and to introduce a right for data subjects to information how their 
data is handled. With regard to data protection, the Commission thus adopts the ‘privacy as a 
fundamental right’ principle.  
The Commission has the authority to propose the content of implementation procedures. However, the 
procedures themselves are conducted by member state authorities. These conduct market surveillance 
for ICT access products, guaranteeing that they comply with safety and labelling requirements227. The 
national supervisory authorities of member states, i.e. ‘Data Protection Authorities’, have the authority 
to implement the EU data privacy framework. Data Protection Authorities must approve data collection 
which poses high risks to the personal rights of data owners, i.e. ‘data subjects’. Moreover, the Data 
Protection Authorities hear and investigate complaints of privacy violations and impose sanctions228. 
Since the adoption of the GDPR, regulatory authority over implementation procedures in the EU is thus 
centralised for both ICT access conformity assessment and privacy implementation. 
For the conformity assessment of ICT access products, the Commission prescribes that these do not pose 
high risks to safety and human health to warrant the additional costs of third-party conformity 
                                                     
226 Regulatory authority is, however, non-centralised notably for a number of ICT content and services policies. 
This includes ICT content protection through encryption which remains the competence of EU member states due 
to its foreign policy relevance related to cybersecurity. Regulatory authority is also non-centralised with regard to 
data localisation where the Commission has not (yet) proposed EU legislation restricting localisation requirements 
for data.     
227 The full list of member state authorities responsible for market surveillance can be retrieved from (Commission, 
2016j: 171-177). 
228 The Data Protection Authorities cooperate among each other and advice the Commission on data protection 
within the Article 29 Working Party. The latter is replaced with the European Data Protection Board under the 
General Data Protection Regulation. 
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assessment. The Commission thus makes producing firms responsible for the declaration of conformity 
Firms apply the testing requirements for conformity assessment and provide data and technical 
documentation that their product meets safety and health requirements. The regulatory principle for 
implementation procedures that the Commission thus applies is Suppliers’ Declaration of Conformity 
Assessment (SDoC).  
The application of the ‘collective redress principle’ for the implementation of privacy provisions 
stipulates that effective enforcement requires that not only individuals, but also qualified associations 
can bring actions to court on behalf of individuals. The ‘independent implementation’ principle foresees 
that enforcement of data privacy is conducted by an independent supervisor rather than a government 
authority. Companies collecting data must implement measures which meet the principles of data 
protection by design and default and thus demonstrate compliance with the General Data Protection 
Regulation. Yet, the Data Protection Authorities must approve data collection which poses high risks to 
the personal rights of data owners (named “data subjects”). With regard to the latter, the GDPR has 
enhanced the judicial and administrative remedies available to Data Protection Authorities to impose 
sanctions for non-compliance.    
 
6.4.4. Contrast of the EU and US ICT regimes  
 
This section summarises divergences between the EU and US regulatory frameworks for ICT access 
and services. It demonstrates that compatibilities exist both with regard to the distribution of regulatory 
authority structures and regulatory principles for ICT access regulatory policies.  
Similar and often in parallel to the EU, the regulatory framework for ICT access in the US only emerged 
during the course of the investigation period of this book. At the time of writing, the US regulatory 
framework is highly fragmented and consists of a large number of Congress Acts and Agency Rules 
(Interview 13). Among them, the Open Internet Order adopted in 2015 (Renda & Yoo, 2015) establishes 
rules prohibiting blocking, throttling and paid prioritisation of ICT services229. The E-Label Act adopted 
in 2014 allows manufacturers of radio-frequency devices to use electronic labelling. With regard to 
standardisation on e-accessibility, the US Access Board has proposed to revise the S508 standard230. At 
the time of writing, the US did not have legislation regulating the standardisation for cloud computing, 
the Internet of Things or data technologies. Privacy regulatory policies in the US are also highly 
                                                     
229 Yet, counter to the EU, there are neither existing Acts nor discussions to adopt policies regulating digital 
platforms including Google, Facebook or Amazon in the US (Renda & Yoo, 2015: 13).  
230 In reference to Section 508 of the US Rehabilitation Act 
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fragmented. Privacy regulatory policies, e.g. the Electronic Communications Privacy Act from 1986231, 
only apply to certain sectors or the regulation of privacy in specific applications.  
Congress Acts have mandated central-level, i.e. federal, agencies to adopt rules on ICT access and ICT 
services. These rules, e.g. the Open Internet Order, and regulations on e-labelling in line with the E-
Label Act are adopted by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Sub-central regulators have 
no authority to adopt regulatory policies on these issues. At the time of writing, the authority of US 
agencies to regulate ICT services and access is comparable in scope to the Commission232. Moreover, 
the FCC has authority to make standards in support of regulation mandatory by ‘referencing’ them. 
Although the FCC has the authority to ‘reference’ standards in support of legislation, it has at the time 
of writing rarely done so (Interview 14)233. Numerous standard development organisations (SDOs) 
develop standards on ICT in the US, in many cases ad-hoc forums and industry-led consortia such as 
the Industrial Internet Consortium (Interview 15)234.The standard on e-accessibility is one of these 
exception as it is referenced in the Telecommunications Accessibility Guidelines of the US Access 
Board. Mostly, industry consortia often adopt standards by international organisations and working 
groups, e.g. the W3C. Firms participate in these working groups with the same representatives as in US 
consortia (Interview 15)235. The distribution of regulatory authority for regulatory policies in the US is 
thus centralised and compatible with the distribution of regulatory authority in the EU. The distribution 
of authority for standard development on emerging ICT technology is non-centralised for both emerging 
IC technologies in both the EU and the US and therefore equally compatible.      
With regard to privacy, in turn, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has no authority to adopt 
comprehensive privacy regulation. Instead, the FTC is only mandated to adopt privacy rules for specific 
sectors or purposes (Hartzog & Solove, 2014). For other sectors and purposes, privacy rules are subject 
to self-regulation by private actors, mostly firms. Regulatory authority in the US is thus non-centralised 
for the adoption of regulatory policies on privacy. This makes the distribution of regulatory authority 
incompatible with the EU.   
The FCC adopts regulations based on the function of the technology rather than product-by-product 
rules. The E-Label Act concentrates on regulating the function of the incorporated technology rather 
                                                     
231 The Electronic Communications Privacy Act has been amended several times, including crucially the US 
PATRIOT Act in 2001. 
232 Renda and Yoo (2015: 35) predict that this may change in the future as the Commission considers proposing 
legislation for which the FCC has no authority to adopt regulation, e.g. on the regulation of digital platforms and 
restrictions on the Internet of Things.  
233 As the pace of innovation in the ICT industry is high, the FCC seeks not to ‘reference’ standards which would 
make them mandatory and thus slow down innovation.  
234 This contrasts with the authority on standards development in the US engineering sector, in which many 
standards are set by former business associations and now accredited SDOs.  
235 As the FCC rarely ‘references’ standards in support of regulation, mandatory standards that clash with 
‘harmonised standards’ in the EU are very rare (Interview 15). Additionally, also the Commission rarely mandates 
the development of standards in support of legislation before standards have already been provided by industry-
led consortia. Where ‘harmonised standards’ on ICT exist, they therefore often reflect or are identical with prior 
industry-developed standards (Interview 14).     
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than the product onto which the electronic label is attached. By regulating the function technology rather 
than adopting product-by-product prescriptions, the FCC seeks to enable an interoperability of electronic 
labels across different products. The same logic applies to standards on e-accessibility. The regulatory 
principle of the FCC for ICT access is thus ‘functionality principle’, making regulatory principles for 
ICT access policies compatible. 
In contrast, the FTC does not adopt the ‘privacy as a fundamental right’ principle adopted in the EU. 
Instead, the FTC views privacy as a tradable commodity that users can exchange in return for better ICT 
services. As a consequence, the FTC has not adopted comprehensive privacy regulation similar to the 
GDPR of the Commission236. Instead, privacy provisions are mostly specific to certain applications or 
users of ICT. Regulatory principles are thus incompatible between the EU and the US with regard to 
privacy.  
The FCC has authority to set the rules for conformity assessment procedures. It tasks 
Telecommunication Certification Bodies to conduct the market surveillance of ICT access products on 
its behalf, guaranteeing that they comply with safety and labelling requirements (FCC, 2015). 
Enforcement of US privacy provisions is within the authority of the FTC. The FTC hears and 
investigates complaints against violations of privacy regulations and has authority to impose sanctions 
(Cline, 2014; Renda & Yoo, 2015: 24). Moreover, it sets the criteria and definitions of privacy violations 
to enforce privacy rules237. Regulatory authority on implementation procedures is centralised with regard 
to conformity assessment for ICT access products and the enforcement of sectoral privacy provisions, 
making the distribution of regulatory authority structures for implementation procedures compatible 
between the EU and the US.  
With regard to regulatory principles for implementation procedures, the FCC shares the application of 
‘Suppliers’ Declaration of Conformity (SDoC)’ for the conformity assessment of ICT access products. 
In 2013, it abolished the requirement to assess the conformity of ICT access products through ‘third-
party conformity assessment’ and adopted the SDoC principle followed by the Commission. As a result 
of the introduction of SDoC, the FCC has since then also begun to implement market surveillance 
procedures for products that were self-certified by producers (Commission, 2016). Regulatory principles 
have therefore become compatible with the adoption of SDoC in 2013.  
                                                     
236 Yet, authors argue that the US government in principle recognises the privacy sub-principles established by the 
OECD in 1980 and implemented by the EU in its privacy regulatory framework. The Consumer Privacy Bill of 
Rights released by the Obama Administration in 2012 consists of seven principles (individual control, 
transparency, respect for the context in which the data is being collected, security, access and accuracy, focused 
collection (minimisation), and accountability) which echo those of the EU GDPR. Industry-commissioned legal 
comparisons of EU and US privacy framework argue that the two are “essentially equivalent” (Sidley, 2016). 
237 Renda and Yoo (2015: 22) stipulate, however, that the criteria and definitions applied by the FTC are not clear, 
arguing that there is “a significant space for a clarification of FTC powers.” 
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The FTC does, however, not share the ‘collective redress procedure’ of the Commission for the 
enforcement of privacy provision238. Moreover, it neither shares the ‘independent implementation’ 
principle for the enforcement of privacy rules and rejects the underlying idea of the ‘independent 
implementation’ principle that implementation should also be safeguarded regarding attempts of state 
actors to violate privacy. Regulatory principles for privacy implementation between the EU and the US 
are thus incompatible. The latter can, however, be made compatible if the FTC agrees to accept the 
principle of ‘collective redress’ for EU data subjects239.  Figure 21 summarises the contrast of the EU 
and US ICT regulatory regimes.          
Dimension Regulatory 
instrument 
Authority 
distribution 
EU US 
Regulatory 
policies 
Legislation Centralised Radio Equipment Directive 
Directive on the Accessibility of the 
Website and Mobile Applications  
General Data Protection Regulation 
 
 
FCC Title 47 Regulations  
Numerous Acts: e.g. Open Internet 
Order, E-Label Act, Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act  
Regulations  
 
Standards  
Centralised Functionality principle: 
- Regulation by function: ensure 
high interoperability with high 
consumer protection 
Privacy as a fundamental right: 
- Right for data subjects to delete 
data and ‘be forgotten’ in the 
online environment, right for data 
subjects to information how their 
data is handled 
Functionality principle: 
- Regulation by function: ensure 
high interoperability with high 
consumer protection 
Privacy as a tradable commodity: 
- No fundamental right to privacy, 
application-specific privacy 
provisions  
Non-
centralised 
 -  
Implementation 
Procedures 
Centralised Suppliers’ Declaration of Conformity: 
- Testing of products by firms 
according to IEC standards, 
market surveillance by MS 
authorities  
Collective redress principle: 
- not only individuals, but also 
qualified associations can bring 
privacy violations to court on 
behalf of individual 
Suppliers’ Declaration of Conformity: 
- Testing of products by firms 
according to IEC standards, 
market surveillance by the FCC 
Public law enforcement of privacy: 
- no collective redress 
 
Non-
centralised 
  
Figure 21: Contrast of the EU and US ICT regulatory regimes 
 
 
                                                     
238 In a public remark, FTC Commissioner Rosch argued in 2011: “It is that no matter what the EU does in the 
realm of collective redress, this effort may be misguided because the underlying premise is flawed. I would suggest 
that a system of private competition remedies is not needed to supplement public law enforcement. Indeed, a 
private enforcement system may in fact hinder, rather than help, the public authorities in their enforcement of 
competition laws.” (FTC, 2011: 2-3) 
239 In this case, the Commission would, however, still have to recognise the FTC as an independent body.  
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To sum up, this section has shown that regulatory authority structures and regulatory principles in the 
EU and the US are compatible with regard to ICT access and services, specifically with regard to e-
labelling and e-accessibility. Moreover, regulatory authority structures are compatible with regard to 
their implementation procedures. The adoption of SDoC by the FCC in 2013 has also made regulatory 
principles for implementation procedures compatible. Regulatory authority structures and regulatory 
principles are, however, incompatible with regard to privacy regulatory policies. While authority 
structures are compatible for privacy implementation procedures, their underlying regulatory principles 
are incompatible240.    
  
                                                     
240 See, however, the remark in the preceding paragraph.  
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6.4.5. Expectations: Commission strategies in transatlantic ICT cooperation  
 
After the contrast of the ICT regulatory regimes in the EU and the US and the distribution of regulatory 
compatibilities, this sub-section formulates expectations for Commission strategies on transatlantic food 
safety cooperation. These expectations concentrate on operationalising the hypothesis derived on the 
influence of regulatory compatibilities on constraining the choice of a regulatory cooperation strategy. 
No separate operationalisations will be presented for the effects of bureaucratic pressure within the 
Commission and societal actor mobilisation. 
Many issues in the ICT sector are addressed by legislation both in the EU and the US, including net 
neutrality, privacy and e-commerce. To change this legislation in the context of ‘regulatory alignment’ 
the Commission either requires the consent of both the Council and the European Parliament or the US 
Congress. As both are potentially difficult to obtain and both EU and US legislators are likely to 
introduce amendments into Commission proposals, the Commission should be expected to refrain from 
pursuing ‘regulatory alignment’ on issues addressed by legislation. 
Based on the constellation of regulatory compatibilities, the Commission can be expected to pursue 
‘regulatory alignment’ on issues within the ICT regulatory regime. Issues within the regulatory authority 
of the Commission which reflect compatible EU and US regulatory principles include regulations on 
spam and malware protection, regulations on e-labelling, mandates on e-accessibility and e-health 
standards and, during the TTIP negotiations, also mandates on standards for cloud computing and the 
Internet of Things. The Commission can thus be expected to pursue ‘regulatory alignment’ on those 
issues in accordance with the mobilisation of societal actors in favour of regulatory cooperation on these 
issues.  
Beyond the pursuit of ‘regulatory alignment’, the Commission can also be expected to pursue an 
‘alignment of implementation procedures’ on market surveillance procedures for ICT products since the 
adoption of SDoC by the FCC. Given the incompatible distribution of regulatory authority and 
regulatory principles with regard to privacy provisions, the Commission should pursue ‘information 
exchange’ only. As authority for implementation procedures is, however, distributed compatibly, it may 
pursue an ‘alignment of implementation principles’ if it considers that regulatory principles are 
compatible for the privacy regulations adopted by the FTC. Moreover, the Commission can be expected 
to pursue ‘information exchange’ on emerging issues and legislative projects for which the compatibility 
of EU and US regulatory authority structures and regulatory principles is still unclear. Yet, to reduce 
analytical complexity, the following process-tracing of the formation and pursuit of regulatory 
cooperation within the ICT regime will concentrate on the formation of ‘regulatory alignment’ 
strategies, notably on the issues presented in the preceding paragraph. 
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6.4.6. Commission strategies in transatlantic ICT cooperation 
 
This section lays down the Commission’s choice of ICT regulatory cooperation strategies during the 
three regulatory cooperation initiatives selected in chapter 5.1. 
 
New Transatlantic Agenda / Transatlantic Economic Partnership (NTA/TEP) 
 
Under the responsibility of DG Information Society, the Commission initiated transatlantic regulatory 
cooperation on ICT issues began with discussions on telecommunication and mobile TV standards and 
e-commerce. ICT access was not discussed, mainly, however, because regulatory work on this issue had 
not started yet. The launch of the TEP under the NTA led then Information Society Commissioner 
Bangemann to task officials to elaborate how DG Information Society could use the TEP for priorities 
within its policy responsibilities (Interview 13).    
Commission officials then consulted with societal actors in the framework of the Transatlantic Business 
Dialogue (TABD). EU and US ICT firms, in 1996 mostly telecommunications firms, however, struggled 
to find joint positions. They were at odds with each other over the in their view insufficient degree of 
liberalisation and market access in the other respective other jurisdiction (Renda, 2009). At the same 
time, other ICT firms did little to lobby the Commission on regulatory cooperation as trade flows on 
ICT were already high in the absence of regulatory cooperation (Renda, 2004). Moreover, 
Commissioner Bangemann was reluctant to maintain insistence on using regulatory cooperation with 
the US on ICT issues to resolve regulatory conflicts.  
In the TEP Action Plan adopted by the Commission and the US Department of Commerce (US DOC) 
in 1997, DG Information Society, in coordination with DG Trade, thus decided to advance only the 
ongoing work between the EU and the US in the WTO (Commission, 1998). It put forward that the 
Commission and US DOC “will consult to ensure the implementation of the WTO work programme on 
the trade-related aspects of electronic commerce, including the examination by the relevant Councils 
and committees of the aspects identified in the work programme” (Commission, 1998: 4). In a separate 
Summit Statement, it clarified that the Commission would engage with the US DOC in “bilateral review 
and discussion” on the following issues: “elimination of unnecessary legal and regulatory barriers; 
promotion of voluntary standards that enhance interoperability, innovation, and competition; 
implementation globally of WTO basic telecommunications commitments” (Commission, 1998: 12). 
Yet, DG Information Society officials did not define specific legal or regulatory barriers in the Action 
Plan and the Summit Statement that could be eliminated. On the contrary, the formulation remained 
vague to accommodate for flexibility in the review of e-commerce issues and maintain autonomy in the 
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future review of EU e-commerce rules. Indeed, the strategy of DG Information Society for the 
discussions on e-commerce was to pursue ‘information exchange’. 
When Liikanen replaced Bangemann as Commissioner for the Information Society, the interest of the 
Commissioner in the engagement of regulatory cooperation changed. Liikanen thus tasked the 
establishment of an institutionalised ‘information exchange’ between DG Information Society and its 
US counterpart, the US Economic and Energy Bureau (EEB) (Interview 13). As a result, he launched 
the Information Society Dialogue in 1999. The dialogue should become an exchange forum for policy 
work and the development of the ICT markets in the EU and the US (Commission, 2000a)241. The 
Information Society Dialogue would be an opportunity to engage in ‘information exchange’ not only on 
ongoing and envisaging policy work, but also discuss the development of ICT industries in a sector that 
was developing fast (Lewis, 2001).  
In 2000 and 2001, officials and the administrative and political leadership of DG Information Society, 
notably Commissioner Liikanen, consulted with industry representatives from the TABD and the TACD 
to identify issues for ‘information exchange’ with the US EEB in the Information Society Dialogue. The 
TABD was evidently not interested in the occupation of the Information Society Dialogue’s agenda with 
discussions on planned legislation on e-commerce. Instead, it pushed DG Information Society to discuss 
regulatory differences that caused EU IT firms problems of market access in the US. These included 
diverging mobile TV standards between the EU and the US and US telecoms regulation (TABD 2000).  
The TACD put forward proposals on e-commerce and e-privacy, demanding the Commission and the 
US government “develop rules to ensure that commercial electronic communications can only be sent 
out with prior affirmative consent of the consumer addressed.” (TACD, 2001: 6). TACD implicit 
demands for ‘regulatory alignment’ on e-commerce and e-privacy lacked detail technical prescriptions 
and failed to shift discussions. Correspondingly, DG Information Society rejected the TACD’s implicit 
call for ‘regulatory alignment’ on e-commerce and replied to the TACD that it had proposed “a 
harmonised opt-in approach to unsolicited commercial e-mail throughout the EU. The proposal is 
currently being discussed by the European Parliament and the Council” (TACD, 2001: 6). DG 
Information Society also rejected discussing regulatory cooperation on e-commerce in the context of the 
Information Society Dialogue. Instead, it chose to keep discussions with the US EEB and the FCC on 
e-commerce ad-hoc (Commission, 2001b; Commission, 2000b). DG Information Society, in 
coordination with DG Enterprise, sought to avoid making substantive policy commitments on e-
commerce in order to retain its autonomy in the domestic legislative process that was still ongoing in 
2000 and 2001. Maintaining policy autonomy at this stage was important for all involved Commission 
DGs (Lewis, 2001). Observations by Renda (2005) support this view. He notes that the Commission 
only sought ad-hoc interactions with the US Administration after it had presented its legislative proposal 
                                                     
241 DG Information Society, i.e. DG Connect, is usually represented by its Director General and the Heads of Units 
in charge of the topics that are put on the agenda by the Director General.  
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on e-commerce for discussion in the Council and the European Parliament (Renda, 2005). In a 2000 
report on the TEP Action Plan, the Commission notes that “both sides have found that ad hoc contacts 
on specific subjects is for the time being the most adequate way forward” (Commission, 2000: 16). 
Besides, DG Information Society officials took up the criticism expressed by EU telecommunications 
firms in the TABD that the liberalisation of the US telecommunications market was incomplete (Renda, 
2005). At the same time, DG Information Society defended the decision of the EU to mandate the 
development of a standard on mobile TV rather than leaving the emergence of a standard to industry 
competition (Commission, 2001b; Commission, 2000b; see also Renda, 2005).   
In sum, while the interest of Commissioner led to the establishment of the Information Society Dialogue 
in 1999, neither the administrative nor political leadership of DG Information Society before or 
subsequently pushed for precise policy commitments through the TEP (or, for that sake, the Information 
Society Dialogue). On the contrary, both officials and the DG’s leadership were evidently concerned 
that policy commitments could restrict the Commission’s autonomy in its future and ongoing legislative 
work. At the same time, the absence of demands for regulatory cooperation by firms and (to a limited 
extent) NGOs did not give DG Information Society any reason to expect that its legitimacy vis-à-vis 
societal actors would increase if it engaged in regulatory cooperation. Moreover, the attention of DG 
Trade to ICT was low as trade in ICT goods (but not ICT services) was generally high (Renda, 2005).    
the Commissioner to the use Information Society Dialogue for anything but the explanation and 
justification of domestic policy choices subsequently was low (Renda, 2005). Business proposals failed 
to make suggestions on a ‘regulatory alignment’ on e-commerce or mobile TV standards. Neither with 
regard to e-commerce nor mobile TV standards did the Commission thus pursue any other strategy than 
‘information exchange’.   
 
High-Level Regulatory Cooperation Forum (HLRCF)/Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC) 
 
With the launch of the HLRCF in 2005, a focus on new issues for ICT cooperation resulted from changes 
internal to the Commission. Accompanying the entrance of a new Commissioner, Commissioner 
Reding, the outlook of the Commission on ICT cooperation slightly changed.  
Rather than continuing the discussions on mobile TV standards and e-commerce, Commissioner Reding 
proposed to address new, emerging issues. A Commission Report from 2005 notes that “more intensive 
upstream co-ordination would help further to prevent unjustified divergences and foster the development 
of innovative technologies on both sides of the Atlantic.” (Commission, 2005a: 10). Moreover, it 
proposes that EU-US coordination “should seek to prevent abuses which reduce the potential of these 
technologies for all users, for example by co-operating to cut down spam and contribute to the fight 
against additional threats such as ‘spyware’ and other forms of ‘malware’. (Commission, 2005a: 10).  
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Nonetheless, EU and US telecoms firms struggled to find common positions and advance issues for 
regulatory cooperation. By 2005, the EU telecoms industry mainly gave up on seeking to introduce the 
DVB-T standard for mobile TV in the US. At the same time, trade between the EU and US in ICT was 
growing and many firms, most of them transnational firms with operations both in the EU and US, found 
ways to cope with regulatory differences (Renda, 2007). The newly set up Transatlantic Business 
Council (TABC), replacing the TABD, did not push for the inclusion of ICT as a priority sector for 
regulatory cooperation in the framework of the TEC either (Interview 13). 
As a result, DG Information Society did not propose any specific ICT issues in the inter-service 
consultation for regulatory cooperation in 2005. ICT issues were absent from the HLRCF Regulatory 
Cooperation Agenda (Commission, 2005b). US internal reports show that Commissioner Reding, 
responsible for Information Society, was not invited to the first high-level TEC meeting (US Department 
of State, 2007).  
With the second TEC meeting in 2007, Industry Commissioner Verheugen who co-chaired the TEC on 
behalf of the EU extended invitations for participation to further Commissioners including Information 
Society Commissioner Reding (Transatlantic Economic Council, 2007b; US Department of State, 
2007). Internal US reports imply that Commissioner Verheugen pushed for common work on the TEC’s 
‘innovation’ pillar after 2005 (US Department of State, 2007b). His shift to the ‘innovation’ pillar 
reflected fears that a strong focus of the TEC on policy differences between the EU and the US would 
prevent successful regulatory cooperation and preclude measurable successes of the TEC (US 
Department of State, 2008). Rather than aiming at an alignment of existing regulatory policies or 
implementation procedures, Verheugen under the ‘innovation’ pillar of the TEC sought to explore 
possibilities for ‘regulatory alignment’ in the future.  
Verheugen and Reding decided to set up two so-called ‘lighthouse’ projects for EU-US cooperation 
(Transatlantic Economic Council, 2007b). Officials from DG Enterprise and DG Information Society 
were tasked to identify possible issues for the pursuit of these lighthouse projects (US Department of 
State, 2009a). The choice for these lighthouse projects reflected inter alia considerations for regulatory 
projects that would be under the competence and control of the Commission and a central-level US 
regulatory agency to ensure effective implementation and follow-up of the strategy (Commission, 2006). 
Moreover, the project should build on previous work (US Department of State, 2007b). 
At the same time, the Commission wanted to look for an issue on which the ‘regulatory approaches’ of 
the EU and the US would be relatively similar to avoid a repetition of failed regulatory cooperation 
attempts in the past. Instead, they should provide the basis for regulatory cooperation on bigger 
innovation issues (Commission, 2006c). The subsequent inter-service consultations suggested that 
ongoing exchanges of the Commission with the US on e-accessibility and planned regulatory work on 
e-health would meet these criteria. Towards US representatives in the TEC, the Commission therefore 
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proposed to establish lighthouse projects on e-accessibility and e-health (Transatlantic Economic 
Council, 2008) 242.      
The choice for e-accessibility reflected the shared objective of DG Enterprise and Industry and DG 
Information Society to cooperate with their US counterparts on the use and interoperability of ICT 
standards. Joint work on e-accessibility was thus seen as a way to persuade the US of the value of 
developing joint standards to achieve interoperability (US Department of State, 2008). Previously, the 
US–EU’s Standards Dialogue on e-Accessibility, launched in 2004, had formulated the objective to 
harmonize their ICT accessibility standards in terms of how digital products can be made accessible to 
persons with disabilities243. To promote a harmonisation of e-accessibility standards, the Commission 
and the US DOC agreed in 2005 to develop work plans and time tables (Commission, 2005b: 3). In 
2005, under the lead of DG Employment, the Commission issued Mandate M376, which led ETSI to set 
up a Joint Working Group that included US experts. The Commission restricted the mandate, however, 
first on the development of a standard for the accessibility of ICT products for public procurement 
(Commission, 2006b: 5). At the same time, in 2006 the US Access Board promised to review its 
standards for information technology covered by Section 508 (S508) of the Rehabilitation Act. The US 
Access Board agreed to invite the Commission to participate in the relevant advisory committee.   
Commissioner Reding and DG Information Society complemented these work plans with additional 
mutual exchanges. Within the framework of the Information Society Dialogue, DG Information Society 
officials organised two workshops on e-accessibility, one on public procurement and one on conformity 
issues related to the accessibility of ICT products and services (Commission, 2006b: 5). Moreover, DG 
Information Society organised a study tour to understand how US agencies determine and demonstrate 
that ICT products conform to requirements, with a view to coordinate conformity assessment for e-
accessibility (European-American Business Council, 2011b). Besides, DG Information Society officials 
sought to mobilise societal actors in support of regulatory cooperation on e-accessibility (European-
American Business Council, 2011b).   
Subsequently, officials from DG Employment, DG Information Society and DG Enterprise participated 
in the advisory committee of the US Access Board on the review of the S508 standard for e-accessibility. 
Under the lead of DG Employment, the Commission finalised the mandate to ETSI to develop a standard 
on accessibility requirement and an assessment of suitable testing and conformity schemes for 
accessibility of ICT products to be used in public procurement and agreed to the participation of the US 
government in the execution of the Commission’s mandate (M376) by ETSI (Commission, 2007b: 4). 
After the mandate had been issued in 2007, focus at the political level in the Commission on e-
accessibility was gradually lost. Commissioner Verheugen and DG Enterprise began to focus on other 
                                                     
242 Outside ICT, ‘lighthouse projects’ have been set up in the area of e-vehicles and biotechnology (Commission, 
2008).   
243 The following paragraph is based on the description of Zero Project (2016). / 
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issues such as e-vehicles (Inside US Trade, 2010a). The harmonisation process for e-accessibility took 
longer than Commission officials as well as the political level had expected because the accessibility 
standard would be legally binding as a ‘referenced’ standard in the US while in the EU it would remain 
voluntary (Interview 13; European-American Business Council, 2011b). At the same time, the US DOC 
considered issues such as the harmonisation of e-accessibility standards as too technical to merit high-
level political attention (US Department of State, 2009b). After Commissioner Verheugen shifted his 
political focus to other issues for regulatory cooperation and the US DOC indicated its unwillingness to 
discuss e-accessibility at high-level TEC meetings, the intensity of the coordination between technical 
Commission officials from DG Employment and the US Access Board declined (Transatlantic 
Economic Council, 2011; Transatlantic Economic Council, 2010).    
The second TEC ‘lighthouse project’ encouraged by Commissioners Verheugen and Reding in 2007 
focused on e-health. Again, the focus on e-health had been the outcome of inter-service consultations 
among Commission DGs. The choice to focus on e-health reflected the earlier establishment of the EU 
co-funded project epSOS2 and potential regulatory work of the Commission on this issue in the future 
(Commission, 2010: 13). E-health was considered a potential test case for the establishment and 
implementation of globally interoperable IT standards (Commission, 2010: 4). The long-term objective 
of the project was to achieve a mutual recognition of electronic patient records (Commission, 2010: 4). 
Through the mutual recognition of electronic patient records, the Commissioners reportedly hoped to 
realise a double benefit: First, the joint work of the Commission with the US HHS should promote the 
work towards best practice solutions on global IT standards (European-American Business Council, 
2011a). The Commission should maintain, if not enhance its autonomy from individual firms and 
organisations and instead develop solutions that would be beneficial for businesses as well as patients 
(Interview 13). Second, the mutual recognition of electronic patient records should deliver templates for 
the development and implementation of globally interoperable IT standards beyond electronic patient 
records that would facilitate trade in ICT goods and services for firms and access to ICT for consumers 
(Interview 15; Commission, 2010). The regulatory cooperation work should therefore also enhance the 
Commission’s legitimacy towards both firms and consumers.       
In order to ensure that societal actors would support the Commission’s lighthouse project on e-health, 
DG Information Society officials consulted with societal actors, especially firms that were already 
involved in the Commission co-funded project epSOS2 (Commission, 2010: 6). Moreover, officials 
sought to raise awareness among business associations and firms for the e-health work to substantiate 
the support of the TEC and gain additional technical input (European-American Business Council, 
2011a). These consultations have been sustained throughout the work of the TEC (Interview 13).   
In 2006, DG Information Society officials had held joint workshops with the US Health and Human 
Services (US HHS) officials on patient safety to prepare the mutual recognition work on electronic 
patient records. Information Society Commissioner Reding closely followed the preparation of the 
European Commission strategies in transatlantic regulatory cooperation 
261 
 
workshop and reportedly underlined the difficulty for small medical providers in the US to switch from 
paper to electronic patient records (US Department of State, 2007a). As an outcome of the meeting, 
Commission officials participating in the workshop underlined the “difficulty of the task which presents 
numerous challenges” (summarised in Commission, 2010: 14). Nonetheless, Commissioner Reding 
supported and sustained the regulatory cooperation process. Upon her support and the support of the 
administrative leadership of DG Information Society, technical working groups of Commission officials 
and US officials on interoperability and certification of e-health record systems had already been 
established in 2006 (Commission, 2006a: 2). Besides, Commissioner Reding demanded that updates on 
the mutual exchanges between DG Information Society officials and US HHS officials be included in 
annual meetings in the framework of the TEC (Transatlantic Economic Council, 2009b; Transatlantic 
Economic Council, 2008; Transatlantic Economic Council, 2007). At the margins of TEC meetings in 
2007, 2008 and 2009, Commission officials continued to meet with societal actors. The Commission 
report from 2010 notes that the joint work of DG Information Society with the US Health and Human 
Services (HHS) began attracting the attention of EU-US business that followed the TEC, especially 
through the TABC (Commission, 2010).  
In 2010, upon the initiative of Commissioner Reding and supported by the new Information Society 
Commissioner Kroes, the Commission, represented by Commissioner Kroes and US Health Secretary 
Sebelius signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with regard to e-health in which they formally 
agreed to cooperate on the interoperability of e-health records. They also used the signing of the MoU 
to ask for a submission of a report within one year including concrete steps towards achieving 
interoperability of e-health records (Commission, 2011c: 13).  
The harmonisation of standards for ICT accessibility and the mutual recognition of electronic patient 
records constitute examples of ‘regulatory alignment’. The roll-out of the work plan above demonstrate 
that especially the political leadership of DG Information Society sought to achieve this ‘regulatory 
alignment’ through frequent technical exchanges among officials to create a dense web of interactions 
and the mutual participation of experts in the respective standardisation committees.    
Encouraged by the successes of the coordination between Commission DGs and the US Access Board 
and the US HHS in the TEC, DG Information Society expanded the range of issues discussed in the 
Information Society Dialogue. An expansion of issues was also facilitated by a shift in the lead in the 
US from the US EEB to the FCC in 2006. The FCC was closer in mandate and regulatory focus to DG 
Information Society than had been the US EEB. At the same time, the FCC had centralised regulatory 
authority on many ICT issues that were also of interest to DG Information Society. In 2007, DG 
Information Society and the FCC set up a dialogue with a view to cooperate on regulatory approaches 
relating to software-defined radio and ultra-wideband technology (US Department of State, 2007a: 5). 
Moreover, the EU and the US held a joint workshop on spam enforcement. Rather than promoting an 
‘alignment of implementation procedures’ within their own jurisdictions, they took the issue to the 
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OECD and there contributed to the adoption of corresponding initiatives (Commission, 2007b). In 2011, 
DG Information Society and the FCC launched a second dialogue in the framework of the Information 
Society Dialogue on cloud computing. Within this dialogue the Commission and the FCC focused on 
understanding the respective regulatory approaches and on standards and certification issues for the 
cloud (Commission, 2013f: 5). Although Commissioner Kroes supported the establishment of these 
dialogues, she did not demand that their establishment should be connected to the achievement of 
specific regulatory outcomes. On the contrary, in view of the limited resources of the DG and potential 
regulatory work on cloud computing in the future, DG Information Society should retain its discretion 
to promote an appropriate regulatory response. She therefore did not push for the support of any other 
regulatory cooperation strategy than ‘information exchange’ on these issues.  
In sum, during the HLRCF and the TEC the Commission’s strategy to harmonise EU and US standards 
for ICT accessibility and to mutually recognise electronic patient records demonstrate its strategy to 
pursue ‘regulatory alignment’. At the same time, the expansion of issues discussed under the Information 
Society Dialogue show its continued reliance on ‘information exchange’.244   
 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 
 
With the preparation of the TTIP negotiations in 2012, the lead in the Commission shifted to DG Trade. 
In 2012, however, ICT regulatory cooperation was not a priority of the Commission (Interview 14, 
Interview 15). E-commerce and electronic data flows were neither mentioned in the final report of the 
High-Level Working Group nor in the Council negotiating directives specifying objectives for the 
Commission in TTIP (High-Level Working Group, 2013; Chase et al., 2016: 16). The Commission also 
does not list ICT in its list of priority sectors for regulatory cooperation (Commission, 2013f). The choice 
of DG Trade not to make ICT a priority sector for regulatory cooperation under the TTIP can be 
explained twofold: First, the EU already had a forum for ‘information exchange’ and discussion with 
the US, namely the Information Society Dialogue (Interview 13). Second, e-commerce and data flows 
were not considered contentious issues between the EU and the US (Interview 13; Chase et al., 2016: 
16). 
Nonetheless, the public consultation organised by DG Trade in 2012 for the preparation of the TTIP 
negotiations mobilised also societal actors from the ICT sector to elaborate suggestions for issues to be 
                                                     
244 A the TEC meeting in April 2011, the Commission endorsed with the US “Trade Principles for ICT Services”, 
underscoring their common commitment to transparency, open networks and network access, free cross-border 
data flows, personal data protection, avoiding data localisation requirements, limiting foreign ownership 
restrictions, calling for independent regulatory authorities, liberal licensing and authorization processes, and 
promoting interconnection” (Commission, 2011). The Trade Principles have, however, not been discussed in this 
section as they did not include an agenda for regulatory cooperation and a work plan to align the respective 
regulatory policies and/or implementation procedures.   
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addressed in the negotiations. Digitaleurope formed a transatlantic coalition and presented a joint 
position paper with the US ICT association ITI. In the position paper, Digitaleurope and ITI pushed DG 
Trade to also pursue regulatory cooperation in the ICT sector (Digitaleurope & ITI, 2013). The joint 
position paper contained demands and proposals with regard to standardisation, ICT access and end user 
information (e-accessibility, e-health, e-labelling), data flows, anti-localisation, encryption and 
cooperation on standards development on the Internet of Things (Digitaleurope & ITI, 2013). For e-
labelling, Digitaleurope proposed the acceptance of an optional electronic labelling on Radio and 
Telecommunication Terminal Equipment through the TTIP (Digitaleurope & ITI, 2013: 7). Besides, 
Digitaleurope and ITI suggested that the EU should identify ICT standards, also developed by industry 
consortia, that already are voluntary US standards and that could be directly referenced in public policies 
(Digitaleurope & ITI, 2013: 8). 
The demand of Digitaleurope and ITI for ICT regulatory cooperation led to exchanges between DG 
Trade and industry societal actors (Interview 12, Interview 13, Interview 14, Interview 15) in which DG 
Trade (both Trade Commissioner de Gucht and technical officials) demanded a clarification of the 
objectives industry thought DG Trade should pursue in the TTIP negotiations with regard to regulatory 
cooperation. Especially in 2012 and 2013 Digitaleurope emphasised regulatory cooperation with regard 
to ICT access (Interview 13, Interview 16).  
At the same time, the contestation of NGOs contributed to a high politicisation of discussions in the ICT 
sector, it did not substantially alter the regulatory cooperation strategies pursued by the Commission. 
Their engagement concentrated on the issues of data privacy and consumer protection in e-commerce 
(Beuc & European Digital Rights, 2016; TACD; 2016a; European Digital Rights, 2015; Netzpolitik, 
2014; TACD, 2013; TACD; 2012). 
With the submission of proposals for regulatory cooperation by Digitaleurope, DG Trade began 
reconsidering its approach to regulatory cooperation on ICT issues (Interview 14). In late 2013, as 
regulatory cooperation in the priority sectors of DG Trade began showing obstacles (see chapter 6.1.6), 
DG Trade officials again consulted with societal actors to understand if regulatory cooperation on ICT 
issues could be extended beyond the work on e-accessibility and e-health in the framework of the TEC 
(Interview 16).  It was then that DG Trade and especially Trade Commissioner de Gucht came to see 
ICT as a ‘row model’ for regulatory cooperation it wanted to promote with the TTIP negotiations 
(Interview 15).  
In parallel to the TTIP negotiations, the work on e-accessibility and e-health initiated in 2005 had 
continued to be addressed in annual meetings in the TEC framework throughout 2012 and 2013. With 
regard to e-accessibility, the Commission, under the lead of DG Employment, provided regular updates 
of the work in the Working Group that also included US experts. The US Access Board launched 
consultations after advanced notices of proposed rule-making in 2010 and 2011. The Advisory 
Committee of the US Access Board which was tasked to update the requirements of the S508 standard 
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also included EU experts (Interview 13). By 2014, the ETSI Working Group succeeded to develop a 
first ‘harmonised standard’ on e-accessibility (Commission, 2016l)245. 
With regard to e-health, with the endorsement of Commissioner Kroes, DG Information Society 
launched a ‘EU-US Roadmap on e-Health’ with the US HHS in 2012. Under the Roadmap, DG 
Information Society officials and US HHS officials should foster standard development to promote 
transnational interoperability of e-health information and communications technology (Commission, 
2013d). A Commission Report from 2013 emphasises the importance of a close inclusion of 
stakeholders and the “creation of an innovative collaborative community of public- and private sector 
entities” in which “input from stakeholders is welcome” (Commission, 2013g). Besides, the 
Commission promoted the identification of “thought leaders and champions from both the EU and the 
US” to guide the development of standards enabling interoperability (Commission, 2013g).   
De Gucht and DG Trade thus initiated consultations with societal actors to explore issues that could be 
addressed in a sectoral annex chapters on ICT issues within a TTIP agreement. Digitaleurope and ITI 
had also suggested e-accessibility and e-health as issues on which the Commission should attempt to 
pursue harmonisation and mutual recognition (Digitaleurope & ITI, 2013). Subsequently, Commissioner 
De Gucht tasked DG Trade officials to coordinate the elaboration of a position paper for an annex on 
ICT regulatory cooperation.   
The position paper was drafted under the lead of DG Grow with the participation of DG Connect and 
DG Trade246. DG Grow indicated four issues on which it wanted to “explore opportunities” for 
regulatory cooperation: interoperability, e-accessibility, e-health and e-labelling (Commission, 2014e). 
Regulatory cooperation was particularly promoted by Digital Commissioner Kroes247 (Inside US Trade, 
2014f). DG Trade also pushed for the pursuit of regulatory cooperation, but wanted to avoid provisions 
on regulatory cooperation in a Chapter on Digital Trade (Interview 12, Interview 13)248. Yet, DG Trade 
officials emphasised that ICT regulatory cooperation should not undermine the ability of DG Trade to 
liberalise digital trade (Interview 12). For this reason, it wanted to avoid provisions on issues such as 
net neutrality, data protection or ICT access cooperation from the Digital Trade Chapter. DG Connect, 
in turn, was keen on anchoring EU policies on net neutrality in such a Digital Trade Chapter (Interview 
                                                     
245 As noted above, this standard should, however, only apply on the accessibility of ICT products under public 
procurement.  
246 While DG Connect and DG Trade jointly drafted the negotiating texts of the E-commerce and 
Telecommunications Chapter, with DG Trade in the lead, DG Grow was in the lead for the position paper and a 
potential text on ICT regulatory cooperation (Interview 12). 
247 Subsequently, officials from DG Connect wanted to introduce provisions on recently adopted policies, notably 
net neutrality, into the TTIP negotiations. As both the EU and the US have adopted policies on net neutrality with, 
however, different scopes, a provision on net neutrality does not yet regulatory cooperation according to the 
understanding of this book.   
248 The Chapter on Digital Trade would be subject to state-to-state dispute settlement and thus entail a higher 
enforceability than the provisions on regulatory cooperation negotiated under the Regulatory Cooperation pillar of 
a potential TTIP agreement. DG Trade thus had to anticipate making greater concessions in exchange for 
provisions in a Digital Trade Chapter than for provisions in a separate Regulatory Cooperation Chapter that would 
not be subject to the same enforceability through state-to-state dispute settlement.  
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12). DG Grow was open to discussing further ICT cooperation on specific issues within the TTIP, given 
that it would not be bound to any deadlines through the discussions (Interview 12). The position paper 
was published in June 2014. It contained four objectives: a) to increase cooperation on e-labelling, b) to 
increase cooperation on e-accessibility, c) to increase cooperation on interoperability and d) “to set 
common principles for certifying ICT products, especially for encoding and decoding information” 
(Commission, 2014e) The position paper did, however, not specify a precise strategy for cooperation.  
As a result of the coordination among the DGs and the publication of the position paper, regulatory 
cooperation on ICT access through the projects on e-accessibility and e-health were now also raised and 
discussed by Commission officials at the margins of the TTIP negotiations (Commission, 2015d). 
Especially on e-health, DG Connect officials used the high-level political attention under the TTIP 
negotiations to advance the work on the roadmap. DG Connect and HHS officials compared patient 
summary specifications across EU and US to assess the decisive factors for interoperability 
(Commission, 2014d). They published recommendations on the structure and the content of an 
International Patient Summary (IPS) standard in a White Paper by 2014 (Interview 13). Moreover, DG 
Connect officials and US HHS promised to promote and advance this IPS standard, hoping that it could 
facilitate cross-border exchange of health data (Commission, 2014d).  
As the TTIP negotiations continued through 2015 and 2016, momentum on ICT regulatory cooperation 
was slowly lost (Interview 13). While ETSI published the ‘harmonised standard’ on e-accessibility in 
public procurement in 2014249, the US Access Board had not completed to revise the S508 defining the 
accessibility characteristics of ICT products that US agencies need to procure. DG Employment, 
however, did not want to wait for the completion of the US standards revision and instead moved ahead 
with the proposal of a European Accessibility Act250 (Interview 13; Interview 15). Interview partners 
stated that an obstacle for the completion of the US standard and subsequent cooperation was that the 
standard would be mandatory in the US while it would remain voluntary in the EU (Interview 13, 
Interview 15).   
With regard to e-health, DG Connect continued discussions on a mutual recognition of electronic patient 
health records. Although a mutual recognition would not lead to transatlantic flows of patient data, DG 
Connect officials began devoting time to explaining US HHS officials the sensitivity of data flows 
(Interview 13). Due to the sensitivity of data privacy in particular to DG Just, DG Connect was reluctant 
to initiate further steps towards mutual recognition before a revised data privacy arrangement between 
the EU and the US had been established (Interview 13). 
Digitaleurope shifted its emphasis in public statements and in consultations with DG Trade officials on 
the certification of encryption products, i.e. source code, and data flows (Digitaleurope, 2014a; Interview 
                                                     
249 This standard is the EN 301 549.  
250 The Commission presented a proposal in 2015 for a European Accessibility Act includes the possibility of using 
standards as guidance to facilitate conformity by industry.  
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15). This shift reflected the observation that the Commission was already working on e-accessibility and 
e-health in the continuation of the TEC (Interview 15). Besides, Digitaleurope also underlined the 
importance of aligning standards. Digitaleurope did not, however, give prominence to cooperation on 
the Internet of Things during meetings with the Commission (Interview 12, Interview 14). 
At the same time, the TACD demanded ‘regulatory alignment’ on e-commerce (TACD, 2013)251. The 
TACD did, however, not advocate the adoption or transfer of either the EU or US regulatory framework, 
but instead called for an updating and improvement in the regulatory frameworks of both sides. NGOs, 
however, mostly continued to lobby against ICT regulatory cooperation through 2014, 2015 and 2016, 
arguing that regulatory cooperation on these issues would undermine the EU’s data privacy regime 
(TACD; 2016a; European Digital Rights, 2015; Netzpolitik, 2014). The TACD had already demanded 
in 2013 that the EU and US first “agree on common data privacy standards outside of the proposed TTIP 
negotiations”. (TACD, 2013: 2). DG Just (and ostensibly also other Commission DGs) shared the 
assessment of EDRi and BEUC that the old Safe Harbour agreement did not provide an adequate level 
of protection and that “enforcement was one of its main flaws” (TACD, 2016a: 2) (Interview 12). 
Interviewees noted, however, that DG Just had already considered a revision of the Safe Harbour 
Agreement in 2010 before TTIP lobbying began (Interview 12). Moreover, despite opposing demands 
by NGOs, DG Trade and DG Just did not give up their intention to include a proposal on free data flows 
in an eventual text (Interview 12; Interview 14).  
Until the TTIP negotiations were frozen in November 2016, the Commission did not publish a draft 
textual proposal on ICT regulatory cooperation. Two explanations account for this: First, the new Digital 
Commissioner Oettinger put less priority on promoting regulatory cooperation than his predecessor 
Kroes (Interview 15). Second, Digitaleurope shifted its lobbying focus towards including a provision in 
a TTIP agreement that would safeguard free data flows between the EU and the US and towards a 
successful conclusion of the negotiations on the Privacy Shield (Interview 14)252. This reduced the 
pressure on Commission officials to pursue regulatory cooperation within the context of the TTIP 
negotiations. 
However, in spring 2016 DG Trade officials held informal consultations with DG Connect and DG 
Grow (Interview 13) on a non-public draft textual proposal for ‘Digital Trade’ that to a limited extent 
also contained regulatory cooperation provisions. DG Trade shared the draft textual proposal on ‘Digital 
Trade’ with member state representatives in the TPC in July 2016. Together with a non-public document  
                                                     
251 The TACD demanded e.g. to ensure coherence in the treatment of unsolicited electronic commercial 
communications, to ensure non-discriminatory consumer protection for all digital products, to improve consumer 
protection from misleading advertisement and unfair online practices, update copyright rules and improve 
consumers’ rights to dispute resolution and redress (TACD, 2013b). 
252 Consequently, the Commission stressed that it wanted to exclude data protection from TTIP and seek an 
agreement with the US enhancing the enforcement of data protection of EU data subjects in the US in parallel to 
the TTIP negotiations. Thus has led to the negotiation over a Privacy Shield (Bendiek & Schmieg, 2016; Inside 
US Trade, 2016d).   
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distributed to member state representatives and the INTA Committee of the EP in March 2016 
(Commission, 2016n), the draft Digital Trade Chapter reveals the strategy of the Commission on ICT 
regulatory cooperation in the TTIP negotiations. The ‘Digital Trade’ consolidated provisions previously 
spread across different Chapters into one text (Interview 14)253. On e-accessibility, the Commission re-
iterated its strategy to achieve ‘regulatory alignment’. However, ‘regulatory alignment’ should only be 
considered once the US Access Board had published its e-accessibility standard. The Commission noted 
that it would mandate a re-examination of the ‘harmonised standard’ afterwards the to see if the EU 
standard could be aligned (Commission, 2016n: 17). Interviewees noted, however, the Commission did 
not take up the proposal of Digitaleurope to engage in a broader exercise to harmonise standards because 
it does not have authority to prescribe standards to ETSI and refused to undermine the authority of ETSI 
to be the exclusive developer or provider of standards (Interview 12, Interview 14)254,255.     
On e-health, the Commission likewise continued to propose ‘regulatory alignment’ based on the e-health 
Roadmap from 2012. The ‘Tactical State of Play’ document underlines that the Commission’s strategy 
adopted under the TEC in the view of officials and the administrative and political leadership is the “the 
appropriate one” (Commission, 2016n: 16).  However, DG Connect and DG Grow underlined the pursuit 
of a mutual recognition of electronic health records should not be subjected to the timetables of TTIP 
negotiations (Interview 12; Commission, 2016n: 17).  Besides, despite the efforts towards ‘regulatory 
alignment’, the distinct regulatory approaches of each side should be respected (Commission; 2016: 17).  
At the same time, the Commission did not begin discussions on e-labelling as it had considered in the 
position paper on ICT regulatory cooperation published in 2014. The FCC had adopted the E-Label Act 
in 2014, allowing manufacturers of radio-frequency devices to use electronic labelling rather than 
physical labels on the equipment. The reluctance of the Commission had less to do with a perception 
among officials that regulatory principles on this issue would be incompatible256. Rather, officials 
emphasised that an extension of e-labelling to other equipment than medical devices was not a legislative 
priority for the Commission at the time, given its focus on other legislative projects (Interview 15; 
Commission, 2016n: 16). Yet, the Commission agreed to maintain ‘information exchange’ with the FCC 
                                                     
253 Interview partners acknowledged that the presentation of a textual proposal on ‘Digital Trade’ was delayed by 
the lack of consensus within the Commission on its position regarding data flows. While DG Connect and DG 
Trade support a provision in a Digital Trade Chapter that would commit the Commission to maintaining free data 
flows, DG Justice opposed such a commitment as long as the renegotiated data protection framework with the US 
had not been implemented and confirmed (Interview 12, Interview 14).  
254 Besides, the position paper of Digitaleurope and ITI does not offer a ‘green list’ of US SDOs or consortia whose 
standards should be considered in particular by EU SDOs for the development or adoption of ICT standards. 
255 Digitaleurope could also not substantially influence the strategy choice of the Commission with regard to the 
development of joint standards for the Internet of Things. The joint position paper only states that “coordination 
between the EU and the US with regard to the nascent Internet of Things would be commendable”. (Digitaleurope 
& ITI, 2013: 2) Yet, it does not list any specific issues on which the Commission should seek coordination beyond 
information exchange in the Information Society Dialogue.  
256 On the contrary, interview partners from both the Commission and business associations stated that the EU and 
the US were “very similar on this” (Interview 12, Interview 13, Interview 14, Interview 15).   
European Commission strategies in transatlantic regulatory cooperation 
268 
 
on e-labelling. It would, however, only intensify these exchanges in the context of a broader project on 
e-compliance (Commission, 2016n: 16). 
Moreover, the Commission decided not to make commitments on regulatory cooperation with regard to 
another issue proposed by Digitaleurope, i.e. e-trust and authentication services. On this issue, under the 
lead of DG Connect the Commission was in the process of revising and developing its own legislation 
at the time of the TTIP negotiations257. DG Connect officials sought to ensure that its discretion to adopt 
legislation would not be restricted under any commitment in the TTIP text (Interview 13). At the same 
time, DG Connect noted the importance of exchanging information and legislative best practices with 
the US on this issue (Interview 12) 258. For this reason, the Commission only laid down in a textual 
proposal for the TTIP e-commerce Chapter that it would seek to discuss the recognition and facilitation 
of interoperable cross-border electronic trust and authentication services (Commission, 2015h)259,260.   
In sum, for the TTIP negotiations, the Commission’ continued to pursue its strategy to harmonise EU 
and US standards for ICT accessibility and to mutually recognise electronic patient records demonstrate 
its choice to pursue ‘regulatory alignment’. Nonetheless, the reluctance to pursue ‘regulatory alignment’ 
on issues on which it was simultaneously pursuing own legislative projects or that were not a legislative 
project at the time of the discussions showed its parallel reliance on ‘information exchange’.  
 
  
                                                     
257 The improvement of consumer protection under e-commerce is one of the core objectives of the Digital Single 
Market. 
258 On other issues still, the Commission chose not to make any commitments in TTIP at the time of writing. This 
concerned notably provisions on free data flows, data localisation as well as net neutrality. On these issues, the 
Commission thus decided to maintain ‘regulatory competition’.  
259 The Commission also sought to align implementation procedures with regard to conformity assessment of ICT 
products. After the FCC had accepted suppliers’ declaration of conformity applied by the EU as the adequate 
conformity assessment procedure, the EU aimed at further aligning implementation procedures by cooperating on 
market surveillance. The perceived compatibility of underlying regulatory principles has been argued to be the 
basis for this alignment. Yet, the Commission wanted to rely on mutual learning and persuasion strategies given 
that it was uncertain to what extent the market surveillance approaches of the FCC and the EU authorities would 
be compatible. Within the context of TTIP, only a framework for cooperation should be established (Commission, 
2016: 15).  
260 The Commission also continued information exchanges in annual meetings under the Information Society 
Dialogue. Information exchange concentrated on legislative work and market developments. The Commission 
concentrated notably on the Digital Single Market and the issue of cloud computing standards, emphasising its 
interest to cooperate with the US on the development of standards and conformity certificates for the cloud to 
avoid the emergence of trade barriers. Moreover, DG Connect used the Dialogue to clarify its position in favour 
of prohibiting data localisation requirements for servers. It did not, however, seek to set up roadmaps or workplans 
towards the joint development of standards or certificates (US Department of State, 2015).     
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6.4.7. Discussion 
 
The previous sub-section has laid down that since the HLRCF/TEC, the Commission has begun to 
choose ‘regulatory alignment’ as a regulatory cooperation strategy for issues within the ICT regulatory 
regime. This sub-section discusses the Commission’s choice of regulatory cooperation strategies during 
the three regulatory cooperation initiatives in view of the hypotheses derived from the Inter-relational 
Institutionalism. Particular attention is put on the analysis of the expectations on the constraints on 
regulatory cooperation formulated in section 6.4.5.   
A comparative analysis of the formation of the regulatory cooperation strategies across the three selected 
transatlantic cooperation initiatives reveals the influence of bureaucratic pressure on the engagement of 
Commission officials in bilateral regulatory cooperation (Hypothesis 1). During the NTA, bureaucratic 
pressure was largely absent, especially in the beginning under the leadership of Commissioner 
Bangemann. Officials from DG Information Society thus mostly contributed to the TEP initiatives with 
proposals to take forward already ongoing under the WTO. Yet, the lack of bureaucratic pressure 
contributed to the persistence of formulations which remained vague and failed to make precise 
commitments on ICT issues. This changed somewhat with the entry into office of Commissioner 
Liikanen who proposed and accompanied the establishment of the Information Society Dialogue. Yet, 
as illustrated in the previous section, DG Information Society officials did not use the dialogue to pursue 
regulatory cooperation beyond ‘information exchange’. This can be linked to the lack of bureaucratic 
pressure to pursue regulatory cooperation, especially beyond ‘information exchange’ during the NTA.   
The formation of a regulatory cooperation strategy and the engagement in ‘regulatory alignment’ began 
with the invitation of Commissioner Verheugen to Commissioner Reding to participate in the TEC. The 
subsequent establishment of the two lighthouse projects on e-health and e-accessibility corresponds to 
the demands and commitment of both Commissioners to use these issues within the ICT regulatory 
regime to advance transatlantic regulatory cooperation. The need for bureaucratic pressure to initiate the 
formation of a regulatory cooperation strategy and to pursue ‘regulatory alignment’ is further underlined 
by the engagement in ICT regulatory cooperation within the TTIP negotiations. During the negotiations, 
bureaucratic pressure emanated both from the political leadership within the technical DG, i.e. 
Commissioner Kroes, as well as the involvement of DG Trade. While reluctant to include ICT 
cooperation as a priority sector at the launch of the negotiations, Commissioners de Gucht and 
Malmström later encouraged and pursued regulatory cooperation in the ICT sector as they realised that 
ICT cooperation could be easier to achieve than in other sectors. Bureaucratic pressure thus drove the 
formation of a regulatory cooperation strategy and the choice of ‘regulatory alignment’ during both the 
TEC and the TTIP negotiations.   
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The empirical finding of the ‘regulatory alignment’ selected under bureaucratic pressure during the TEC 
and the TTIP negotiations supports the expectations formulated in section 6.4.5. Indeed, the choice for 
‘regulatory alignment’ only in the ICT sectoral regime among the case studies examined in this book is 
in line with the distribution of regulatory compatibilities between the EU and the US in the ICT regime 
(Hypothesis 2). 
The interview evidence gathered for the purpose of this book suggests that regulatory centralisation in 
both the EU and the US was essential because the pursuit of ‘regulatory alignment’ relied on dense and 
frequent consultations between Commission officials and their US counterparts, especially officials 
from the FCC. At the same time, it underlined that compatibility of regulatory principles was crucial. 
On the one hand, the Commission chose the two ‘lighthouse projects’ on e-accessibility and e-health 
because it knew that neither side had yet implemented policies or adopted principles that would make 
an alignment difficult (Interview 13). On the other hand, they were chosen because discussions under 
the Accessibility Standards Dialogue had signalled to the Commission that both the EU and the US 
“shared similar thinking on these issues”. Indeed, subsequent meetings demonstrated to Commission 
officials that both the EU and the US “were very similar on this” (Interview 13).  
Yet, ‘regulatory alignment’ was ‘only’ chosen by the Commission with regard to e-accessibility and e-
health, but not e-labelling and e-authentication. This indicates that compatible regulatory authority 
structures and principle do not inevitably lead the Commission to pursue ‘regulatory alignment’. Rather, 
the process-tracing conducted in section 7.4.6. implied that the Commission’s choice to pursue 
‘regulatory alignment’ depended on the support of the responsible Commissioner and the absence of 
ongoing domestic legislative activities in parallel to regulatory cooperation discussion. The personal 
endorsement of the TEC by Commissioner Verheugen thus drove the Commission’s establishment of 
the ‘lighthouse projects’ on e-accessibility and e-health. Moreover, the support of Commissioner Kroes 
contributed to maintain the Commission’s pursuit of ‘regulatory alignment’ on those lighthouse projects 
even after the US leads on the TEC had found them too technical to deserve high-level political attention. 
At the same time, ongoing parallel domestic legislative activities also restricted the willingness of 
Commission officials and Commissioners alike to pursue ‘regulatory alignment’ on those issues at least 
until domestic legislation had been completed. This has been the case with the reluctance of the 
Commission to commit to definite ‘regulatory alignment’ on e-accessibility until the European 
Accessibility Act had been adopted. Moreover, the Commission was reluctant to begin ‘regulatory 
alignment’ on e-authentication before the corresponding consumer protection provisions had been 
adopted under its Digital Single Market programme. Legislative autonomy may also deter the 
Commission from pursuing ‘regulatory alignment’ under a given timeframe or timetable if this would 
entail domestic legislative activity on an issue that the Commission does not consider a legislative 
priority at the time, as suggested by potential ‘regulatory alignment’ on e-labelling. On all these issues, 
the Commission instead chose to pursue ‘information exchange’, at least during the time of writing.   
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Furthermore, the process-tracing has shown that the mobilisation of societal actors in line with the 
distribution of regulatory compatibilities has led technical officials to choose ‘regulatory alignment’ 
(Hypothesis 3). The relevance of societal mobilisation is evidenced most clearly by a contrast of the 
mobilisation of societal actors during the NTA and TTIP. During the NTA EU and US ICT firms and 
business associations were mostly at odds with each other over the design of mobile TV standards. In 
contrast, Digitaleurope and ITI formed an alliance during the TTIP negotiations and jointly presented a 
position paper with demands reflecting issues of compatible authority structures and principles within 
the authority of the Commission and its US counterparts. The invitation of the Commission to societal 
actors to propose issues for regulatory cooperation also illustrates that it seeks to pursue ‘regulatory 
alignment’ there where it delivers benefit to societal actors. 
At the same time, the failure of societal actors to include an issue in their demands and position papers 
contributes to the absence of this issue from the scope of the ‘regulatory alignment’ strategy formed by 
the Commission. This conclusion is also in line with hypothesis 3. Indeed, the Commission’s demand 
to societal actors to support discussions for ‘regulatory alignment’ shows that it hesitates to pursue 
‘regulatory alignment’ without their support. It is shown by the initial absence of joint EU-US standards 
on the Internet of Things as an issue for ‘regulatory alignment’. Interview evidence demonstrated that 
absent demands of societal actors for this issue strongly contributed to the focus of Commission officials 
on other issues (Interview 12). Mobilisation of societal actors also fails to affect the choice of a 
regulatory cooperation strategy if societal actors do not formulate demands sufficiently specific to guide 
the Commission’s focus. The lack of technical detail provided by Digitaleurope and the TACD for 
‘regulatory alignment’ on Internet of Things standards or e-commerce legislation offer examples for the 
second. 
Moreover, and also in line with hypothesis 3, societal actors cannot push or force the Commission to 
pursue regulatory cooperation. As shown in the previous case studies, the ability of societal actors to 
demand regulatory cooperation is constrained by regulatory compatibilities. Besides, it is also 
constrained by the Commission’s insistence to preserve its autonomy in simultaneously ongoing 
domestic legislative projects. For this reason, mobilisation of societal actors for ‘regulatory alignment’ 
has failed to expand beyond the Commission’ pursuit of regulatory cooperation beyond the lighthouse 
projects on e-accessibility and e-health. The embedding of regulatory cooperation into the TTIP 
negotiations, in turn, did not lead to an expansion of ‘regulatory alignment’ to further issues.  
The continuation and expansion of ‘regulatory alignment’ on ICT access issues is unclear at the time of 
writing. On the one hand, the Commission has increasingly expanded the agenda for ‘information 
exchange’ under the Information Society Dialogue with the FCC. The compatible distribution of 
regulatory authority entails that the Commission may well consider and propose additional issues for 
‘regulatory alignment’ once it has concluded legislative activities ongoing at the time of writing, e.g. on 
e-labelling or e-authentication. On the other hand, the increasing adoption of divergent legislation in the 
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EU and the US on ICT issues, e.g. on net neutrality, may promote the establishment of new, incompatible 
regulatory principles. Moreover, continuing internal discussions within the Commission on the 
treatment of international data flows may make both Commission officials and Commissioners to move 
ahead with ‘regulatory alignment’ issues that involve data flows, even if the issue for which ‘regulatory 
alignment’ is considered does not require itself data flows. In addition, potential divergent regulatory 
frameworks in the future and the adoption of regulatory principles in the EU that are incompatible with 
those in the US may be supported by preferences among EU telecommunications, software and Internet 
firms to regain competitive advantages over US firms through the establishment of regulatory 
differences.   
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7. Conclusion 
 
The examination of the factors which constrain the engagement in regulatory cooperation and the choice 
of a regulatory cooperation strategy has been the objective of the preceding empirical case studies. The 
four sectoral regime case studies have shown that the choice of a regulatory cooperation strategy is 
relatively consistent even if the macropolitical context changes. They have found that the strategy which 
the Commission as the regulator examined in this book chooses and employs on issues within a given 
sectoral regime is consistent across different cooperation initiatives. This finding reinforces the initial 
assumption motivating this book that the choice of a cooperation strategy is constrained by structural 
factors. These structural factors, i.e. the compatibility of regulatory authority structures and regulatory 
principles, have been theoretically refined and empirically tested by this book. 
This chapter draws conclusions about the explanatory strength of the Inter-relational Institutionalism 
deduced theoretically in the first part to account for the constraints on the choice of a bilateral regulatory 
cooperation strategy examined in the empirical case studies in the second part of this book. A first 
section summarises the main results of this book (chapter 7.1.). A second section carries out a 
comparative analysis of the case studies. To this purpose, it discusses the influence of the three 
independent variables on the formation and choice of a regulatory cooperation strategy, based on the 
findings from the four empirical case studies investigated in this book. It then discusses limitations to 
generalising the findings from the four case studies beyond the analysis of bilateral regulatory 
cooperation of the EU with the US in the selected cases. Here, this book re-considers the specificity of 
the sectoral regimes chosen, the specificity of the US as a partner for regulatory cooperation to the EU, 
the ability to infer from bilateral to international regulatory cooperation as well as the specificity of the 
EU and the Commission in particular as an actor in bilateral regulatory cooperation (chapter 7.2.). A 
third section assesses the contributions of this book. It outlines its contributions to theories of the 
constraints of domestic (regulatory) institutions on the engagement of ‘state actors’ in international 
cooperation. Furthermore, it describes the contribution which the findings of this book offer with regard 
to the hopes business actors place in bilateral regulatory cooperation and fears articulated by NGOs. To 
this end, it looks at effects of bilateral regulatory cooperation that is constrained by the compatibility of 
regulatory institutions (as well as the presence of bureaucratic pressure and mobilisation by societal 
actors) on safeguarding and strengthening the level of consumer safety, public health and environmental 
protection as well as promoting administrative efficiency (chapter 7.3). A final section provides a brief 
summary of this book (chapter 7.4.).  
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7.1. Summary of the main results 
 
This book has raised the puzzle why a regulator with high regulatory capacity from a jurisdiction with 
a large internal market such as the Commission does not use its power resources in international 
regulatory cooperation to try and externalise domestic regulatory measures and standards to third 
countries through bilateral regulatory cooperation. From this puzzle it has deduced the research question 
which factors constrain the formation and choice of a bilateral regulatory cooperation strategy of a state 
or jurisdiction with high regulatory capacity such as the Commission.  
Four sectoral regime case studies from transatlantic regulatory cooperation between the EU and the US 
have empirically tested the Inter-relational Institutionalism which has been theoretically deduced from 
an integration of the New Interdependence Approach and actor-centred institutionalism.  
The case studies have offered ample evidence that the existence of bureaucratic pressure to cooperate, 
raised by either a politically appointed such as a Commissioner or top-level officials from a non-
technical bureaucratic body such as DG Trade, initiates the formation of a bilateral regulatory 
cooperation strategy. Due to different bureaucratic roles and mandates, politically appointed 
Commissioners and non-technical DGs have more often seen bilateral regulatory cooperation as an 
opportunity structure to enhance the Commission’s autonomy and legitimacy than technical officials. If 
Commissioners and non-technical DGs raised bureaucratic pressure to initiate cooperation, the 
discretion of technical officials to determine their own priorities was reduced and they followed the 
priorities set by Commissioners, non-technical DGs. The need for bureaucratic pressure to initiate the 
formation of a regulatory cooperation strategy has, however, been weaker for the pursuit of ‘information 
exchange’. 
The case studies have further confirmed that the compatibility of regulatory institutions between the 
domestic and the foreign jurisdiction constrains the subsequent choice of regulatory officials among 
different bilateral regulatory cooperation strategies. Once bureaucratic pressure had initiated the priority 
to cooperate internationally, the specific EU regulatory institutions constrained technical Commission 
officials in their choice of a regulatory cooperation strategy across four all sectoral regimes studied. The 
case studies showed that both the compatibility of EU regulatory authority structures and regulatory 
principles with US regulatory institutions constrained the choice of Commission officials of a bilateral 
regulatory cooperation strategy. As the distribution of regulatory compatibilities within individual 
sectoral regimes stayed mostly constant over time, the ‘maximum’ regulatory cooperation strategy 
chosen by Commission officials did not change across different regulatory cooperation initiatives. The 
interview evidence confirmed that Commission officials only saw regulatory cooperation as an 
opportunity structure to avoid adverse political intervention to regulation if it did not undermine either 
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the Commission’s domestic regulatory authority or its adherence to institutionalised regulatory 
principles.  
Process-tracing within the individual case studies has laid down that societal mobilisation is essential to 
ensure that regulatory officials would promote and politically appointed officials would adopt a 
regulatory cooperation strategy in line with regulatory compatibilities as their actual strategy. The case 
studies have revealed that mobilisation of societal actors not only helps Commission officials to obtain 
technical knowledge and expertise of issues within the sectoral regimes on which they can pursue 
regulatory cooperation. They have also shown that societal mobilisation is necessary because it provides 
Commission officials with an indication that societal actors approve of their pursuit of regulatory 
cooperation. Societal actor mobilisation thus also gives legitimacy to the decision of regulatory officials 
to adopt a specific regulatory cooperation strategy. The process-tracing has demonstrated that societal 
actor mobilisation has mostly been reactive upon initiative of the Commission. At the same time, the 
case studies have shown that societal actor mobilisation cannot push Commission officials to pursue 
regulatory cooperation ‘beyond’ the constraints of regulatory compatibilities. 
 
7.2. Comparative analysis of the case studies 
 
This section discusses the hypotheses formulated in chapter 4.3 in light of the evidence gathered from 
the four sectoral case studies in chapter 6 through a comparative case analysis. It will first discuss the 
influence of bureaucratic pressure on the engagement of technical regulatory officials in regulatory 
cooperation. Subsequently, it will discuss the effect of the compatibility of both regulatory institutions, 
regulatory authority structures and regulatory principles, on constraining the choice of a regulatory 
cooperation strategy.  Moreover, it will re-examine the role that societal actors play in the formation of 
a regulatory cooperation strategy.  
 
7.2.1. Bureaucratic pressure  
 
The findings of all empirical case studies support the hypothesis that the pursuit and uptake of regulatory 
cooperation is initiated within the Commission. They confirm hypothesis 1 that the launch of regulatory 
cooperation is the result of changes in power dynamics within the Commission. Hypothesis 1 stated that 
shifts in access among different DGs and Commissioners to collective preference formation influence 
the choice between ‘regulatory competition’ and ‘regulatory cooperation’. The gathered evidence found 
that demands of Commissioner and the DG Trade for regulatory cooperation changed if Commission 
officials considered engaging in any strategy of regulatory cooperation or if they chose to maintain 
regulatory competition. To substantiate their demand, both Commissioners and the DG Trade have 
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mobilised societal actors. Especially where institutionalised exchanges exist, technical Commission 
officials have, however, also pursued ‘information exchange’ in the absence of changes in internal power 
dynamics. Nonetheless, demands of Commissioners or the DG Trade have been important for the pursuit 
of ‘regulatory alignment’, ‘equivalence’ or an ‘alignment of implementation procedures’.  
In all four case studies, the process of strategy formation for the pursuit of regulatory cooperation with 
the US began with demands for regulatory cooperation by the competent Commissioner or 
corresponding demands of DG Trade. Commissioner demands were particularly important during the 
NTA and the TEC, but also during the TTIP negotiations. The evidence presented in the case studies 
citing interview partners from all sides strongly underlines this point. Likewise, the empirical case 
studies offered clear evidence that the participation of DG Trade in the adoption of Commission 
strategies initiated the engagement in regulatory cooperation by technical officials. The involvement of 
DG Trade for the initiation of regulatory cooperation was mostly relevant during the TTIP negotiations. 
Although the role identified for DG Trade confirms hypothesis 1, the evidence underlining the role of 
DG Trade in supporting the uptake of regulatory cooperation was less clear cut than for Commissioners. 
The ICT case study suggests that DG Trade wanted to ensure that regulatory cooperation did not overlap 
and create unfavourable issue linkages with its other priorities before asking technical DGs to explore 
opportunities for regulatory cooperation (Interview 12). The case studies do not allow for a sufficient 
differentiation between the influence of the competent Commissioner and the participation of DG Trade 
on the pursuit of regulatory cooperation by the technical DG officials. Any conclusions therefore need 
to remain indicative. Yet, it can be concluded that the engagement in regulatory cooperation in 2005 
under the TEC largely occurred without the contribution of DG Trade. Here the role of the 
Commissioners and especially Industry Commissioner Verheugen was pivotal. The demands of DG 
Trade for regulatory cooperation during the TEC supported the formation of regulatory cooperation 
strategies, although arguably not to the same extent across all sectors. In the latter case, regulatory 
cooperation came to be pursued where competent Commissioners at least did not oppose regulatory 
cooperation. In any case, an indicative conclusion is that the involvement of DG Trade does not appear 
to be essential for technical officials to pursue regulatory cooperation rather than maintain regulatory 
competition. This indicative conclusion should, however, be examined in additional research beyond 
the scope of this book.  
The case studies also revealed that the same causal mechanism is at work when Commissioners and DG 
Trade push technical DGs to engage in regulatory cooperation. During each of the cooperation initiatives 
examined, either the sectoral Commissioner or during TTIP the Trade Commissioner proposed the 
launch of high-level discussions with US counterparts with the aim to establish institutionalised 
regulatory cooperation. To substantiate their claims, they mandated the establishment of public 
consultations and dialogues with societal actors. These consultations and dialogues mobilised EU 
societal actors to connect with US societal actors and propose issues on which regulatory cooperation 
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would create benefits for societal actors. Moreover, they mandated the publication of scientific studies 
to identify from a legal perspective on which issues EU and US regulatory systems had the potential for 
overlap (Egan & Nicolaidis, 2001). The process-tracing indicated many issues across all case studies 
and across all phases on which technical officials did not pursue regulatory cooperation or would not 
have pursued regulatory cooperation in the absence of Commissioner pressure or demands of DG Trade. 
Indeed, the interview evidence offered in the case studies provides ample illustration that technical 
Commission officials hesitated to pursue regulatory cooperation. Reasons stated in the interviews 
confirm findings of prior research by Pollack (2005): the workload of Commission officials and the fear 
that regulatory cooperation would distract resources from the fulfilment of other regulatory and 
legislative tasks (Interview 1, Interview 7, Interview 9, Interview 10, Interview 15). In addition, 
interview partners stressed that Commission officials were sceptical towards regulatory cooperation 
with the US in particular as US regulators had not seriously engaged with regulatory cooperation 
proposals of the Commission in the past. 
The hypothesis that bureaucratic pressure is necessary to initiate the formation of a regulatory 
cooperation should, however, be refined in view of the finding that Commission officials pursued 
‘equivalence’ in the Joint Veterinary Committee in the food safety case and ‘information exchange’ e.g. 
under the Information Society Dialogue in the ICT case. In these instances, technical officials have 
engaged in strategy formation and the pursuit of regulatory cooperation without demands of the 
competent Commissioners or pushes for regulatory cooperation by DG Trade. Moreover, interview 
partners across all competent DGs involved in the chosen sectoral case studies stated that by the time of 
the TTIP negotiations they had come to “appreciate the value of regulatory cooperation in principle” 
(Interview 1, Interview 7).  
Based on the findings from the case studies, technical Commission officials indeed have over time 
increasingly chosen to engage in bilateral regulatory cooperation also in the absence of bureaucratic 
pressure, especially in cooperation by means of ‘information exchange’. This finding confirms the 
assumption of the New Interdependence Approach that sub-state actors including regulators increasingly 
perceive rule overlap between jurisdiction as an opportunity structure. ‘Information exchange’ allows 
technical officials to maintain their discretion and avoid conflicts between domestic and foreign 
regulatory objectives as a result of regulatory cooperation. At the same time, however, interview 
evidence suggested that ‘information exchange’ has been sporadic and ad-hoc and has not been used in 
a ‘strategic’ way (Interview 2, Interview 14). ‘Information exchange’ on ICT issues through the 
Information Society Dialogue is an exception to this as in this instance, ‘information exchange’ has been 
embedded in an institutionalised structure which has been created upon bureaucratic pressure in the first 
place. Moreover, if technical officials engaged in regulatory cooperation in the absence of bureaucratic 
pressure, they mostly restricted their choice of regulatory cooperation to ‘information exchange’. The 
pursuit of ‘equivalence’ through the Joint Veterinary Committee constitutes an exception. But in this 
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instance again, regulatory cooperation has been embedded in an institutionalised structure that had been 
previously established upon bureaucratic pressure.  
In view of the finding that technical Commission officials engage in ‘information exchange’ out of their 
own initiative and in the absence of bureaucratic pressure, the theoretical underpinning for the reluctance 
of officials to engage in regulatory cooperation in the absence of bureaucratic pressure must be refined. 
The workload of technical officials and the burden that the conduct of bilateral regulatory cooperation 
additionally poses on officials (Pollack, 2005) remains a valid explanation. It supports the notion that 
‘information exchange’ pursued by technical officials is sporadic rather than systematic. Yet, interview 
evidence suggests an additional explanation why bureaucratic pressure is necessary to initiate the 
formation of a regulatory cooperation strategy. Bureaucratic pressure in the EU entails that 
Commissioners and Directors General or even Heads of State or Government from the member states 
raise regulatory cooperation as a priority in exchanges with their counterparts from a third country. This, 
in turn, is likely to entail that the foreign counterparts of the technical officials receive bureaucratic 
pressure themselves to engage in cooperation with the Commission. If foreign technical officials act 
under bureaucratic pressure from foreign bureaucratic leaders or the foreign political leadership, they 
are less likely to reject or ignore the proposals of Commission officials for the engagement in regulatory 
cooperation. Responses of foreign officials to strategy proposals of the Commission, in turn, lower the 
perception among technical Commission officials that bilateral regulatory cooperation is an additional 
burden on their workload which may entail little tangible benefit for themselves. 
The emphasis of this book on bureaucratic pressure as the main initiator of regulatory cooperation must 
not be read as a claim that bureaucratic officials and politically appointed officials can act in insulation 
from democratically elected legislatures. Indeed, as noted in chapter 4.4.3., in the EU the Commission 
densely interacts with member state representatives in the Council, notably through the TPC, and since 
the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on an equal basis also with members of the European 
Parliament. As the Commission reports to both bodies on regular basis and is tightly monitored by both 
in its transnational interactions261, it cannot act against the preferences and priorities of majorities in 
either body. Its discretion is even further constrained where it relies on both for the ratification of 
international agreements. Moreover, the Commission uses both bodies to obtain technical guidance on 
issues on which it can or cannot pursue regulatory cooperation. The strong language against any changes 
to the European chemicals framework REACH in the resolution of the European Parliament on TTIP 
(European Parliament, 2015) would have made any negotiation difficult even if the Commission had 
considered discussions with the EPA on REACH. Likewise, the emphasis of member states in the TPC 
on embracing regulatory cooperation on engineering issues (Interview 16, Interview 18) arguably 
supported the elaboration of corresponding position papers. Statements in favour of regulatory 
                                                     
261 During the TTIP negotiations, the Commission reported to the TPC and the INTA Committee before and after 
each negotiation round (Interview 16).  
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cooperation by officials in the Council and members of the EP also strengthened the perception among 
Commission officials that their pursuit of regulatory cooperation was legitimate (Interview 18). 
Endorsement of regulatory cooperation by the European Council arguably serves a similar purpose (for 
the role of the European Council in the EU’s international interactions see Wessels, 2016).   
The argument put forward by the Inter-relational Institutionalism is rather that in practice, neither 
officials in the TPC nor members of the EP or the European Council systematically demand the pursuit 
of regulatory cooperation on specific issues. Interview evidence collected for this study has repeatedly 
supported this conclusion (e.g. Interview 1, Interview 7, Interview 16). Where the Council, EP or 
European Council have referred to regulatory cooperation, their references have remained vague or 
general. Moreover, the process-tracing has revealed that support by members of these bodies has 
followed earlier demands for regulatory cooperation by Commissioners. One interviewee summarised 
the role of the Council and the EP in sector-specific regulatory cooperation as follows: 
“They were neither in favour nor against. At most, they were observant and wanted to see what 
we could get out of the [sector-specific talks]” (Interview 4).    
Thus, in sum, in all four case studies, the formation of a regulatory cooperation strategy and the uptake 
of regulatory cooperation has resulted from demands and power dynamics within the Commission.  
Demands of competent Commissioners and DG Trade for the uptake of regulatory cooperation are 
particularly important for the pursuit of ‘regulatory alignment’, ‘equivalence’ and an ‘alignment of 
implementation procedures’. The demands of Commissioners or DG Trade for technical officials to 
engage in regulatory cooperation did, however, not lead to the pursuit of a strategy that lies outside the 
constraints of regulatory compatibilities. In the absence of demands for regulatory cooperation, technical 
officials mostly choose to maintain regulatory competition for the reasons already stated in previous 
literature. The finding that technical officials increasingly engage in ‘information exchange’ even in the 
absence of bureaucratic pressure refines hypothesis 1, but does not reject it. Rather, it is an important 
confirmation of the validity of the New Interdependence Approach and its assumption that regulators 
increasingly see the international level as an opportunity structure. Yet, this book has been able to show 
that both the pursuit of deeper or higher dimension strategies and the pursuit of systematic ‘information 
exchange’ presuppose bureaucratic pressure. 
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7.2.2. Regulatory compatibilities  
 
The findings of the empirical case studies support hypothesis 2 that the Commission’s choice of 
regulatory cooperation strategy - other than regulatory competition - reflects institutional conditions, i.e. 
the compatibility of regulatory authority structures and regulatory principles in the EU and the US. 
Hypothesis 2 stated if regulatory authority structures and regulatory principles are compatible, the 
Commission pursues a strategy of ‘regulatory alignment’. If regulatory authority structures are 
compatible, but regulatory principles are incompatible, the Commission pursues a strategy of 
‘equivalence’. If regulatory authority structures are compatible, but regulatory principles are 
incompatible, the Commission pursues a strategy of ‘alignment of implementation procedures’. If both 
regulatory authority structures and regulatory principles are incompatible, the Commission pursues a 
strategy of ‘information exchange’. The contrast of the case studies shows that the compatibility of EU 
and US regulatory institutions indeed determined the limits of regulatory cooperation that the 
Commission would pursue. It did, however, not pre-determine the choice of regulatory cooperation 
strategy per se.  
As predicted by the case selection, this book only identified the pursuit of ‘regulatory alignment’ in one 
of the four empirical case studies, i.e. ICT. This is also the only sector chosen in the case selection in 
which I identified both compatible regulatory authority structures and compatible regulatory principles 
in the EU and the US. Interview evidence confirmed that both the distribution of competences and the 
regulatory approaches were decisive for the Commission in its behavioural choice. Interview partners 
responded that the Commission chose to pursue the harmonisation of e-accessibility standards and the 
mutual recognition of electronic patient records because officials knew that their interlocutor had 
authority to implement the alignment. Their decision was reinforced by the knowledge that the 
alignment would not be contravened by rival decisions of other federal or state-level regulators. 
Moreover, interview evidence indicated that the Commission decided to pursue ‘regulatory alignment’ 
on these issues because they knew that both the Commission and the US regulators “followed the same 
thinking” (Interview 13). The interviews thus confirm the relevance of both authority structures and 
principles for the Commission’s strategy. The ICT case study has also shown that ‘regulatory alignment’ 
is demanding for the Commission. Both the Commission and their US counterparts seek to protect their 
respective discretion in taking decisions on related issues in the future while ensuring that the ‘regulatory 
alignment’ does not undermine their pursuit and protection of the regulatory objectives that they are 
tasked to achieve.  
Similarly, as predicted by the case selection, this book identified the Commission’s pursuit of 
‘equivalence’ on issues within the food safety sector. This is the sector chosen in the case selection in 
which regulatory authority structures are compatible, but regulatory principles incompatible. Interview 
partners explained that harmonisation or mutual recognition were not the objective of the Commission 
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in this sector because “the EU and the US had completely different ways of regulating things”. 
Nonetheless, cooperation would be possible because the Commission and its US interlocutors both had 
competence to adopt and recognise regulations on these issues (Interview 7, Interview 8). To ensure that 
regulatory cooperation would not lead to a lowering of safety, health or environmental protection, the 
Commission provides the US with scientific evidence that the level of protection in both systems is 
equivalent and demands the same from FDA and the USDA for their ‘equivalence’ proposals. In contrast 
to ‘regulatory alignment’, it can therefore be concluded that the pursuit of ‘equivalence’ does not 
presuppose that regulatory principles are compatible. The pursuit of ‘equivalence’ in the engineering 
sector since the last rounds of the TTIP negotiations shows that this hypothesis cannot be reversed. 
Indeed, the Commission may pursue ‘equivalence’ even if regulatory principles are de facto compatible. 
As ‘equivalence’ is easier to achieve for the Commission than ‘regulatory alignment’, both actors within 
the Commission and societal actors may propose ‘equivalence’ rather than ‘regulatory alignment’ 
strategies. This increases the likelihood that the Commission can successfully realise an outcome within 
a defined time period. This refinement does, however, not disprove the hypothesis that the Commission 
will pursue ‘equivalence’ where regulatory authority structures are compatible, but regulatory principles 
incompatible.          
At the same time, confirming the predictions of the case selection, I observed the pursuit of an ‘alignment 
of implementation procedures’ for implementation procedures in the engineering sector. This is the 
sector in the case selection in which there are incompatible regulatory authority structures262, but 
regulatory principles are compatible. Interview partners outlined that the Commission hesitated to 
pursue ‘equivalence’ or ‘regulatory alignment’ strategies because of the distribution of authority 
structures i.e. “because the distribution of competences in both systems is very different” (Interview 6). 
Statements that the level of protection achieved by both EU and US safety standards and the 
identification of certain risks was very similar encouraged the Commission, however, to explore 
possibilities for regulatory cooperation in order to facilitate trade. This indicated that regulatory 
principles are compatible and were also perceived as compatible by Commission officials. For this 
reason, the Commission pursued what it considered to be a way to facilitate trade without harming EU 
consumers or firms and constraining its own regulatory autonomy. 
Two observations have been made across the case studies that may appear to violate hypothesis 2c with 
regard to the pursuit of implementation procedures. First, interview partners emphasised that the 
Commission’s pursuit of an ‘alignment of implementation procedures’ strategies was accompanied by 
the demonstration that the implementation of the alignment would not be questioned by the partial non-
centralisation of conformity assessment in the EU. The subsequent explanations showed, however, that 
an incompatibility of regulatory authority structures does not constrain the pursuit of an ‘alignment of 
                                                     
262 Note that regulatory authority structures are not incompatible for all issues. There are indeed a number of 
electrical safety issues for which the US OSHA has authority to set regulations and thus has compatible regulatory 
authority with the Commission (see chapter 6.2.3).  
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implementation procedures’ as long as the Commission can demonstrate that the non-centralisation does 
not undermine the reliability and quality of the enforcement of the overarching regulatory policies. This 
difference to the requirement of compatible authority structures for ‘equivalence’ and ‘regulatory 
alignment’ implies that regulators are relatively more open to give up discretion on enforcement as long 
as they can be ensured that effective implementation will take place. In the engineering section, I have 
referred to this demonstration as the ‘construction and establishment of compatible authority structures’.  
Second, an ‘alignment of implementation procedures’ was also pursued by Commission officials during 
the TTIP negotiations in food safety although I have argued before that regulatory principles in this 
sector are incompatible. Interview partners explained, however, that while regulatory approaches 
differed on the design and content of actual policies, the EU and the US shared thinking on the design 
of implementation principles263. This made it possible for Commission officials to expect that US 
authorities would also certify compliance with regulatory requirements according to the same thinking 
as in the EU. This construction of the like-mindedness in the food safety sector, however, involved, 
substantial persuasion efforts, while the alignment of implementation procedures was immediately 
pursued in the engineering sector.  
Despite these two additions from the empirical case studies, hypothesis 2c can thus also be confirmed. 
In view of the evidence collected in the food safety case study, it may be refined stating that ‘an 
‘alignment of implementation procedures’’ may also be pursued if regulatory principles diverge, but 
regulators share a like-mindedness in the determination of conformity. Moreover, for analytical clarity, 
it should be added that the Commission pursues an ‘alignment of implementation procedures’ under 
incompatible authority structures if it can be additionally constructed that the incompatibility does not 
undermine the effective enforcement of the implementation procedures. Both refinements do, however, 
not alter the institutional condition that the Commission will pursue an ‘alignment of implementation 
procedures’ if regulatory principles are compatible or can be constructed to be compatible for 
implementation procedures while this strategy does not presuppose a compatibility of regulatory 
authority structures.  
Ultimately, and confirming theoretical expectations, ‘information exchange’ persisted in the chemicals 
sector. In this sector, centralised and non-centralised authority structures prevail in the EU and the US 
and the regulatory approaches show conflicting goals. In line with hypothesis 2d, the Commission did 
not pursue any other regulatory cooperation strategy than ‘information exchange’ on different chemicals 
issues across the three phases. Interview evidence stressed that both the differences in competences and 
the differences in regulatory approaches impeded regulatory cooperation in any other form. ‘Information 
exchange’ was also chosen in all other sectors studied, from engineering to ICT. This suggests that the 
institutional condition of hypothesis 2d should be read as a negative one, i.e. the pursuit of ‘information 
                                                     
263 In the food safety section (chapter 6.3.), I have described this point under ‘implementation principles’.  
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exchange’ does not require that either regulatory authority structures or regulatory principles are 
compatible. Indeed, Commission officials have chosen to pursue ‘information exchange’ on issues in 
other sectors to maintain their regulatory discretion on final decisions and to avoid taking decisions that 
would violate their overarching regulatory objectives. Interview evidence showed, however, that 
Commission officials nonetheless chose to exchange information to prevent the adoption of unnecessary 
divergent decisions across jurisdictions. This choice reflected the fear that divergent decisions would 
allow firms to engage in regulatory arbitrage and put pressure on regulators to weaken the stringency of 
regulatory requirements for competitive reasons. The chemicals case study underlines, however, that 
information exchange is the only possible strategy if regulatory authority structures and regulatory 
principles are incompatible.                   
Besides, the comparison of the regulatory cooperation strategies pursued within individual sectors across 
the three regulatory cooperation initiatives shows that the Commission has not pursued a strategy that 
‘exceeds’ the depth and dimension of regulatory cooperation given by the constraints of the regulatory 
compatibilities. Comparisons across different cooperation contexts suggest that the Commission has 
varied the specific issues on which it has pursued a particular regulatory cooperation strategy. Moreover, 
they imply that the Commission has increased the number of issues on which it has sought regulatory 
cooperation with the US in parallel. It is this increase in issues pursued in parallel that has probably 
induced authors (e.g. Shaffer, 2016) to speak of an increase in regulatory cooperation over time. The 
contrast of the case studies examined in this book stresses, however, that this increase in issues must be 
analytically separated from the depth and dimension of regulatory cooperation chosen for related issues, 
which has remained constant264.    
While the distinction between regulatory authority structures and regulatory principles allows a clear 
delineation of the constraints on the choice of a regulatory cooperation strategy, it is admittedly not 
always easy to apply in practice. On the one hand, overarching regulatory principles are not always 
clearly identifiable and need to be established through an analysis of legal comments or interviews with 
regulators and legislators to understand the motivation underlying given regulatory policies. On the other 
hand, especially regulatory principles are often employed inconsistently in domestic regulation within a 
given sectoral regime. The inconsistent application of the precautionary principle in the EU chemicals 
and food safety regimes is a good example for this265. Legislation and regulations on different issues 
                                                     
264 This statement does not preclude that the Commission may choose another dimension or depth of regulatory 
cooperation after it or the US has reformed domestic institutions and aligned them with those of the other side. 
These reforms would also change the distribution of regulatory compatibilities. Such fundamental reforms are, 
however, rare especially in established regulatory systems for a number of reasons (for a theoretical discussion of 
such reasons see Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). Anecdotal evidence from the reform of the US chemicals and food 
safety reforms referred to in the corresponding case studies of this book supports this conclusion.    
265 Emerging EU regulation on the use of nanomaterials (Elliott & Pelkmans, 2015) as well as on the use of 
nanomaterials in food packaging (Josling & Tangermann, 2015) only to some degree follow the precautionary 
principle (see also Beuc, 2016 and CIEL, 2014) for a critique of the Commission’s arguable negligence of the 
precautionary principle in these cases.  
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within a sectoral regime are adopted at different points of times under the lead of different individuals 
and majorities in the legislature. As a consequence, guiding regulatory principles underpin specific 
regulations and even legislation to different degrees. Moreover, regulations on different issues within a 
sectoral or policy regime may conflict with each other. For analytical simplicity, these clashes within 
domestic regulatory regimes and the inconsistent reflection of overarching regulatory principles in 
specific regulations or the design of implementation procedures have been somewhat neglected in this 
book. This decision can be justified with the argument that at least apparent conflicts between domestic 
regulations will be revised by legislatures or be challenged by courts so that mostly more hidden or 
ambiguous conflicts between domestic regulations and inconsistent applications of regulatory principles 
persist. 
In sum, the empirical case studies have shown that at least in the cases analysed, institutional conditions, 
i.e. regulatory compatibilities, constrain the Commission’s choice of regulatory cooperation strategy. 
The compatibility of regulatory authority structures constrains the choice for regulatory cooperation on 
regulatory policies or implementation procedures only. The compatibility of regulatory principles 
constrains the depth of regulatory cooperation both on both regulatory policies and implementation 
procedures. The strategies chosen by the Commission across the four sectoral regimes analysed in this 
book have confirmed the expectations for the influence of regulatory compatibilities on strategy choice. 
Moreover, they have shown that the choice for ‘information exchange’ is independent of regulatory 
compatibilities and is also employed by the Commission where both regulatory authority structures and 
regulatory principles between the EU and a third country are incompatible. As a refinement to these 
hypotheses, it should be emphasised that institutional conditions, i.e. the compatibility of regulatory 
institutions, are maximum constraints on the depth and dimension of regulatory cooperation strategy. 
Commission officials may and in practice do choose to pursue less deep or ‘only’ implementation 
procedure cooperation and thus deviate from this ‘maximum’ constraint. 
 
7.2.3. Societal actor mobilisation 
 
The empirical case studies have shown that societal actor mobilisation is crucial for regulatory officials 
to adopt a regulatory cooperation strategy in line with regulatory compatibilities. Hypothesis 3 can thus 
also be confirmed. The influence of societal actor mobilisation is particularly relevant for the adoption 
of a bilateral regulatory cooperation strategy which goes beyond ‘information exchange’, i.e. an 
‘alignment of implementation procedures’, ‘equivalence’ and ‘regulatory alignment’. This sub-section 
first summarises the interview evidence on reasons for the importance of societal actor mobilisation for 
the formation of a regulatory cooperation strategy. Then it looks at factors which increase the likelihood 
that societal actors can influence the choice of a regulatory cooperation strategy. Besides, it revisits the 
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limits of societal actor mobilisation to influence the choice of a regulatory cooperation strategy and 
discusses regulatory cooperation in the absence of societal actor mobilisation.  
In particular the ICT and food safety case studies have shown that societal actor mobilisation in support 
of regulatory cooperation on specific issues is essential to drive regulatory officials to engage in 
regulatory cooperation on this issue. Both interview partners from the Commission and societal actors 
confirmed that societal mobilisation followed invitations to contribute from the Commission. To 
substantiate the sequence of mobilisation, interview partners also indicated several mobilisation 
difficulties among societal actors that stood in the way of actively lobbying the Commission officials. 
First, member firms did not see regulatory cooperation as a priority and instead encouraged business 
association officials to pursue other priorities instead (Interview 3, Interview 10). Second, EU and US 
firms and even EU and US subsidiaries of the same firm disagreed over the proposals that should be 
raised towards the Commission (Interview 2, Interview 14, Interview 15). Third, EU and US business 
associations in principle shared an interest in forming a transatlantic business coalition, but struggled to 
identify common priorities or maintain a joined coalition (Interview 1, Interview 9, Interview 10). 
Technical guidance and the supply of information is one reason why societal actor mobilisation is 
relevant. It can, however, not account for the relevance of societal actor mobilisation alone. In particular 
with regard to transatlantic regulatory cooperation, a number of scientific studies are available that list 
non-tariff measures which obstruct trade between the EU and the US (e.g. Francois et al., 2012; Ecorys, 
2009). If regulatory officials only relied on societal actor mobilisation for the provision of information, 
they should have required mobilisation less by the time of the TTIP negotiations when information was 
widely available. Interview evidence suggests, however, that especially during the TTIP negotiations, 
Commission officials mobilised societal actors in support of regulatory cooperation. Indeed, the food 
safety case study showed that the Commission eventually chose not to consider ‘equivalence’ on certain 
issues such as ‘natural’ pathogen reduction treatments or anti-microbial resistance because societal 
actors did not mobilise in favour of it. Similar examples were cited in the ICT case study, e.g. with 
regard to the joint development of standards for the Internet of Things. This demonstrates that apart 
from the provision of information, societal actor mobilisation is relevant for the formation of a regulatory 
cooperation strategy because it gives legitimacy to the pursuit of regulatory cooperation. In other words, 
regulatory officials faced with uncertainty understand mobilisation in support of regulatory cooperation 
as an indicator that societal actors consider the behaviour of the regulator as legitimate. As a result, the 
mobilisation of societal actors in support of regulatory cooperation is not restricted to business actors. 
Yet, business actors support cooperation more frequently than NGOs because of the benefits they expect 
from trade liberalisation.   
The analysis of the patterns of societal actor mobilisation across the four sectoral regime case studies 
and across the three regulatory cooperation initiatives demonstrates that societal actors are in a better 
position to shape the formation of a regulatory cooperation strategy if they form a transnational alliance 
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with similar societal actors in the foreign jurisdiction. A transnational alliance of societal actors helps 
to raise similar demands and present similar proposals in both the domestic and foreign jurisdiction. 
Domestic regulatory officials are then more willing to engage in regulatory cooperation if they expect 
that their foreign counterparts will respond positively to their demands and suggestions. The 
mobilisation of societal actors across jurisdictional boundaries, especially where rules overlap, supports 
the positive response of foreign officials to domestic initiatives. Foreign officials equally seek to 
maintain legitimacy towards their constituencies. The engineering case study has shown that 
Commission officials have requested Orgalime and VDMA to elaborate joint positions before they were 
willing to present a textual proposal for engineering cooperation to US officials in the TTIP negotiations. 
The chemicals and ICT case studies have shown that overlapping firm membership in Cefic and the 
ACC as well as in Digitaleurope and ITI has facilitated the emergence of a transnational business 
coalition. At the same time, the weakening of the chemicals industry coalition in support of ‘information 
exchange’ demonstrates that overlapping firm membership does not guarantee the maintenance of a 
transnational coalition. However, a systematic analysis of the patterns of transnational societal 
mobilisation goes beyond the scope of this book and forms the subject of separate future research.    
Moreover, the food safety case study implies that regulatory officials also take up suggestions and 
demands of societal actors even if these do not succeed to form a transnational coalition. Indeed, the 
consideration of their demands may by itself correspond to the preferences of regulators to use 
interdependence as an opportunity structure and expand their legitimacy.  
The case studies have similarly shown that societal actors have not been able to alter the constraints on 
the choice of a regulatory cooperation strategy. Across the four empirical case studies, societal actors 
have not been able to lobby the Commission to pursue regulatory cooperation to a depth or dimension 
which is not within the constraints of the regulatory compatibilities. Interview partners have noted 
business demands for ‘regulatory alignment’, notably in the chemicals and food safety case studies 
during the NTA and TEC (Interview 2, Interview 11). By the time of the TTIP negotiations, demands 
of societal actors have become more aligned with the distribution of regulatory compatibilities. 
Correspondingly, interview partners have underlined that societal actors learned to propose more 
‘realistic’ and ‘feasible’ issues and objectives for regulatory cooperation (Interview 2, Interview 3, 
Interview 6, Interview 10, Interview 12). This potential learning or alignment of regulatory priorities 
over time corresponds to recent insights from the EU lobbying literature that societal actors are more 
successful if they ‘frame’ their demands in light of the discourses employed by the Commission 
(Mahoney & Klüver, 2015). At the same time, societal actors have not been able to stop the Commission 
from pursuing regulatory cooperation. On the contrary, policy documents and interview evidence have 
shown that the Commission chose to convince societal actors that its regulatory cooperation ambitions 
neither infringe upon the decision and participation rights of legislators or societal actors in the EU nor 
undermine its regulatory objectives (Interview 1, Interview 7, Interview 12).    
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The argument that this book makes with regard to the influence of societal actor mobilisation thus differs 
substantially from the role that Open Economy Politics ascribes to the role of societal actors. For the 
latter, societal contestation constrains the autonomy and policy space of government and other state 
actors (Peterson & Young, 2014; Lake, 2009; Young & Peterson, 2006; Milner, 1997). In accordance 
with the Inter-relational Institutionalism, the capacity of government and state actors to ‘buffer’ societal 
demands and give slightly preferential access to societal actors whose preferences correspond to their 
own ones enhances their autonomy and policy space under contestation266.   
Hypothesis 3 needs to be refined with regard to the adoption of an ‘information exchange’ strategy. For 
the latter, Commission officials have formed corresponding strategies even in the absence of societal 
actor mobilisation. The frequent informal exchanges e.g. between DG Environment, the ECHA and the 
EPA as well as between DG Sante, the EFSA and the FDA underline this point (ECHA, 2017; Maier, 
2008). Unlike the other strategies, ‘information exchange’ does not constrain the autonomy of regulatory 
officials even if it offers a lower use of interdependence as an opportunity structure than the other 
strategies. In the absence of societal mobilisation, however, interviewees have added that these 
exchanges often remain ad-hoc (Interview 1, Interview 12). 
In sum and crucially for this book, the empirical case studies have confirmed hypothesis 3 that societal 
mobilisation leads regulatory officials from the Commission to adopt a suggestion for regulatory 
cooperation as a strategy. Societal mobilisation offers technical expertise and guidance to regulatory 
officials on which issues within a regulatory regime they can cooperate with a third country or 
jurisdiction. Moreover, it assures them that societal actors consider their pursuit of regulatory 
cooperation as legitimate. Hypothesis 3 needs to be slightly refined for the choice of ‘information 
exchange’ which regulatory officials readily choose even in the absence of societal actor mobilisation.   
 
7.2.4. Limitations of the comparative case design  
 
This section discusses the limitations of the findings of this book with regard to their reliability, validity 
and wider generalisability. Limitations pertain both to methodological issues and the case selection. 
Methodological limitations can be discussed from the perspective of the reliability and validity of the 
findings. Limitations towards a wider generalisation reflect the case selection and thus the omission of 
potential other cases (Leuffen, 2007: 157). This section begins with a discussion of the limitations 
regarding the reliability and validity of the findings before examining the scope for their wider 
generalisation.   
                                                     
266 The limits to buffering are reached, however, where societal actor mobilisation becomes so large that ignoring 
the demands of these actors would itself undermine the legitimacy of the regulator (Eliasson, 2014). This argument 
does thus call into question the constraining effect of politicisation, including on regulators (Zürn, 2015).   
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Limitations with regard to the reliability of the findings shall be discussed in light of the reliance of this 
book on a qualitative approach and expert interviews. Reliability limitations potentially exist because 
interview data is subject to subjective interview factors that may impede the replication of the same 
statements and observations by other researchers. The collection of data depended on the availability of 
potential interview partners for an in-depth conversation as well as their perception of my 
trustworthiness and expertise. The information and observations shared by interview partners are at least 
in part contingent on the level of trust between researcher and interview partner. Moreover, they 
depended on contextual factors outside the influence of the researcher, including the time constraint of 
the interview partner on the day that the interview was conducted. It must therefore be acknowledged 
that these contextual influences on the interview situation impose constraints on the replicability of the 
data by other researchers. Nonetheless, other researchers can at least obtain very similar data through 
interviews if they display a high level of trustworthiness and expertise. Moreover, the triangulation of 
Commission statements with assessments that societal actor representatives shared in interviews and 
statements contained in policy documents helped to verify if interview partners were ‘speaking the 
truth’. The triangulation revealed a strong overlap of Commission statements with assessments of other 
actors overseeing regulatory cooperation, notably member state representatives and societal actors. At 
the same time, the difficulty to understand a complex process such as strategy formation by means of 
indicator-based research makes it difficult to design a quantitative research project for this issue that 
would improve the reliability of the data used for the conclusions.  
While this book can arguably not avoid certain limitations on the reliability of the data collected, the 
chosen approach enhances the validity of the findings. Expert interviews with the actors responsible for 
the formation of the regulatory cooperation strategies allow obtaining a deep insight into the factors 
which shape the considerations and decisions of the responsible actors. Moreover, the possibility to 
clarify the sequence of issues and decisions makes it possible to describe a causal mechanism which 
leads to the formation of a strategy. At the same time, the confrontation of interview partners with 
potential rival explanations for the development of a specific strategy allows disentangling the relevance 
of different potential explanatory factors for the strategy. Here, the triangulation of the interviews of 
Commission officials with interviews conducted with societal actors and member state representatives 
has confirmed that I have been able to carry out interviews with the relevant stakeholders on the EU side 
for each sector examined. 
The findings can be potentially generalised along four dimensions: the expansion of regulatory 
cooperation with the US in other sectors, the EU’s choice of regulatory cooperation strategies with other 
countries than the US, the choice of regulatory cooperation strategies for multilateral regulatory 
cooperation and the relevance of regulatory compatibilities for other large jurisdictions beyond the EU.  
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Explaining the strategy choice in other sectors of transatlantic regulatory cooperation  
 
The explanatory power of the Inter-relational Institutionalism framework for the Commission’s choice 
of regulatory cooperation strategy should be even higher for sectors in which politicisation is low and 
intra-industry trade is high. The case selection sought to maximise the likelihood that the Commission 
would not choose to engage in regulatory cooperation because the intensity of societal contestation and 
politicisation was high. At the same time, it focused on sectors in which the level of intra-industry trade 
is high. If the intensity of politicisation is lower than in the cases analysed, Commission officials should 
have even larger domestic discretion in their choice of strategy.  
A probe into the Commission’s strategy choices for transatlantic regulatory cooperation in the 
pharmaceuticals and automotive sectors, two sectors in which the level of intra-industry trade between 
the EU and US is very high, suggests that the Inter-relational Institutionalism can also account for the 
Commission’s choices in these sectors. In the pharmaceuticals sector, Inter-relational Institutionalism 
suggests that the incompatibility of the regulatory principles for the authorisation of pharmaceuticals, 
i.e. the adoption of the ‘precautionary principle’ in the EU and the rigorous reliance on scientific risk 
assessment in the US, makes policy cooperation inconceivable. The compatible distribution of 
regulatory authority, i.e. the centralisation of authority over rules with the European Medicals Agency 
(EMA) in the EU and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), should allow the Commission to pursue 
an ‘alignment of implementation procedures’. Implementation procedures in the EU are such that the 
EMA develops EU-wide procedures on ‘Good Manufacturing Practices’ (GMP) inspections and 
coordinates and harmonises GMP activities at the EU level. Within the context of the TTIP, the textual 
proposals of the Commission show that it has indeed pursued an ‘alignment of implementation 
procedures’ in the pharmaceuticals sector. More specifically, it has pursued a recognition of each other’s 
‘Good Manufacturing Practices’ inspections of pharmaceutical production facilities (Commission, 
2014j). A brief look at the ‘maximum’ strategy selected in transatlantic regulatory cooperation in the 
pharmaceutical sectors thus appears to confirm the prediction of the Inter-relational Institutionalism.       
In the automotive sector, in turn, regulatory principles of EU and US regulators are - at least argued to 
be – very similar in the regulation of automotive safety (Interview 5). This similarity makes it likely that 
EU and US also follow compatible regulatory principles. Moreover, authority to adopt automotive safety 
regulations lies with the Commission in the EU and the NHTSA in the US and is thus centralised and 
compatible across both jurisdictions. In line with the prediction of Inter-relational Institutionalism that 
compatibilities of regulatory authority structures and principle enable the Commission to pursue 
‘regulatory alignment’, the Commission has pursued a harmonisation and mutual recognition of specific 
automotive safety regulations in the TTIP negotiations (Commission, 2013c).  
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No theoretical limitation has been made that should make the Inter-relational Institutionalism only 
applicable to regulatory cooperation in goods sectors. On the contrary, there is strong reason to assume 
that it equally applies to services sectors. On the one hand, services sectors are also increasingly 
characterised by high levels of intra-industry trade. On the other, certain services sectors, notably the 
telecommunications and the financial sector are subject to extensive regulation shaping the design and 
provision of services, including and even increasingly at the EU level. The Inter-relational 
Institutionalism framework should thus also apply to these sectors. Any probes that can be suggested 
here fall short of a rigorous scientific analysis, though. The applicability of Inter-relational 
Institutionalism to additional sectors of high intra-industry trade should be the object of future research. 
Institutional conditions should also constrain the choice of regulatory cooperation strategies in sectors 
characterised by low intra-industry trade or in which regulations do not regulate product characteristics, 
but production processes267. Yet, limitations to the Inter-relational Institutionalist framework may arise 
related to the support of societal actors for regulatory cooperation and the initiation of regulatory 
cooperation by actors within the Commission. This should be the case for sectors such as textiles which 
are not characterised by high intra-industry trade at least between the EU and the US. In these cases, 
industry associations are likely to mobilise resources to maintain the divergence of regulations and 
implementation procedures to protect their position in the EU market268. Rather than offering guidance 
on which issues Commission officials could seek regulatory cooperation, firms and industry associations 
can be expected to lobby against regulatory cooperation. On the other hand, the low level of intra-
industry trade implies that the autonomy of the Commission in regulating the safety and health 
protection for domestic products is not challenged by rule overlap and potential competitive pressures 
on domestic industries. If intra-industry trade is low, the legitimacy gains to the Commission emanating 
from regulatory cooperation are too small if only few firms subsequently benefit from trade 
liberalisation. Regulatory cooperation is thus unlikely to be a salient issue to Commissioners in sectors 
with low levels of intra-industry and may neither offer substantial autonomy or legitimacy gains. 
Limitations to the explanatory power of Inter-relational Institutionalism thus arise because societal 
actors do not support regulatory cooperation and lobby against its pursuit rather than offering technical 
guidance to Commission officials. Moreover, the explanatory power of the constraints imposed on the 
strategy choice by institutional conditions may be difficult to verify empirically because Commissioners 
may not initiate regulatory cooperation in these sectors due to the low legitimacy and autonomy gains 
they can expect.  
                                                     
267 For the distinction between product and production process regulations see Scharpf (1997). Scharpf argued that 
harmonisation of product regulations in the construction of the Single Market was more likely than a harmonisation 
of production process regulations.   
268 Moreover, Eckhardt (2016) argues that industry organisation and the capacity to mobilise resources for lobbying 
is a crucial factor explaining bureaucratic action. Focussing the analysis of this book on sectors with high 
organisational capacity therefore potentially risks over-estimating the influence of societal mobilisation on the 
pursuit of and strategy choice on regulatory cooperation. 
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Likewise, institutional conditions and regulatory compatibilities can be expected to constrain the choice 
of regulatory cooperation strategy in the case of production process regulations and non-product 
regulations. Production process and non-product regulations include regulations related e.g. to 
competition policy, labour rights and climate policy. Damro’s (2006) case study of cooperation between 
EU and US competition regulators implies that cooperation was enabled by the centralisation of 
authority in the hands of central-level regulators in both the EU and the US. Besides, case studies on the 
promotion of labour rights in TTIP (Orbie et al., 2015) acknowledge that Washington’s lack of 
competence on issues covered by the ILO conventions makes the Commission reluctant to pursue the 
ratification of ILO conventions in TTIP. Limitations with regard to the explanatory power of the inter-
relational institutionalist framework exist, however, for production process and non-product regulations 
as far as the initiation of regulatory cooperation and the support of societal actors is concerned. Since 
production process and non-product regulations do not (or only indirectly) lead to trade liberalisation, 
DG Trade is unlikely to demand (or prioritise) regulatory cooperation on these issues. Besides, firms 
and business associations are unlikely to mobilise resources to externalise EU competition, labour rights 
and climate policy regulations. On the contrary, conflicting regulatory requirements across jurisdictions 
on these issues allow firms to engage in regulatory arbitrage and maintain other production processes in 
other countries. While NGOs can be expected to support regulatory cooperation on these issues, their 
described scepticism towards regulatory cooperation (e.g. Peterson & Young, 2014: 84) is unlikely to 
induce them to offer Commission officials technical guidance on issues for regulatory cooperation. In 
the latter case, regulatory cooperation should only be initiated within institutional constraints if the 
responsible Commissioner demands the pursuit of regulatory cooperation and uses ‘permeability’ to 
encourage lobbying activities of NGOs.  
In sum, the Inter-relational Institutionalism can also be applied to other sectors, both goods and services, 
if these are characterised by high levels of intra-industry trade. Limitations to the generalisability of the 
framework may exist related to sectors with low intra-industry trade and production process or non-
product regulations such as competition, labour and climate. These limitations, however, refer to the 
initiation of regulatory cooperation rather than the depth and dimension of regulatory cooperation. If 
regulatory cooperation occurs, strategies should equally depend on regulatory compatibilities between 
the initiating jurisdiction and its interlocutor.  
 
Explaining the strategy choice for regulatory cooperation between the EU and other countries 
 
The Inter-relational Institutionalist framework can in principle also be applied to explain the 
Commission’s choice of regulatory cooperation strategies in dialogues and negotiations with other 
countries than the US. Based on existing literature, regulatory cooperation, however, relies on sufficient 
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regulatory capacity of both cooperation partners (Newman & Posner, 2015). Indeed, the EU does not 
only pursue regulatory cooperation with the US, but also with other large economies, notably Canada, 
Japan and South Korea (see chapter 5.1)269.  
Anecdotal evidence from the EU’s discussions with Canada in the context of the CETA negotiations 
imply that both the compatibility of regulatory authority structures and regulatory principles affected 
and constrained the depth and dimension of regulatory cooperation. In the automotive sector, the 
centralisation of regulatory authority in the EU and the US and the overall adoption of risk assessment 
methods established within the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) meant that 
both regulatory principles and regulatory authority structures were compatible for auto safety 
regulations. Correspondingly, the Commission pursued mutual recognition and thus a strategy of 
‘regulatory alignment’ for certain auto safety regulations. In food safety, the pursuit of the ‘scientific 
risk assessment principle’ by the Canadian government and its incompatibility with the EU’s 
precautionary principle has likely pushed the Commission to pursue ‘equivalence’ on a number of food 
safety issues and follow the Veterinary Equivalence Agreement. At the same time, Ottawa’s lack of 
authority for many financial services regulations implied that the Commission did not pursue policy 
cooperation with Canada in this sector (Commission, 2015). Furthermore, from studies that compare 
EU regulations with those of South Korea and Japan (e.g. Berends, 2011; Naiki, 2010) it can be inferred 
that both the compatibility of regulatory authority structures and regulatory principles constrain the 
Commission’s choice of regulatory cooperation with these countries. At least in regulatory interactions 
with a few other countries, such as Canada, Japan and South Korea, the Inter-relational Institutionalism 
should therefore apply.    
Nonetheless, limitations to the generalisability of the framework for the analysis of the EU’s regulatory 
cooperation with other countries than the US must be acknowledged. As argued in chapter 5.1., the US 
is an ‘extreme’ case for regulatory cooperation due to the complexity of both the EU and US regulatory 
frameworks, the similarity in market size and the high levels of intra-industry trade and mutual market 
penetration. Moreover, the US also enjoys a certain degree of ‘soft power’ (Nye, 2004) which likely 
contributes to the motivation of Commissioners to pursue regulatory cooperation with the EU for 
autonomy and legitimacy gains of the Commission. As the degree of ‘soft power’ is likely lower for the 
other countries with which the Commission is pursuing regulatory cooperation at the time of writing, 
the motivation of Commissioners to push regulatory cooperation can be expected to smaller. Moreover, 
transnational ties of EU societal actors and mutual market penetration are smaller with those countries 
than with the US, reducing incentives for societal actors, notably business associations, to mobilise 
members and prioritise the provision of technical suggestions to Commission officials for the pursuit of 
                                                     
269 The Commission has not yet initiated bilateral regulatory cooperation with Russia and China, arguably due to 
the relatively lower ‘regulatory capacity’ of both countries at the time of writing. One interview partner noted, 
though, that the EU may also begin regulatory cooperation with these countries once their regulatory systems 
mature (Interview 5).   
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regulatory cooperation. Even where past trade negotiations have established institutional frameworks 
for regulatory cooperation270, they may not lead the Commission to pursue the same strategies as in 
regulatory cooperation. This is a consequence of the presumably lower interest of Commissioners (or 
high-level bureaucrats) and the lower interest of societal actors, notably firms, in regulatory cooperation 
as an instrument for trade liberalisation. As a result, Commission officials in many cases choose to 
pursue only ‘information exchange’ with regulators from e.g. Canada, South Korea and Japan. Where 
Commissioners or high-level bureaucrats put forward regulatory cooperation and societal actors offer 
technical guidance on specific issues for cooperation, officials’ choice of regulatory cooperation strategy 
beyond ‘information exchange’ should, however, follow the consideration of regulatory compatibilities.  
At this point, a potential further limitation to the applicability of the Inter-relational Institutionalist 
framework shall not be omitted. The larger the asymmetry in market size between the EU and a third 
country, arguably the more likely it becomes that the EU uses the relative power resulting from its 
regulatory capacity and market size to demand that the third country reforms its regulatory institutions 
and adjusts its regulatory framework to that of the EU in exchange for market access. The latter falls 
into the logic of externalisation described by the ‘Market Power Europe’ approach (Damro, 2015a, 
Damro, 2015b; 2012).  Admittedly, the Inter-relational Institutionalism offers limited explanatory power 
for the behaviour of the Commission towards countries in the immediate geographical proximity of the 
EU, such as countries in the European Neighbourhood Policy. Future research may inquire if it is 
possible to establish a (more precise) scope condition for the externalisation of policies according to the 
‘Market Power Europe’ conceptual framework and regulatory cooperation according to Inter-relational 
Institutionalism.  
 
Explaining the strategy choice of the Commission in international regulatory cooperation          
 
Inter-relational Institutionalism also offers insights into the Commission’s choice of regulatory 
cooperation strategies in international regulatory cooperation. The compatibility between regulatory 
principles of the EU and those of other large countries in international organisations influences and 
constrains the depth of regulatory cooperation that the EU can pursue. To illustrate this point, the 
incompatibility of the ‘precautionary principle’ with the ‘scientific risk assessment’ principle adopted 
e.g. by the US, Canada and Australia for instance may be linked to the absence of an ambition of the 
Commission to externalise its food safety policies to the Codex Alimentarius Commission (Young, 
2014). Moreover, the incompatibility of regulatory authority structures in other countries, notably a lack 
                                                     
270 Both the EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement and the EU-Canada Free Trade Agreement (CETA) have established 
such frameworks. The EU also pursues the establishment of a future regulatory cooperation framework in the 
negotiations with Japan which were ongoing at the time of writing.  
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of centralisation of authority, has contributed to constrain the ability of the EU to enforce multilateral 
agreements on regulatory cooperation, e.g. on labour rights in the EU (Schwellnus, 2014) or on 
greenhouse gas emission reductions in climate policy. In this sense, the consideration of the 
compatibility of regulatory institutions for the strategy that the EU is able to pursue internationally is 
also generalisable to international regulatory cooperation.    
Moreover, the explanation of Inter-relational Institutionalism that regulatory cooperation is initiated by 
power dynamics within the Commission can be expected to be also generalisable to international 
regulatory cooperation. The demands of Commissioners and top-level bureaucrats to externalise EU 
policies and implementation procedures through multilateral forums and international organisations 
likely also contributes to explain the decision of the EU to seek international regulatory cooperation. 
For instance, Damro’s (2005) account of the ambition of DG Competition to promote international 
regulatory cooperation on competition policy through the International Competition Network implies 
support for an emphasis on bureaucratic dynamics to explain regulatory cooperation decisions of the 
Commission. An analysis of this claim requires testing in future research, though.    
Yet, the generalisability of Inter-relational Institutionalism to international regulatory cooperation is 
limited due to important differences between bilateral and international regulatory cooperation. First, in 
contrast to bilateral regulatory cooperation, the EU (often, but not always represented by the 
Commission) does not only pursue harmonisation, mutual recognition, equivalence or the mutual 
recognition of conformity assessment procedures in international regulatory cooperation, but also 
pursues strategies of policy import and policy promotion (Falkner & Müller, 2013). While in bilateral 
regulatory cooperation domestic regulatory capacity is a precondition for regulatory cooperation, in 
international regulatory cooperation the Commission may also promote regulatory decisions to enhance 
its domestic regulatory capacity. Kudrna and Müller (2016) argue that the Commission promoted a 
regulatory decision in the Basel Committee on capital equity requirements at the international level to 
overcome domestic resistance by member states. The rules adopted in the Basel Committee did not 
reflect the domestic rules of any other jurisdiction, but were a compromise and creation of participating 
‘countries’. The Commission’s subsequent policy import of the rules did not unilaterally disadvantage 
EU firms and prevent adjustment costs for non-EU firms, but impose regulatory burdens on EU and 
non-EU financial institutions alike.  
Second, the pursuit of policy promotion and the simultaneous interaction with multiple countries in 
international organisations and multilateral forums means that the EU also strategically uses 
incompatibilities of regulatory authority structures. If decisions of other jurisdictions are not recognised 
as equivalent, but ‘new’ decisions are formed, the EU can use its relatively higher regulatory capacity 
and higher regulatory centralisation as an instrument of power against jurisdictions with no 
centralisation of regulatory authority. Büthe and Mattli (2011) offer an argument that a lower degree of 
centralisation and hierarchisation of authority reduce the ability of jurisdictions to pass on information 
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efficiently and thus shape decisions in hierarchical international forums. At the same time, the EU is 
arguably less ‘concerned’ about a lack of authority centralisation in other jurisdictions when decisions 
within international forums are taken. As the EU does not recognise the decisions and rules of other 
jurisdictions as equivalent to its own ones, but agrees on ‘new’ rules, incompatibilities in regulatory 
authority structures do not undermine the autonomy of the Commission to the same extent as in bilateral 
regulatory cooperation. Besides, decisions on international rules tend to give domestic governments 
considerable discretion in implementing international rules anyway. While this book has argued that 
incompatible regulatory authority structures prevent the Commission from engaging regulatory 
cooperation with another jurisdiction, differences in regulatory authority centralisation do not obstruct 
international regulatory cooperation. In line with the New Interdependence Approach literature they 
may rather constitute a power advantage in favour of the jurisdiction with the higher degree of 
centralisation, given that most international organisations and multilateral forums have a hierarchical 
decision-making structure.  
Third, although EU regulatory principles may be incompatible with the principles of some other member 
jurisdictions of international organisations, the regulatory state in many states, notably emerging and 
less developed countries, is little developed. This means that the EU will use the low development as an 
opportunity structure to spread its domestic regulatory principles often in competition to conflicting and 
incompatible regulatory principles of other jurisdictions with high regulatory capacity. The competition 
with the US about the establishment of an international regulatory principle on food safety, i.e. the 
conflict between the EU’s ‘precautionary principle’ and the US ‘scientific risk assessment’ principle 
exemplifies this point. In this constellation, the EU will seek to form a coalition with other states which 
share the EU’s regulatory principle to externalise its domestic policies and procedures to the 
international level (Newman & Posner, 2015: 891) that the Commission seeks to externalise its policies 
through ‘coalition-building’ under high preference differentials. Unlike in bilateral regulatory 
cooperation, however, the incompatibility of regulatory principles does not prevent the Commission (or 
the EU represented through member states) from seeking international regulatory cooperation.  
 
Explaining strategy formation and choice for third-country regulators  
 
Even if the EU may be the ‘most likely’ candidate to engage in bilateral regulatory cooperation, a few 
other jurisdictions also show the features that are credited by the international regulatory cooperation 
literature as power resources. Examples include notably the US and to a lesser extent also Japan and 
Canada. There is little reason to assume that the structural, institutional constraints on the choice of a 
bilateral regulatory cooperation strategy that have should not equally apply to other jurisdictions. On the 
contrary, this study has derived both constraints through a deductive theoretical exercise without 
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consideration of institutional specificities of the EU. The transferability of the ‘bureaucratic pressure’ 
argument to US, Japanese or Canadian regulators may, however, be limited. On the one hand, the 
embeddedness of regulators in one body with external relations actors is a specific feature of the EU. 
This limits the pressure that non-technical bureaucrats can exert on technical officials in other third 
countries. In the US, regulatory agencies are largely independent from government departments (Pérez 
& Dudley, 2016), restricting the influence that e.g. the USTR can have on regulatory agencies such as 
the FDA or EPA. On the other hand, the institutional separation of regulatory officials from external 
relations actors in third countries also implies that they mostly do not share the externalisation 
perspective of Commission officials (Shaffer, 2016; Interview 5). The transferability of the Inter-
relational Institutionalism to third-country regulators could be the object of future research. 
Lastly and beyond considerations on case study research, limitations should be discussed that relate to 
the operationalisation of the variables, in particular the independent variable “regulatory 
compatibilities”271. Here, a dichotomous operationalisation has been selected to keep analytical 
complexity manageable. In real politics, however, the distribution of compatibilities may not always be 
as clearly structured as this book suggests. As for example regulatory policies are combinations of 
numerous sets of ideas that themselves are derived from overarching principles, regulatory policies from 
two different jurisdiction in practice are likely to be partly compatible. More precisely, their 
compatibility is likely to vary on a range from full compatibility to low compatibility. Different degrees 
of compatibility can for instance result from the fact that two jurisdictions may share regulatory 
principles on a fundamental level, but disagree on the deduction of specific behavioural rules and ideas 
that they individually derive from these principles. Two jurisdictions may thus agree that environmental 
regulation should be based on the polluter-pays principle. However, they may still disagree who the 
typical polluter is in a setting and thus design regulation in a way that imposes different behavioural 
constraints and costs on specific actors. Furthermore, complexity results from the fact that regulators do 
not always clearly know if two sets of regulatory policies are compatible or not. Depending on a 
researcher’s epistemological stance, they may not even be able to do so. In practice therefore, regulators 
may adhere to a notion of partial compatibility and – in line with arguments by the experimentalist 
governance literature - start regulatory cooperation with a strategy that does not immediately aim at the 
‘maximum’ strategy enabled by regulatory compatibilities. Future research could examine the question 
whether a more differentiated operationalisation of regulatory compatibilities can offer additional 
analytical merit. It may thus potentially also contribute to account for the variation of strategies that 
have been summarised as one outcome on the dependent variable. Here, it shall be reiterated that the 
objective of this book has been complexity reduction to achieve analytical benefit which has made 
certain simplifications inevitable.                  
                                                     
271 Bureaucratic pressure and societal mobilisation have been operationalised in agreement with existing research. 
Constraints of this operationalisation with regard to displaying nuances in either internal bureaucratic politics and 
interest group politics are thus no different from existing studies.   
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7.3. Contributions 
 
This book has started off with the argument that neither actor-centred institutionalism nor the New 
Interdependence Approach can individually explain the strategies of actors, especially government and 
sub-state actors, in actively shaping patterns of global governance in an environment of interdependence. 
It has argued that this theoretical gap becomes particularly apparent in the shortcomings of either 
approach to account for the strategy choices of government and regulatory officials in bilateral 
regulatory cooperation, an increasingly important empirical phenomenon. Following from this 
argument, this book has deduced an integrative framework to explore how these previously distinct 
approaches, i.e. the dominant approach in policy and governance research and the emerging research 
framework to study cross-jurisdictional patterns of institutional change, can be combined. This sub-
section outlines the contribution of the Inter-relational Institutionalism to wider international relations 
(IR) theory (chapter 7.3.1.). Moreover, it resumes the debate outlined in the introduction about the costs 
and benefits of bilateral regulatory cooperation. Although this book has not explicitly examined the 
influence of bilateral regulatory cooperation on the level of consumer protection, democratic 
accountability and administrative efficiency, the examination of the constraints on the choice of a 
strategy offers corroborating evidence on the implications of bilateral regulatory cooperation for these 
issues. They will be discussed in chapter 7.3.2.     
 
7.3.1. Constraints of domestic regulatory institutions on international cooperation  
 
The Inter-relational Institutionalism contributes to a large body of Liberal Institutionalist (LI) literature 
explaining the emergence of international cooperation (Katzenstein, 2009; Keohane, 2009; Lake, 2009; 
Keohane & Martin, 2001; Moravcsik, 1993; Putnam, 1988). The framework deduced in this book 
complements and refines this literature. Moreover, it refines the content of existing analytical 
instruments in LI research, including notably the two-level game framework. This sub-section first 
outlines the refinement that the combination of the New Interdependence Approach and actor-centred 
institutionalism make to the LI literature related to the understanding of domestic constraints on 
international cooperation. Second, it specifies the refinement that the incorporation of the principal-
agent logic offers to the understanding of the causal mechanism that explains to the engagement in 
international cooperation within the ‘domestic politics’ game.  
First, the combination of actor-centred institutionalism and the New Interdependence Approach refines 
the domestic constraints that actors face in shaping international cooperation in the context of 
interdependence. The Inter-relational Institutionalism does not call into question the domestic 
constraints arising from the need to ensure domestic ratification of treaty agreements (Lütz, 2011; Lake, 
2009). Neither does it question the role of legislatures in constraining the discretion of executives and 
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the influence of societal actors and contestation on the constraints that legislatures execute on executives 
(Newman, 2011; Lake, 2009). It also does not challenge the relevance of the power resources that enable 
regulators from a jurisdiction to engage in cooperation, notably a large internal market and strong 
regulatory capacity (Damro, 2015b; Damro, 2012). Yet, on the one hand, the incorporation of the New 
Interdependence Approach into actor-centred institutionalism defines the motivation of actors to engage 
in international cooperation and coalition-building across jurisdictional boundaries. The New 
Interdependence Approach shows that under interdependence, not only government negotiators as a 
domestic-international interface promote international cooperation. Instead, it proposes that 
interdependence and rule overlap across jurisdictions create incentives for government actors and ‘sub-
state actors’, i.e. regulatory actors, to use interdependence as an opportunity structure to pursue their 
preferences. The constellation of societal interests in favour of cooperation is thus not per se a domestic 
constraint on the emergence of international cooperation. Government and regulatory actors use rule 
overlap as an opportunity to extend their influence, autonomy and legitimacy. The emergence of 
interdependence thus endogenously alters the domestic societal contestation constraint on the emergence 
of international cooperation. This book has therefore confirmed that the New Interdependence Approach 
is a promising theoretical innovation to existing Liberal Institutionalist theory in order to understand the 
emergence of cooperation in an environment of interdependence.  
On the other hand, the combination of the New Interdependence Approach and actor-centred 
institutionalism helps clarify the domestic constraints that government and regulatory actors face during 
the engagement in international cooperation. Referring to the metaphor of the two-level game, the Inter-
relational Institutionalism shares the assumption of Open Economy Politics that actors are constrained 
at the international level (level I) by the need to reach an agreement with foreign actors. To reach an 
agreement, domestic actors do not pursue strategies that entail significant legislative or institutional 
change in the foreign jurisdiction as this would raise the risk of a non-agreement. Moreover, it shares 
the assumption of previous literature working with the two-level game metaphors that actors engage in 
international cooperation to reduce the likelihood of political intervention, but are cautious to protect 
their discretionary autonomy at the domestic level (Damro, 2006). The Inter-relational Institutionalism, 
however, refines the domestic constraints that government and regulatory actors face in the pursuit of 
international cooperation. This refinement follows from the integration of rational-choice and 
constructivist elements into one integrative framework. 
The Inter-relational Institutionalism reconciles and integrates two streams of literature that have until 
the time of writing been rival explanatory approaches for international cooperation and regulatory 
convergence. It shows that power and competence distributions and regulatory approaches and cultures 
cannot be studied in isolation or as rival explanations. On the contrary, in international cooperation 
within the discretionary authority of regulators, domestic politics constraints are the potential of 
additional veto players to claim political intervention rights and the intervention of legislatures in case 
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of a violation of institutionalised regulatory approaches. Put differently, it argues that one constraint is 
the compatibility of domestic institutions of power-sharing, i.e. domestic ‘regulatory authority 
structures’ which delineate the discretionary authority of regulators, with foreign institutions of power-
sharing. This constraint constitutes the rational-choice element of the framework. Regulators do not 
enable potential veto players at level II through international cooperation if their negotiation patterns at 
level I do not face more veto players than they themselves do. The recognition of decisions and 
procedures by regulators at level I that involve veto players from a different level of government or 
private actors encourages potential veto players at level II to demand an expansion of their intervention 
rights. To protect their autonomy and discretion, regulators are therefore constrained by the 
compatibility of their own authority at level II with the authority of their cooperation partner at level I.  
Besides, the Inter-relational Institutionalism argues that an equal domestic constraint is the compatibility 
of domestic regulatory approaches with foreign regulatory approaches. This constraint reflects the 
incorporation of constructivist elements. Regulators do not offer incentives to legislatures for political 
intervention in their discretionary authority if they do not recognise or accept decisions and procedures 
that establish regulatory approaches that conflict with the approaches given to them by their legislatures. 
Legislatures do not intervene into the discretion given to regulators if these do not significantly ‘shirk’ 
and undermine the regulatory objectives and approaches institutionalised through legislation. Regulators 
expect, however, that legislatures will politically intervene if they accept or recognise decisions and 
procedures at level II that establish conflicting regulatory objectives. To protect their autonomy and 
discretion at level II, regulators are therefore also constrained by the compatibility of their regulatory 
principles at level II with the regulatory principles of their cooperation partner at level I.  
In a wider perspective, the incorporation of actor-centred institutionalism into the New Interdependence 
Approach for the deduction of the Inter-relational Institutionalism contributes to a broader trend to 
combine rational-choice and constructivist explanations in institutionalist approaches (e.g. Siles-
Brügge, 2014, Woll, 2008). The integration of constructivist elements offers a refinement, not a rejection 
of dominant rational-choice frameworks. Following institutionalised ideas does not only play an 
essential role in times of crisis (Blyth, 2002), but is constantly conducive for actors in approximating 
rational behaviour under uncertainty.  
Second, the Inter-relational Institutionalism contributes a micro-foundation to the engagement in 
international cooperation under the constraints of domestic regulatory institutions. This micro-
foundation clarifies the causal mechanism which links preferences of regulators, the institutional 
constraints under which they act and the mobilisation of societal actors to the choices of regulatory 
cooperation strategies, i.e. the ‘type’ of international cooperation that regulators seek. To deduce this 
micro-foundation that specifies the causal mechanism for the formation of a regulatory cooperation 
strategy, the Inter-relational Institutionalism borrows a variant of the principal-agent logic. This variant 
specifies delegation, autonomy and control mechanisms among different bureaucratic actors within the 
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agent: technical officials, non-technical officials, politically appointed bureaucratic leaders. Their 
preferences differ due to different institutional roles and ideational influences. The relative influence of 
different ‘agents’ on the preference of the regulator as an aggregate body ‘agent’ depend on their access 
and use of access to collective internal decision-making. 
The incorporation of this variant of the principal-agent approach which considers intra-agent dynamics 
offers an alternative specification of the causal mechanism that explains the formation of a strategy at 
level I. Open Economy Politics and the New Interdependence Approach mostly rely on an aggregation 
of societal preferences as the micro-foundation to explain the behaviour of actors in international 
cooperation at the domestic-international interface. The specification of the causal mechanism of this 
book allows an explanation of the behaviour of government and regulatory actors even in cases in which 
they are insulated from societal contestation, societal mobilisation is muted or contested. The Inter-
relational Institutionalism can explain the pursuit of international cooperation by state and sub-state 
actors, including regulators, within their discretionary authority as an opportunity structure to realise 
their preferences. The micro-foundation based on the bureaucratic pressure argument elaborated within 
the Inter-relational Institutionalism thus complements the existing micro-foundation proposed by Open 
Economy and the New Interdependence Approach for cases in which societal contestation cannot 
entirely explain the behaviour of government and sub-state actors such as regulators in international 
cooperation.  
The development of this alternative, complementary micro-foundation for the formation of a regulatory 
cooperation strategy for instances in which societal mobilisation is muted, contested or reactive does 
not presume that regulators and state actors can act in isolation from societal actors. With regard to the 
EU, the Commission widely consults with societal actors to specify its strategies. Societal actors 
influence the adoption of prior legislation that subsequently establishes regulatory principles 
constraining the regulator’s choice among cooperation strategies (see e.g. Klüver 2012). Besides, they 
provide technical expertise and guidance on issues on which the regulator can focus its cooperation 
efforts. The mobilisation or non-mobilisation of business associations, firms and NGOs therefore rather 
shapes the focus on specific issues, including the failure of a regulator to identify issues within the 
constraints of regulatory compatibilities. At the same time, societal actors contribute to articulate 
differences and similarities in regulatory approaches, and to a lesser extent, authority structures.  
It shall be emphasised that the contribution of this book is without prejudice to the ‘passive’ 
externalisation of EU regulations and rules through processes of diffusion, ‘trading-up’ by third 
countries and regulatory convergence (see chapter 3.1.2). Even if the EU as – arguably – the most 
prominent actor in bilateral regulatory cooperation does not actively seek to transfer its rules and 
procedures through discussions with regulators from third countries by means of the strategies laid down 
in this book, the large size of the Single Market, the regulatory capacity of the Commission and the 
stringency of EU regulations offer incentives for third countries to adopt or emulate EU legislation and 
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regulation. Diffusion may indirectly be promoted notably through the pursuit of information exchange 
with third-country regulators and the explanation of EU regulations. 
To sum up, the theoretical contribution of the Inter-relational Institutionalism deduced and elaborated 
in this book is twofold: First, it refines the domestic constraints on actors at the domestic-international 
interface in international cooperation. The integration of actor-centred institutionalism and the New 
Interdependence Approach allows re-specifying the domestic constraints which affect state and sub-
state actors beyond the immediate mobilisation of societal actors by adopting a focus on structural 
constraints. As a side-effect of this refinement of the domestic constraints with a view to structural, 
institutional constraints, this book has combined and reconciled previously separated literatures. Second, 
this book specifies an alternative, complementary theoretical micro-foundation for the engagement of 
state and sub-state actors in international cooperation beyond the existing micro-foundation offered by 
the Open Economy Politics and New Interdependence Approach literatures. This theoretical micro-
foundation and the specification of a corresponding causal mechanism takes into account a certain 
degree of autonomy for state and sub-state actors in international cooperation and considers their own 
preference for using interdependence as an opportunity structure. It relies on an incorporation of the 
variant of the principal-agent approach that emphasises variation in intra-agency dynamics as an 
explanatory factor.    
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7.3.2. Benefits and costs of bilateral regulatory cooperation  
 
In the introduction, this book has given an overview of the benefits that advocates of regulatory 
cooperation frequently underline. These benefits have been summarised as a) the protection and 
strengthening of standards for consumer safety, public health and environmental protection, b) the 
facilitation and liberalisation of trade flows, and c) the reduction of the workload for regulators and thus 
the promotion of regulatory efficiency in the face of budget cuts and austerity measures.  
This section investigates the real-world implications of the empirical confirmation of the predictions 
formulated by the Inter-relational Institutionalism. First, as a side-result of the empirical analyses, it 
examines the implications for the relevance of (bilateral) regulatory cooperation in promoting greater 
regulatory resource efficiency while promoting and strengthening standards for consumer safety, public 
health and environmental protection. Second, it briefly sheds light on the implications of bilateral 
regulatory cooperation for the democratic accountability of regulators. Third, it draws conclusions how 
different actors in the EU (and in other jurisdictions) can adjust their behaviour to make regulatory 
cooperation a promising endeavour that can promote the achievement of regulatory objectives and at 
the same time promote greater resource efficiency. These conclusions will particularly focus on societal 
actors and the politically appointed leaders of regulators, actors that have been identified as essential in 
this book.  
This book has admittedly not explicitly tested if bilateral regulatory cooperation leads to downward 
pressure on consumer safety, public health and environmental protection, the principal concerns 
expressed by critics and opponents of regulatory cooperation. Likewise, it has not measured the potential 
of regulatory cooperation to promote greater resource efficiency. Still, the confirmation of the 
predictions formulated by the Inter-relational Institutionalism allow drawing some conclusions with 
regard to the relevance of (bilateral) regulatory cooperation for downward pressure on safety, health and 
environmental standards as well as regulatory efficiency.  
The constraints exerted by regulatory compatibilities on the regulator’s choice of a regulatory 
cooperation strategy means that downward pressure on the stringency of regulation and the level of 
protection they ensure to the safety of consumers, public health or the environment is highly unlikely. 
In two out of the four cooperation strategies distinguished by this book, i.e. ‘regulatory alignment’ and 
the ‘alignment of implementation procedures’, regulators choose the strategy because they adhere to a 
regulatory principle that is compatible with the regulatory principle(s) shaping the regulations the 
responsible regulators in the third country. This implies that they share a similar definition of a 
regulatory problem and conceivable approaches to solving this regulatory problem even if the eventual 
solution subsequently differs. Under ‘equivalence’, regulators demand or verify that the level of 
protection guaranteed by status quo regulations is not undermined. Under the pursuit of ‘information 
exchange’, the substance of domestic regulations and implementation procedures is not affected.  
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The conclusions drawn in the last paragraph cannot exclude that the scientific assessment used to 
determine the level of consumer, health or environmental protection ensured by domestic regulations 
inadequately assesses the level of protection delivered by status quo. Scientific enquiries to measure the 
level of protection ensured by domestic and foreign regulations may be designed along the approaches 
and problem understandings underlying either domestic or foreign regulations or may be contingent on 
contextual factors specific to either jurisdiction272. Moreover, the ‘appropriate’ level of protection for 
consumers, health or the environment is often difficult to ascertain as status quo regulations may also 
be subject to over-regulation. Lowering e.g. the permitted maximum residue levels for a given substance 
in fruits or vegetables may not entail effects for the protection of public health or the environment if 
available scientific evidence suggests that the substance is not detrimental to either human health or the 
environment at the new maximum level either273.    
As ‘regulatory alignment’ is unlikely to be frequently chosen by regulators in bilateral regulatory 
cooperation for the reasons discussed in this book and the other strategies leave the substance of 
regulations unchanged, regulatory cooperation in practice is unlikely to have a large impact on the level 
of protection for consumers, health or the environment. This means that regulatory cooperation is 
unlikely to directly raise standards274. Crucially, however, it can be rather safely concluded that the 
constraints which regulatory compatibilities impose on the choice of a regulatory cooperation strategy 
make sure that regulators do not accidentally lower regulatory stringency or the level of protection 
ensured domestically as a direct result of bilateral regulatory cooperation275.        
Implications of bilateral regulatory cooperation can be assumed to be larger for administrative 
efficiency. Again, it must be acknowledged that the determination of administrative efficiency increases 
resulting from bilateral regulatory cooperation has not been the object of this book. There is good reason 
to assume that the sharing of regulatory tasks between domestic and foreign regulators reduces the 
workload for each regulator individually. Interviewees consulted for this book largely confirmed this 
assumption. Yet, no quantitative assessment is possible how coordination through bilateral regulatory 
                                                     
272 One interview partner (Interview 5) explained that the level of protection ensured by car safety regulations in 
the EU and the US is difficult to compare based on traffic accident data. Roads in the US tend to be wider than the 
EU, leading to a lower density of traffic compared to traffic density in the EU. Lower traffic rates in the US may 
thus equally reflect different (and potentially preferable road designs in the US) just as higher safety standards 
entailed by US car safety regulations. Analytically, the two effects are, however, difficult to disentangle given 
available accident statistics.   
273 For a further reflection of these considerations see also (Vogel, 2012: 25).  
274 For the increase in standards across jurisdictions, diffusion processes and ‘cross-national layering’ as described 
by the New Interdependence Approach is likely to be much more important than bilateral regulatory cooperation. 
However, bilateral regulatory cooperation may support and reinforce diffusion processes through the 
institutionalisation and strengthening of information exchange and socialisation between domestic and foreign 
regulators.   
275 This paragraph has only discussed the direct effects of bilateral regulatory cooperation. It cannot draw solid 
conclusions on indirect implications of bilateral regulatory cooperation for regulatory stringency and the level of 
protection. Indirect effects can occur e.g. as the decisions of regulators are shaped and influenced by their 
exchanges with foreign regulators. While there is little reason to assume that regulator preferences should change 
as a result of information exchanges, a solid conclusion on this question requires further scientific investigation.   
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cooperation reduces the workload for regulators. The empirical analyses conducted for this book do not 
allow drawing inferences for the balance between time invested into the coordination and time savings 
due to the distribution and sharing of regulatory tasks, i.e. the assessment of priority chemicals, between 
domestic and foreign regulators. Yet, even if the empirical analyses collected for this book do not include 
definite evidence to which extent bilateral regulatory cooperation enhances administrative efficiency, 
they offer corroborating evidence why bilateral regulatory cooperation is very likely to increase 
administrative efficiency. First, the constraints imposed by regulatory compatibilities on the choice of a 
regulatory cooperation strategy ensures that regulators concentrate regulatory cooperation onto issues 
and questions where they share similar problem definitions and competences with foreign regulators. 
This reduces the likelihood that regulators engage in regulatory cooperation that is unlikely to deliver 
any outcomes, but only consumes time resources that regulators could better invest into domestic 
regulatory projects and processes. Second, the gains in legitimacy that regulators expect and obtain from 
societal actors that benefit from the decisions under bilateral regulatory cooperation mean that these 
societal actors should reduce lobbying efforts in seeking to change status quo regulations or 
implementation procedures. This entails that regulators need to spend less time in defending their 
regulatory decisions and processes to domestic and foreign societal actors. Moreover, as the legitimacy 
of decisions and processes increases, societal actors are less likely to engage in shirking to circumvent 
the requirements and objectives of regulations. Regulators may therefore need to invest less resources 
into enforcement and market surveillance to ensure that societal actors comply with their regulations 
and implementation procedures.  
Given the relevance of the support of societal actors for the engagement in and pursuit of bilateral 
regulatory cooperation, bilateral regulatory cooperation is unlikely to negatively affect the democratic 
accountability of regulators. The empirical chapters have demonstrated that the Commission has 
continuously consulted with societal actors to identify issues for regulatory cooperation. If at all, the 
engagement and pursuit of regulatory cooperation enhances the accountability of regulators as regulators 
reach out to societal actors to identify issues for their agenda-setting activities.  
This argument is notwithstanding to the broader concerns of a lack of democratic accountability of 
regulators, including in domestic regulatory policy-making. Although in the EU the Commission is very 
open to all types of societal actors and is required to justify its decisions to them (Kohler-Koch & Eising, 
2011), it maintains discretion in setting the agenda and pursuing priorities in line with its own 
preferences. Moreover, the literature on EU interest groups discusses if the openness of the Commission 
towards societal actors disproportionately benefits business actors at the expense of NGOs and civil 
society organisations. As regulatory policy-making is highly technical, openness may offer higher 
benefits to those actors able to provide technical resources, i.e. business associations and firms (Klüver, 
2012; Bouwen, 2004).Yet, this argument applies to regulatory policy-making in general and is not 
specific regulatory cooperation. Regulatory cooperation may strengthen the access of business actors to 
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regulatory policy-making. It may, however, also create new opportunities for NGOs to contribute to 
regulatory policy-making, in particular as consultations of the regulator, i.e. the Commission in the EU, 
become institutionalised even on issues previously not subject to formal consultations. At the time of 
writing, the effects of regulatory cooperation on the democratic accountability of regulators are still 
difficult to measure given the lack of empirical data. Yet, it can be safely assumed that regulatory 
cooperation does not lower the democratic accountability of regulators relative to purely domestic 
regulatory policy-making, even if it may substantially enhance it.           
The findings of this book thus entail some implications for actors in the real world to make the 
engagement in bilateral regulatory cooperation promising and effective. These implications particularly 
address societal actors and political leaders of regulators: 
Societal actors should understand bilateral regulatory cooperation as an opportunity to protect, if not in 
certain cases raise regulatory standards while facilitating trade276. They should therefore offer regulators 
technical knowledge and expertise that the latter need to pursue regulatory cooperation successfully. 
This applies in particular to business associations and firms with transnational activities. These firms 
are an important source of technical information for regulators because they have high technical 
knowledge of foreign regulations due to their need to comply with foreign regulations if they want to be 
active transnationally. Yet, firms and business associations should understand that the depth and 
dimension of regulatory cooperation they can expect is constrained by the compatibilities of regulatory 
institutions. Their demands for ‘regulatory alignment’ will therefore be inactive where domestic and 
foreign regulatory institutions are incompatible. On the contrary, lobbying demands for ‘regulatory 
alignment’ may be counter-productive to effective regulatory cooperation if they mobile opposition by 
NGOs and thus require regulators to invest their (limited) resources into defending the pursuit of 
regulatory cooperation. Instead, firms and business associations should appreciate the value of 
regulatory cooperation strategies which are less deep and far-reaching than ‘regulatory alignment’ and 
maintain their support to regulators for the pursuit of these strategies.  
Bilateral, like international, regulatory cooperation is a complicated process and requires empirical 
assessments of regulators as well as persuasion efforts in order to be successful. Firms and business 
associations should not drop their support if their most preferred outcome cannot be reached due to 
‘structural’ constraints, i.e. regulatory incompatibilities. At the same time, they should not drop their 
support for ambitious regulatory cooperation efforts, i.e. those aiming at ‘regulatory alignment’ or 
‘equivalence’, where these are ‘structurally’ feasible in exchange for short-term benefits from lower-
hanging fruits that are easier to achieve. This remains in particular a challenge for business associations 
                                                     
276 As bilateral regulatory cooperation is restricted to jurisdictions with sufficient regulatory capacity (Damro, 
2012; Bach & Newman, 2007), it is more likely to occur between developed economies. This means that trade 
liberalisation will liberalise intra-industry trade. Intra-industry trade liberalisation does not produce the negative 
effects on labour standards and workers’ wages commonly associated with inter-industry trade liberalisation (e.g. 
Rodrik, 2005).   
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that need to convince firm representatives internally to raise regulatory cooperation objectives and 
provide technical input to regulators in lobbying papers and face-to-face exchanges with regulators277. 
Unless business associations and firms provide technical knowledge and support to regulatory 
cooperation initiatives, regulators may struggle to find regulatory cooperation an activity that enhances 
their legitimacy vis-à-vis societal actors. 
Important real-world implications also exist for political leaders, in particular the political and 
administrative leadership of regulators. These should express their support for bilateral regulatory 
cooperation and adopt regulatory cooperation as a priority. In the EU, this corresponds to the 
Commissioners and Directors General of the Directorates-General of the Commission. Yet, these 
implications can also be extended to other political leaders, i.e. legislatures or executive leaders. These 
include the heads of state or government in the European Council or the Commission President in the 
EU. Political support of these actors is not only important because technical regulatory officials may see 
regulatory cooperation as a distraction and additional burden on top of their regulatory responsibilities 
(Pollack, 2005). It is also essential as high-level support reduces uncertainty among technical officials. 
Besides, high-level political support increases the likelihood that foreign regulatory officials will 
respond to cooperation offers of domestic regulators. Even if technical Commission officials in the EU 
share the perception of benefits from regulatory cooperation which are emphasised by advocates of 
regulatory cooperation, they may be unwilling to engage in efforts if foreign regulatory officials are 
unresponsive to their strategies and activities. High-level political support entails that political leaders, 
i.e. Commissioners and Directors General, address regulatory cooperation in their exchanges with their 
foreign counterparts and thus work towards the emergence demands of foreign political leaders towards 
foreign regulators to engage in regulatory cooperation. This constrains the discretion of foreign 
regulatory officials to reject offers for regulatory cooperation. As a consequence, technical officials can 
expect effective responses of foreign officials to their cooperation strategies and may be more willing 
to mobilise resources in favour of the pursuit of regulatory cooperation. Political support for regulatory 
cooperation also in the EU is particularly important as perceived similarities between the EU and other 
third countries, notably the US, sink and regulatory officials may be inclined to adopt a more inward 
focus.    
In sum, this section has discussed the empirical implications of the findings of this book. It has argued 
that the constraints imposed by regulatory compatibilities on regulators’ choice of a regulatory 
cooperation strategy makes it highly unlikely that bilateral regulatory cooperation lowers the level of 
protection for consumer safety, public health and the environment, but rather improves it. Moreover, it 
has offered corroborating evidence from regulators’ consideration of regulatory cooperation as an 
opportunity structure why regulatory cooperation likely enhances administrative efficiency. It has 
                                                     
277 Interviewees who requested to remain anonymous emphasised that obtaining firm support for regulatory 
cooperation has been a great challenge for business associations in the TTIP negotiations.  
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concluded that even if regulatory cooperation may not enhance the democratic accountability of 
regulators, the crucial role played by societal actors in agenda-setting and legitimacy ensures that the 
democratic accountability of regulators is not undermined by regulatory cooperation. Lastly, it has 
proposed implications especially for societal actors and the political leadership of regulators in order to 
make bilateral regulatory cooperation effective and promising.   
 
7.4. Summary  
 
The engagement in bilateral regulatory cooperation plays an increasingly important role especially for 
the EU as a result of its ambition to export its standards on consumer safety, health and environmental 
protection while liberalising trade. The academic literature on regulatory cooperation focuses primarily 
on the strategies and constraints of the EU in multilateral regulatory cooperation in international 
organisations. Policy-oriented literature on regulatory cooperation also addresses challenges and 
obstacles for the EU in bilateral regulatory cooperation. However, comprehensive and systematic 
analyses on the constraints that the EU reflects in the formulation of strategies for bilateral regulatory 
cooperation are largely lacking. This book has addressed this gap in the literature and as its main 
contribution has investigated the constraints that the Commission faces and considers in the formation 
and choice of a bilateral regulatory cooperation strategy. It addressed the main research question ‘What 
constrains the choice and formation of a bilateral regulatory cooperation strategy?’ This book is thus the 
first study in the political science literature that systematically examines and tests factors that determine 
the choice of a regulator with high regulatory capacity such as the Commission among different bilateral 
regulatory cooperation strategies.   
Following the assumption of the New Interdependence Approach that interdependence creates 
incentives for regulators to cooperate internationally to prevent policy erosion under rule overlap, this 
book has combined the two currently dominant approaches in governance and interdependence research, 
the New Interdependence Approach and actor-centred institutionalism. This choice reflects the notion 
that a combination of both approaches should overcome the limitations with regard to the puzzle 
addressed by this book that each approach encounters taken individually. From this combination of two 
approaches, this book has deduced a new integrative analytical framework, the Inter-relational 
Institutionalism. This Inter-relational Institutionalism puts forward that the formation and choice of a 
regulator with high regulatory capacity among different bilateral regulatory cooperation strategies is 
constrained by the presence of bureaucratic pressure, the compatibility of domestic and foreign 
regulatory institutions and the mobilisation of societal actors.  
To test the Inter-relational Institutionalism, this book analysed the Commission’s choice of regulatory 
cooperation strategies with the United States in four industry sectoral regimes for three different 
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transatlantic cooperation initiatives between 1995 and 2016. The analysis of the formation of the 
Commission’s cooperation strategies in the chemicals, engineering, food safety and ICT sectoral 
regimes during the NTA, the TEC and the TTIP negotiations showed how the involvement of 
Commissioners and the DG Trade initiated the formation of cooperation strategies. It also showed that 
the choice among different regulatory cooperation strategies is constrained by the structural, institutional 
factors which have been captured by the concept of ‘regulatory compatibilities’.  
The analysis showed that in the absence of bureaucratic pressure, technical Commission officials have 
preferred to concentrate their limited resources on domestic regulation and only exchange information 
with US regulators on an ad-hoc basis. Yet, when Commissioners, top-level officials and non-technical 
DGs raise bureaucratic pressure to initiate cooperation, the discretion of technical officials to concentrate 
resources only on EU regulation fell. While individual Commissioners and DG Trade have tended to 
see regulatory cooperation as an opportunity structure to enhance EU policies and procedures and create 
additional benefits for societal actors, technical officials have also looked at regulatory cooperation as a 
distraction of limited resources from domestic regulatory priorities. The willingness of technical 
officials to engage in bilateral regulatory cooperation with the US has also been obstructed by low 
success prospects as US regulators have often not shared the EU’s enthusiasm for regulatory 
cooperation. Yet, with the emergence of demands to evaluate opportunities for regulatory cooperation 
they followed the priority set by Commissioners and non-technical DGs and have formed strategies for 
transatlantic regulatory cooperation beyond information exchange.  
It has been demonstrated that the extent of regulatory cooperation, conceptualised as the ‘depth’ and 
‘dimension’ of cooperation by this book, that a regulator with high regulatory capacity envisages with 
another large jurisdiction is shaped by two regulatory institutional constraints. These constraints are the 
compatibility of domestic and foreign regulatory authority structures and the compatibility of domestic 
and foreign regulatory principles. While the Commission welcomes the opportunity to expand its 
influence internationally, it has been wary about giving rise to additional domestic veto players that 
might undermine its status quo discretion. Besides, although Commission officials have been keen on 
exporting its regulatory principles and approaches, they have been cautious to recognise policy solutions 
that might be seen by legislators and societal actors as undermining regulatory approaches enshrined in 
EU legislation. The study concluded that these institutional constraints play a greater role in constraining 
the Commission’s choice than the cooperation in international organisation, previous socialisation 
between EU and US regulators and the extent of societal contestation.  
The study has also re-conceptualised the role played by societal actors, i.e. firms, business associations 
and NGOs, in regulatory cooperation. In contrast to many contributions to the Open Economy Politics 
literature that see societal contestation mainly as a constraint on the autonomy of government and state 
actors and explain strategies of the latter with an aggregation of societal preferences, this study has 
shown that societal actors also support the engagement in regulatory cooperation. They provide technical 
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expertise and give legitimacy to the pursuit of regulatory cooperation. At the same time, strategies 
chosen by regulators do not only reflect an aggregation of societal preferences. Societal preferences fail 
to affect the strategy choice where their demands exceed the constraints set by regulatory 
compatibilities.  
The integration of actor-centred institutionalism and the New Interdependence Approach re-specifies 
the domestic constraints affecting state and sub-state actors in international cooperation by focussing on 
structural constraints. These structural constraints emanate both from the distribution of competences in 
a jurisdiction as well as the ideas on regulatory objectives and approaches that have become 
institutionalised in legislation. Second, it specifies an alternative, complementary theoretical micro-
foundation for the engagement of state and sub-state actors in international cooperation. It takes into 
account a certain degree of autonomy for state and sub-state actors in international cooperation and 
considers their own preference for using interdependence as an opportunity structure. Certain points of 
criticism towards regulatory cooperation can be soothed. The constraints imposed by regulatory 
compatibilities on regulators’ choice of a strategy make it highly unlikely that bilateral regulatory 
cooperation lowers the level of protection for consumer safety, public health and the environment. 
Instead, the results imply why bilateral regulatory cooperation may enhance administrative efficiency 
without undermining the democratic accountability of legislators and regulators.    
With regard to the EU, the findings of this study generally support bureaucratic politics explanations of 
the Commission’s behaviour. Irrespective of the level of societal contestation and the potential position 
of member states in the Council and the European Parliament, the study confirmed that preferences and 
priorities do not only differ across Commission DGs, but implied that they also differ between technical 
officials and politically appointed Commissioners. Taking into consideration the nature and use of inter-
service consultations, these differences in preferences and positions are likely to concern decision-
making in the Commission more broadly. As regulatory bureaucracies become established and 
functionally internally differentiated, discussions between bureaucratic divisions approximate and 
resemble the discussions within legislatures and among societal actors.  
Future research on the formation of regulatory cooperation strategies could further address these issues 
and expand the empirical scope of this book. It would be worthwhile to investigate if the 
institutionalisation of bilateral regulatory cooperation of the EU with other third countries, including 
Japan and Canada, furthers opens up technical officials to bilateral regulatory cooperation and leads 
them to pursue strategies of ‘regulatory alignment’ and ‘equivalence’ even in the absence of bureaucratic 
pressure. Future investigations could also verify the constraints identified by this book that shape the 
choice of cooperation strategies. Research projects could also address the question why some societal 
actors fail to form stable transnational coalitions although their high degree of economic 
internationalisation would suggest an alignment of preferences and priorities. Lastly, future research 
could aim at addressing the unexamined link between strategy formation and strategy success: Does 
Conclusion 
310 
 
increasing understanding of regulatory compatibilities between the EU and a third country, e.g. the US, 
lead the Commission to propose issues for cooperation which also attract the interest of third-country 
regulators?  
Regulatory cooperation between jurisdictions with mature regulatory systems entails the confrontation 
and comparison of highly differentiated institutional structures of authority allocation and problem-
solving approaches that developed divergently in path-dependent ways over an extended time. 
‘Regulatory alignment’ across numerous policy fields between these differentiated institutional 
structures is thus neither realistic nor often desirable. The elimination of ‘unnecessarily’ divergent 
decisions within the constraints of regulatory compatibilities is arguably more effectively addressed 
through repeated efforts between regulators to exchange information on envisaged legislative projects 
and to develop a mutual understanding of the institutional structures and problem-solving approaches. 
Especially firms and business associations should recognise the potential of structured, institutionalised 
information exchange between regulators and support it correspondingly. This could pave the way for 
more effective and promising regulatory cooperation, both international and bilateral, in the future.  
With the continuation of interdependence despite the recently proclaimed ‘populist backlash’ against 
globalisation with the election of US President Trump, bilateral regulatory cooperation will remain an 
important issue for the EU. This applies not only to third countries whose attractiveness as a cooperation 
partner for the EU has risen since 2016, i.e. Canada and Japan, but also and especially with the US. The 
high levels of economic and continued political interdependence between the EU and the US make 
addressing regulatory divergences and their implications for policy erosion and/or trade impediment 
hard for the Commission to ignore. The prospect of budget cuts not only for regulatory agencies in the 
US under the Trump Administration, but also likely budget cuts for the Commission after the missing 
contributions of the UK to the EU budget after Brexit raise the relevance of regulatory burden-sharing 
between mature regulatory systems such as the EU and the US.  
There is not (yet) a general ‘best practice’ to make bilateral regulatory cooperation more effective. The 
reliance on scientific comparisons of regulatory requirements and estimation of their comparability in 
the level of consumer, health and environmental protection they achieve heralded by some scholars 
(Messerlin, 2014) has failed to improve regulators’ mutual understanding of the reasons underlying 
distinct authority allocations and regulatory principles in other jurisdictions. At the same time, the 
connection of regulatory cooperation with trade negotiations in the context of TTIP has arguably 
contributed to creating an impression among some regulators that regulatory cooperation is mainly about 
making trade easier, not making regulations and implementation procedures better. While continued 
information exchange between regulators may contribute to avoid some ‘unnecessarily divergent’ or 
duplicative requirements, the defence of regulatory principles by established societal actors, the 
autonomy of legislators to adopt divergent decisions and the path-dependent development of 
institutional structures make many regulatory incompatibilities there to stay. Moreover, despite 
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continued socialisation and exchanges among EU and US regulators, political considerations and the 
employment of ‘tit-for-tat’ strategies remain inextricably linked to the conduct of regulatory 
cooperation. At the end of the day, regulatory cooperation is not only a technically complex exercise, it 
is utterly political.           
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Annex  
 
Annex 1: List of interviews 
 
Interview 1 Commission Official, DG Grow, Brussels, 28 October 2016 
Interview 2 Industry Official, Verband der Chemischen Industrie, Brussels, 20 October 2016 
Interview 3 Industry Official, Cefic, Brussels, 23 August 2016 
Interview 4 Commission Official, DG Trade, Brussels, 22 June 2016 
Interview 5 Commission Official, DG Grow, Brussels, 23 August 2016 
Interview 6 Industry Official, Orgalime / VDMA, Frankfurt, 11 January 2017 
Interview 7 Commission Official, DG Sante, Brussels, 2 December 2017 
Interview 8 Commission Official, DG Trade, Brussels, 15 December 2016 
Interview 9 Industry Official, freshfel, Brussels, 18 January 2017 
Interview 10 Industry Official, UECBV, Brussels, 2 February 2017 
Interview 11 Industry Official, Deutscher Bauernverband, phone, 2 September 2017 
Interview 12 Commission Official, DG Trade, Brussels, 19 January 2017   
Interview 13 Commission Official, DG Connect, Brussels, 28 November 2016 
Interview 14 Industry Official, Digitaleurope, Brussels, 24 August 2016 
Interview 15 Industry Official, Digitaleurope, Brussels, 1 September 2016 
Interview 16 Commission Official, DG Trade, Brussels, 24 August 2016 
Interview 17 Ministry Official, Federal Ministry of Economics, Berlin, 6 July 2015 
Interview 18 Industry Official, Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie, Berlin, 12 August 2015 
Interview 19 Industry Official, Deutscher Industrie- und Handelskammertag, Berlin, 13 May 2015 
Interview 20 Ministry Official, Federal Ministry of Economics, Berlin, 14 August 2015 
Interview 21 Industry Representative, VDMA, Cologne, 30 January 2015 
Interview 22 Industry Representative, Die Familienunternehmer, Cologne, 3 February 2015 
Interview 23 Industry Representative, DIHK, Cologne, 9 April 2015 
Interview 24 Industry Official, Die Familienunternehmer, Berlin, 13 May 2015 
Interview 25 Industry Official, Bundesverband der mittelständischen Wirtschaft, 7 July 2015  
Interview 26 Industry Official, Verband der Automobilindustrie, Berlin, 12 May 2015  
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Annex 2: Samples of interview questionnaires 
 
Commission Official, Food Safety  
• How long have you followed SPS issues? Which processes have you followed in cooperation 
with the US? Mechanisms/Fora  
 
Actors 
• Which processes have contributed to the formation of the Commission’s position? 
• How were you involved in these processes? 
• Why did you participate in these processes? What has been your interest? How do you assess 
your influence in these processes?  
• Which other DGs participate in RC on food safety? What is their interest?  
• Do other actors in the EU influence TRC on food issues? Member States? EP? 
• What is the interest of US actors on TRC (USDA, APHIS, IFIS, FDA, EPA)? Are there 
differences in their interest on TRC? 
• Have there been other influences?  
 
Societal Actors 
• Does the lack of agreement among US and EU agricultural groups impede TRC? Is there 
alignment among processed food producers? Which are the leading / most relevant groups?   
• Has the interest of businesses in TRC changed over time?  
• Have NGOs affected TRC? How? 
 
Processes 
• Through which bilateral fora does the EU engage with the US (ex. TATFAR)?  
• How do multilateral and bilateral talks affect each other? 
 
Topics  
• Please describe the US regulatory approach on risk assessment and risk management. How do 
you think that it differs from the EU approach on this issue?  
• Why did you take a negative position on pathogen reduction treatments? Have there been 
internal debates on the EU approach on this?  
• What impedes further equivalence of food standards? Is US less ambitious on implementing 
equivalence (“knowledge acquired through experience with the other Party’s competent 
authorities”)  
• Why has there been no agreement on Grade A? (since 2002)  
• Does US reject facilitating MRCA in the audits paragraph? 
• Why has AMR entered the TTIP negotiations rather late? Is there tension between EU and US 
on AMR standards in Codex? 
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Commission Official, Information and Communications Technology 
 
• How long have you followed transatlantic regulatory cooperation (TRC)? Which processes 
have you followed? 
 
Actors 
• Which processes have contributed to the formation of the Commission’s position? 
• How were you involved in these processes? Who has set agenda topics for the Transatlantic 
Economic Council? 
• Why did you participate in these processes? What has been your interest? How do you assess 
your influence in these processes?  
• Which other DGs participate in RC on ICT? What is their interest?  
• Do other actors in the EU influence TRC on ICT issues? Member States? EP? 
• What is the interest of US actors on TRC (USTR, FCC)? Are there differences in their interest 
on TRC? 
• Have there been other influences?  
 
Societal Actors 
• From your perception, do EU and US firms and business associations agree in their positions 
on TRC? 
• Has the interest of businesses in TRC changed over time? Has this affected TRC? How? 
• Have NGOs affected TRC? How? 
 
Processes 
• The Information Society Dialogue has been interrupted between 2010 and 2014. Why? Why 
has it been taken up again? What is the objective of this dialogue? How does it relate to the 
sectoral regulatory dialogues envisioned in the TTIP negotiations? 
• How do multilateral and bilateral talks affect each other? 
 
Topics  
• The Transatlantic Economic Council has agreed on common standards on e-Health. How has 
this agreement been achieved? Why was an agreement on common standards possible in the 
case of e-Health? 
• Discussions have been ongoing on common standards on e-Labelling since the early days of 
the TEC. Why have these discussions not yet led to common standards? Why has the EU 
decided to set its own standard on e-Labelling for medical devices in 2013? How has this 
decision affected the discussions on e-Labelling in TTIP? 
• Could you describe the US approach on e-accessibility? How do you compare it to the EU 
approach?  
• Why have Cloud Computing and Internet of Things not been put on the agenda of the TTIP? 
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Annex 3: EU exports to the US 2016 by industry sector 
 
Industry Sector EU exports to the US, 2016 
value in millions of Euro 
 
Engineering 60729,1 
Pharmaceuticals 48263,6 
Information and Communications Technology 37369,3 
Chemicals 32658,9 
Automotive 22367,6 
Food 18389,8 
Raw Materials 10061,4 
Textiles 6601,8 
Own calculation, source: Eurostat (2017) 
 
Industry Sector Standard International Trade 
Classification (SITC) sections  
Engineering 72,73,74, 77 
Pharmaceuticals 54 
Information and Communications Technology 75, 76  
+ “Information, 
Telecommuncations and Computer 
Services” (OECD, 2017) 
Chemicals 51,52,53,55,56,59 
Automotive 71  
Food 01-19, 22 
 
Raw Materials 32,33,34,35 
Textiles 83,84,85 
Own calculation, source: Eurostat (2017)  
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Annex 4: EU imports of US products and exports to the US, 2006-2016 
 
Source: Own calculation (Eurostat, 2017; OECD, 2017)  
  
 
EU imports of US products in millions of euros  
Sector 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Food 6308 6839 7467 5545 6996 7663 7720 9179 9831 11519 10793 
Chemicals 15191 17307 17071 13910 17560 17140 17476 17659 17233 19812 19253 
Pharmaceuticals 15416 14261 14511 16468 17256 19149 22035 21141 23803 31149 31678 
Automotive 13793 14615 14903 15275 16694 18063 20626 21014 21533 26347 28826 
Engineering 25847 25567 25419 19742 23409 24370 24924 24273 25985 30613 30396 
ICT 17154 16506 13221 8831 22143 22603 24765 25264 26625 27223 28849 
            
            
EU exports to US in millions of euros  
Sector 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Food 11376 11222 10031 9266 10792 11954 13499 13814 14595 17314 18390 
Chemicals 27566 26090 25453 23915 26716 27945 29725 27813 27215 34164 32659 
Pharmaceuticals 23525 25907 24489 27304 30480 30722 32988 30055 35535 49803 48264 
Automotive 14798 16216 16252 13725 15717 17880 20364 19487 21499 24430 22368 
Engineering 43597 42534 40067 29688 34903 42537 48007 47772 52531 60156 60729 
ICT 9633 8383 7689 6907 19777 21846 25313 26105 30493 34284 37369 
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Annex 5: SPS legal text comparison: EU TTIP SPS proposal and US TTIP SPS proposal 
 
Title EU TTIP US TTIP 
 
Comments 
Objectives The objectives of this chapter are 
to: 
 
1.Facilitate trade between the 
Parties to the greatest extent 
possible while preserving each 
Party’s right to protect human, 
animal or plant life and health in its 
territory and respecting each Party’s 
regulatory systems, risk assessment, 
risk management and policy 
development processes;  
2. Ensure that the Parties’ sanitary 
and phytosanitary (SPS) measures 
do not create unnecessary barriers 
to trade;  
3. Further the implementation of the 
WTO Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (WTO SPS 
Agreement); 
4. Build upon and extend the scope 
of the Veterinary Agreement which 
is fully integrated in this Chapter; 
5. Improve communication and 
cooperation on sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures between the 
Parties; 
6. Improve consistency, 
predictability and transparency of 
each Party’s SPS measures; 
7. Provide a framework for 
dialogue and cooperation with a 
view to enhancing the protection 
and welfare of animals and reaching 
a common understanding 
concerning animal welfare 
standards.  
 
 EU: 
Specific mention of respect 
for each Party’s regulatory 
systems, differentiation and 
mentioning of risk 
assessment, risk management 
and policy development 
More ambitious on furthering 
the implementation of the 
SPS Agreement 
Mention of the Veterinary 
Agreement 
More ambitious on 
predictability and 
transparency 
Listing of animal welfare as a 
specific objective  
 
US:  
Less ambitious on SPS 
implementation 
Introduction of consultation 
of competent authorities 
Specific mention of adoption 
of international standards 
  
Scope and 
Coverage 
This Chapter applies to all SPS 
measures that may, directly or 
indirectly, affect trade between 
Parties.  
This Chapter shall also apply to 
collaboration on animal welfare 
matters.  
This Chapter, unless 
otherwise specified, applies 
to all SPS measures that may, 
directly or indirectly, affect 
trade between Parties.  
 
EU: inclusion of animal 
welfare 
Affirmation of 
the SPS 
Agreement 
(EU: Rights 
and 
Obligations) 
The Parties affirm their rights and 
obligations under the WTO SPS 
Agreement.  
 
Nothing in this Chapter shall limit 
the rights and obligations of the 
Parties under the Agreement 
established by the World Trade 
Organisation and its Annexes.  
 
The Parties shall avail themselves 
of the necessary resources to 
effectively implement this Chapter.   
 
The Parties affirm their rights 
and obligations with respect 
to each other under the WTO 
SPS Agreement. 
EU:  
specific mention of 
implementation of the SPS 
Chapter  
Competent 
Authorities  
For the purpose of this Chapter, the 
competent authorities of each Party 
Upon entry into force this 
Agreement, each Party shall 
US: 
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(US: and 
Contact Points)  
are those listed in (Annex 2). The 
Parties shall inform each other of 
any change of these competent 
authorities.   
provide the other Party with 
the following information in 
writing: 
(a) with respect to each of the 
Parties’ competent authorities 
that have responsibility for 
developing, implementing, 
and enforcing SPS measures 
that may affect trade between 
the Parties; 
a. a description of each 
authority, including the 
authority’s specific 
responsibilities, and  
b. a point of contact within 
each authority; and  
(b) the name and contact 
information for a 
representative of the Party 
with authority to accept 
correspondence or inquiries 
from the other Party 
regarding matters arising 
under this Chapter.  
   
Each Party shall promptly 
transmit to the other Party 
any material changes to this 
information.  
More extensive information 
requirements on competent 
authorities 
Equivalence The importing Party shall accept 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
of the exporting Party as equivalent 
to its own if the Party objectively 
demonstrates to the importing Party 
that its measures achieve the 
importing Party’s appropriate level 
of protection.  
Equivalence may be recognised in 
relation to an individual measure 
and/or groups of measures and/or 
systems applicable to a sector or 
part of a sector. For the 
determination, recognition and 
maintenance of equivalence the 
Parties shall follow the principles 
set out in the available guidance of 
international standard-setting 
bodies recognised by the WTO SPS 
Agreement, as well as in the 
provisions of (Annex IV), where 
applicable. 
 
The final determination whether a 
sanitary measure maintained by an 
exporting Party achieves the 
importing Party’s appropriate level 
of sanitary protection rests solely 
with the importing Party acting in 
accordance with its administrative 
and legislative framework. Where 
the importing Party has concluded a 
positive equivalence determination, 
the importing Party shall take the 
necessary legislative and/or 
administrative measures to 
Each Party recognises that 
determining that SPS 
measures of the other Party 
achieve an equivalent level of 
sanitary or phytosanitary 
protection as its own SPS 
measures can facilitate trade 
between the Parties. Each 
Party shall permit such 
determinations of 
equivalence to be made with 
respect to a specific measure, 
on the basis of a product or 
category of products or on a 
system-wide basis.  
Each Party, in determining 
whether an SPS measure of 
the other Party achieves the 
Party’s appropriate level of 
protection, shall take into 
account the following, where 
relevant: 
a. decisions of the WTO SPS 
Committee 
b. the work of the relevant 
international organisations; 
and 
c. knowledge acquired 
through experience with the 
other Party’s relevant 
competent authorities.   
Each Party shall follow the 
process set forth in Annex X-
A with respect to 
determinations of 
equivalence.  
 
EU: 
Specific mention that 
determination of equivalence 
rests solely with importing 
Party (but US implies the 
same) 
More ambitious 
implementation requirements 
of recognised equivalence 
Equivalence based on same 
level of protection  
Equivalence linked to trade 
facilitation 
US: 
more discretion in choosing 
methods for determining 
equivalence: importing Party 
may use knowledge acquired 
through experience with the 
other’s Party’s relevant 
authorities  
more discretion in 
implementation of 
recognising equivalence 
no mention of specific 
exclusive right of importing 
Party to determine 
equivalence (but implied) 
Equivalence shall not only be 
granted on same level of 
protection, but same effect  
However, importing Party 
needs to justify non-
recognition of equivalence  
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implement it without undue delay 
and normally within six months.  
If necessary and objectively 
justified, the Parties may identify 
special conditions which, in 
combination with the exporting 
Party’s measures, will achieve the 
importing Party’s appropriate level 
of protection.  
(Annex V) sets out: 
(a) The areas for which the 
importing Party recognises that the 
measures of the exporting Party are 
equivalent to its own, and 
(b) The areas for which the 
importing Party recognises that the 
fulfilment of the specified special 
conditions, combined with the 
exporting Party’s measures, achieve 
the importing Party’s appropriate 
level of protection.  
The Parties may agree on simplified 
sanitary or phytosanitary 
certificates for products for which 
equivalence has been recognised.  
Science and 
Risk 
 In undertaking a risk 
assessment appropriate to the 
circumstances, each Party 
shall ensure that it takes into 
account: 
(a) relevant available 
scientific evidence, including 
quantitative or qualitative 
data and information; and 
(b) relevant guidance from 
the WTO SPS Committee 
and international standards, 
guidelines, and 
recommendations concerning 
the risk at issue.  
 
Prior to adopting an SPS 
regulation, each Party shall 
evaluate- in light of results of 
any risk assessment that it 
undertook or relied upon in 
developing SPS regulation- 
any alternatives to achieve 
the appropriate level of 
protection being considered 
by the Party or identified 
through timely submitted 
public comments, including 
where raised, the alternative 
of not adopting any 
regulation. Each Party shall 
conduct such evaluation with 
a view to ensuring 
compliance with the Party’s 
obligation under 5.6 of the 
SPS Agreement.  
 
1.Each Party shall ensure that 
any risk assessment that it 
undertakes related to 
developing or reviewing an 
US: 
Weaker commitment to take 
into account available science 
into risk assessment  
Requirement to evaluate 
alternatives to individual SPS 
regulations to achieve the 
level of protection 
Notice and comment 
Requirement to discuss 
comments in the SPS 
Committee 
Risk assessment open for 
public review “under normal 
circumstances” 
Justification for regulation in 
light of available scientific 
evidence  
No mention of risk 
management  
 
TPP: more right to regulate 
(3(a) 
No formal justification 
requirements  
Notice-and-comment at the 
discretion of importing Party 
Only requires document risk 
analysis (not adoption of 
regulation)  
 
Perhaps “Science and Risk” 
article along TPP template?   
Annex 
358 
 
Title EU TTIP US TTIP 
 
Comments 
SPS regulation is under 
normal circumstances made 
available on the Internet for 
public review and comment. 
Each Party shall ensure that 
any of its competent 
authorities responsible for 
undertaking a risk assessment 
take into account any 
relevant comments the Party 
receives during the period 
afforded for interested parties 
to provide public comment, 
including where appropriate 
by revising the risk 
assessment. Each Party shall 
also ensure that any of its 
competent authorities that are 
responsible for undertaking 
the risk assessment or that 
may use it in connection with 
developing or reviewing an 
SPS regulation, shall, upon 
request, discuss with the 
other Party in a timely 
manner any matters the other 
Party raises in its comments 
related to the risk assessment, 
including possible 
alternatives to achieve the 
Party’s level of protection. 
 
2. At the time a Party makes 
a risk assessment available 
for public comment, it shall 
include the following 
explanations: 
 
3. When issuing or 
submitting any final 
administrative decision for an 
SPS regulation, the Party 
shall make publicly available 
on the Internet an explanation 
of: 
(a) the relationship between 
the regulation and the 
scientific evidence and 
technical information, 
including any risk assessment 
and any other analyses or 
information the regulatory 
authority considered in the 
preparing the regulation, as 
well as how the specific 
requirements set out in the 
regulation address the risks 
the regulation seeks to 
address; 
(a) any alternative identified 
through public comments, 
including by a Party, as 
significantly less restrictive 
to trade; and  
Where a regulatory authority 
of a Party submits a proposal 
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for an SPS measure for 
approval by a committee 
comprising national 
representatives and 
(a) the committee rejects or 
modifies the proposal; or 
(b) the regulatory authority of 
a Party modifies the proposal 
in response to feedback, 
including any rejection, from 
the committee each member 
of the committee or the 
regulatory authority of the 
Party, as the case might be, 
shall make publicly available 
an explanation of the basis 
for rejecting or modifying the 
proposal, including the extent 
to which it is supported by 
relevant scientific evidence 
and technical information and 
analysis, including any risk 
assessment.  
 
Each Party that provisionally 
adopts an SPS measure 
pursuant to Article 5.7 of the 
SPS Agreement that affects 
trade between Parties shall, 
upon request, explain: 
(a) to the extent possible, any 
alternatives significantly less 
restrictive to trade it 
considered and why it 
considered that any such 
alternatives do not achieve 
the Party’s appropriate level 
of protection or are not 
technically or economically 
feasible; 
(a) its view on any comments 
and information submitted by 
the other Party; 
(b) the additional information 
it believes  
(c)cunder which 
circumstances, and if 
possible when, it will review 
whether to maintain or 
modify the measure.  
 
This Article shall not apply 
with respect to any SPS 
measure that conforms to 
international standards, 
guidelines, or 
recommendations necessary 
for a more objective 
assessment of risk and plans 
for obtaining such 
information.  
Trans- 
parency 
Notification 
 
Each Party shall notify the other 
Party without undue delay of: 
1. During the time period 
described in paragraph 2, 
when a regulatory authority 
of a Party is developing an 
SPS regulation, it shall, under 
Rather diametrical  
 
EU: 
Notification of changes in 
pest/disease status, changes 
Annex 
360 
 
Title EU TTIP US TTIP 
 
Comments 
(a) significant changes in 
pest/disease status, such as the 
presence and evolution of diseases 
in {Annex II Process of 
Recognition of Regional 
Conditions}; 
(b) changes in their respective 
sanitary or phytosanitary measures; 
(c) findings of epidemiological 
importance with respect to animal 
diseases which are not in Annex II, 
or which are new diseases; 
(d) significant food safety issues 
relating to products traded between 
the Parties; and  
(any significant changes to the 
structure and organization of their 
competent authorities. 
 
Information exchange 
 
2. The Parties will endeavor to 
exchange information on other 
relevant issues including: 
(a) on request, the results of a 
Party's official controls and a report 
concerning the results of the 
controls carried out; 
(b) the results of import checks 
provided for in Article 13 {Import 
Checks and Fees} in case of 
rejected or non-compliant 
consignments of products; 
(c) on request, risk analyses and 
scientific opinions relevant to this 
Chapter and produced under 
responsibility of a Party. 
3. Unless otherwise decided by the 
Committee referred to in Article 18 
{Joint Management Committee}, 
when the information referred to in 
paragraph 1 or 2 has been made 
available via notification to the 
WTO or another relevant 
international standard-setting body 
in accordance with the relevant 
rules, the requirements in paragraph 
1 and 2 as they apply to that 
information are 
fulfilled. 
normal circumstances,4 make 
publicly available on the 
Internet: 
(a) the text of the regulation 
it is developing; 
(b) any risk assessment, as 
well as the scientific 
evidence and technical 
information and any other 
analyses and information the 
regulatory authority relied 
upon in support of the 
regulation and an explanation 
of how such evidence, 
information and analyses 
support the regulation; 
(c) an explanation of how the 
regulation, including its 
objectives, achieves those 
objectives, the rationale for 
the material features of the 
regulation, and any major 
alternatives being considered; 
and 
(d) the name and contact 
information of an official 
who may be contacted for 
questions regarding the 
regulation. 
 
2. Each Party shall make 
publicly available the 
information described in 
paragraph 1: 
(a) after the relevant 
authority of the Party has 
developed a text for the 
regulation that contains 
sufficient detail so as to allow 
persons to evaluate how the 
regulation, if adopted, would 
affect their interests; and 
(b) before the relevant 
authority of the Party that is 
developing the measure 
issues or submits any final 
administrative decision with 
respect to the regulation so 
that this authority may take 
into account timely received 
comments and, as 
appropriate, revise the 
regulation. 
 
3. Where a regulatory 
authority of a Party is 
developing an SPS regulation 
and makes publicly available 
the information described in 
paragraph 1, the Party shall 
ensure that any person, 
regardless of domicile, has an 
opportunity, on no less 
favorable terms than any 
person of the Party, to submit 
comments on the regulation, 
in SPS measures, findings on 
animal diseases, significant   
Only notification of changes 
in measures  
Endeavour for Information 
exchange on controls and 
rejected import consignments  
 
US: 
Notice and comment for 
proposed regulations 
No notification of changes in 
pest/disease status and 
changes in SPS measures 
(but included in TPP)    
No information exchange  
Annex 
361 
 
Title EU TTIP US TTIP 
 
Comments 
including by providing 
written comments and other 
input with respect to the 
information described in 
paragraph 1, to the regulatory 
authority. The Party shall 
promptly make publicly 
available any comments it 
receives on the regulation, 
except to the extent necessary 
to protect confidential 
information or withhold 
personal identifying 
information or inappropriate 
content, in which case the 
Party shall ensure it makes 
publicly available a version 
that redacts such information 
or a summary of the 
comment that does not 
contain such information. 
 
4. In determining the time 
period during which 
interested persons may 
submit comments on the 
regulation, each Party shall 
take into account the relevant 
decisions of the WTO SPS 
Committee. 
 
5. Where a regulatory 
authority of a Party issues 
any final administrative 
decision for an SPS 
regulation, each Party shall 
also make publicly available: 
(a) the text of the regulation; 
(b) an explanation of the 
regulation, including its 
objectives, and how the 
regulation achieves those 
objectives, and the rationale 
for the material features of 
the regulation (to the extent 
different from the 
explanation provided in 
accordance with paragraph 1 
(c)); 
(c) the regulatory authority's 
views on substantive issues 
raised in the comments; and 
(d) an explanation of the 
nature and the reason for any 
significant revisions to the 
regulation since the Party 
made it available for public 
comment. 
 
6. Each Party shall publish, in 
print or electronically, all 
final SPS regulations in a 
single official journal or 
website. Each Party shall 
publish in this single official 
journal or website the text of 
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any SPS regulation it is 
developing and that it makes 
publicly available in 
accordance with paragraphs 1 
and 2. 
Elimination of 
Redundant 
Controls 
The Parties recognize each other's 
competent authorities as responsible 
to ensure that establishment, 
facilities and products eligible for 
exports meet the applicable sanitary 
or phytosanitary requirements of 
the importing Party. 
 
2. The importing Party shall accept 
establishments or facilities that 
were authorized and listed by the 
exporting Party without re-
inspection, third party certification 
or any other additional guarantees. 
 EU: Proposal of MRA  
EU: Audits and 
Verification 
US: Audit and 
Inspections) 
1.In order to maintain confidence in 
the effective implementation of the 
provisions of this Chapter, each 
Party has the right to carry out an 
audit or verification, or both, of all 
or part of the other Party's control 
system. Audits shall follow a 
systems based approach which 
relies on the examination of a 
sample of system procedures, 
documents or records and, where 
required, a selection of sites. 
 
2. The nature and frequency of 
audits and verifications shall be 
determined by the importing Party 
taking into account the inherent 
risks of the product the track record 
of past import checks and other 
available information, such as 
audits and inspections undertaken 
by the competent authority of the 
exporting party. 
 
3. For the purpose of paragraph 1, 
the importing Party shall endeavor 
to rely on audits and verifications 
undertaken by the competent 
authority of the exporting Party. 
 
4. Audits and verifications shall be 
conducted in accordance with 
{Annex VII} and in line with 
internationally agreed guidelines5. 
 
5. Verification procedures may 
include, but are not limited to: 
(a) an assessment of all or part of 
the exporting Party's total control 
program, including, where 
appropriate, reviews of the 
exporting Party's inspection and 
audit programs, and 
(b) on-site checks and inspections 
of a selection of sites within the 
scope of the audit. 
 
1. Each Party shall conduct 
any audits of the other Party's 
competent authorities in 
accordance with Annex X-C. 
 
2. Each Party recognizes that, 
in order to verify compliance 
with applicable SPS 
measures and any applicable 
requirements agreed upon by 
the Parties, a Party may 
inspect premises, 
laboratories, and other 
relevant facilities in the other 
Party's territory.] 
EU:  
Accommodates US concerns 
on frequency and nature of 
audits and verifications 
Importing Party shall 
endeavour to rely on audits of 
exporting Party  
Measures taken in response 
to audits shall be taken in 
proportion to risk (mention of 
proportionality of action)  
 
US:  
No mention that importing 
Party shall endeavour to rely 
on audits of exporting Party  
Transparency requirements 
for audits  
Discretion in taking decisions 
and actions based on audits 
(knowledge of authorities, 
objective evidence) 
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6. For the European Union, the 
European Commission will carry 
out the verification procedures 
provided for in paragraph 1. The 
US agencies identified in {Annex I} 
shall facilitate the performance of 
these verification procedures by the 
Commission. 
 
7. The US agencies identified in 
Annex I will carry out the 
verification procedures provided for 
in paragraph 1 for the US. The 
European Union shall facilitate the 
performance of these verification 
procedures by those agencies. 
 
8. Any measures taken as a 
consequence of audits and 
verifications shall be proportionate 
to risks identified. If so requested, 
technical consultations regarding 
the situation shall be held in 
accordance with Article X.17 
{Technical Consultation}. The 
Parties shall consider any 
information provided through such 
consultations. 
 
9. Either Party may publish the 
results and conclusions of its 
verification procedures. 
 
10. Each Party shall bear its own 
costs associated with the audit or 
verification.] 
Regulatory 
Approvals for 
Products of 
Modern 
Agricultural 
Technology 
 1. Where a Party requires a 
product of modern 
agricultural technology to be 
approved or authorized prior 
to its importation, use or sale 
in its territory, the Party shall 
allow any person to submit 
an application for approval at 
any time. 
 
2. Where a Party requires a 
product of modern 
agricultural technology to be 
approved or authorized prior 
to its importation or sale in 
its territory, each Party shall 
make publicly available: 
(a) a description of the 
processes it applies to accept, 
consider, and decide 
applications for approval or 
authorization; 
(b) the competent authorities 
responsible for receiving and 
deciding applications for 
approval or authorization; 
(c) the timelines for 
completion of any steps or 
procedures in the approval or 
authorization; 
US:  
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(d) any documentation, 
information, or actions it 
requires from applicants as 
part of its approval or 
authorization processes; and 
under normal circumstances7 
each Party shall promptly 
make publicly available any 
risk assessment it conducts as 
part of an approval or 
authorization process for a 
product of modern 
agricultural technology. 
 
 
3. Each Party shall endeavor 
to meet applicable timelines 
for all steps in its approval or 
authorization processes for 
products of modern 
agricultural technology. 
Where a Party does not meet 
the timeline for a step in an 
approval or authorization 
process, upon request of the 
other Party, the Party shall 
provide a timely notification 
to the other Party explaining 
why the timeline for that step 
was not met and identify and 
update the timeline for all 
remaining steps in the 
approval or authorization 
process. 
 
4. Each Party shall avoid 
unnecessary duplication and 
burdens with respect to: 
(a) any documentation, 
information, or actions 
required of applicants as part 
of its approval or 
authorization processes for 
products of modern 
agricultural technology; and 
(b) any information the Party 
evaluates as part of the 
approval or authorization 
processes for products of 
modern agricultural 
technology. 
 
5. Each Party shall promptly 
publish any changes to its 
required approval or 
authorization processes or 
related requirements for 
products of modern 
agricultural technology. 
Except in urgent 
circumstances, each Party 
shall endeavor to provide a 
transition period between 
publication of any material 
changes to its approval or 
authorization processes or 
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related requirements for 
products or modern 
agricultural technology and 
their entry into force to allow 
interested persons to become 
familiar with and adapt to 
such changes, and endeavor 
to accommodate and avoid 
lengthening the approval or 
authorization process for 
applications that were 
submitted prior to publication 
of the changes. However, 
where the change reduces 
burdens on interested 
persons, entry into force 
should not be unnecessarily 
delayed. 
 
6. Each Party shall maintain 
mechanisms or processes that 
provide an applicant seeking 
approval or authorization for 
a product of modern 
agricultural technology to 
timely obtain: 
(a) information on the status 
of its application for approval 
or authorization; 
(b) answers to questions 
regarding the approval or 
authorization processes and 
regulatory requirements for 
approval; 
(c) notice that the Party 
requires clarification or 
additional information from 
the applicant; 
 
7. Each Party shall participate 
in the Global Low Level 
Presence Initiative to develop 
an approach or set of 
approaches to manage low-
level presence in order to 
reduce unnecessary 
disruptions affecting trade. 
 
8. The Parties hereby 
establish a Working Group 
on Trade in Products of 
Modern Agricultural 
Technologies (“Working 
Group”) to be co-chaired by 
representatives of each 
Party's trade agency. 
Each Party shall designate 
officials from its competent 
authorities, including 
officials from authorities that 
conduct or evaluate risk 
assessments in connection 
with applications for 
approval of products of 
modern agricultural 
technology, to participate in 
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the Working Group. The 
Working Group shall be a 
forum for the Parties to: 
(a) discuss specific measures 
or issues related to modern 
agricultural technologies that 
may affect, directly or 
indirectly, trade between the 
Parties; 
(b) discuss and resolve 
specific trade concerns 
arising from a measure of a 
Party affecting products of 
modern agricultural 
technology; 
(c) facilitate the exchange of 
information, including on 
laws, regulations and policies 
of each Party, related to the 
trade of products of modern 
biotechnology; and 
(d) consult on issues and 
positions related to 
international cooperative and 
standard-setting efforts 
related to modern agricultural 
technologies. 
 
The Working Group shall 
provide an annual report to 
the Joint Committee 
concerning its activities as 
well as any progress it has 
made toward resolving trade 
concerns raised by a Party. 
 
Import Checks  
EU: and Fees  
   
Application of 
SPS Measures 
Except as provided for in Article 
X.6 {Adaptation to regional 
conditions} each Party shall apply 
its sanitary or phytosanitary import 
conditions to the entire territory of 
the other Party. Where harmonized 
import conditions exist in one 
Party, these conditions shall apply 
to the entire territory of the 
exporting Party. 
 
Without prejudice to Article X.6 
{Adaptation to regional conditions} 
each Party shall ensure that 
products which are in conformity 
with these import conditions can be 
placed on the market and used in its 
entire territory on the basis of a 
single authorization, approval or 
certificate. 
 EU:  
SPS measures shall be 
applied to entire territory of 
the other Party  
(EU: Joint 
Management) 
Committee 
(US: on 
Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary 
Matters) 
1. The Parties hereby establish a 
Joint Management Committee 
(JMC) for SPS Measures, hereafter 
called the Committee, 
compromising regulatory and trade 
representatives of each Party who 
have responsibility for SPS 
measures. 
1. The Parties hereby 
establish a Committee on 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Matters (the “Committee”) 
compromising 
representatives of each Party. 
No later than {15}) days after 
the date of entry into force of 
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2. The functions of the Committee 
include: 
(a) To monitor the implementation 
of this Chapter and to consider any 
matter relating to this Chapter, and 
to examine all matters which may 
arise in relation to its 
implementation; 
(b) To provide direction for the 
identification, prioritization, 
management and resolution of 
issues; 
(c) To address any requests by the 
Parties for the modification of 
import checks; 
(d) To review the Annexes to this 
Agreement; 
(e) To provide a regular forum for 
exchanging information relating to 
each Party's regulatory 
system, including the scientific 
basis; 
(f) To prepare and maintain a 
document detailing the state of 
discussions between the Parties on 
their work on recognition of the 
equivalence of specific SPS 
measures. 
 
3. In addition, the Committee may, 
inter alia: 
(a) identify opportunities for greater 
bilateral engagement, including 
enhanced relationships, which may 
include exchanges of officials; 
(b) discuss at an early stage, 
changes to, or proposed changes to, 
measures being considered; 
(c) facilitate improved 
understanding between Parties 
related to the implementation of the 
WTO SPS Agreement, promoting 
cooperation between Parties on SPS 
issues under discussion in 
multilateral fora, including the 
WTO SPS Committee and 
international 
standard-setting bodies, as 
appropriate; 
(d) identify and discuss, at an early 
stage, initiatives that have an SPS 
component and would benefit from 
cooperation. 
 
4. The Committee may establish 
working groups consisting of 
expert-level representatives of the 
Parties, to address specific SPS 
issues. When additional expertise is 
needed, participants from 
nongovernmental organizations 
may be included, with the 
agreement of the parties. 
 
5. A Party may refer any SPS issue 
to the Committee. The Committee 
this Agreement, the Parties 
shall establish the 
Committee's terms of 
reference and identify 
through an exchange of 
letters the primary 
representative of each Party 
that shall serve as its co-chair 
on the Committee. Each 
Party shall ensure that its 
representatives on the 
Committee are the 
appropriate officials from its 
relevant trade agencies or 
ministries and competent 
authorities with responsibility 
for the development, 
implementation, and 
enforcement of SPS 
measures. The Committee 
shall meet at least once a 
year, unless the Parties 
decide otherwise. 
 
2. The functions of the 
Committee shall include: 
(a) enhancing each Party's 
implementation of this 
Chapter and facilitating the 
exchange of information on 
each Party's progress in 
implementing this Chapter; 
(b) consulting on issues and 
positions related to the 
meetings and work of the 
WTO SPS Committee, the 
International Plant Protection 
Convention (hereinafter 
“IPPC”), World Animal 
Health Organization 
(hereinafter “OIE”), and the 
Codex Alimentarius 
Commission (hereinafter 
“Codex”); 
(c) providing a forum for 
discussion of and reviewing 
progress on addressing 
specific trade concerns 
related to the application of 
SPS measures and other SPS 
matters with a view to 
reaching mutually acceptable 
solutions; 
(d) referring issues to 
technical working groups in 
support of work that the 
Committee considers to be a 
priority, establishing 
additional technical working 
groups, and eliminating 
technical working groups 
other than those established 
pursuant to Article X.13; 
(e) {approving any 
modifications to the Annexes 
of this Chapter}; and 
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should consider any matter referred 
to it as expeditiously as possible. 
 
6. In the event that the Committee 
is unable to resolve an issue 
expeditiously, the Committee shall, 
upon request of a Party, report 
promptly to the {TTIP Oversight 
Body}. {Pending outcome of 
institutional chapter}] 
 
7. Unless the Parties otherwise 
agree, the Committee shall meet 
and establish its work program no 
later than six months following the 
entry into force of this Agreement, 
and its rules of procedure no 
later than one year after the entry 
into force of this Agreement. 
 
8. Following its initial meeting, the 
Committee shall meet as required, 
normally on an annual basis. 
If agreed by the Parties, a meeting 
of the Committee may be held by 
videoconference or 
teleconference. The Committee may 
also address issues out of session by 
correspondence. 
 
9. The Committee shall report 
annually on its activities and work 
program to the [TTIP Oversight 
Body. {Pending outcome of 
institutional chapter} 
 
10. Upon entry into force of this 
Agreement, each Party shall 
designate and inform the other 
Party of a Contact Point to 
coordinate the Committee's agenda 
and to facilitate communications on 
SPS matters.] 
(f) reporting, at least 
annually, to the Joint 
Committee on its activities 
and progress on resolving 
specific trade concerns and 
other SPS matters, including 
those specific trade concerns 
for which a technical 
working group has developed 
an action plan. 
3. A Party may request the 
Committee to refer a specific 
trade concern regarding an 
SPS measure or other SPS 
matter to a technical working 
group. If the Committee 
decides to refer the matter to 
a technical working group, it 
shall forward the request to 
the relevant technical 
working group and the 
requesting Party shall at that 
time provide the technical 
working group with technical 
information in support of its 
preferred approach for 
resolving the matter. Any 
decision to refer a matter to a 
technical working group shall 
take into account the 
resources of each Party and 
the need to balance the 
respective interest of each 
Party. The Committee may 
refer matters to a technical 
working group no more than 
once a year, except in cases 
of exceptional urgency.] 
Technical 
Working 
Groups 
   
Technical 
Consultation 
   
Emergency 
Measures 
1. The importing Party may, on 
serious grounds, provisionally take 
emergency measures necessary for 
the protection of human, animal or 
plant health. 
 
2. Emergency measures shall be 
notified to the other Party within 24 
hours after the decision to 
implement them is taken and, on 
request, technical consultations 
regarding the situation shall beheld 
in accordance with Article 17 
{Technical consultation}. The 
Parties shall consider the 
information provided through such 
consultations. 
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3. The importing Party shall: 
(a) consider information provided 
by the exporting Party when 
making decisions with respect to 
consignments that, at the time of 
adoption of emergency measures, 
are being transported between the 
Parties; 
(b) consider the most suitable and 
proportionate solution for 
consignments in transport between 
the Parties, in order to avoid 
unnecessary disruptions to trade 
and 
(c) revise or repeal, without undue 
delay, the emergency measures or 
replace them by permanent 
measures with a view to avoiding 
unnecessary trade disruption 
Animal 
Welfare 
1. The Parties recognize that 
animals are sentient beings. They 
undertake to respect trade 
conditions for live animals and 
animal products that are aimed to 
protect their welfare. 
 
 
2. The Parties undertake to 
exchange information, expertise and 
experiences in the field of animal 
welfare with the aim to align 
regulatory standards related to 
breeding, holding, handling, 
transportation and slaughter of farm 
animals. 
 
3. The Parties will strengthen their 
research collaboration in the area of 
animal welfare to develop adequate 
and science-based animal welfare 
standards related to animal breeding 
and the treatment of animals on 
farms, during transport and at 
slaughter. 
 
4. In accordance with Article X.20 
{Collaboration in international fora 
(multilateral and bilateral)}, the 
Parties undertake to collaborate in 
international fora with the aim to 
promote the further development of 
good animal welfare practices and 
their implementation. 
 
5. The Committee described in 
Article X.15 [Joint Management 
Committee] may appoint a working 
group to implement this provision.] 
  
Anti-Microbial 
Resistance 
   
Collaboration 
in 
International 
For a 
 
The Parties will collaborate in the 
international standard-setting 
bodies (OIE, Codex Alimentarius, 
IPPC, etc.), with a view to reaching 
mutually satisfactory outcomes.] 
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(US TPP: 
Cooperation) 
Recognition 
and 
Termination of 
the Veterinary 
Agreement  
The Parties recognize the 
achievements that have been 
accomplished under the Agreement 
between the European Community 
and the Government of the United 
States of America on sanitary 
measures to protect public and 
animal health in respect of trade in 
live animals and animal products 
(the Veterinary Agreement) and 
confirm their intention to continue 
this work under the framework of 
this Agreement. {This Veterinary 
Agreement of 21 April 1998, as 
amended, is terminated from the 
date of entry into force of this 
Agreement. 
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Annex 6: TBT legal text comparison: EU TTIP TBT proposal and Consolidated TTIP TBT text 
 
Article EU Initial Position TBT TTIP Consolidated EU-US TBT TTIP 
Text  
(European Commission & 
USTR, 2016)  
Comments  
Objective and 
Scope 
(US: Scope and 
Coverage)  
First, as far as possible, measures 
should aim at removal of 
unnecessary barriers to trade 
arising from differences in the 
content and application of technical 
regulations, standards and 
conformity assessment procedures.  
Second, although compatibility is 
important, it must be recognised that 
the systems of the two regions are 
different, both to meet the specific 
needs of their economies and for 
historical reasons, and it is not 
possible for one side to impose its 
system on the other; nor can either 
side be expected to treat its partner 
more favourably than its own side.  
Third, while the need for a high 
level of protection remains, 
measures should aim for methods of 
regulation, standardisation and 
conformity assessment that are not 
more trade-restrictive than 
necessary to achieve the relevant 
public interest objective, while 
taking into account the need to give 
preference to internationally harmo-
nized methods. 
Fourth, closer co-operation between 
the EU and the US should not result 
in new hindrances to their trade with 
the rest of the world.  
Finally, it should be recognised that 
there are existing voluntary 
instruments of transatlantic co-
operation in or related to TBT 
matters, arising from earlier 
sectoral or general trans-Atlantic 
initiatives, and that the results of 
such initiatives should not be 
compromised in any new 
Agreement. 
 
As stated under Section 3 above, 
while taking into account any 
divergences with regard to the 
above aspects, the EU considers 
that the aim of maintaining an 
overall balance of commitments in 
the TBT area can only be achieved 
if both the sub-regional (in the EU) 
and the sub-federal (in the US) 
regulations are covered. 
1. The objective of this Chapter is 
to promote convergence in 
regulatory approaches by 
reducing or 
eliminating conflicting technical 
requirements as well as redundant 
and burdensome conformity 
assessment 
requirements. 
2. This Chapter applies to the 
preparation, adoption and 
application of technical 
regulations, standards and 
conformity assessment 
procedures that may affect trade 
in goods between the Parties. 
3. This chapter does not apply to: 
(a) purchasing specifications 
prepared by a governmental body 
for production or consumption 
requirements of governmental 
bodies; or 
(b) sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures as defined in Annex A 
of the WTO Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures. 
4. All references in this Chapter 
to technical regulations, standards 
and conformity assessment 
procedures 
shall be construed to include any 
amendments thereto and any 
additions to the rules or the 
product coverage 
thereof.] 
Similar  
  
Incorporation 
of the WTO 
TBT 
Agreement  
The WTO Agreement on 
Consideration should be given to 
incorporating the TBT Agreement 
into this agreement, in order to 
make its terms part of the 
1. The WTO Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade 
(hereinafter referred to as “the 
TBT Agreement”) is 
Similar  
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Text  
(European Commission & 
USTR, 2016)  
Comments  
agreement, and to allow disputes 
arising out of its terms to be dealt 
with bilaterally. 
hereby incorporated into and 
made part of this Agreement. 
2. References to “this Agreement” 
in the TBT Agreement, as 
incorporated into this Agreement 
are to be read, 
as appropriate, as references to 
this Agreement (the TTIP). 
3. The term “Members” in the 
TBT Agreement, as incorporated 
into this Agreement, shall have 
the same 
meaning in this Agreement as it 
has in the TBT Agreement. 
4. Terms referred to in this 
Agreement, shall have the same 
meaning in this Agreement as 
they have in the 
TBT Agreement.  
Technical 
Regulations  
Clearly, there is a gain from 
removing unnecessary duplicative 
compliance costs in the 
transatlantic market. There is also a 
potential gain to be had through 
measures such as improvements in 
information transfer and regulatory 
co-operation, and where possible 
through measures towards 
convergence – or at least, com-
patibility - of the parties’ 
regulations themselves. 
 
Where neither side has regulations 
in place, the making of common – 
or at any rate coherent – technical 
regulations may be considered by 
the Parties. Wherever appropriate, 
consistent with Article 2.8 of the 
TBT Agreement, consideration 
should be given to basing such 
common / coherent regulations on 
product requirements in terms of 
performance rather than detailed 
design prescriptions. The EU’s 
positive experience of the “New 
Approach” as a method of 
regulating based on setting 
“essential requirements” for health 
and safety without prescribing 
specific technical solutions, which 
themselves are laid down in 
supporting voluntary standards, 
shows that this is, for large 
industrial product sectors, a very 
efficient, flexible and innovation-
friendly regulatory technique. 
 
Wherever possible, global 
harmonization of technical 
requirements should be pursued in 
the framework of international 
agreements / organisations in 
which both the EU and the US 
participate. This would then allow 
1. The Parties undertake to co-
operate as far as possible to 
ensure that their technical 
regulations are compatible with 
one another. 
2. If a Party expresses an interest 
in developing a technical 
regulation of equivalent scope to 
one existing in 
or being prepared by the other 
Party, that other Party shall on 
request provide to the interested 
Party, to the 
extent practicable, relevant data 
upon which it has relied in the 
preparation of the technical 
regulation, and on 
request discuss the possibility of 
developing harmonized or 
compatible technical regulations. 
The Parties 
recognize that it may be necessary 
to clarify and agree on the scope 
of a specific request, and that 
confidential information may be 
withheld. A Party planning to 
introduce a technical regulation 
shall, on 
request of the other Party, discuss 
the possibility of the elaboration 
of compatible technical 
regulations, or the 
enhancement of the compatibility 
of existing technical regulations 
by the Parties. 
3. The Parties undertake to co-
operate towards global 
harmonization of technical 
requirements in the 
framework of existing or planned 
international agreements or 
organizations in which the US 
and the EU or 
its Member States participate. 
(No mention of 
performance 
requirements, New 
Approach, standards 
should be left 
voluntary) 
 
Persuasion:  
 
Efforts towards 
convergence and 
compatibility    
Enhanced information 
exchange 
Global harmonisation  
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Text  
(European Commission & 
USTR, 2016)  
Comments  
both sides to recognise each other’s 
technical regulations as equivalent.  
 
Such standards ought in principle 
to be left voluntary, in order to 
allow sufficient flexibility for 
industry to choose the technical 
solution that best fits its needs, thus 
also stimulating innovation. 
 
Ideally, mandatory legislation 
should only set general 
requirements (e.g. health, safety, 
and the protection of the 
environment) and then leave 
flexibility to the market as to how 
compliance should be assured. 
 
 
 
4. Each Party shall endeavor to 
ensure that products originating in 
the other Party that are subject to 
technical 
regulation can be marketed or 
used across all the territory of 
each Party on the basis of a single 
authorization, 
approval or certificate of 
conformity.  
Transparency  There is an interest in providing for 
improved transparency through a 
dialogue of regulators with regard 
to notification of draft legislation 
and replies to written comments 
received from the other party. In 
this context, notification of all draft 
technical regulations and 
conformity assessment procedures 
(including proposed new 
legislation), regardless of the 
initiator of the proposal in 
compliance with Articles 2.9 and 
5.6 of the TBT Agreement, as well 
as the possibility to receive 
feedback and discuss the written 
comments made to the notifying 
party in compliance with Articles 
2.9.4 and 5.6.4 of the TBT 
Agreement shall be ensured. Of 
particular importance will be the 
possibility to receive written replies 
to comments and the ability of 
regulators to communicate with 
each other during the comments 
procedures. 
 
The possibility to provide for an 
advanced information exchange 
between regulators, before the TBT 
notifications are carried out, may 
also be examined in this chapter or 
the context of cross-cutting dis-
ciplines. 
1. In line with Articles 2.9.2, 
5.6.2 and 3.2 of the TBT 
Agreement, the Parties agree: (I) 
to notify all relevant 
draft technical regulations and 
conformity assessment 
procedures to the WTO, 
regardless of the kind or form 
of the legal act, the level of 
government (central or local), or 
the authority adopting them, (ii) 
to make the 
draft text publicly available; (iii) 
in principle, to allow a period of 
no less than 60 calendar days 
following 
notification for the other Party to 
provide comments in writing to 
the proposal.  
2. 
(a) Each Party shall, upon request 
of the other Party, provide 
information regarding the 
objectives of, 
legal basis and rationale for, a 
technical regulation or conformity 
assessment procedure, that the 
Party has adopted or is proposing 
to adopt. 
(b) Where a Party has received 
comments on proposed technical 
regulations or conformity 
assessment procedures from the 
other Party, it shall (i) upon 
request of the other Party, discuss 
written comments made by the 
other Party on such proposed 
technical regulations or 
conformity 
assessment procedures, with the 
participation of its competent 
regulatory authority, at a time 
when 
(No mention of 
transparency in 
participation, reflecting 
that US is already very 
open)  
 
Bargaining:  
 
Introduction of 
notification system 
similar to that of 
national draft laws in 
non-harmonised areas 
of goods regulation, in 
which regulations and 
standards are notified, 
and may be subject to a 
“standstill measure” if 
the EU wishes to pursue 
regulatory action.  
 
Notification of draft 
technical regulations 
and CAPs, possibility to 
receive feedback and 
discuss written 
comments 
Possibility to receive 
written replies, ability 
of regulators to 
communicate with each 
other  
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Text  
(European Commission & 
USTR, 2016)  
Comments  
they can be taken into account; 
and (ii) provide written replies to 
such comments to the other Party 
no later than the date of 
publication of the final technical 
regulation or conformity 
assessment 
procedure. 
3. 
(a) From the date of entry into 
force of this Agreement, each 
Party shall make publicly 
available all 
new technical regulations, 
adopted either at central level or 
by entities at a lower level than 
Federal 
(US) or Union (EU). 
(b) Within [..] years of the date of 
entry into force of this 
Agreement, each Party shall make 
publicly 
available a complete registry of 
all its applicable technical 
regulations, new or existing, 
adopted 
either at a central level or by 
entities at a lower level than 
Federal (US) or Union (EU). 
(c) Within [..] years of the date of 
entry into force of this 
Agreement, each Party shall make 
publicly 
available a complete registry of 
the titles and references of 
standards that have been selected 
for 
reference in, or use in connection 
with, technical regulations. 
(d) The Parties agree to make the 
information referred to in (a), (b) 
and (c) of this paragraph 
accessible to the public through a 
single information point and to 
keep it up to date. 
4. Where a Party detains at a port 
of entry a good imported from the 
territory of the other Party on the 
grounds that the good has failed 
to comply with a technical 
regulation, it shall without undue 
delay notify the 
importer of the reasons for the 
detention of the good, and 
provide an opportunity for the 
importer to appeal 
against the decision to detain the 
good. 
Conformity 
Assessment 
Procedures  
While we should not abandon 
hopes to achieve greater 
compatibility of our conformity 
assessment regimes in those areas 
over time, we should pragmatically 
acknowledge that prospects for 
1. The Parties undertake to co-
operate with a view to reducing 
unnecessary burdens arising from 
differences 
in their respective conformity 
assessment requirements. 
(Only in negotiating 
text: Movement 
towards, avoid 
dominant position, 
avoid specific CABs) 
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substantial convergence will 
generally be less promising than in 
new areas linked to innovative 
technologies or emerging risks. 
 
However, as both the US and EU 
regularly re-evaluate the 
regulations applicable to different 
industrial sectors over time, some 
re-evaluation might be possible on 
a common basis when it is 
prompted by the same reasons.  
 
A future commitment might be 
explored by which regulators on 
both sides, when introducing new 
rules, agree in principle (as set out 
in the TBT agreement) to apply 
common criteria with a view to 
identifying the least trade 
restrictive means of conformity 
assessment, commensurate with the 
relevant risks. 
 
In areas where registration / 
authorisation procedures and 
similar requirements apply in both 
Parties, approaches could be 
devised to make such procedures as 
compatible as possible and identify 
opportunities for administrative 
simplification that would alleviate 
burdens for manufacturers and 
facilitate their business under both 
systems.  
 
In situations where there is a valid 
case for mutual recognition (e.g., 
where the Parties both require third 
party conformity assessment), 
experience has shown that the 
application of mutual recognition is 
much more successful when based 
on similar requirements, usually 
based themselves on an 
international standard and/or an 
international agreement / scheme; 
furthermore, it is preferable from a 
trade-facilitation perspective if the 
agreement / scheme is not closed or 
applied bilaterally only, but open to 
several partners who apply the 
international standard and wish to 
be part of the agreement / scheme.  
It is therefore not proposed to 
consider extending the 1998 MRA 
in its present form to new areas. In 
the other areas that it nominally 
covers as well in any additional 
specific, mutually agreed sectors, 
other approaches to facilitate 
conformity assessment may be 
considered at a sectoral level. 
 
2. To that end, the Parties 
undertake to review within 
[timeline to be discussed] their 
conformity assessment 
procedures in order to move 
progressively towards the least 
burdensome possible procedures, 
commensurate 
with the risk that the underlying 
technical regulations are intended 
to address. Priority areas for 
consideration 
shall include electrical safety, 
electro-magnetic compatibility, 
machinery and 
telecommunications. 
3. [Placeholder for referencing 
specific outcomes on conformity 
assessment resulting from the 
negotiations 
in individual sectors] 
4. Where Parties require third 
party conformity assessment of 
products as a condition of 
compliance with 
technical regulations applicable 
on their respective territories, the 
Parties undertake to give 
consideration to 
mechanisms to facilitate the 
mutual acceptance of the results 
of conformity assessment 
conducted by 
conformity assessment bodies 
(CABs) located on the territory of 
the exporting Party. 
5. 
(a) The Parties shall take 
measures sufficient to avoid 
actual or potential conflicts of 
interest between 
conformity assessment bodies and 
standardization bodies, notably by 
establishing a clear separation 
of functions between them in 
cases where a standard referenced 
in technical regulations or 
otherwise 
allowed to be used to achieve 
compliance with technical 
regulations is set by an entity that 
also 
operates in the conformity 
assessment market. (b) The 
Parties shall ensure that standards 
referenced in technical 
regulations do not contain 
technical requirements that limit 
the choice of CABs or that refer 
to specifics CABs. 
6. The Parties agree that, where a 
class of products is subject to 
conformity assessment 
procedures, and 
(only in position paper: 
mention of agreeing on 
common criteria for the 
choice of conformity 
assessment procedures, 
mention of international 
standards as a basis for 
third-party conformity 
assessment in 
negotiating text, 
accreditation of CABs 
based on international 
standards)  
 
Persuasion: 
Gradual movement 
towards SDoC in 
limited sectors 
Mechanisms to 
facilitate mutual 
acceptance of 
conformity assessment   
Compatibility of 
registration and 
authorisation 
procedures 
 
Bargaining: 
Conflict of interest of 
SDOs 
No duplicative testing 
of components  
Avoid referencing of 
specific CABs in 
technical regulations   
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Arrangements for cooperation and 
mutual recognition between 
accreditation bodies exist through 
organisations such as the 
International Laboratory 
Accreditation Cooperation (ILAC) 
and the International Accreditation 
Forum (IAF); there may be some 
merit in encouraging greater use of 
these agreements to facilitate the 
mutual recognition of accreditation 
certificates and, as a result, of 
accredited conformity assessment 
results. 
 
where components or parts of 
such products are also subject to 
conformity assessment 
procedures (and thus 
constitute products in their own 
right), CABs approved by the 
regulator to assess products that 
include such 
components or parts shall be 
obliged by the regulator not to 
require as a condition of assessing 
the product as 
a whole, that such components or 
parts be re-assessed by the CABs 
themselves, independently of the 
final 
product. 
7. The Parties shall take 
appropriate steps to prevent the 
establishment or abuse of 
dominant positions by any 
CAB in the market of its territory 
for the assessment of a specific 
product or class of risks. 
8. In those areas where 
registration or authorization 
procedures or similar 
requirements apply in both 
Parties, 
the Parties undertake to co-
operate with a view to making 
such procedures and related 
requirements as 
compatible as possible and to 
identify opportunities for 
administrative simplification that 
would alleviate 
burdens for economic operators 
and facilitate bilateral trade in the 
products concerned. 
Standardisation 
/ Standards  
Further consideration should be 
given to improving links between 
the systems, while allowing each to 
maintain its distinctive character. 
 
In a joint document adopted in 
November 2011, entitled “Building 
bridges between the US and EU 
standards systems”, the EU and the 
US agreed on specific actions to 
improve each side’s processes for 
the use of voluntary standards in 
regulation. Mechanisms should be 
created to promote cooperation and 
coherence in this area, in view of 
minimizing unnecessary regulatory 
divergences and better aligning the 
respective regulatory approaches. 
 
Improved cooperation between US 
and EU standardisation bodies 
should be sought, including the 
development of joint programmes 
of work, and the use – or potential 
1. The Parties shall promote 
closer cooperation between the 
standardization bodies located 
within their 
respective territories with a view 
to facilitating, inter alia: 
(a) the exchange of information 
about their respective activities, 
(b) the harmonization of 
standards based on mutual 
interest and reciprocity, according 
to modalities 
to be agreed directly by the 
standardization bodies concerned, 
(c) the development of common 
standards, and 
(d) the identification of suitable 
areas for such co-operation, in 
particular in new technologies. 
2. The Parties shall use their best 
endeavors to ensure that 
standardization bodies located 
within their respective territories 
(i) provide information in 
(Only in position paper: 
implementation of the 
“building bridges” 
document) 
 
(Only in negotiating 
text: encourage SDOs to 
provide early 
notification of planned 
standardisation work  
criteria for selection of 
standards  
consider relevant 
international standards 
if referencing standards 
Updating of referenced 
standards)    
 
 
Persuasion:  
Closer cooperation 
between SDOs, 
development of joint 
work programmes  
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use – of the resulting common 
standards in connection with 
legislation. The results of bilateral 
cooperation should be also used to 
further global harmonization 
through the development of 
international standards. 
 
There may be areas in which the 
development of common or 
technically equivalent standards 
could be considered. A mechanism 
by which the EU and US standards 
systems could – by common 
agreement – work on common 
standards, for transposition in both 
economies, might be developed 
(maybe in the form of a common 
web-based standardisation 
platform). 
 
Clearly the preference would be for 
such common standards to be 
developed by international 
standardisation organisations and 
such a bilateral approach could not 
apply in the general case, but the 
possibility should be considered in 
some areas of mutual interest. 
 
Consideration could be given to 
systematic co-operation in the 
context of such bodies, possibly 
with exchange of technical data, 
common actions within such 
bodies, and commitment to 
transposing the results. 
advance on their planned 
standardization activities that 
concern the development of new, 
or the review of existing, 
standards intended to support 
public policies, 
including the scope and purpose 
of the planned standards, and the 
prospective timetable procedures 
for their 
adoption, and (ii) publish drafts 
for public comment before 
finalizing or adopting such 
standards. 
3. If a Party intends to select an 
existing or planned voluntary 
standard for reference in technical 
regulations, 
such selection shall be subject to 
objective, clear and transparent 
criteria, which shall be published 
before the 
selection is made. Standards for 
reference in technical regulations 
applicable on all or part of the 
territory of 
the Parties shall be selected 
following consideration of 
relevant international standards 
and other standards 
developed through an open and 
transparent process, including 
standards developed by 
standardization bodies 
located within the territory of the 
other Party. 
4. The Parties undertake to keep 
references to standards in support 
of technical regulations up to date 
with 
the latest version of the standard 
and the latest review of the 
technical regulation. 
5. The Parties shall endeavor to 
ensure that, in using standards to 
achieve compliance with the 
requirements 
of technical regulations or parts 
thereof, suppliers are free to use 
standards other than those chosen 
by 
domestic regulators for reference 
in such technical regulations, 
without prior authorization from 
the 
regulator, provided that such 
suppliers can demonstrate (e.g., 
through adequate technical 
documentation) that 
the applied alternative solution 
complies with the requirements of 
the technical regulation, or parts 
thereof.  
 
use of other standards 
than referenced ones for 
compliance  
 
 
Bargaining:  
encourage SDOs to 
provide early 
notification of planned 
standardisation work  
 
criteria for selection of 
standards  
consider relevant 
international standards 
if referencing standards 
Updating of referenced 
standards    
  
  
 
Annex 
378 
 
Article EU Initial Position TBT TTIP Consolidated EU-US TBT TTIP 
Text  
(European Commission & 
USTR, 2016)  
Comments  
Cooperation  The Parties shall strengthen their 
co-operation in the areas of 
technical regulations, standards, 
metrology, 
conformity assessment 
procedures, accreditation, market 
surveillance and monitoring and 
enforcement 
activities in order to facilitate the 
conduct of trade between the 
Parties, as laid down in Chapter 
[…] 
(Regulatory Cooperation). This 
may include promoting and 
encouraging cooperation between 
their 
respective public or private 
organizations responsible for 
standardization, metrology, 
conformity assessment, 
accreditation, market surveillance 
and conformity assessment bodies 
to participate in cooperation 
arrangements that promote the 
acceptance of conformity 
assessment results. 
 
 
 
